New York Law Review

Tag: evidence law

  • People v. Price, 29 N.Y.3d 403 (2017): Authenticating Social Media Evidence in Criminal Trials

    People v. Price, 29 N.Y.3d 403 (2017)

    To authenticate evidence from a social media profile, the proponent must show both that the printout is an accurate depiction of the website content and that the website is attributable to the defendant; mere appearance of the defendant’s name and picture on the profile is insufficient.

    Summary

    In People v. Price, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained from a social media website, specifically a photograph allegedly depicting the defendant with a firearm. The court held that the prosecution failed to properly authenticate the photograph because it did not establish a sufficient link between the defendant and the social media account from which the photo was obtained. The court emphasized that for such evidence to be admissible, the prosecution must not only prove that the printout accurately represents the online content but also demonstrate that the account belongs to, and is controlled by, the defendant. Without this connection, the photograph lacks the necessary foundation of authenticity and is inadmissible.

    Facts

    The defendant, Chris Price, was convicted of robbery. At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce a photograph purportedly showing Price holding a handgun. The photograph was obtained from a public profile on the social media website BlackPlanet.com. A detective testified that she found the profile by searching Price’s surname. The profile used the username “Price_OneofKind” and displayed several photographs of Price. The victim identified the gun in the photograph as “similar” to the one used in the robbery. However, the prosecution presented no evidence to show that Price created or controlled the profile.

    Procedural History

    Price objected to the admission of the photograph, arguing a lack of authentication. The trial court admitted the photograph over objection. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the prosecution laid a proper foundation for the photograph’s admission. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to authenticate a photograph obtained from an internet profile page as a fair and accurate representation of the defendant holding a gun.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was insufficient to establish that the website belonged to and was controlled by the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the prosecution failed to adequately authenticate the photograph. The court reiterated the importance of authentication, requiring proof that the evidence is genuine and has not been tampered with. The court noted that in the case of photographs, authentication usually requires testimony that the photograph accurately represents the subject matter depicted. The court acknowledged that authentication methods may vary. Specifically, the court addressed whether a photograph found on social media could be authenticated. Assuming this was possible with proof that the website was attributable to the defendant, the court found the evidence presented – merely the appearance of the defendant’s surname and picture on the profile page – was insufficient. The court explained that the prosecution provided no evidence Price was aware of or exercised control over the profile.

    The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the photograph was sufficiently authenticated by the detective’s testimony about the profile page and the accuracy of the printout, combined with the indicia suggesting that the profile belonged to defendant. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions that have adopted a two-pronged analysis for authenticating evidence from internet profiles: proof of an accurate printout and proof that the website is attributable to the defendant. However, the New York court found the second prong, the link to the defendant, was absent here.

    The concurring opinion by Judge Rivera further emphasized the need for authentication. Judge Rivera clarified that the People’s proof needed to overcome two levels of authentication, demonstrating not only the accuracy of the printout but also that the web page belonged to Price. She agreed that the appearance of Price’s name and picture alone did not establish this link. Without evidence the defendant exercised dominion or control, the photograph was not properly authenticated.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides important guidance for attorneys regarding the authentication of social media evidence. It establishes that, at a minimum, more than the mere appearance of a defendant’s identifying information on a social media profile is required for authentication. Prosecutors and civil litigators must provide stronger evidence demonstrating the defendant’s link to the account. This might include evidence of the defendant’s communications through the account, use of electronic devices associated with the account, or other indicia of control. This case impacts:

    • How similar cases should be analyzed: Authentication of social media evidence requires careful attention to establishing the defendant’s control over the social media account.
    • Changes to legal practice in this area: Attorneys must anticipate needing to present evidence of ownership or control, not just content matching, to authenticate social media materials.
    • Business or societal implications: As social media use grows, this case impacts evidence presentation in an increasingly large number of legal contexts.
    • Later cases that have applied or distinguished this ruling: Other courts will likely use this case to establish a baseline for authentication standards.

  • People v. Small, 28 N.Y.3d 151 (2016): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts (Molineux Evidence) When Defendant Raises Agency Defense in Drug Sale Case

    28 N.Y.3d 151 (2016)

    When a defendant asserts an agency defense in a drug sale case, the prosecution may introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale convictions (Molineux evidence) on their direct case to establish the defendant’s intent to sell, even if the defense is based on evidence presented by the prosecution.

