New York Law Review

Tag: Evidence

  • People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560 (1975): Corroboration Requirements for Child Testimony in Public Lewdness Cases

    People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560 (1975)

    In the absence of a statutory requirement of corroboration, the scope of appellate review is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence against the accused is satisfactory under legal standards, especially when a child testifies.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for public lewdness, holding that the 10-year-old complainant’s sworn testimony was properly admitted and did not require corroboration. The court emphasized that corroboration is only required when mandated by statute or when the testimony is inherently suspect. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, as the complainant’s testimony was clear and convincing and supported by other evidence placing the defendant at the scene. The court distinguished the case from prior cases where corroboration was required due to suspect testimony arising from matrimonial disputes.

    Facts

    On January 15, 1972, Claire Sullivan (10 years old) and her sister Helen (almost 8 years old) were walking when a car driven by Nisoff stopped. Nisoff asked for directions, then exposed himself and invited the girls to touch him. Claire identified Nisoff as the perpetrator. Helen did not see the exposure but confirmed Nisoff was the driver who asked for directions. A neighbor testified the girls left her house shortly before the incident. Another witness saw the girls near a parked car with one occupant.

    Procedural History

    Nisoff was convicted of public lewdness in the Justice Court of the Town of Queensbury, Warren County, following a jury trial. He appealed, challenging the admissibility of the children’s testimony and arguing that corroboration was required. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 10-year-old complainant to give sworn testimony.

    2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing the 8-year-old sister to give unsworn testimony.

    3. Whether the crime of public lewdness requires corroboration of the complainant’s testimony, even though not explicitly mandated by statute.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court properly determined that the 10-year-old complainant understood the nature of an oath.

    2. No, because the trial court properly determined that the 8-year-old sister possessed the requisite intelligence and capacity to give unsworn testimony.

    3. No, because the court found sufficient evidence of a clear and convincing variety to support the conviction, distinguishing this case from those requiring corroboration due to inherently suspect testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 60.20(2) allows the trial court discretion in determining whether a child under 12 is competent to give sworn testimony. The court emphasized that “the infant witness must not only demonstrate sufficient intelligence and capacity to justify the reception of his or her testimony, but it must also be clear that he knows, understands and appreciates the nature of an oath before the trial court may permit the reception of sworn testimony.” The trial court properly assessed the 10-year-old’s understanding of an oath and her ability to differentiate between truth and falsehood. As for the 8-year-old, the court found she had the capacity and intelligence to give unsworn testimony. The court further stated, quoting Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524, “The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge… [and] will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous.”

    Regarding the need for corroboration, the court noted that the common law did not require corroboration in offenses against the chastity of women. The court distinguished People v. Porcaro, 6 N.Y.2d 248 (1959), where the court found the uncorroborated testimony of a child insufficient due to the unique factual setting of a matrimonial dispute, making the testimony inherently suspect. The court stated, “in the absence of a statutory requirement of corroboration the scope of our review should be limited to ascertaining whether or not the evidence against the accused is otherwise satisfactory under legal standards.” Here, there was ample evidence to support the conviction including identification by both girls, corroboration of their presence at the scene by other witnesses and no indication that the testimony was inherently suspect. Unlike Porcaro, the testimony here did not arise from a matrimonial dispute.

  • Matter of Brown v. Ristich, 36 N.Y.2d 183 (1975): Admissibility of Unsworn Testimony in Administrative Hearings

    Matter of Brown v. Ristich, 36 N.Y.2d 183 (1975)

    In administrative disciplinary proceedings, unsworn testimony is admissible if the hearing officer determines that the witness possesses rudimentary testimonial capacity, even if the witness does not understand the nature of an oath.

    Summary

    This case concerns the dismissal of a hospital attendant, Brown, for striking a patient. The primary evidence against Brown was the unsworn testimony of the victim and another patient, both deemed unable to understand an oath. The Court of Appeals held that unsworn testimony is admissible in administrative hearings if the witness demonstrates a basic capacity to observe, recall, and narrate events, and understands the moral responsibility to speak truthfully. The court emphasized that administrative hearings are not bound by strict evidentiary rules and should prioritize ascertaining the truth. Therefore, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated Brown’s dismissal, finding that the hearing examiner had adequately determined the patients’ testimonial capacity.

