Krieger v. Krieger, 25 N.Y.2d 364 (1969)

A party who delays unreasonably in challenging the validity of a divorce decree, especially when the other party remarries in reliance on the decree, may be barred by laches from obtaining a declaratory judgment invalidating the divorce.

Summary

Benjamin Krieger sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate his ex-wife Ethel’s Florida divorce obtained in 1952 and her subsequent remarriage in 1964. The New York Court of Appeals held that Benjamin’s 12-year delay in bringing the action, especially after Ethel remarried, constituted laches, barring him from challenging the divorce’s validity. The Court reasoned that Benjamin had a justiciable controversy since 1952 and could have sought a declaration earlier. His unreasonable delay prejudiced Ethel, who remarried believing the divorce was valid. Therefore, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and directed declaratory judgment for Ethel and her new husband.

Facts

Benjamin and Ethel Krieger were married but separated in 1950. Ethel obtained a divorce in Florida in 1952. Twelve years later, in 1964, Ethel remarried Herbert Becker in New Jersey. Four months after the remarriage, Benjamin commenced an action for a declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the Florida divorce was void, that he was still Ethel’s lawful husband, and that Ethel’s subsequent marriage to Becker was a nullity. Benjamin knew of the Florida divorce shortly after it was granted and resisted Ethel’s attempts to obtain a religious divorce (“gett”).

Procedural History

The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted judgment for Ethel and Becker, declaring that the Florida court had jurisdiction and that Benjamin’s delay barred relief. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the Florida court lacked jurisdiction over the marriage and that laches did not apply. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

Whether a 12-year delay in bringing an action to declare a divorce invalid, particularly after the former spouse has remarried, constitutes laches barring the action for declaratory judgment.

Holding

Yes, because Benjamin unreasonably delayed bringing the action despite knowing about the divorce and Ethel’s assertion of rights based on it. This delay prejudiced Ethel, who remarried believing the divorce was valid, thus barring Benjamin from relief due to laches.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals found that Benjamin had a justiciable controversy from 1952 when the Florida divorce was granted. He could have sought a declaratory judgment at that time. The court cited James v. Alderton Dock Yards, noting the general purpose of declaratory judgment is to serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation. The court also cited Long v. Long, 281 App. Div. 254, where an action was maintained alleging a Nevada decree of divorce in favor of the husband was void and she was his lawful wife.

The court emphasized that declaratory judgment actions are governed by equitable principles, and laches can bar relief. The court noted that Benjamin waited until Ethel, believing the divorce was valid, remarried. This delay prejudiced Ethel, making it unjust for the court to assist Benjamin. The court distinguished Krakower v. Krakower, 291 N.Y. 604, noting that it merely upheld the Supreme Court’s discretion not to entertain a declaratory judgment action, not that such an action was inappropriate. The court stated, “Here the plaintiff waited without any recourse to judicial action until the wife, believing the divorce good, and having obtained a religious sanction which satisfied her, remarried. Such a delay with such consequence is not easily excused.”

The court concluded that any useful result from judicial intervention was doubtful, as the marriage seemed “dead beyond recall.” Therefore, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and directed declaratory judgment for Ethel and Becker based on Benjamin’s laches.