New York Law Review

Tag: escape

  • People v. Antwine, 9 N.Y.3d 671 (2008): Defining “Escape” from Custody Under New York Law

    People v. Antwine, 9 N.Y.3d 671 (2008)

    Under Penal Law § 205.10(2), a person “escapes from custody” when they break free from an officer’s restraint or control with the conscious purpose of evading that custody, regardless of whether they leave a physical structure.

    Summary

    Antwine was arrested for grand larceny and other charges. While in the hospital for treatment, he removed his handcuff and fled down a hallway. He was apprehended before exiting the hospital. He argued that he could not be convicted of escape in the second degree because he did not leave the hospital, analogizing his situation to escape from a “detention facility” under a different subdivision of the escape statute. The New York Court of Appeals held that physical departure from a structure is not required for a conviction under Penal Law § 205.10(2). The key element is breaking free from the restraint imposed by a public servant with the intent to evade custody.

    Facts

    On April 22, 2003, Antwine was arrested for stealing a car with two children inside and crashing it. He was taken to the precinct, where he complained of a toothache and hernia. Officer Bohan-McDowell escorted him, in handcuffs, to St. Barnabas Hospital by ambulance. At the hospital, the officer handcuffed Antwine’s right wrist to the bed. After Antwine complained the handcuff was too tight, the officer started to loosen it. Antwine then lifted the handcuff and ran away. The officer caught up to him about 25-30 feet down the hallway, but he broke free again and headed toward the hospital exit. The officer tackled him before he exited the building.

    Procedural History

    Antwine was charged with robbery, grand larceny, endangering the welfare of a child, and escape. A jury acquitted him of robbery but convicted him of grand larceny, escape in the second degree, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether legally sufficient evidence existed to support Antwine’s conviction for escape in the second degree under Penal Law § 205.10(2), where he fled from an officer while handcuffed to a hospital bed but was apprehended before exiting the hospital.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Penal Law § 205.10(2), escape occurs when a defendant breaks free from an officer’s restraint or control with the conscious purpose to evade custody, regardless of whether they leave a physical structure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished Penal Law § 205.10(2) from § 205.10(1), which concerns escape “from a detention facility.” The latter requires a crossing of a tangible threshold. However, § 205.10(2) focuses on whether the defendant escaped from “custody,” defined in Penal Law § 205.00(2) as “restraint by a public servant.” The court relied on the commonly understood definition of “escape” as “to get away (as by flight or conscious effort): break away, get free or get clear,” citing People v. Hutchinson, 56 N.Y.2d 868, 870 (1982). The court reasoned that once Antwine broke free from the officer’s control and had removed himself from her custody without authorization, the elements of Penal Law § 205.10(2) were met. "Here, the statute requires proof that defendant “escape[d] from custody.” “Custody,” in turn, “means restraint by a public servant” (Penal Law § 205.00 [2]). Hence, once the People show that a defendant broke free or got away from the restraint or control of the officer, as defendant did here by physically removing restraints to free himself from the controls imposed and running away, sufficient evidence exists to support the crime of escape." The court also noted that simply circumventing handcuffs, while remaining under the officer’s control, would only constitute attempted escape. The key was that Antwine was no longer under the officer’s control, requiring her to give chase and placing herself and the public at risk. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that escape requires exiting a building. It would lead to "incongruous results" if a defendant who traveled 35-45 feet through multiple doorways after breaking free from his handcuffs only to fall a few feet short of the exit door should not be found guilty of the crime of escape.

  • Sebastian v. State, 93 N.Y.2d 790 (1999): Governmental Function Immunity for Juvenile Delinquent Supervision

    93 N.Y.2d 790 (1999)

    When the State’s alleged negligence arises from the performance of a governmental function, such as the supervision and recapture of a juvenile delinquent, the State is generally immune from negligence claims absent a special relationship between the injured party and the State.

    Summary

    Sebastian sued the State for injuries inflicted by Chadderdon, a juvenile delinquent who escaped from a non-secure Division for Youth (DFY) facility. Sebastian argued the State was negligent in supervising Chadderdon and failing to recapture him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of the claim, holding that the State’s actions in supervising and attempting to recapture the juvenile delinquent were governmental functions, not proprietary ones. Absent a special relationship, which Sebastian conceded did not exist, the State was immune from liability. The court emphasized that juvenile delinquency placements, aimed at protecting the community, are inherently governmental activities.

    Facts

    Daniel Chadderdon was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed in DFY custody. He was initially in a secure facility but was later transferred to a non-secure facility. Chadderdon escaped. One month later, he robbed and assaulted Sebastian, a taxicab driver. Sebastian sued the State, alleging negligence in Chadderdon’s supervision, failure to prevent his escape, failure to notify authorities, and failure to recapture him.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims rejected Sebastian’s claim for failure to state a meritorious cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the claim arose from the State’s performance of a governmental function, requiring a special relationship for liability. Sebastian appealed to the Court of Appeals based on a two-Justice dissent at the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State may be held liable in negligence for injuries inflicted by a juvenile delinquent who escaped from a Division for Youth (DFY) facility, specifically considering whether the State’s alleged negligence arose out of the performance of a governmental, rather than a proprietary, function.