    Facts

    Brown, a ward attendant, was accused of striking Beverly Cash, a 22-year-old patient, with a broom handle, causing a head laceration. Cash and another patient, Louise Gruzo, witnessed the incident. A physician testified that Cash reported the assault immediately after it occurred, and another patient identified the broom handle as the weapon. A school psychologist testified that while both patients had low I.Q.s, they could differentiate between truth and lies and relate to reality on a basic level. The hearing examiner determined that both patients lacked the capacity to understand an oath.

    Procedural History

    The administrative hearing resulted in Brown’s dismissal. The Appellate Division annulled the determination, citing the lack of sworn testimony from the patient witnesses. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether unsworn testimony is admissible in an administrative disciplinary proceeding under Section 75 of the Civil Service Law, when the witnesses are deemed incapable of understanding the nature of an oath.

    Holding

    Yes, because in administrative proceedings, strict adherence to evidentiary rules is not required, and unsworn testimony can be admitted if a proper foundation establishes that the witness possesses rudimentary testimonial capacity. The inability to understand the nature of an oath does not automatically disqualify a witness from testifying.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the formalistic oath and testimonial capacity. It stated that a witness is capable of testifying when they can “observe, recall and narrate… events that he sees must be impressed in his mind; they must be retained in his memory; and he must be able to recount them with sufficient ability such that the presiding official is satisfied that the witness understands the nature of the questions put to him and can respond accordingly, and that he understands his moral responsibility to speak the truth.” The court noted that administrative proceedings are not bound by the same evidentiary rules as court trials, as stated in Civil Service Law § 75, subd. 2: “compliance with technical rules of evidence shall not be required.”

    The court referenced People ex rel. Fordham M. R. Church v. Walsh, 244 N. Y. 280, 287, quoting Judge Cardozo: “It is enough that reasonable men could view them as entitled to probative effect.” The court also noted that in criminal proceedings, a child’s unsworn testimony is admissible if the child possesses sufficient intelligence and capacity, even if the child does not understand the oath.

    The court emphasized the importance of ascertaining the truth in administrative hearings and the need to balance the rights of the employee with the rights of institutional residents, particularly those with limited cognitive abilities. The court cited Fleury v. Edwards, 14 Y 2d 334, where it was held that evidentiary rules should “further, not frustrate, the truth-finding function of the courts.”

    The court acknowledged that unsworn testimony may not always constitute substantial evidence, but in this case, the foundation laid by the expert witness, along with the circumstantial evidence, supported the hearing examiner’s determination. The fact that the hearing examiner observed the witnesses and assessed their comprehension was also given deference. Policy considerations also favored allowing such testimony, as denying institutional residents the right to complain due to their inability to understand an oath would be unrealistic.

  • People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 941 (1979): Procedure for Challenging Grand Jury Testimony Based on Illegal Wiretapping

    People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 941 (1979)

    A grand jury witness who believes questions are based on illegal wiretapping must request to be brought before the court to raise the objection, after which the court can inquire into the basis of the questioning.

    Summary

    This case addresses the procedure a grand jury witness must follow when they suspect questions are derived from illegal wiretapping. The Court of Appeals held that while a witness cannot be compelled to answer questions based on illegal wiretaps, the prosecutor isn’t automatically obligated to confirm or deny the wiretapping. The witness must request to be brought before the court to raise the objection. The court can then investigate, including questioning the prosecutor, to determine if the objection is valid. Because the defendant didn’t seek court advice, the Appellate Division’s order was reversed.

    Facts

    A grand jury witness, McGrath, was questioned and believed the questions were based on illegally obtained wiretap evidence. McGrath did not request to be brought before the court for guidance or to formally raise his objection.

