New York Law Review

Tag: Establishment Clause

  • Grumet v. Pataki, 93 N.Y.2d 677 (1999): Establishing a School District Favoring a Religious Group Violates the Establishment Clause

    93 N.Y.2d 677 (1999)

    A law that enables a village comprised of members of a single religious sect to create a separate school district for its disabled children, when the law has the primary effect of advancing that religion, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

    Summary

    This case examines the constitutionality of a New York law (Chapter 390) that allowed the village of Kiryas Joel, a village of Satmar Hasidic Jews, to create a separate school district for its disabled children. Previous attempts to create such a district were struck down as violating the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs argued that Chapter 390, like its predecessors, favored a specific religious group. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the law violated the Establishment Clause because it had the primary effect of advancing the Satmar Hasidic religion by delegating governmental power to a religious group in a way that was not equally available to other communities. The court emphasized that the law effectively benefited almost exclusively one religious community.

    Facts

    Kiryas Joel is a village populated by Satmar Hasidic Jews who adhere to a strict religious lifestyle.
    Due to the community’s unique needs, Kiryas Joel sought a separate school district to provide special education services to its disabled children.
    Previous legislative attempts to create such a school district were found unconstitutional because they were seen as favoring a single religious group.
    After the Supreme Court decision in Agostini v. Felton, the state attempted a new statute.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs, citizen taxpayers, filed suit against the Governor and other officials, challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 390.
    The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, declaring the law unconstitutional.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the law applied to only two municipalities and was not a truly religious-neutral law.
    The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Chapter 390 of the Laws of 1997, which enables Kiryas Joel to create a separate school district for its disabled children, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution?

    Holding

    No, because the legislation has the impermissible effect of advancing one religious sect, therefore, it is unconstitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while Chapter 390 set forth facially neutral criteria, its actual effect was to benefit almost exclusively the Village of Kiryas Joel, a religious community.
    The Court relied on previous Supreme Court cases, including Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, which held that the state cannot delegate discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its religious character.
    The Court found that Chapter 390 was not a law of general applicability because it was designed to accommodate the needs of a specific religious community, and the class of beneficiaries was not sufficiently broad.
    The Court distinguished this case from Agostini v. Felton, noting that Chapter 390 did not simply provide aid to a parochial school, but delegated to a religious group the power to form its own public school district.
    The Court concluded that the legislative history and context of Chapter 390 indicated that it was intended to provide the residents of Kiryas Joel with an exclusively Satmar “public school” environment at taxpayer expense.
    The Court determined that, even after Agostini v. Felton, which eliminated the obstacle that prevented the education of handicapped children in an exclusive Satmar setting, the enactment of Chapter 390 would likely be perceived as a religious preference.
    The dissent argued that the law was constitutional because it removed previously adjudicated constitutional defects, was neutral in application, and enjoyed a presumption of constitutionality. The dissent contended that the majority’s reliance on legislative history and the lack of a “broad spectrum” of beneficiaries was misplaced.

  • Matter of Klein, 78 N.Y.2d 662 (1991): Constitutionality of Religious Organization Unemployment Insurance Exemption

    Matter of Klein, 78 N.Y.2d 662 (1991)

    A state law exempting religious organizations from unemployment insurance contributions for employees performing religious duties does not violate the Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

    Summary

    Shirley Klein, an English teacher at Beth Jacob High School, a religious institution, was denied unemployment benefits because her employment was exempt from unemployment insurance coverage under New York Labor Law § 563(2)(c). Klein challenged the exemption as a violation of the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. The court held that the exemption served a secular purpose by extending unemployment coverage to nonprofit employees while maintaining exemptions for groups with stable employment or those not truly part of the labor force. The incidental benefit to religious organizations does not render the exemption unconstitutional, and the minimal inquiry required to determine religious status avoids excessive entanglement.

    Facts

    Shirley Klein was employed as an English teacher at Beth Jacob High School, operated by a religious organization. Her employment was terminated, and she applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Division determined she was ineligible because her employment was exempt under Labor Law § 563(2), as it was with a religious organization. She was required to repay $4,140 in benefits she had received.

    Procedural History

    The local office of the Unemployment Insurance Division initially determined Klein was ineligible for benefits. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sustained this determination, which was affirmed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s ruling, addressing and rejecting Klein’s constitutional challenges to Labor Law § 563(2)(c).

