New York Law Review

Tag: eviction

  • Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 117 (2003): Establishing Nuisance for Eviction in Rent-Stabilized Apartments

    Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 117 (2003)

    A landlord can pursue eviction of a rent-stabilized tenant based on a nuisance created by a guest if the guest’s conduct demonstrates a recurring or continuing pattern of objectionable behavior that threatens the comfort and safety of others in the building.

    Summary

    Domen Holding Co., a landlord, sought to evict Irene and Jorge Aranovich, rent-stabilized tenants, due to the disruptive behavior of Irene’s guest, Geoffrey Sanders. The landlord cited instances of Sanders using racial slurs, making threats, and engaging in altercations with building staff and other tenants. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a high threshold of proof is needed for eviction, the landlord presented enough evidence of a potential nuisance to warrant a trial. The Court emphasized that the notice of termination adequately informed the tenants of the grounds for eviction, and the subsequent evidence elaborated on those allegations.

    Facts

    The Aranovichs were rent-stabilized tenants in a building owned by Domen Holding Co. Geoffrey Sanders, a guest of Irene Aranovich, resided in the apartment. Over several years, the landlord received complaints about Sanders’s behavior. In August 2000, Sanders allegedly used racial slurs and threatened a doorman, Wayne Ellis. In June 1997, Sanders allegedly threatened a visually impaired tenant, Thomas DeRosa. In November 1995, Sanders was involved in an altercation with the building superintendent. The landlord sent Ms. Aranovich notices regarding these incidents, reminding her of her responsibility for her guests’ behavior.

    Procedural History

    The landlord served a notice of termination and subsequently filed an ejectment action against the tenants. The Supreme Court denied the landlord’s motion for summary judgment and granted the tenants’ cross-motion to dismiss, finding the incidents insufficient to constitute a nuisance. The Appellate Division affirmed, limiting its review to the allegations in the notice of termination. Two dissenting Justices believed a factual issue existed regarding whether Sanders’ conduct constituted a nuisance. The landlord appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the landlord’s notice of termination and supporting evidence were sufficient to state a claim for nuisance warranting eviction of the rent-stabilized tenants.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented an issue of fact as to whether Sanders’ presence in the building resulted in a recurring or continuing pattern of objectionable conduct threatening the comfort and safety of others in the building sufficient to constitute a nuisance. The Appellate Division order was modified to deny the cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and remit to Supreme Court for a trial on the issues.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rent Stabilization Code allows for eviction if a tenant permits a nuisance. Nuisance involves interference with a person’s enjoyment of their land, importing a continuous invasion of rights. The Court determined that the notice of termination adequately informed the tenants of the grounds for eviction, detailing specific incidents of Sanders’s misconduct, including names, dates, descriptions, and police complaint numbers. While the incidents occurred over five years, the Court found that their severity and circumstances supported the landlord’s claim that Sanders displayed intolerance and aggression. The Court distinguished the case from instances where a notice is deficient; here, the notice was adequate, and subsequent submissions were elaborations providing evidence of ongoing nuisance. The Court stated, “While surely a high threshold of proof would be required for eviction, we cannot conclude as a matter of law, as the courts below did, that dismissal of the complaint was warranted.” The Court highlighted that a trial was necessary to determine whether Sanders’s conduct constituted a “recurring or continuing pattern of objectionable conduct threatening the comfort and safety of others in the building sufficient to constitute a nuisance.”

  • Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 116 (2003): Nuisance Claims and Chronic Late Rent Payments

    Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich, 1 N.Y.3d 116 (2003)

    A landlord pursuing eviction based on nuisance must demonstrate the tenant’s actions interfered with the use or enjoyment of the property; chronic late rent payments alone, without aggravating circumstances, are insufficient to establish a nuisance claim.

    Summary

    Domen Holding Co., a cooperative building owner, initiated eviction proceedings against Aranovich, a rent-controlled tenant, alleging that her chronic late rental payments constituted a nuisance under New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations. The Civil Court initially dismissed the petition, but the Appellate Term reversed. After a trial, the Civil Court again dismissed the petition, finding no nuisance. The Appellate Term affirmed, as did the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while chronic late payments might support eviction for violating a substantial obligation of the tenancy, the landlord had failed to prove that the late payments interfered with the use or enjoyment of the property, a necessary element of a nuisance claim.