    Procedural History

    The specific procedural history before the Court of Appeals is not detailed in the provided text, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division, First Department, and remitted the case back to that court for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a grand jury witness, objecting to questions on the grounds of illegal wiretapping, must request to be brought before the court to trigger a judicial inquiry into the validity of the objection?

    Holding

    Yes, because when a witness believes the Grand Jury questioning is based on illegal wiretapping, they must request the court’s intervention; the prosecutor is not obligated to automatically address the objection during the Grand Jury proceeding itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a witness cannot be compelled to answer questions based on illegally obtained wiretap evidence (citing U.S. Code, tit. 18, § 2515), the burden is on the witness to raise the objection before the court. The court emphasized that the prosecutor doesn’t have an automatic obligation to affirm or deny the existence of illegal wiretapping during the Grand Jury proceeding unless the witness asks to be brought before the court. Once the witness makes that request, “the Presiding Justice may make appropriate inquiry whether the witness’ objection is sound.” The court explicitly grants discretion to interrogate the prosecutor, even in camera, regarding the basis for questioning the witness. The court distinguished state procedure from federal procedure under U.S. Code, tit. 18, § 3504, noting the omission of a similar requirement for prosecutors to affirm or deny in state grand jury proceedings was intentional. Because the defendant failed to seek the court’s advice or instruction, the Court of Appeals found the Appellate Division’s order was in error.

  • Spampinato v. A. B. C. Consolidated Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 283 (1974): Use of Adverse Party’s Deposition at Trial

    35 N.Y.2d 283 (1974)

    A party may introduce an adverse party’s deposition as evidence in chief without being bound by the deponent’s statements and without making the deponent the party’s own witness.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, a bicyclist struck by the defendant’s truck, introduced the truck driver’s deposition at trial. The trial court instructed the jury that by doing so, the plaintiff made the driver his own witness and was bound by the driver’s version of the accident. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under CPLR 3117, a party can use an adverse party’s deposition as evidence in chief without being bound by it. The court emphasized that no party is limited by the witnesses they produce in establishing the facts at issue and clarified the distinction between being bound by testimony and the rules of impeachment.

    Facts

    On August 8, 1969, plaintiff Robert Spampinato, an 18-year-old, was riding his bicycle on Flatbush Avenue when he was struck by a truck owned by defendant A. B. C. Consolidated Corp. and driven by defendant Harold Stark. At trial, the plaintiff introduced Stark’s deposition, which presented conflicting versions of the accident’s cause. The plaintiff’s theory was that Stark was inattentive; the defendant’s theory was that the plaintiff suddenly moved into the truck’s path.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury that by introducing Stark’s deposition, the plaintiff made Stark his own witness and was bound by Stark’s version of the accident. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party, by introducing the deposition of an adverse party as evidence in chief, makes the deponent the party’s own witness and is bound by the deponent’s version of the facts.

    Holding

    No, because CPLR 3117(a)(2) explicitly allows a party to use the deposition of an adverse party “for any purpose,” including as evidence in chief, without being bound by it or making the deponent the party’s own witness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPLR 3117, which governs the use of depositions at trial. The court emphasized that CPLR 3117(a)(2) specifically allows a party to use the deposition of an adverse party for any purpose. The court stated the trial court’s charge was erroneous because the plaintiff was entitled to use the driver’s deposition as evidence in chief under CPLR 3117(a)(2). The Court explained that while calling a witness to testify does make that person the party’s witness, this does not mean the party is bound by the witness’s version of the facts. Quoting Becker v. Koch, 104 N.Y. 394, the court noted that no party is limited by the witnesses they produce from establishing the facts at issue. The court clarified the distinction between the concept of being “bound” by a witness’s testimony and the rules regarding impeachment of a witness. Chief Judge Breitel concurred, emphasizing that CPLR 3117(a)(2) permits the “unqualified use of the adverse party’s deposition for any purpose.” He further explained the distinction between being “bound” by a witness’s testimony and the permissible scope of impeachment, noting that the trial court has discretion to control the scope of cross-examination to conserve trial time and prevent abusive tactics. He stated that limitations on impeachment usually do not apply to adverse parties.

