New York Law Review

Tag: Equal Access to Justice Act

  • Kimmel v. State of New York, No. 36 (2017): Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) and Sex Discrimination Claims

    Kimmel v. State of New York, No. 36 (2017)

    The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) allows for the award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in an action against the State of New York under the Human Rights Law for sex discrimination in employment by a state agency.

    Summary

    Betty Kimmel, a former New York State Trooper, sued the State for sex discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, ultimately prevailing at trial and receiving a substantial jury award. Kimmel and her attorneys sought fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The trial court denied the motion, holding the EAJA inapplicable to actions seeking compensatory damages for tortious acts of the State. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the EAJA, which provides for attorney’s fees in certain civil actions against the state, applied to Kimmel’s case. The Court relied on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, which supported a broad interpretation of the term “any civil action,” rejecting the State’s argument that the term was limited to review of administrative actions.

    Facts

    Betty Kimmel, a New York State Trooper from 1980-1994, experienced sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. Kimmel filed a complaint in 1995 against the State of New York and the New York State Division of State Police, alleging a hostile work environment and seeking damages, including attorney’s fees. The State defendants denied any wrongdoing and engaged in obstructionist tactics, leading the Appellate Division to strike their answers. After over a decade, Kimmel prevailed at trial and received a jury award exceeding $700,000. Kimmel and her attorneys then sought attorney’s fees under the EAJA.

    Procedural History

    Kimmel filed suit in 1995. The State defendants’ answers were struck due to their obstructionist tactics. Supreme Court held that the EAJA did not apply. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal from the Appellate Division order, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the EAJA permits the award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in an action against the State under the Human Rights Law for sex discrimination in employment by a state agency.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plain language of the EAJA defines “any civil action” broadly and there are no explicit limitations that would exclude Kimmel’s case, which was brought under the Human Rights Law and was not brought in the Court of Claims.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first looked at the plain language of the statute and found the EAJA applicable to “any civil action” against the state. The Court acknowledged that two limitations exist: that another statute does not specifically provide for counsel fees, and that an action was not brought in the Court of Claims. Since Kimmel’s case was brought in Supreme Court under the Human Rights Law, neither of these exceptions applied. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the term “judicial review” in the EAJA limited its scope to Article 78 proceedings or actions seeking review of a state agency’s administrative actions. The court determined that to accept the State’s interpretation would render the exclusion of actions in the Court of Claims meaningless. The Court also cited that the EAJA was intended to be comparable to the federal Equal Access to Justice Act, and is a remedial statute and therefore, should be construed broadly.

    The Court emphasized that “the word ‘any’ means ‘all’ or ‘every’ and imports no limitation” and further noted that the State’s interpretation would require adding an exception to the statute that was not clearly expressed.

    The concurring opinion agreed that the statutory language was ambiguous but concurred in the result. The concurrence emphasized a concession made by the State during oral arguments, where the State admitted that the EAJA could apply to a Human Rights Law action seeking injunctive relief against a State agency.

    The dissenting opinion maintained that the EAJA’s language, when read in context and with consideration to legislative history, limits its application to judicial review of agency actions and does not encompass actions seeking compensatory damages.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that under the EAJA, attorney’s fees can be awarded in sex discrimination cases brought under the Human Rights Law, which can be brought in Supreme Court, against state agencies. The Court’s emphasis on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history highlights the importance of examining the specific statutory language. Attorneys should consider the possibility of obtaining attorney’s fees under the EAJA for clients who prevail in actions against the State, particularly in the absence of other fee-shifting provisions. Furthermore, the Court’s decision emphasizes the broad construction of remedial statutes. Lawyers and lower courts should be aware of the practical and fiscal consequences of this ruling and its impact on the state’s willingness to engage in litigation.

    Subsequent cases will likely apply this ruling to similar cases involving state agencies and discrimination, and could extend to other types of civil actions against the state that do not fall under the Court of Claims jurisdiction.

  • Beechwood Restorative Care Center v. Signor, 5 N.Y.3d 435 (2005): Recovery of Attorney’s Fees Under FOIL

    5 N.Y.3d 435 (2005)

    To recover attorney’s fees under New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), a party must demonstrate that the records obtained were of clearly significant interest to the general public, and the agency lacked a reasonable basis for withholding the record.

    Summary

    Beechwood Restorative Care Center sought attorney’s fees after successfully compelling the New York State Department of Health (DOH) to release documents under FOIL. Beechwood argued that the documents, related to the closure of its nursing facility, were of significant public interest. The Court of Appeals held that while Beechwood substantially prevailed in obtaining the documents, it failed to demonstrate that the specific records released were of clearly significant interest to the general public, as required for fee recovery under FOIL. The court also held that the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) does not apply to FOIL proceedings.

