New York Law Review

Tag: Estates

  • In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d 68 (2001): Limits on Disinheritance Based on Wrongdoing

    In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d 68 (2001)

    The doctrine preventing a wrongdoer from profiting from their crime (Riggs v. Palmer) does not automatically disinherit the wrongdoer’s innocent heirs from receiving testamentary bequests from the victim’s will.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the principle preventing a wrongdoer from profiting from their crime requires disinheritance of the wrongdoer’s heirs, negating their bequests in the victim’s will. Edward killed his wife Kathleen, then himself. Kathleen’s will bequeathed property to Edward, and a share of the residuary estate to Edward’s parents and siblings (the Coverts). Kathleen’s parents (the Millards) argued that Edward’s actions should prevent the Coverts from inheriting. The court held that because the Coverts were innocent distributees, they were entitled to their share of Kathleen’s estate, as the Riggs v. Palmer doctrine should not be extended to cause proprietary forfeiture for innocent parties.

    Facts

    On April 3, 1998, Edward shot and killed Kathleen, and then committed suicide.
    Edward and Kathleen had executed a joint will in 1995. The will left all property to the surviving spouse.
    Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the residuary estate was to be divided equally among Edward’s parents, Kathleen’s parents, and the couple’s siblings.
    Kathleen’s probate and non-probate assets were valued at $225,000. Edward’s assets were worth approximately $71,000. The couple also held $121,000 in joint tenancy.

    Procedural History

    The will was admitted to probate, and the executrix petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for direction on how to distribute the estates.
    The Coverts demanded strict compliance with the will.
    The Millards argued that Edward’s crime should prevent the Coverts from inheriting.
    The Surrogate’s Court granted summary judgment to the Millards, precluding the Coverts from taking any of Kathleen’s property. The Appellate Division modified the order, treating Edward as having predeceased Kathleen and directing all property to pass through Kathleen’s estate to be distributed in equal thirds. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the doctrine of Riggs v. Palmer, which prevents a wrongdoer from profiting from their crime, mandates the disinheritance of the wrongdoer’s heirs, thereby negating their entitlement to an express testamentary bequest made in the victim’s will.

    Holding

    No, because where a victim’s will makes bequests to the wrongdoer’s family—innocent distributees—their status as legatees under the victim’s will is not vitiated, and they are not disinherited by virtue of their familial relationship to the wrongdoer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court restated principles regarding will construction and testamentary distribution, noting that a validly executed joint will is a proper means of disposing of property. Testamentary instruments are strictly construed to give effect to the testator’s intent.
    However, the court also acknowledged the equitable principle from Riggs v. Palmer that no one should profit from their own wrongdoing. In Riggs, the court prevented a grandson who murdered his grandfather from inheriting under the will.
    The court clarified that the Riggs rule prevents wrongdoers from acquiring property or profiting from their wrongdoing, but it has never been applied to cause forfeiture of a vested property interest. Public policy, as reflected in Civil Rights Law § 79-b, militates against applying Riggs to cause proprietary forfeiture: “a conviction of a person for any crime, does not work a forfeiture of any property, real or personal, or any right or interest therein”.
    Because Edward killed Kathleen, Riggs nullifies any bequests from Kathleen to him. However, the Millards’ argument to extend Riggs to void the gifts to the Coverts was rejected. Absent evidence that the Coverts were anything other than innocent distributees, Riggs is inapplicable.
    The court noted that the insurance and pension funds were Edward’s property and the alternative beneficiaries were innocent distributees of his property and are entitled to take under the policies.
    The court held that individual assets owned outright by Edward and Kathleen pass through their respective wills. Jointly held property should be divided in half, with half passing through Edward’s estate and half through Kathleen’s. Assets with named beneficiaries (insurance policies, pension plans) should pass to the alternative beneficiaries. The court distinguished Petrie v. Chase Manhattan Bank, noting that Petrie concerned the disposition of the victim’s property, and the murderer was first in line to benefit from his wrongful act.