  • People v. Ahrens, 34 N.Y.2d 172 (1974): Admissibility of Evidence and Chain of Custody in Grand Jury Proceedings

    People v. Ahrens, 34 N.Y.2d 172 (1974)

    Evidence is admissible before a grand jury if it is sufficiently connected to the defendant, and the chain of custody is adequately established to ensure the integrity of the evidence, even if minor inconsistencies exist, absent any indication of tampering or a gap in custody.

    Summary

    Linda Ahrens and a co-defendant were indicted for drug-related offenses based on a sale to an undercover officer. The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding insufficient evidence to link the drugs analyzed to the defendants. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented to the grand jury, including the officer’s testimony and the lab report, was legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The Court clarified the standards for establishing the chain of custody for evidence presented to a grand jury, emphasizing that minor inconsistencies affect the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, provided there’s no indication of tampering or a significant gap in custody.

    Facts

    An undercover state trooper purchased cocaine from the defendants, Linda Ahrens and Connelly, at their residence. The trooper testified he asked Connelly for cocaine, and Connelly directed Ahrens to retrieve it. Ahrens provided packets of tinfoil, from which the officer selected one and paid Ahrens. The officer marked the evidence and placed it in a police evidence locker.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted on drug charges. The trial court dismissed the indictment, deeming the evidence insufficient to establish a proper chain of custody. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented to the Grand Jury, specifically the testimony of the undercover officer regarding the drug purchase, was legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case of possession and sale of a dangerous drug.
    2. Whether the narcotics and the laboratory report were sufficiently connected to the defendants to be considered competent evidence before the Grand Jury, considering the chain of custody.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the officer’s testimony established a prima facie circumstantial case of possession and sale, sufficient to sustain the indictment.
    2. Yes, because the chain of custody was adequately established, with the officer and investigator testifying to the handling and mailing of the evidence, and the certified lab report being admissible to establish the content of the exhibit, without any apparent gap in custody or suggestion of tampering.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the officer’s testimony established a prima facie case of possession and sale. The Court then addressed the chain of custody issue. It referenced People v. Mirenda, 23 N.Y.2d 439, 453, stating that real evidence is admissible when it is “sufficiently connected with the defendants to be relevant to the issue in the case.” It differentiated between items that are patently identifiable and those that are easily altered. For the latter, admissibility requires that all who have handled the item “identify it and testify to its custody and unchanged condition” (People v. Sansalone, 208 Misc. 491, 493). The Court acknowledged the “chain of evidence approach,” but emphasized that the Legislature, through CPL 190.30, subd. 2, allows for the admissibility of a certified expert’s report without requiring the expert’s presence. The Court addressed the defendants’ arguments about inconsistencies in markings and potential access to the evidence locker. The Court stated, “inconsistent notations on the wrappers used to transmit evidence should be considered irregularities bearing only on the weight of the evidence when as here the defendants’ names or some other indicator invariably appears throughout.” Conversely, evidence accessible to unknown persons over an extended period casts doubt on its integrity. However, the Court found no apparent gap in the chain of custody, suggesting no access or tampering. The court concluded that the officers’ testimony established the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence, prima facie, which suffices for Grand Jury proof, citing People v. Oakley, 28 N.Y.2d 309. The Court emphasized that any issues regarding the integrity of the evidence are best resolved during a voir dire at trial.

  • People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371 (1974): Balancing Probative Value and Prejudice in Impeachment

    People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371 (1974)

    A trial court has discretion to make an advance ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding a defendant’s prior criminal, vicious, or immoral acts to impeach credibility, balancing probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice.

    Summary

    Sandoval was convicted of common-law murder. Before jury selection, his counsel moved to prohibit the use of Sandoval’s prior crimes to impeach his credibility if he testified. The trial court ruled some convictions admissible and others inadmissible. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and approved the procedure allowing defendants to obtain advance rulings on the scope of cross-examination regarding prior bad acts. This determination requires balancing the probative value of the evidence on credibility against the risk of unfair prejudice, potentially deterring the defendant from testifying.