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 563(2)(c) violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by exempting religious organizations from unemployment insurance contributions.
    2. Whether Labor Law § 563(2)(c) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by favoring nonprofit religious schools over nonprofit secular schools.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute has a secular legislative purpose, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.
    2. No, because the statutory classification is rationally related to legitimate state interests, including extending unemployment coverage while maintaining exemptions for organizations with stable employment and avoiding undue government involvement in religious employment matters.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by noting the presumption of a statute’s constitutionality. The court applied the Lemon test, evaluating whether the statute had a secular legislative purpose, whether its primary effect advanced or inhibited religion, and whether it fostered excessive government entanglement with religion. The court found the statute’s purpose was to extend unemployment insurance coverage to employees of nonprofit organizations while retaining exemptions for groups with stable employment, such as religious organizations. The court reasoned that the exemption was not exclusively for religious organizations but also applied to other nonreligious entities. The court likened the exemption to the property tax exemption upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, where the Court found that exempting religious and charitable organizations from property taxes did not advance religion. The court stated, “[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.” Regarding entanglement, the court noted that the inquiry to determine religious status is minimal and that without the exemption, there would be greater “official and continuing surveillance.” The court also rejected the equal protection claim, finding a rational relationship between the classification and legitimate state interests. The Court stated, “As noted above, the original purpose of the exclusions of Labor Law § 563 (2) was to extend unemployment insurance coverage to employees of certain nonprofit organizations while retaining the exemption for some organizations, including religious organizations, in accordance with the ‘time-honored’ tradition of sparing certain tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations from the burden of general taxation.”

  • Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108 (1973): Government Neutrality and Student Newspaper Content

    Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108 (1973)

    Tax-supported colleges may provide financial assistance for a student newspaper publishing an occasional article attacking religious beliefs, so long as the nature of the attack is arguably within constitutionally protected publication, evidencing a neutral forum for debate rather than an intent to advance or destroy religious beliefs.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether public colleges can fund student newspapers that publish articles critical of religion without violating the Establishment Clause. The New York Court of Appeals held that colleges may provide financial support to student newspapers that occasionally publish articles attacking religious beliefs, as long as the college maintains a neutral forum for diverse opinions and does not systematically attack religion. The court emphasized that censorship of occasional articles touching on religious beliefs would violate freedom of the press.

    Facts

    Two separate proceedings were consolidated: one involving Staten Island Community College’s newspaper, The Dolphin, which published an article entitled “The Catholic Church—Cancer of Society,” and the other involving Richmond College’s newspaper, The Richmond Times, which printed an article expressing a Black militant attitude toward Christianity. Both newspapers were funded by mandatory student fees and displayed official seals of their respective colleges. The petitioning students and taxpayers argued that permitting the publication of articles attacking religion in newspapers supported by public funds violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

    Procedural History

    Special Term ruled in favor of the petitioners, directing college officials to prevent publication of similar articles in the future. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petitions, holding that the colleges had merely established a forum for the free expression of ideas, and college officials could not infringe on the rights of students to free expression. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether tax-supported colleges violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by providing financial assistance to student newspapers that occasionally publish articles attacking religious beliefs.

    Holding

    No, because the colleges merely provided a neutral forum for debate and did not evidence an intent to advance or destroy religious beliefs. The court reasoned that only systematic and unbalanced attacks on religion might constitute an attempt to “establish” a “secular religion.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the Establishment Clause principles, referencing cases like Abington School Dist. v. Schempp and Epperson v. Arkansas, which prohibit government action that advances or inhibits religion. However, the court also cited cases like Walz v. Tax Comm., which allows for “benevolent neutrality” that permits religious exercise without sponsorship or interference. The court emphasized that the secular objectives of the student newspapers (developing journalistic skills, providing campus news, and fostering intellectual exchange) outweighed any incidental impact on religion. The court stated, “The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”

    The court reasoned that censoring the content of the newspaper would entail a sustained and detailed review of religious material submitted for publication, raising concerns about biased enforcement. The court also noted that excluding all religious material from a student newspaper, even under neutral supervision, could defeat acceptable civilized purposes, such as listing church events or studying comparative religion. The court concluded that the test is not the appearance of derogatory or critical material, but whether the government maintains neutrality by permitting all sides of any religious controversy to be raised without favoring any particular side.