  • Matter of Bieley, 91 N.Y.2d 520 (1998): Establishing Gift by Implication in Will Construction

    Matter of Bieley, 91 N.Y.2d 520 (1998)

    A gift by implication in will construction allows a court to infer a testator’s intent to dispose of property in a certain way, even if not explicitly stated in the will, where the intent is clear from the entire document and circumstances.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a residuary clause in a will can be enforced when the life beneficiary predeceased the testatrix, and the will lacks an express alternative distribution plan. The New York Court of Appeals held that a gift by implication existed, allowing the residuary estate to pass to the named beneficiaries despite the failed life estate. The court emphasized that the testatrix’s intent, gleaned from the entire will, was to avoid intestacy and to provide for the named beneficiaries, her secretary and her mother’s caregiver. This decision underscores the court’s commitment to fulfilling the testator’s clear intent, even when faced with imperfectly drafted testamentary documents.

    Facts

    Sally Bieley executed a will in 1986, making specific bequests to a cousin and friends. The residuary estate was to be held in trust for her mother, Fannie, for life, and upon Fannie’s death, divided equally between Mary Schwenk and Doreen McIntosh (or their descendants). Fannie Bieley predeceased Sally. After Sally’s death in 1995, a dispute arose as to the distribution of the residuary estate, given that the condition precedent (mother surviving) never occurred. Schwenk was Bieley’s secretary and McIntosh was Bieley’s mother’s caregiver.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court admitted the will but prohibited distribution of the residuary estate pending a construction of Article Fourth. The executor petitioned for a determination, arguing that the intent was to benefit Schwenk and McIntosh even if Fannie predeceased Sally. A cousin, Orans, an intestate distributee, opposed, arguing for intestacy. The Surrogate’s Court found for the named beneficiaries, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the will, lacking an express provision for the circumstance where the life beneficiary predeceased the testatrix, effectively disposes of the residuary estate to the named beneficiaries, or whether the residuary estate passes through intestacy?

    Holding

    Yes, because the will, read as a whole, manifests the testatrix’s intent to bequeath the residuary estate to the named beneficiaries, Mary Schwenk and Doreen McIntosh, regardless of whether her mother survived her or not. This constitutes a valid gift by implication.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the testator’s intent is the “absolute guide” in will construction, to be ascertained from a “sympathetic reading of the will as an entirety.” The court noted the strong presumption against intestacy, particularly for residuary estates. A gift by implication can be found where the will reveals a clear intent to completely dispose of the testator’s property, even if a specific contingency is not expressly addressed. The implication must be a “necessary one,” leaving no doubt as to the testator’s dominant purpose.

    The court found that Bieley’s will demonstrated a clear intent to dispose of her entire estate. The specific bequests to friends and a cousin indicated a selective distribution, not an oversight of family. The residuary clause itself included “all the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, real, personal, or otherwise and wheresoever situate, including any lapsed legacies or bequests,” indicating a desire to avoid intestacy.

    The court distinguished this case from Matter of Kronen, where the will contained an express intent to limit the children’s participation in the estate. Here, no such contrary intent was evident.

    The court also cited Matter of Fordham, stating that a limitation “upon the death” of a life tenant does not necessarily defeat the remainder if the life tenant predeceases the testator. Instead, the failure of the preceding estate accelerates the remainder interest.

    The court concluded that the testatrix intended the residuary estate to go to Schwenk and McIntosh upon her death, irrespective of whether her mother survived her. Allowing the gift by implication would avoid intestacy and fulfill the apparent intent of the testator. As the court stated, “common sense and justice compel the reasoned application of the doctrine of gift by implication to redress a situation arising from obvious omission.”

  • Matter of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691 (1985): Establishing Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence Standards

    Matter of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691 (1985)

    To prove testamentary capacity, the proponent of a will must show the testator understood the nature of the will, the extent of their property, and the natural objects of their bounty; undue influence requires proof of moral coercion that restrained independent action and destroyed free agency.