    Facts

    Defendant Sandoval was indicted for common-law murder.
    Prior to jury selection, defense counsel made a motion requesting the trial court to prohibit the prosecution from using prior crimes or convictions to impeach Sandoval’s credibility if he testified.
    The trial court considered various prior charges and convictions against Sandoval.
    The trial court ruled that the prosecution could use a 1964 conviction for disorderly conduct and a 1965 conviction for assault in the third degree, including inquiring into the underlying facts.
    The court prohibited the use of other charges, including contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving while intoxicated, felonious assault (resulting in dismissal), a traffic violation, and gambling.

    Procedural History

    The trial court made rulings on the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s rulings and Sandoval’s subsequent conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court has the discretion to make an advance ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding a defendant’s prior criminal, vicious, or immoral acts for impeachment purposes.
    How should a trial court balance the probative value of such evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant?

    Holding

    Yes, because the nature and extent of cross-examination are subject to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who can make an advance ruling on the use of prior convictions or bad acts to impeach a defendant’s credibility.
    The trial court must strike a balance between the probative worth of evidence of prior bad acts on the issue of the defendant’s credibility and the risk of unfair prejudice, considering both the impact of the evidence if admitted and its potential effect in discouraging the defendant from testifying. In exercising its discretion, the trial court must determine if “the prejudicial effect of the admission of evidence thereof for impeachment purposes would so far outweigh the probative worth of such evidence on the issue of credibility as to warrant its exclusion.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized that CPL 60.40(1) only addresses the introduction of independent proof of a prior conviction if a defendant denies it, not the extent of permissible cross-examination. The court emphasized the trial judge’s discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination, citing People v. Schwartzman.
    The court reasoned that the admissibility of other crimes evidence requires balancing probative value against the risk of prejudice, quoting People v. Schwartzman: “When evidence of other crimes has no purpose other than to show that a defendant is of a criminal bent or character and thus likely to have committed the crime charged, it should be excluded.”
    The court explained that the trial court should consider the probative value of prior bad acts on the defendant’s credibility against the risk of unfair prejudice, including the potential impact on the jury and whether it deters the defendant from testifying. The court also stated that “A demonstrated determination deliberately to further self-interest at the expense of society or in derogation of the interests of others goes to the heart of honesty and integrity.”
    The court identified factors to consider such as the nature of the prior conduct, its relevance to credibility, lapse of time, and similarity to the charged crime. For instance, acts of impulsive violence may have little bearing on credibility, while acts of dishonesty are highly relevant. Crimes similar to the charged offense may be highly prejudicial. The court also noted that crimes related to addiction may have lesser probative value.
    The court highlighted the importance of the defendant informing the court of prior convictions and misconduct that could unfairly affect their testimony. The court cited People v. Sorge, noting this case sets some boundaries to the scope of cross-examination permitted in the past.

  • People v. St. John, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979): Admissibility of Child Witness Testimony and Evidence of Uncharged Acts

    People v. St. John, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979)

    In cases of sexual abuse, a trial court has discretion to allow child witnesses to testify, even if unsworn, after adequately inquiring into their understanding and intelligence; evidence of similar uncharged acts is admissible to show the defendant’s disposition and the ongoing relationship between the parties.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for deviate sexual practices with his daughters. The court held that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in allowing child witnesses, some unsworn, to testify after assessing their understanding. It further ruled that testimony from neighbor children about similar uncharged acts committed by the defendant upon his daughters was admissible to show the defendant’s disposition and the ongoing relationship between the parties within the home, where the charged acts occurred.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with deviate sexual acts involving his daughters. The prosecution presented testimony from multiple child witnesses, ranging in age from 6 to 12 and a half years old. The trial judge administered oaths to all but the 6 and 7-year-old witnesses. The prosecution also presented testimony from neighbor children who observed similar uncharged deviate acts by the defendant against his daughters. These acts occurred within the defendant’s home.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing child witnesses under 12 years of age to testify, some without being sworn.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing neighbor children to testify about their observations of similar uncharged deviate acts committed by the defendant upon his daughters.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial judge adequately inquired into the understanding and intelligence of each of the witnesses under 12 years old, and the decision to swear them or take their statements unsworn was within the judge’s discretion and not abused. The conviction did not rest solely on the interrogation of the unsworn witnesses.