    Facts

    Domen Holding Co. owned shares in a cooperative building. Aranovich was a rent-controlled tenant in the building. Domen Holding Co. repeatedly had to institute nonpayment proceedings and serve rent demands on Aranovich due to her chronic tardiness in paying rent. Domen Holding Co. then brought a holdover proceeding seeking to evict Aranovich based on the argument that her lateness constituted a nuisance.

    Procedural History

    The Civil Court initially dismissed Domen Holding Co.’s petition. The Appellate Term reversed and remitted the case for trial. After trial, the Civil Court dismissed the petition again. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Appellate Division affirmed, and then granted Domen Holding Co. leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether chronic late payment of rent, without additional aggravating circumstances, constitutes a “nuisance” under the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations sufficient to warrant eviction.

    Holding

    No, because Domen Holding Co. failed to demonstrate that Aranovich’s conduct interfered with the use or enjoyment of the property, an essential element of a nuisance claim. The court explicitly stated they were not deciding “whether chronic late payment or nonpayment of rent, when combined with aggravating circumstances, could ever support an eviction proceeding for a ‘nuisance’ within the meaning of the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition because Domen Holding Co. pursued the case as a nuisance claim, not as a violation of a substantial obligation of the tenancy. To succeed on a nuisance claim, the landlord needed to show that the tenant’s conduct interfered with the use or enjoyment of their property. The court emphasized that the specific harm alleged by Domen Holding Co. was the repeated need to institute nonpayment proceedings. The court found this might have supported an eviction proceeding based on violation of a substantial obligation of tenancy, as stated in 9 NYCRR 2204.2[a][1]. Because Domen Holding Co. chose to proceed on the basis of nuisance, they were bound to prove interference with the use or enjoyment of property. As the court noted, “Having opted to pursue their remedy in the context of a nuisance case, petitioners were required to establish that respondent’s conduct ‘interfere[d] with the use or enjoyment’ of their property (see, e.g., Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co., 41 NY2d 564, 568).” The court found that Domen Holding Co. failed to offer any evidence of such interference. The court explicitly declined to rule on whether chronic late payment, combined with aggravating factors, might constitute a nuisance.

  • McMurray v. New York State Division of Housing & Renewal, 72 N.Y.2d 1022 (1988): Limits on Landlord’s Right to Evict Rent-Controlled Tenants

    72 N.Y.2d 1022 (1988)

    A landlord’s right to evict rent-controlled tenants is limited by statute, and the statutory requirement that a tenant must have occupied the premises for less than 20 years to be evicted is a condition precedent that cannot be tolled, protecting long-term tenants even if they reach the 20-year threshold during ongoing legal proceedings.

    Summary

    This case addresses the eviction of a tenant from a rent-controlled apartment in New York City. The landlord sought eviction, but the tenant argued he was protected by rent control laws due to his age and length of tenancy. The key issue was whether the 20-year occupancy requirement for eviction protection could be tolled (suspended) during legal proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the 20-year requirement is a condition precedent to eviction, not a statute of limitations, and thus cannot be tolled. Therefore, a tenant who reaches 20 years of occupancy during the court process is protected from eviction.

    Facts

    Frank McMurray was a tenant in a rent-controlled apartment. The landlord, George Wild, sought to evict him. The New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) initially issued a certificate of eviction. During the legal proceedings challenging the eviction, McMurray reached the 20-year occupancy mark, which, under New York City’s rent control laws, provides certain protections against eviction for long-term tenants. McMurray argued that because he became a 20-year tenant during the court process, he was now protected from eviction. DHCR supported this position.