    Summary

    This case addresses the burden of proof in will contests, specifically regarding testamentary capacity and undue influence. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that there was insufficient evidence to submit the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence to the jury. The court emphasized the proponent’s burden to prove the testator understood the will’s nature, their property’s extent, and their beneficiaries. It found that testimony from witnesses close to the decedent and the treating physician indicated competency, while the objectant’s evidence was insufficient. Similarly, the court found no evidence of undue influence, emphasizing the high standard of proving moral coercion that overcomes the testator’s free will.

    Facts

    The decedent’s will was challenged based on lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The will contained a bequest to a deceased brother described as living in “Cuba, Cattaraugus County, New York.” The will drafter was named trustee and was described as having an opinionated personality. A physician reviewed the decedent’s medical records, and testified they were unable to definitively determine the competency of the decedent at the time she signed the will. The decedent’s attorney testified that he assumed the person referenced in the will was the decedent’s brother. The decedent’s nephew also had the same name as the brother, and resided in Cuba, Cattaraugus County.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court initially allowed the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence to be decided by a jury. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to the Surrogate’s Court for entry of a decree granting the petition for probate.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of testamentary capacity to the jury.
    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of undue influence to the jury.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to warrant submitting the issue of testamentary capacity to the jury.
    2. No, because there was no evidence that the decedent’s attorney exercised a moral coercion that restrained independent action and destroyed free agency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the proponent had presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate testamentary capacity. The court noted that the subscribing witnesses and those close to the decedent testified that she was alert and understood her actions. The treating physician opined that the decedent was competent when she signed the will. The court dismissed the objectant’s evidence, finding the physician’s testimony inconclusive. The court also deemed the bequest to the deceased brother insignificant because the attorney made an assumption that the person referred to was the decedent’s brother, and the nephew had the same name and resided in Cuba, Cattaraugus County.

    Regarding undue influence, the court emphasized that the objectant needed to show more than the will drafter benefitting from the will and possessing a strong personality. The court cited Matter of Walther, 6 NY2d 49, 53, quoting Children’s Aid Socy. v Loveridge, 70 NY 387, 394, stating that undue influence requires ” ‘moral coercion, which restrained independent action and destroyed free agency, or which, by importunity which could not be resisted, constrained the testator to do that which was against h[er] free will’ “. Since there was no evidence of such coercion, the issue should not have been submitted to the jury.

  • Matter of Walther, 6 N.Y.2d 49 (1959): Establishing Undue Influence in Will Contests

    Matter of Walther, 6 N.Y.2d 49 (1959)

    To prove undue influence in a will contest, circumstantial evidence must demonstrate not only opportunity and motive, but also that such influence was actually exercised to overcome the testator’s free will.

    Summary

    This case addresses the evidentiary burden required to prove undue influence in a will contest. The court affirmed the Surrogate’s decision to not submit the undue influence claim to the jury because the contestant failed to demonstrate that influence was actually exerted. While opportunity and motive may have existed, the contestant needed to provide evidence that the testator’s will was overcome. The court also upheld the jury’s finding of testamentary capacity, as the attesting witnesses testified to the testator’s lucidity at the time of execution, despite conflicting expert testimony regarding senile dementia.

    Facts

    The testator executed a will that favored one child (the proponent) over the other (the contestant). Following the testator’s death, the contestant challenged the will’s validity, alleging undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. The contestant presented circumstantial evidence suggesting the proponent had the opportunity and motive to exert undue influence over the testator. A neurologist testified that, based on an examination two months after the will’s execution, the testator suffered from severe senile dementia.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court refused to submit the undue influence claim to the jury. The jury found that the testator possessed the requisite testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s Court decision. The contestant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Surrogate properly refused to submit the undue influence claim to the jury due to insufficient evidence.
    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the testator possessed the requisite testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed.
    3. Whether the Surrogate committed prejudicial error in sustaining objections to questions posed by the contestant to his expert witness.