    2. No, because such evidence involving the ongoing relationship and conduct between the parties is relevant and permissible where the charged acts occurred within the home, open to question concerning defendant’s disposition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 60.20, which allows children under 12 to be questioned even if they don’t understand the oath. The court emphasized the trial judge’s role in assessing each child’s understanding and intelligence. The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the children to testify, sworn or unsworn, as the judge properly assessed their capacity. The Court further relied on *People v. Henson, 33 Y 2d 63, 72; Richardson, Evidence [10th ed.], § 182* to allow evidence of similar uncharged acts committed by the defendant. The court reasoned that because the acts occurred within the home, the acts were “open to question concerning defendant’s disposition,” and evidence of the ongoing relationship and conduct between and among the parties involved, is relevant and permissible.

    The court stated, “Such evidence, involving the ongoing relationship and conduct between and among the parties involved, is relevant and permissible where the acts charged occur within the home and are open to question concerning defendant’s disposition.” The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of the trial judge’s role in assessing the competency of child witnesses and the admissibility of evidence showing the defendant’s propensity for the charged acts within the specific context of familial sexual abuse.

  • People v. Fiore, 34 N.Y.2d 88 (1974): Admissibility of Uncharged Crimes to Show Common Scheme

    People v. Fiore, 34 N.Y.2d 88 (1974)

    Evidence of uncharged criminal conduct is inadmissible to establish a predisposition to commit the crime charged, unless it is offered for a relevant purpose other than to show criminal propensity, such as demonstrating a common scheme or plan that encompasses both the charged and uncharged crimes.

    Summary

    Fiore, a former president of a school board, was convicted of bribe receiving and related offenses for allegedly soliciting a kickback from a contractor. The prosecution introduced evidence that Fiore had previously received unlawful payments from the project’s architect, for which he was never charged. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the architect’s testimony was improperly admitted because it served only to show Fiore’s criminal propensity, not a common scheme or plan. The court emphasized that the uncharged crime did not directly support an inference that a single, inseparable plan existed encompassing both the charged and uncharged crimes.

    Facts

    The Lackawanna School Board, responsible for awarding construction contracts, charged Fiore with soliciting a kickback from a general contractor bidding on an elementary school addition. The contractor testified that the architect provided Fiore’s contact information, and Fiore, representing the board, requested 10% of the contract price, which the contractor refused. The architect testified he paid Fiore 20% of his fees in cash under an “arrangement”, and that Fiore asked him to have the contractor contact him. Fiore denied receiving payments from the architect or soliciting the contractor, claiming the meeting occurred after the contract was awarded at the contractor’s request.

    Procedural History

    Fiore was convicted in a jury trial for bribe receiving and related offenses. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the admission of the architect’s testimony regarding prior uncharged payments was reversible error. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed, vacating the conviction and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged criminal conduct (payments from the architect to Fiore) to prove the charged crime (solicitation of a kickback from the contractor).

