In re Estate of Maruccia, 54 N.Y.2d 191 (1981)

For a separation agreement to revoke a prior will under EPTL 3-4.3, it must explicitly renounce testamentary dispositions or clearly manifest an intent to no longer be beneficiaries under each other’s wills.

Summary

This case addresses whether a separation agreement containing a general release clause revoked a prior will that favored the testator’s estranged spouse. The New York Court of Appeals held that the separation agreement did not revoke the will because it lacked an explicit renunciation of testamentary gifts or clear intent to revoke beneficiary status. The court overruled prior precedent suggesting a general waiver of rights was sufficient for revocation, emphasizing the need for explicit language to ensure testamentary intent is honored. The decision underscores the importance of updating wills after separation agreements to reflect changed circumstances.

Facts

Alfred Maruccia executed a will in 1966, naming his second wife, Ethelyn, as a beneficiary and co-executor. In 1976, Alfred and Ethelyn entered into a separation agreement containing a general release of claims. The agreement addressed property division and waiver of statutory rights related to the marriage. Alfred died in 1977 without updating his will. His first wife and children from that marriage challenged Ethelyn’s status as beneficiary and executor, arguing the separation agreement revoked her rights under the will.

Procedural History

The Surrogate’s Court ruled that the separation agreement’s language was “wholly inconsistent” with the will, revoking the provisions favoring Ethelyn. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the agreement only waived statutory rights, not voluntary bequests. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

Whether a separation agreement containing a general release clause, but lacking explicit renunciation of testamentary gifts or a clear manifestation of intent to revoke beneficiary status, is “wholly inconsistent” with a prior will under EPTL 3-4.3, thus revoking the will’s provisions favoring the estranged spouse.

Holding

No, because to revoke a prior will under EPTL 3-4.3, a separation agreement must either explicitly renounce testamentary dispositions or clearly manifest an intent to no longer be beneficiaries under each other’s wills; a general waiver of rights is insufficient.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that EPTL 3-4.3 requires a high standard for implied revocation of a will based on a subsequent act. The statute uses the term “wholly inconsistent,” indicating a strict approach. The court emphasized that testamentary instruments should not be invalidated based on conjecture about the testator’s intent, especially when they had the opportunity to update the will. The court explicitly overruled Matter of Hollister to the extent that it suggested a general waiver of rights “against the estate” was sufficient to revoke a prior will. The court stated that the separation agreement in this case only relinquished statutory rights arising from the marital relationship and did not explicitly renounce the voluntary bequests made to Ethelyn in Alfred’s will. The court quoted Matter of Torr, stating “a solemn testamentary instrument should not be rendered ineffectual upon conjecture as to the motivation of a testator who in his lifetime had ample opportunity to revoke or to amend the instrument had he desired to do so.” The court noted that while EPTL 5-1.4 automatically revokes testamentary dispositions to a former spouse after a divorce, this case involved a separation agreement without a subsequent divorce. The court emphasized the importance of updating wills to reflect changed circumstances after a separation or divorce.