    Procedural History

    The DHCR initially issued a certificate of eviction. The Supreme Court likely upheld the eviction (though the opinion does not explicitly state this), but the Appellate Division reversed that decision, considering the fact that McMurray had become a 20-year tenant during the proceedings. The landlord appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that McMurray was exempt from eviction because he reached 20 years of occupancy before the case was finally decided.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 20-year occupancy requirement under New York City’s rent control laws for protection against eviction can be tolled (suspended) during the pendency of judicial proceedings, such that a tenant who reaches 20 years of occupancy during the proceedings is not protected from eviction.

    Holding

    No, because the 20-year occupancy requirement is a condition precedent to the landlord’s right to evict, not a statute of limitations, and therefore cannot be tolled. A tenant who accumulates 20 years of occupancy before the validity of a certificate of eviction is finally determined by the courts is protected from eviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute creating the landlord’s right to evict tenants protected by rent control law specifically states that the eviction provision “shall not apply” when the tenant falls within protected categories, including long-term occupancy. Construing the 20-year requirement as a statute of limitations and allowing it to be tolled would be inconsistent with this statutory language. The court stated, “Since the statute creates the landlord’s right to evict tenants protected by the rent control law, it is consistent with the legislative intent to construe the limitation that the tenant be in occupancy for less than 20 years as a condition precedent to the maintenance of an eviction proceeding. So viewed, the limitation cannot be tolled.”

    The court emphasized that this interpretation aligns with the broad remedial purpose of the statute, which aims to protect elderly, long-term, and disabled tenants from the hardships of eviction. The court further noted that the statute allows the reviewing court to consider new evidence presented by the agency (DHCR), and DHCR took the position that McMurray was exempt from eviction. Therefore remittal to the agency was not required because the agency’s position was clear.

  • Sobel v. Higgins, 63 N.Y.2d 746 (1984): Landlord’s Eviction Rights Limited by Tenant’s Protected Status

    Sobel v. Higgins, 63 N.Y.2d 746 (1984)

    A landlord’s right to evict a tenant for personal use is limited when the tenant is protected under statutes designed to safeguard elderly or disabled, long-term residents.

    Summary

    This case addresses the limitations placed on a landlord’s ability to evict a tenant for personal use due to statutory protections afforded to certain tenants. The New York Court of Appeals held that amendments to the Administrative Code of the City of New York, the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act prevent a landlord from evicting a tenant who is 62 years or older, has resided in the premises for 20 years or more, or has a permanent, medically demonstrable impairment preventing substantial gainful employment, provided the tenant was in possession on the statute’s effective date. The matter was remitted for redetermination consistent with these amendments.

    Facts

    The petitioners, Sobel, sought to evict their tenant, Higgins, for their own necessary use of the apartment. However, during the proceedings, amendments to relevant housing laws took effect, providing protection against eviction for tenants meeting specific criteria related to age, residency duration, or medical impairment.

    Procedural History

    The case initially involved an application by the landlords to evict the tenant. After amendments to relevant housing laws took effect, the matter was brought before the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed, and the case was remitted for redetermination considering the new statutory protections.

    Issue(s)

    Whether amendments to the Administrative Code of the City of New York, the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act prevent a landlord from evicting a tenant for personal use when the tenant is 62 years of age or older, has been a tenant for 20 years or more, or has a medically demonstrable impairment which is expected to be permanent and prevents the tenant from engaging in substantial gainful employment.

    Holding

    Yes, because under recent amendments to the Administrative Code of the City of New York, the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act, a landlord may no longer evict a tenant in good faith for his own necessary use or that of his immediate family where a member of the tenant’s household meets the criteria of age, residency, or disability as specified in the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the applicability of the newly enacted amendments to the ongoing eviction proceeding. The court emphasized that the amendments explicitly prevented the petitioners’ eviction because the tenants were in possession of the apartment when the statute became effective and met all three factors that now bar the eviction of rent-controlled tenants (age, length of residency, and disability). The court recognized that the landlord’s right to evict for personal use is now subordinate to the statutory protections afforded to vulnerable tenants. The court stated that the respondent conceded the applicability of the amendments. By remitting the matter, the court directed that the lower court consider the impact of Chapter 234 of the Laws of 1984, which codified these protections. The decision underscores a legislative intent to protect long-term, elderly, or disabled tenants from displacement, even when landlords seek the premises for their own use. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions published.