    Holding

    1. No, because the contestant failed to provide evidence that undue influence was actually exercised, only that opportunity and motive existed.
    2. Yes, because the attesting witnesses testified to the testator’s lucidity and rationality at the time the will was executed, providing ample support for the jury’s finding.
    3. No, because the Surrogate’s rulings were within the scope of judicial discretion and often accompanied by suggestions for rephrasing the questions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence of opportunity and motive alone is insufficient to establish undue influence. There must be a showing that such influence was actually exerted and that it overcame the testator’s free will. “While the circumstantial evidence adduced at trial may have tended to indicate the existence of an opportunity and a motive on the part of the proponent to exercise undue influence, there was no showing that it in fact was ever exercised.” The court noted that favoring one child over another does not, in itself, create an inference of undue influence.

    Regarding testamentary capacity, the court deferred to the jury’s finding, supported by the testimony of the attesting witnesses, who observed the testator’s lucidity and rationality at the time of the will’s execution. The court acknowledged the conflicting expert testimony but found the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

    Finally, the court held that the Surrogate’s rulings on evidentiary objections were within the judge’s discretion, especially since the judge often offered guidance on how to properly rephrase the questions. This highlights the trial court’s role in managing the presentation of evidence and ensuring fairness in the proceedings. The court implicitly acknowledged the difficulty in overturning a jury verdict that is based on conflicting evidence, showing deference to the fact-finder’s role.

  • Matter of Estate of Grossman, 38 N.Y.2d 565 (1976): Determining Estate Value When Property is Held in Tenancy by the Entirety

    Matter of Estate of Grossman, 38 N.Y.2d 565 (1976)

    When calculating a testamentary bequest expressed as a fraction of the estate, property held by the testator in tenancy by the entirety does not form part of the testator’s estate.

    Summary

    This case concerns the proper calculation of a wife’s bequest from her husband’s will. The will provided the wife with a fraction of the “estate remaining after the deduction of debts, funeral and administrative expenses.” The dispute centered on whether real property held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety should be included in the calculation of the ‘estate’. The court held that because the husband’s interest in the property terminated upon his death, the property was not part of his estate for the purposes of calculating the bequest. This affirmed the principle that a will speaks from the time of death unless a contrary intention is expressed.

    Facts

    The decedent’s will provided a general bequest for his wife, calculated as a fraction of the estate remaining after deductions. At the time of his death, the decedent held two parcels of real property with his wife as tenants by the entirety. A dispute arose regarding whether these properties should be included when calculating the value of the estate for the purpose of determining the wife’s bequest.

    Procedural History

    The lower court determined that the properties held in tenancy by the entirety should not be included in the calculation of the estate. This decision was appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether real property held by the testator and his wife as tenants by the entirety should be included in the calculation of the testator’s “estate” for the purpose of determining the amount of a bequest expressed as a fraction of the estate.

    Holding

    No, because upon the decedent’s death, his interest in the tenancy by the entirety property ceased to exist and could not be passed by will; therefore, it was not part of his “estate.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a will speaks from the time of death unless the testator expresses a contrary intention. The will in this case did not provide any specific definition of “estate” that would override this general principle. Upon the husband’s death, his interest in the properties held as tenants by the entirety extinguished. As the court stated, “In this case, the decedent, upon his death, ceased to have any interest which he could pass by will in the two parcels of realty which he and his wife had come to hold as tenants by the entirety.” Because the decedent could not pass the interest by will, the properties were not part of his estate. The court cited several cases supporting the principle that property held in tenancy by the entirety is not part of the estate for distribution under a will, including Sulz v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 145 NY 563, 574 and Matter of Basile, 63 Misc 2d 845, 846. The court found no expression of intention in the will to suggest that the term ‘estate’ should be interpreted differently than its common legal meaning. The absence of such an intention meant that the general rule applied, and the tenancy by the entirety property was excluded from the calculation of the widow’s bequest.