    Holding

    No, because the evidence of uncharged criminal conduct did not establish a common scheme or plan encompassing both the charged and uncharged crimes, but instead served only to show the defendant’s criminal propensity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the general rule that evidence of uncharged criminal conduct is inadmissible to establish a defendant’s predisposition to commit crimes. While such evidence may be admissible if offered for a relevant purpose other than to show criminal propensity (e.g., to prove a common scheme or plan), the court found that the architect’s testimony did not meet this exception. The court distinguished this case from cases like People v. Duffy, where there was a close relationship between the scheme and the multiple bribes received. Here, the court reasoned that there was no evidence of a single scheme to collect corrupt payments from both the architect and the contractor. The court stated, “[T]here must be ‘such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations’.” The court found that the close similarity of the bribery attempts, with only arguably insubstantial identities, did not support an inference that there existed a common scheme or plan encompassing both the contractor and the architect. The court also noted that while a modus operandi might be an element of proof in establishing a common scheme, it alone does not establish a common scheme. The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value and warranted a new trial. The court also briefly addressed the prosecutor’s inquiry regarding Fiore’s refusal to waive immunity before the grand jury, advising caution on retrial to avoid focusing on the waiver issue unless Fiore’s trial testimony was inconsistent with his earlier refusal.

  • People v. Whalen, 369 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1975): Admissibility of Prior Identification When Witness Cannot Make In-Court Identification

    People v. Whalen, 369 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1975)

    When a witness cannot make an in-court identification but has previously identified the defendant, another witness can testify to the prior identification to establish the defendant’s identity, and such testimony is admissible as evidence in chief.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of testimony regarding a prior out-of-court identification when the witness is unable to make an in-court identification. Mrs. Wesey, a robbery victim, identified Whalen shortly after the crime but couldn’t identify him at trial due to a change in his appearance. Detective Ohlhausen testified about Mrs. Wesey’s prior identification. The New York Court of Appeals held that Detective Ohlhausen’s testimony was admissible under CPL 60.25, even though the trial occurred after the statute’s effective date, finding no ex post facto violation. The court reasoned that CPL 60.25 allows a third party to establish the prior identification when the original witness cannot make an in-court identification.

    Facts

    On March 12, 1971, Mrs. Starsy Wesey was robbed at her store, the Great Neck Garden Center. The robbers, including Whalen, were apprehended and brought back to the store shortly after the robbery. Mrs. Wesey positively identified Whalen and his accomplice to Detective Joseph Ohlhausen. Before the trial, Whalen altered his appearance by cutting his hair.

    Procedural History

    Whalen was indicted and tried in December 1971. At trial, Mrs. Wesey could not identify Whalen due to his changed appearance but testified to her prior identification. Detective Ohlhausen then testified that Whalen was one of the persons Mrs. Wesey had previously identified. Whalen appealed, arguing that Detective Ohlhausen’s testimony was inadmissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, and Whalen appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 60.25 permits a witness other than the person who made the initial identification to testify that the defendant was the person identified.

    2. Whether the application of CPL 60.25 to Whalen’s trial, which occurred after the statute’s effective date but for an indictment prior to that date, violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 60.25 specifically authorizes the admission of testimony by another person to establish that the defendant is the person whom the witness previously identified when the witness is unable to make an in-court identification.

    2. No, because a statute authorizing the use of evidence not previously admissible is not an ex post facto law; CPL 60.25 involves a procedural change in the manner of proof, not a change in the elements of the crime or the amount of evidence required for conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 60.25 allows for testimony from another witness to establish the defendant’s identity when the original identifying witness cannot make an in-court identification. The court rejected Whalen’s argument that the other witness’s role is limited to establishing the “sameness” of the defendant without mentioning the identification itself, stating, “Testimony that defendant is the person whom the witness previously identified is the necessary logical link between the defendant and the person identified.”

    The court further held that applying CPL 60.25 to Whalen’s trial did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court cited Calder v. Bull, stating that statutes which change the rules of evidence, requiring a lesser amount of evidence, are ex post facto. Procedural changes however are not. The court noted the statute does not criminalize conduct that was legal before the statute’s enactment, nor does it increase the punishment for the crime. CPL 60.25 is a procedural rule that changes the manner of proof, and therefore its application is permissible.

    The court emphasized the importance of allowing such testimony to ensure accurate fact-finding and prevent defendants from benefiting from changes in appearance. As the court highlighted, CPL 60.25 allows a third party to testify as to the facts of the out-of-court identification and is admissible as evidence in chief.