  • 829 Seventh Ave. Co. v. Reider, 36 N.Y.2d 582 (1975): Applicability of Rent Stabilization Laws

    829 Seventh Ave. Co. v. Reider, 36 N.Y.2d 582 (1975)

    Courts can determine the applicability of rent stabilization laws in eviction proceedings without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, but issues arising under those laws must be addressed administratively.

    Summary

    This case concerns a landlord seeking to evict tenants, arguing that the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 did not apply to the apartments. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Civil Court proceedings were appropriate to determine the applicability of the Rent Stabilization Law without first exhausting administrative remedies. However, issues arising under the law’s provisions must be addressed administratively. The court determined that the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 applied because the apartments did not fall under any of the law’s exceptions, and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 further solidified this application, negating vacancy decontrol arguments. The court distinguished between determining the law’s applicability and enforcing its provisions, finding the former appropriately addressed by the court.

    Facts

    The landlord, 829 Seventh Ave. Co., sought to evict tenants from apartments. The landlord argued that the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 did not apply to the apartments. The tenants argued they were protected under the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974.

    Procedural History

    The Civil Court heard the eviction proceedings. The Appellate Term reviewed the Civil Court’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Civil Court proceedings are appropriate to test the applicability of the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 without first exhausting administrative remedies?

    Holding

    Yes, because the determination of whether the Rent Stabilization Law applies to the apartments is distinct from issues arising under the law’s provisions, which require administrative resolution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the initial determination of whether the Rent Stabilization Law applied was appropriately before the court. The court emphasized that this was a question of *applicability*, not *enforcement* of the law’s specific provisions. The court stated, “The proceedings in Civil Court to obtain summary eviction were appropriate to test the applicability of the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, without first exhausting administrative remedies.” The court also found that the apartments in question did not fall under any exceptions to the Rent Stabilization Law as outlined in the Administrative Code of the City of New York. Furthermore, the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, enacted due to an emergency situation, reinforced the application of rent stabilization, nullifying the landlord’s argument for vacancy decontrol. The court stated, “The statute nullified and terminated the experiment of vacancy decontrol for reasons of current emergency, hardly allowing of exception for tenants sought to be evicted because of the very conditions which brought about the emergency enactment.” The court clarified that any further issues regarding rent regulation or stabilization must be pursued through administrative channels. The court distinguished between the question of whether the law applies at all (a judicial question) and specific disputes arising under the law (an administrative question initially).

  • De Minicis v. 148 East 83rd Street, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 432 (1965): Rent Control Law and Cooperative Conversions

    De Minicis v. 148 East 83rd Street, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 432 (1965)

    The Emergency Housing Rent Control Law does not apply to cooperative conversions where no statutory tenants in possession are evicted, and the Rent Commission lacks jurisdiction absent an eviction.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs sought to rescind a proprietary lease agreement for a cooperative apartment, alleging the cooperative conversion violated the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law. The defendant converted the building into a cooperative after purchasing it and renovating vacant apartments. The plaintiffs purchased shares and a lease for an apartment that had been voluntarily vacated. The court held that the Rent Commission lacked jurisdiction because no statutory tenants were evicted during the conversion. The plaintiffs entered an arm’s length transaction, and applying rent control in this situation would not advance the law’s purpose.

    Facts

    Defendant Carsen purchased a building in 1954, taking title under the corporate defendant’s name. The building was subject to the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, with some apartments occupied by statutory tenants and others vacant. After renovations, the defendant arranged a cooperative ownership plan where purchasing shares entitled the owner to a 99-year proprietary lease. In 1957, Carsen vacated an apartment and offered its corresponding shares for sale. The plaintiffs purchased the shares, paying $2,000 down and agreeing to monthly “Maintenance Rent” and “Leasehold Lien Rent”. The plaintiffs took possession and one plaintiff even served as president and director of the corporation. The dispute arose after disagreements about selling the property.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs filed suit seeking to rescind the lease agreement. The lower courts held the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficient. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law applies to a cooperative conversion when no statutory tenants in possession have been evicted.