    Summary

    The case concerns the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence (Molineux evidence) in a drug sale case. The defendant argued an agency defense – that he was merely assisting the buyer. The trial court, after the defendant requested an agency instruction, allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a defendant raises an agency defense, even based on the prosecution’s evidence, the prosecution may introduce Molineux evidence of prior drug sales to prove intent. The court emphasized that the trial court must first determine whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs its potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Facts

    Undercover officers observed the defendant and another individual, Barrios. Barrios gave the defendant money, after which the defendant entered a building, emerged, and gave Barrios glassine envelopes. Police arrested the pair and recovered heroin from Barrios and a small amount of money from the defendant. The defense counsel gave notice of a possible agency defense. During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to establish that the defendant was acting as a friend to the buyer, focusing on their relationship and the small amount of money the defendant possessed. The defense did not call the buyer to testify. After the close of the People’s case, the court granted the defendant’s request for an agency instruction, after which the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale conviction, with the proper limiting instructions. The jury found the defendant guilty.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce the Molineux evidence. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, ruling the evidence was properly admitted. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and also affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale conviction on their direct case, given that the agency defense was supported solely by inferences drawn from the prosecution’s evidence?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion as the defendant raised the issue of intent by seeking the agency defense, thereby opening the door for the introduction of the prior conviction evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court explained that under New York law, a defendant is guilty of selling a controlled substance when they knowingly and unlawfully sell a narcotic drug. The agency defense holds that if the defendant acted solely as the agent of the buyer, they cannot be convicted of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The court referenced People v. Molineux, which addressed the admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes. Such evidence is generally inadmissible to show bad character or propensity to commit a crime, but it is admissible when relevant to an issue other than criminal disposition, such as intent. The Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s actions during cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses and the request for an agency charge raised the issue of intent. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing evidence of the prior conviction after balancing its probative value against its potential prejudice.

    The court distinguished this case from situations where intent is easily inferred from the act itself, noting that the agency defense specifically disputes the intent to sell. The court relied on its previous holding in People v. Small, where Molineux evidence was deemed admissible when the defendant raised an agency defense. The court emphasized that there is no requirement that the court rule on the admissibility of the Molineux evidence prior to trial and reiterated that the agency defense is triggered where there is some evidence, however slight, supporting the inference that the defendant was acting as an extension of the buyer.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces that a defendant’s decision to pursue an agency defense in a drug sale case opens the door for the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior drug sale convictions to establish intent, even if the defense is based on evidence presented by the prosecution. This ruling highlights that the timing of the presentation of such evidence is within the trial court’s discretion. Defense attorneys must carefully consider the implications of raising the agency defense, understanding it may result in the introduction of prior bad acts evidence, and the possible prejudice to the client. It is important to carefully assess the strength of the prosecution’s case, as well as the potential prejudicial impact of prior bad acts evidence on the jury. Prosecutors should be prepared to present such evidence and should ensure they have a proper foundation established for the prior acts and that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.

  • People v. Henry, 31 N.Y.3d 273 (2018): Admissibility of Prior Conduct Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Cases

    31 N.Y.3d 273 (2018)

    In child sexual abuse cases, evidence of a defendant’s prior consensual sexual conduct with adults, if it demonstrates a unique pattern of behavior mirroring the alleged abuse, may be admissible to corroborate a victim’s testimony, provided its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence concerning a defendant’s prior sexual conduct in a child sexual abuse case. The court held that evidence of the defendant engaging in oral sex with consenting adults in a manner similar to the alleged abuse of the children was properly admitted to corroborate the victims’ testimony. The court distinguished this evidence from inadmissible propensity evidence, emphasizing its relevance in demonstrating a distinctive pattern. The court further affirmed the trial court’s discretion in balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with sexually abusing two minor sisters. The girls described being forced by the defendant to perform oral sex while he smoked crack cocaine with his shirt over his head. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence that the defendant engaged in the same sexual acts with the girls’ mother and another adult woman. The trial court admitted the evidence of the defendant’s similar sexual conduct with adults. The defendant was found guilty by the jury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of the defendant’s prior consensual sexual conduct with adults was properly admitted, despite the defendant’s argument that it was impermissible propensity evidence.

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was not considered propensity evidence and was relevant to corroborating the victims’ testimony.

    2. No, because the trial court properly balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual conduct with adult women was not “propensity” evidence because it did not show a propensity to commit the crimes charged, but instead demonstrated a unique, corroborating pattern of behavior. The court stated that the defendant engaging in oral sex with consenting adult women in the same manner as the alleged abuse of the victims, while smoking crack, showed no propensity to commit the crimes for which he was on trial. The court emphasized that the evidence corroborated the girls’ accounts of their abuse. The Court further noted that the trial court’s admission of the evidence was proper since it was relevant and probative to the People’s case. The Court also found that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the prejudice. The court recognized that almost all relevant evidence is prejudicial to some degree. The Court referenced the trial court’s broad discretion in determining evidentiary matters and the high threshold for overturning such decisions.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance to prosecutors and defense attorneys regarding the admissibility of prior conduct evidence in child sexual abuse cases. It establishes that evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual conduct with adults, similar to the alleged abuse, can be admissible if it corroborates the victim’s testimony and demonstrates a unique pattern, provided the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice. Attorneys should consider the specific facts of the case and the need for corroboration when arguing for or against the admissibility of such evidence. This case underscores the importance of a detailed evidentiary analysis. The ruling requires that the court’s decision to admit such evidence be made with care.