    Holding

    No, because the State’s supervision and recapture efforts of a juvenile delinquent are governmental functions. Absent a special relationship between the injured party and the State, the State is immune from negligence claims arising from these activities.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court analyzed whether the State’s actions were governmental or proprietary. Governmental functions are those undertaken for the protection and safety of the public, while proprietary functions are those that substitute or supplement traditionally private enterprises. The Court stated: “a ‘governmental entity’s conduct may fall along a continuum of responsibility to individuals and society deriving from its governmental and proprietary functions’”. Placing juvenile delinquents in public institutions is done by court order, considering both the youth’s best interests and the need to protect the community. This protection aspect, the court reasoned, makes it a governmental activity. The Court distinguished this case from those involving escapes from psychiatric hospitals, noting that providing psychiatric care is traditionally a function also performed by the private sector, while juvenile detention is not. Allowing liability in this case, the Court reasoned, could deter the State from pursuing rehabilitation-release goals. The court stated, “These protective measures are aimed at society as a whole and are historically undertaken exclusively by the State as one of its unique civic responsibilities — ‘a tell-tale sign that the conduct is not proprietary in nature’”.

  • People v. Richardson, 88 N.Y.2d 1049 (1996): Waiver of Objection to Lesser Included Offense

    People v. Richardson, 88 N.Y.2d 1049 (1996)

    A defendant who affirmatively requests that the trial court submit a lesser included offense to the jury waives the right to challenge the submission of that charge on appeal, and the production of a securing order is not always necessary to prove escape in the first degree if other evidence establishes custody pursuant to a court order.

    Summary

    Richardson was convicted of escape in the second degree and escape in the first degree. He appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly submitted the lesser included offense of escape in the second degree to the jury and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of escape in either degree. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Richardson waived his right to challenge the submission of the lesser charge by affirmatively requesting it and that sufficient evidence existed to prove he was in custody pursuant to a court order, even without producing the securing order itself. The Court emphasized that the defense counsel’s objection pertained to the wording, not the submission itself, of the charge.

    Facts

    Richardson was arrested and charged with rape in the first degree on October 15, 1992. While in custody, he escaped but was soon apprehended and charged with escape in the first degree. After arraignment on the rape charge, bail was set, and Richardson was incarcerated. The following day, he was arraigned on the escape charge and returned to jail. On November 25, 1992, he was taken to court for a conference with his attorney but escaped again before being taken back into custody later that day.

    Procedural History

    A grand jury indicted Richardson on charges of rape in the third degree and two counts of escape in the first degree. At trial, the crime of escape in the second degree was submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense of one of the escape in the first degree charges at the defendant’s request. The jury acquitted Richardson of rape but convicted him of escape in the second degree and escape in the first degree. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, and leave to appeal was granted.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in holding that Richardson waived any objection to the submission of the lesser included offense of escape in the second degree by requesting it be submitted to the jury.

    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Richardson of escape in either the first or second degrees, particularly given the lack of production of the securing order.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because by affirmatively requesting that the trial court submit the lesser charge to the jury, Richardson waived his right to challenge the submission of the lesser charge on appeal.

    2. Yes, because the trial testimony established that Richardson was in custody pursuant to a court order, making the production of the securing order unnecessary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Richardson waived his right to challenge the submission of the lesser included offense because his attorney affirmatively requested that the trial court submit the lesser charge to the jury. The court cited People v. Ford, 62 NY2d 275, 283, for the principle that a defendant cannot request a specific charge and then claim error on appeal. The objection at trial was addressed to the wording of the charge, not its submission. The court stated, “by affirmatively requesting that the trial court submit the lesser charge to the jury, defendant waived his right to challenge the submission of the lesser charge on appeal.”

    Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for the escape charges, the court held that production of the securing order was not necessary to establish escape in the first degree. The court relied on the testimony of the court clerk and the investigator who were present at the arraignment, indicating that the judge directed the clerk to prepare the securing order after the arraignment and that the judge set bail and signed a securing order. This testimony established that Richardson was in custody pursuant to a court order, satisfying the elements of the crime. The court cited CPLR 4543 in support of using this type of evidence.

    The court emphasized that “[p]roduction of the securing order is not, however, necessary to establish this charge.” This clarifies that while a securing order is ideal evidence, other forms of evidence proving the defendant was in custody under court order are acceptable.

  • People v. Neale, 77 N.Y.2d 488 (1991): Defining Custody for Escape Charges After Acquittal by Reason of Insanity

    People v. Neale, 77 N.Y.2d 488 (1991)

    An individual acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect and subsequently escaping from a non-secure mental health facility is not considered to be escaping from “custody” as defined in the second-degree escape statute, but may be considered in custody for a third-degree escape charge.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant, acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect and placed in a non-secure facility, could be charged with escape in the second degree after leaving the facility without authorization. The court held that escape in the second degree requires escape from custody, which in this context, requires more than mere supervision in a non-secure environment. However, the court also considered the possibility of a charge of escape in the third degree. This case highlights the nuances of defining “custody” within the framework of mental health law and penal law related to escape.