    The court further stated, “Granting financial means to a newspaper occasionally publishing articles promoting or condemning religion may give rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than censoring articles having a religious subject, or terminating financial aid when religious attacks are published. The questions are ‘whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement-’”

    The court also addressed the suggestion that The Richmond Times article should be suppressed to maintain an efficient school system, stating that neither petitioners nor college officials had urged suppression on this ground. The court stated, “unless it can be shown that suppression is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with the requirements of order and discipline in the operation of the college, publication is protected by freedom of the press.”

  • Dickens v. Erie County Dept. of Social Services, 31 N.Y.2d 63 (1972): Religious Matching in Adoption and the Establishment Clause

    Dickens v. Erie County Dept. of Social Services, 31 N.Y.2d 63 (1972)

    Religious matching in adoption proceedings, giving preference to adoptive parents of the same religion as the child, does not violate the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, nor does it violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as long as the child’s best interests remain the primary consideration.

    Summary

    Robert and Anne Dickens, a non-religious couple, were denied the opportunity to apply for adoption by the Erie County Department of Social Services solely because they lacked a religious affiliation. They challenged New York’s constitutional and statutory provisions favoring religious matching in adoption, arguing violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the religious matching provisions, when considered in the context of the child’s best interests, do not create an establishment of religion, infringe upon religious freedom, or deny equal protection under the law. The court emphasized that religion is one of many factors and the child’s welfare is paramount.

    Facts

    Robert and Anne Dickens, with no religious affiliation, attempted to file an adoption application with the Erie County Department of Social Services.

    The Department refused to accept their application based solely on their lack of religious affiliation, citing New York laws favoring religious matching in adoptions.

    The Dickens initiated legal proceedings, arguing that the religious matching requirements violated their constitutional rights.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners, Robert and Anne Dickens, filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking a judgment declaring the religious affiliation requirements unconstitutional and directing the Department to process their application.

    The lower courts found no constitutional violation but directed the Department to accept and process the application.

    The petitioners appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York’s constitutional and statutory provisions requiring religious matching in adoption proceedings create an establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment?

    2. Whether these provisions violate the petitioners’ right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment?

    3. Whether these provisions deny the petitioners equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment?

    Holding

    1. No, because the religious matching provisions serve a secular legislative purpose and do not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, nor do they foster excessive government entanglement with religion.

    2. No, because the religious matching provisions, when balanced with the child’s best interests, do not discriminate against or penalize the petitioners for lacking a religious affiliation.

    3. No, because the religious matching provisions reasonably allow surrendering parents to express a religious preference and do not create an arbitrary classification denying the petitioners equal protection.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the Establishment Clause test derived from Abington School District v. Schempp and Lemon v. Kurtzman, requiring a secular legislative purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and no excessive government entanglement with religion.

    The court reasoned that the religious matching provisions fulfill a secular legislative purpose by ensuring the child’s best interests while respecting the religious preferences of the natural parents. The provisions reflect a “benevolent neutrality” toward religion, as stated in Walz v. Tax Commission.

    The court highlighted that religion is not an exclusive or controlling factor in adoption proceedings; the “best interests of the child” standard provides flexibility and broad discretion to the court.

    The court noted that amendments to the Family Court Act and Social Services Law eliminated any mandatory requirement for religious matching, emphasizing the child’s welfare as the primary consideration.

    Regarding the Free Exercise Clause, the court found no coercion or penalty imposed on the petitioners for their lack of religious affiliation. The court suggested the Dickens could adopt children whose parents expressed indifference to religion or whose religious background was unknown.

    Addressing the Equal Protection argument, the court stated the issue was not with the religious matching provisions themselves, but with the scarcity of adoptive children whose parents lack religious preferences.

    The court quoted the statutes, underscoring that the religious wishes of parents must be given effect “so far as consistent with the best interests of the child.” The court emphasized that even within the religious matching framework, parents can express indifference to religion or make it a subordinate consideration.

  • Walz v. Tax Commission, 24 N.Y.2d 30 (1969): Constitutionality of Property Tax Exemption for Religious Organizations

    Walz v. Tax Commission, 24 N.Y.2d 30 (1969)

    Property tax exemptions for religious organizations do not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because they are a longstanding practice and serve a secular purpose of fostering social welfare and pluralism.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties used exclusively for religious purposes. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the practice, holding that such exemptions do not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court reasoned that these exemptions have a long history in the United States and serve the secular purpose of promoting social welfare by supporting religious organizations that contribute to society through various charitable and community services. Furthermore, the court emphasized that these exemptions foster a pluralistic society by allowing diverse religious groups to thrive.