    Holding

    No, because the Rent Commission lacks jurisdiction over premises except when statutory tenants in possession are sought to be evicted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law primarily aims to protect statutory tenants from eviction. The relevant regulations, such as Section 55(3) and Section 10(4), focus on procedures for evicting tenants and withdrawing housing accommodations from the rental market. The court emphasized that the Rent Commission’s jurisdiction is limited to situations involving the eviction of statutory tenants. The court cited People ex rel. McGoldrick v. Sterling, 283 App. Div. 88, 92, stating that “The State’s police power is exercised through control of evictions”. Here, the plaintiffs were not statutory tenants and took possession based on an arm’s length purchase agreement. Granting relief would not advance the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law’s purpose. The court noted the plaintiffs did not rely on any representations that rent laws had been complied with and make no claim based on fraudulent inducement. The court stated that absent an eviction, the Rent Commission is without jurisdiction.

  • Smith v. Wait, 28 N.Y. 324 (1863): Enforceability of a Lease Despite Landlord’s Lack of Title

    Smith v. Wait, 28 N.Y. 324 (1863)

    A tenant’s obligation to pay rent under a lease is independent of the landlord’s actual title to the property, especially where the lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the tenant has not been evicted.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a tenant can avoid paying rent by claiming the landlord had no valid title to the property. Smith (landlord) sued Wait (tenant) for unpaid rent under a two-year lease. Wait argued Smith lacked title and that a third party, Williams, had obtained a judgment to recover possession. The court held that Wait was obligated to pay rent because the lease implied a covenant of quiet enjoyment, which served as sufficient consideration, and because Wait had not alleged actual eviction from the premises. The court emphasized that the agreements for quiet enjoyment and rent payment were independent.

    Facts

    The key facts are:

    1. Smith leased property to Wait for a two-year term in a written agreement, reserving rent payable quarterly.
    2. The written lease was not an indenture (a deed executed by both parties) but a parol demise (oral or simple written lease).
    3. Wait allegedly promised to pay the rent.
    4. Wait claimed Smith lacked any interest or estate in the property.
    5. A third party, Williams, obtained a judgment against Wait in a separate action to recover possession of the property.
    6. Wait did not allege that he had been evicted or deprived of possession as a result of Williams’ judgment.

    Procedural History

    The case originated from a suit by Smith against Wait for unpaid rent. Wait presented a defense claiming Smith lacked title and that Williams had obtained a judgment to recover possession. The lower court’s ruling on the demurrer is not specified, but the Court of Appeals reviewed the case on appeal from that ruling.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a tenant can refuse to pay rent based on the landlord’s alleged lack of title to the property when the lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
    2. Whether a judgment obtained by a third party to recover possession constitutes a valid defense against rent payment when the tenant has not alleged actual eviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the agreement for quiet enjoyment implied in the lease is independent of the landlord’s actual title and serves as sufficient consideration for the tenant’s promise to pay rent.
    2. No, because the tenant must plead and prove actual eviction from the premises to assert a valid defense against rent payment based on a third party’s claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the agreement to pay rent and the agreement for quiet enjoyment are independent covenants. The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment acts as a sufficient consideration for the tenant’s promise to pay rent, regardless of the landlord’s actual title. The court referenced The Mayor of New-York v. Mabie and Tone v. Brace to support the existence of an implied agreement for quiet enjoyment. Drawing on Whitney v. Lewis, the court highlighted that a covenant for quiet enjoyment is sufficient consideration even if the grantor lacks title.

    Furthermore, the court stated that to properly plead an eviction as a defense, the tenant must allege an actual eviction or expulsion from the premises and being kept out of possession until after the rent became due. Simply stating that a third party obtained a judgment to recover possession is insufficient. As the court noted, “In pleading an eviction, the plea must state an eviction or expulsion of the tenant from the demised premises, and the keeping him out of possession until after the rent became due; otherwise it is bad.”

    The court underscored the principle that without a deed executed by both parties or an actual entry, the strict landlord-tenant relationship might not exist, but the independent agreement for quiet enjoyment remains enforceable.