    Facts

    The New York State Department of Health (DOH) initiated proceedings to revoke Beechwood Restorative Care Center’s license due to substandard care allegations. Between August 1999 and January 2001, Beechwood submitted 17 FOIL requests to DOH seeking documents related to DOH procedures and Beechwood’s license revocation. DOH provided some documents, but Beechwood claimed non-compliance regarding 12 requests. This prompted Beechwood to file suit seeking the remaining documents and attorney’s fees.

    Procedural History

    Beechwood commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, alleging DOH failed to respond to FOIL requests. Supreme Court ordered DOH to provide affidavits detailing their search efforts. After multiple rounds of affidavits and document production, Beechwood moved for attorney’s fees under FOIL and the EAJA. Supreme Court denied the motion, finding Beechwood failed to demonstrate the records were of significant public interest and that the EAJA was inapplicable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lower courts erred in determining that Beechwood failed to establish that the records obtained were of clearly significant interest to the general public, as required for an attorney’s fee award under FOIL.

    2. Whether the counsel fee provision in the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) applies to FOIL proceedings.

    Holding

    1. No, because the records themselves must be of significant interest to the public, and Beechwood failed to demonstrate such interest in the documents it obtained from DOH.

    2. No, because the EAJA’s counsel fee provision does not apply when another statute, such as FOIL, specifically provides for counsel fees.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to recover attorney’s fees under FOIL, the specific records disclosed must be of “clearly significant interest to the general public” (Public Officers Law § 89[4][c][i]). The Court distinguished between public interest in the event (the nursing home closure) and public interest in the records themselves. Beechwood failed to show how the general agency records, job descriptions, employee training documents, and internal communications were of significant interest to the public. The Court cited the legislative history, noting that the public interest standard was intentionally tightened to require more than just potential public interest. Because Beechwood failed to satisfy this requirement, its claim for attorney’s fees under FOIL failed. Regarding the EAJA, the Court pointed to the statute’s introductory proviso, which states that the EAJA applies “except as otherwise specifically provided by statute” (CPLR 8601[a]). Since FOIL specifically provides for attorney’s fees in FOIL proceedings, the EAJA is inapplicable. The court emphasized that “the bill clarifies and tightens the public interest standard by requiring that the record be of ‘clearly significant interest to the general public’ and not just ‘potentially’ so” (Governor’s Mem approving L 1982, ch 73, 1982 NY Legis Ann, at 47). The court reinforced the principle that simply using the documents in litigation against the government does not automatically establish public interest. The court explicitly states that FOIL is a statute that “otherwise specifically provide[s]” an attorneys’ fee standard to be applied, thus, Beechwood may not seek counsel fees pursuant to the EAJA.

  • Alesi v. New York City Department of Social Services, 97 N.Y.2d 736 (2002): Limits of “State” Under the Equal Access to Justice Act

    Alesi v. New York City Department of Social Services, 97 N.Y.2d 736 (2002)

    The New York City Department of Social Services is not considered the “State” or a state agency under the Equal Access to Justice Act (CPLR Article 86), and therefore, is not subject to awards of attorney’s fees under that statute.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, prevailing parties in an action against the New York City Department of Social Services, sought attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The EAJA allows for fee awards against the “state” unless its position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the New York City Department of Social Services is not the “state” or a state agency within the meaning of the EAJA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, clarifying that while local social services commissioners may act as state agents in some capacities, the statute explicitly avoids bureaucratic finger-pointing by holding the State directly liable for attorney’s fees, not its agents.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs prevailed in a civil action against the New York City Department of Social Services. They subsequently moved for attorney’s fees and costs under Article 86 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), also known as the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The EAJA allows prevailing parties to recover attorney’s fees in actions against the “state” under certain conditions.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees, concluding that the EAJA does not authorize awards against a city agency. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York City Department of Social Services constitutes the “State” or a state agency as defined in CPLR 8602(g), thereby making it subject to attorney’s fees awards under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

    Holding

    No, because the New York City Department of Social Services is neither the State nor a state agency within the meaning of CPLR 8602(g). The statute intends to place liability for attorney’s fees on the State itself, not its agents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing the explicit language of CPLR 8602(g), which defines “State” as the State, its agencies, or its officials acting in their official capacity. While acknowledging prior cases recognizing local social services commissioners as agents of the state (citing Matter of Beaudoin v Toia, 45 NY2d 343, 347 [1978]), the Court distinguished between these individual commissioners and the broader Department of Social Services. The Court highlighted the legislative intent behind the EAJA, referencing Matter of Thomasel v Perales, 78 NY2d 561, 570 [1991]: “By requiring that the ‘State’ be a party, the statute avoids the ‘evasion of responsibility by bureaucratic finger-pointing’ by placing liability for attorneys’ fees on the State as opposed to its agents.” This rationale underscores a policy consideration to streamline responsibility and prevent diffusion of accountability when awarding attorney’s fees under the EAJA. The Court’s decision clarifies the scope of the EAJA and prevents its application to entities that, while connected to the state, do not fall squarely within the statutory definition of “State”. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.