    Facts

    Frederick Walz, a New York property owner, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of state laws granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties used solely for religious worship. Walz argued that these exemptions indirectly required him to support religious organizations through his own property taxes, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in New York state courts. The trial court upheld the tax exemption. Walz appealed, and the appellate division affirmed. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the constitutionality of the property tax exemption. The U.S. Supreme Court later affirmed this decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties used exclusively for religious purposes violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because such exemptions are a longstanding practice, serve a secular purpose, and do not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The New York Court of Appeals, in affirming the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for religious organizations, emphasized the historical context and secular purpose of such exemptions. The court noted that these exemptions have been a part of American law since the nation’s founding and reflect a policy of benevolent neutrality toward religion, rather than an endorsement. The court stated, “Firmly embedded in the law of this State, both by Constitution (art. XVI, § 1) and by statute (Real Property Tax Law, § 420), is the doctrine that real property owned by a religious corporation and used exclusively for religious purposes is exempt from taxation.”

    The court reasoned that these exemptions serve a secular purpose by encouraging religious organizations to engage in activities that benefit society, such as providing charitable services, education, and community outreach. By reducing the financial burden on religious organizations, the exemptions enable them to better fulfill these roles. The court also emphasized that these exemptions avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Taxing religious properties would necessitate valuing them and potentially litigating disputes over their use, which could lead to greater government intrusion into religious affairs. The court highlighted a national consensus, citing numerous cases supporting the constitutionality of such exemptions, stating, “courts throughout the country have long and consistently held that the exemption of such real property from taxation does not violate the Constitution of the United States.”

  • Board of Education v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109 (1967): Public Funds and Secular Textbooks in Parochial Schools

    Board of Education v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109 (1967)

    A state law requiring local school boards to purchase and loan textbooks to students in parochial schools does not violate the New York State Constitution’s prohibition against using public funds in aid of religious schools if the textbooks are secular and the primary benefit is to the students.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring local school boards to purchase and loan textbooks to students attending parochial schools. The Boards of Education argued that this violated the state constitution’s prohibition against using public funds to aid religious institutions. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute, reasoning that the textbooks were secular in nature and the primary benefit was to the students, not the schools themselves. The court emphasized that the statute ensured children received a basic education, a legitimate secular purpose, and the incidental benefit to religious schools did not invalidate the law.

    Facts

    The New York legislature amended Section 701 of the Education Law to require local school boards to purchase and loan textbooks to students in grades seven through twelve, including those attending private and parochial schools.
    The textbooks were to be the same as those used in public schools and approved by the local school authorities.
    Several Boards of Education brought suit, challenging the constitutionality of the law, arguing that it violated Article XI, Section 3 of the New York Constitution, which prohibits the use of public funds to aid religious schools.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Albany County, initially ruled against the statute’s constitutionality.
    The Appellate Division reversed, upholding the statute.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a state law requiring local school boards to purchase and loan secular textbooks to students in parochial schools violates Article XI, Section 3 of the New York Constitution, which prohibits the use of public funds to aid religious schools.

    Holding

    No, because the textbooks are secular, and the primary benefit is to the students, not the religious schools. The incidental benefit to the schools does not invalidate the law, as its main objective is to ensure all children receive an adequate education.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the “child benefit theory,” which posits that government aid programs that benefit children directly, rather than religious institutions, do not violate constitutional prohibitions against state support of religion. The court emphasized the secular nature of the textbooks, stating that they were the same books used in public schools and approved by local authorities. The court also reasoned that the law served a legitimate secular purpose: to ensure that all children, regardless of where they attend school, receive an adequate education. The court distinguished this case from Judd v. Board of Education, where transportation was deemed a direct benefit to the school. Here, the benefit was to the student. The court found the incidental benefit to religious schools did not invalidate the law. The court stated, “The statute merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State.”
    The dissenting opinion argued that the provision of textbooks, even secular ones, indirectly aids religious schools by freeing up their funds for religious purposes. The dissent also questioned the ability to reliably distinguish between secular and religious textbooks. Justice Van Voorhis, in dissent, stated, “If the books to be purchased by Boards of Education and supplied to pupils of parochial schools were religious tracts, it is conceded that the statute would be unconstitutional…The constitutionality of this enactment is sought to be sustained on the basis that the textbooks to be supplied are “secular” rather than “religious”.” The dissent cited Smith v. Donahue, which held unconstitutional the furnishing of free textbooks to children attending parochial schools, reasoning such furnishing is indirectly in aid of the institution.