  • People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.3d 300 (2015): Admissibility of Relevant Evidence and Balancing Probative Value vs. Prejudice

    People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.3d 300 (2015)

    Evidence is admissible if it is relevant and its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice; however, even if relevant, it may be excluded if the potential for prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of a witness’s murder in the defendant’s trial for witness tampering and bribery. The defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The court held that the evidence of the witness’s murder was relevant to explain the state of mind of key witnesses and the circumstances surrounding their testimony, and that the trial court’s limiting instructions mitigated any potential prejudice. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, emphasizing the trial court’s discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against the risk of prejudice.

    Facts

    Defendant’s half-brother was accused of murder, with three teenaged girls as witnesses. Defendant cultivated relationships with the girls and persuaded them to recant their testimonies. Defendant gave the girls money. The defendant was charged with witness tampering and bribery. Another eyewitness was murdered, and the girls then revealed to police that they had taken money from the defendant and recanted their identifications. The trial court allowed evidence of the second witness’s murder, to explain the girls’ state of mind and their decision to cooperate with the prosecution, while giving limiting instructions. The defendant was acquitted of the witness tampering charges but convicted of the bribery charges, leading to an appeal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed evidence of the murder of the witness, Gibson, to be presented to the jury. Defendant was convicted of bribery but acquitted of witness tampering. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the murder of witness Bobby Gibson, despite defendant’s lack of involvement.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was relevant, and the limiting instructions from the court mitigated any potential prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible unless an exclusionary rule applies. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to prove a material fact. Even if evidence is relevant, it may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice. Here, the court found the evidence relevant to explain why the girls changed their stories and ultimately provided incriminating testimony against the defendant, thus increasing the jury’s understanding of the surrounding circumstances. The court also found that the trial court properly minimized potential prejudice with limiting instructions to the jury. The court noted the trial court’s specific instructions during voir dire and in its charge to the jury, emphasizing that the defendant was not involved in the witness’s murder.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect. Attorneys must be prepared to argue both sides of this balance, arguing for admissibility when the evidence is highly probative and any prejudice can be minimized, and for exclusion when the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. The case highlights the efficacy of limiting instructions in mitigating prejudice and the need for courts to clearly explain the purpose for which certain evidence is admitted. When facing similar situations, this case directs that attorneys need to understand that the court has broad discretion, and the outcome will depend on the specific facts and the adequacy of limiting instructions.

  • People v. Montgomery, 88 N.Y.2d 923 (1996): Admissibility of Confirmatory Identifications Without a “Drive-By”

    People v. Montgomery, 88 N.Y.2d 923 (1996)

    A police station identification by an experienced undercover officer shortly after a drug purchase from the defendant can be admissible as a confirmatory identification, even without a prior “drive-by” identification, if the circumstances ensure the reliability of the identification.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the admissibility of a station house identification as confirmatory, even without a “drive-by,” because the identification occurred shortly after the undercover officer’s second face-to-face drug transaction with the defendant. An undercover officer bought cocaine from the defendant in an apartment, secured a search warrant, bought cocaine again a week later, and the backup team arrested the defendant. The officer identified the defendant at the station house through a one-way mirror less than five hours after the second purchase. The Court held that the prompt identification following the drug purchase was a proper completion of police procedure, ensuring reliability despite the absence of a drive-by identification.

    Facts

    An experienced undercover officer purchased a gram of cocaine from the defendant inside a Manhattan apartment.

    Based on this purchase, a search warrant was obtained for the premises.

    One week later, the same undercover officer returned to the apartment and bought another gram of cocaine from the defendant.

    Immediately after leaving the building, the officer radioed his backup team that the “buy had gone down.”

    The backup team arrived at the apartment within five minutes to execute the warrant and arrested the defendant and other occupants.

    The undercover officer was not present during the search or arrest.

    Later that evening, the undercover officer identified the defendant through a one-way mirror at the station house, less than five hours after the second drug purchase.

    Procedural History

    The hearing court ruled the station house identification admissible as a confirmatory procedure.

    The Appellate Division affirmed this ruling.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police station identification can be considered a confirmatory identification and thus admissible when there was no prior “drive-by” identification to confirm that the correct individual was apprehended?

    Holding

    No, not necessarily. The absence of a “drive-by” does not automatically preclude an identification from being considered confirmatory because other circumstances can provide sufficient assurance of reliability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts, finding the identification admissible. The court reasoned that the station house identification, occurring only hours after the officer’s second face-to-face transaction with the defendant, constituted “the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure.” The Court declined to impose a per se requirement of a “drive-by” identification for police identifications to be considered confirmatory. It emphasized that courts must be vigilant in assuring the reliability of identifications that have not been shown to be free of suggestive taint. While a “drive-by” is one way to ensure reliability, it is not the only way. The Court highlighted that the search warrant was executed only minutes after the undercover officer left the apartment, which substantially reduced the risk that the wrong person would be taken into custody and the risk of a later misidentification.

    The Court acknowledged prior cases such as People v. Wharton and People v. Morales, where “drive-bys” were present. However, it clarified that those cases did not establish a rigid requirement. The key factor is the reliability of the identification, and that can be established through various means. As the court stated, the officer’s identification “constitute[d] the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure.”