    Facts

    The defendant, Neale, was acquitted of criminal charges due to mental disease or defect under CPL 330.20. Following the acquittal, the court ordered Neale to be placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health. Initially, Neale was confined in a secure psychiatric facility. Later, the court granted permission for Neale to be transferred to a non-secure facility. Neale subsequently left the non-secure facility without permission and was charged with escape in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the second-degree escape charge, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Neale’s unauthorized departure from the non-secure facility constituted escape in the second degree because he was still in the “custody” of the Commissioner of Mental Health.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect and who elopes from a non-secure mental health facility is considered to have escaped from “custody” within the meaning of Penal Law § 205.10, thus justifying a charge of escape in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because the “custody” required for escape in the second degree necessitates a level of restriction greater than that present in a non-secure facility. However, the court suggested the possibility of a charge for escape in the third degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “custody,” as used in the escape statute, implies a significant restraint on liberty. The court acknowledged that CPL 330.20 places individuals acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect under the supervision of the Commissioner of Mental Health. However, it distinguished between secure and non-secure facilities. The court found that the level of supervision and freedom afforded in a non-secure facility did not constitute the type of “custody” contemplated by the second-degree escape statute. The court emphasized the difference between the restriction of liberty in a secure facility versus the relative freedom in a non-secure facility. A dissenting opinion argued that escape from a non-secure facility still constituted escape from the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and should be considered escape in the third degree, pointing to the language of CPL 330.20 which refers to acquittees, whether in secure or non-secure facilities, as being in the “custody” of the Commissioner. The dissent cited People v Walter, 115 AD2d 52, 55-56 and People v Buthy, 85 AD2d 890 in its reasoning.

  • People v. Hutchinson, 56 N.Y.2d 868 (1982): Establishing ‘Ownership’ in Robbery and Intent in Escape

    People v. Hutchinson, 56 N.Y.2d 868 (1982)

    In a robbery case, an employee’s possessory right to an employer’s property, however limited, is superior to that of a robber; and, in an escape case, while specific intent to escape need not be proven, the act of escaping requires a conscious effort to evade custody.

    Summary

    Defendant Hutchinson appealed convictions for attempted robbery and escape. The attempted robbery charge stemmed from trying to steal money from a bank teller. The escape charge arose when he left police custody at a hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the prosecution didn’t need to prove the teller was the “owner” of the money, only that the teller’s possessory right was superior to the defendant’s. As for the escape charge, the court held that while specific intent wasn’t required, the act of escape itself requires a conscious effort to evade custody, and the judge’s instructions were sufficient. The court also found that the defendant’s claim regarding excessive testimony about another robbery was not properly preserved for review.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with attempting to steal money from Dennis O’Connor, a bank teller. He was also charged with escape after leaving the hospital where he was under police guard following an arrest for a felony. The defendant had been under police guard in the hospital for six weeks prior to the escape. He left the hospital without authorization at 5:30 a.m.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and escape. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, in a charge of attempted robbery, the prosecution must prove that the person from whom the defendant attempted to steal was an “owner” of the property.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in not charging the jury that the crime of escape requires a showing of knowledge or volition.

    3. Whether the trial court permitted an excessive volume of testimony with respect to another similar bank robbery.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecution only needed to prove that the person had a possessory right superior to that of the defendant.

    2. No, because the jury was properly charged with the statutory definition of escape and custody, and the commonly understood definition of “escape” implies a conscious effort.

    3. The claim was not preserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the attempted robbery charge, the court reasoned that the Penal Law only requires proof that the person from whom the property was taken had a possessory right superior to that of the defendant. The court stated, “Because the proof was uncontradicted that O’Connor was an employee of the bank it cannot be said that the jury was not warranted in concluding that as such employee he had a right of possession superior to that of defendant, who had no right of possession whatsoever.” The court emphasized that it was immaterial that the money in question came from other tellers’ drawers.

    Regarding the escape charge, the court acknowledged that while the better practice would have been to explicitly instruct the jury that escape involves conscious effort, independent proof of intent is not required unless the facts suggest a different purpose for leaving custody. The court cited the dictionary definition of “escape” as “to get away (as by flight or conscious effort)” and noted the defendant’s extended stay in the hospital under police guard as evidence suggesting a conscious effort to evade custody when he left without authorization. The court reasoned, “While the better practice in light of defendant’s specific request for a charge on knowledge or volition would have been to point up for the jury that escape involves conscious effort, independent proof of intent is not required absent facts suggesting a purpose other than the evasion of custody, as for example, to evade the outbreak of fire in the area of confinement.”

    Regarding the final claim, the court stated that the defendant’s argument regarding the excessive testimony was not preserved for review because it was not properly raised at trial.