    The court specifically noted that the testimony is not hearsay, as the third party is testifying to the fact that the out-of-court statement was made and not to prove the truth of that statement.

  • People v. Al-Kanani, 317 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1974): Physician-Patient Privilege Waiver When Insanity is Raised as a Defense

    People v. Al-Kanani, 317 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1974)

    When a defendant asserts an insanity defense and introduces psychiatric evidence to support that defense, they waive the physician-patient privilege, allowing the prosecution to introduce psychiatric testimony, even from doctors who previously treated the defendant, to rebut the insanity claim.

    Summary

    Al-Kanani was convicted of murdering his wife. At trial, he pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and presented psychiatric testimony from Central Islip State Hospital supporting his claim. The prosecution then called Dr. Lanzkron, a psychiatrist who treated Al-Kanani at Matteawan, to testify that Al-Kanani was sane at the time of the murder. Al-Kanani argued that this violated his physician-patient privilege. The New York Court of Appeals held that by introducing psychiatric evidence to support his insanity defense, Al-Kanani waived his physician-patient privilege, allowing the prosecution to present psychiatric testimony to rebut his claim of insanity. This decision balances the need to protect patient confidentiality with the pursuit of justice when a defendant uses a mental health condition as a legal defense.

    Facts

    Al-Kanani murdered his wife by striking her with a fireplace poker and stabbing her with a meat fork in April 1964.

    He was initially found mentally unfit to stand trial and committed to Matteawan State Hospital.

    After being certified as capable of conducting his defense, he pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.

    At trial, the defense presented psychiatric testimony from Central Islip State Hospital asserting Al-Kanani was insane at the time of the crime.

    The prosecution called Dr. Lanzkron, a psychiatrist who treated Al-Kanani at Matteawan, to testify that he was sane, over defense objection.

    Procedural History

    Al-Kanani was initially convicted, but the conviction was reversed due to improper testimony from a prosecution-retained doctor (31 A.D.2d 838, aff’d 26 N.Y.2d 473).

    He was convicted again in a second trial, and the Appellate Division affirmed this conviction.

    The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals by permission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant waives his physician-patient privilege when he asserts an insanity defense and introduces psychiatric evidence to support that defense, thus allowing the prosecution to call psychiatric experts to testify regarding his sanity, even if they have previously treated the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a defendant introduces psychiatric evidence to support an insanity defense, they waive the physician-patient privilege, allowing the prosecution to present psychiatric testimony to rebut the insanity claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the physician-patient privilege, codified in CPLR 4504 and CPL 60.10, aims to protect patients from the disclosure of sensitive information that could cause humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace. Citing Steinberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y. 45, 48-49, the court noted that the privilege is meant “to protect those who are required to consult physicians from the disclosure of secrets imparted to them”. However, the court found that this protection is waived when the patient affirmatively puts their mental state at issue by asserting an insanity defense and presenting psychiatric evidence.

    The court emphasized that by disclosing evidence of his mental state, the defendant “has given the public the full details of his case, thereby disclosing the secrets which the statute was designed to protect”. This waiver removes the information from the statute’s protection, as “when a secret is out it is out for all time and cannot be caught again like a bird and put back in its cage”. Citing People v. Bloom, 193 N.Y. 1, 10, the court stated, “The legislature did not intend to continue the privilege when there was no reason for its continuance and it would simply be an obstruction to public justice”.

    The court further stated that once the defendant opens the door by presenting psychiatric evidence, the prosecution is entitled to present its own evidence to rebut the defendant’s claim, even if that evidence comes from psychiatrists who previously treated the defendant. The court noted the waiver is complete and the prosecution is allowed to call psychiatric experts to testify regarding his sanity (cf. People v. Carfora, 25 Y 2d 972).

    The court found the defendant’s remaining contentions insubstantial. It noted the claimed error in the receipt of testimony of a fellow convict, was precipitated by defendant’s own questioning. Further, there was no substance to the claim that the court coerced the jury into reaching a verdict (cf. People v. Randall, 9 Y 2d 413, 426).