New York Law Review

Tag: Environmental Conservation Law

  • Matter of Bath and Hammondsport R.R. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 73 N.Y.2d 434 (1989): Extent of Commissioner’s Eminent Domain Power

    Matter of Bath and Hammondsport R.R. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 73 N.Y.2d 434 (1989)

    The Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) possesses broad statutory authority under ECL 3-0305(1) to acquire land via eminent domain for any of the department’s purposes or functions, even when a specific statute relating to a particular function (like fish and wildlife management under ECL 11-2103) does not explicitly mention eminent domain.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the DEC Commissioner could use eminent domain to acquire land for a public fishing access site when the statute governing fish and wildlife acquisitions didn’t explicitly authorize condemnation. The Court held that ECL 3-0305(1) grants the Commissioner broad power to condemn land for any departmental purpose, including fish and wildlife management, and that the absence of specific eminent domain language in ECL 11-2103 doesn’t negate this general authority. This decision underscores the comprehensive nature of the Commissioner’s power to acquire land necessary for DEC’s functions.

    Facts

    The DEC proposed a fishing access site, including a boat launch and parking lot, on Keuka Lake. The proposed site was located on 3.2 acres of land owned by the Bath and Hammondsport Railroad Company. The Commissioner approved the proposal, which included condemning the railroad company’s land to establish the fishing access.

    Procedural History

    The Village of Hammondsport and the railroad company separately challenged DEC’s authority to condemn the land in EDPL 207 proceedings before the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division sided with the petitioners, annulling DEC’s determination, reasoning that ECL 11-2103 lacked specific authorization for acquisitions via eminent domain for public hunting and fishing grounds. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the absence of an explicit reference to eminent domain in ECL 11-2103 precludes the DEC Commissioner from exercising the eminent domain power, granted generally in ECL 3-0305, to condemn land for a public fishing purpose.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language and legislative history of ECL 3-0305(1) demonstrate that the Legislature intended to provide the Commissioner with broad condemnation power, exercisable for each of the proper functions of the Department, including fish and wildlife management.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that statutory interpretation hinges on legislative intent. It found that ECL 3-0305(1) clearly authorizes the Commissioner to acquire “any” land for “any” departmental purpose using condemnation procedures. The Court highlighted the statute’s legislative history, noting that a 1960 amendment broadened the Commissioner’s condemnation power beyond lands and forests to encompass all departmental functions. The Court stated, “Giving the statutory language its natural and obvious meaning (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 94) and the unqualified word ‘any’ its full significance as a general term… the conclusion is inescapable that ECL 3-0305 (1) is intended to be a general authorization to employ eminent domain within the full scope of the Department’s responsibilities.”

    The Court rejected the argument that ECL 11-2103(1)’s omission of eminent domain implied its exclusion. It reasoned that applying rules of construction like *ejusdem generis* and *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* to restrict the Commissioner’s power would contradict the evident purpose of ECL 3-0305(1). The Court also dismissed the argument that specific eminent domain grants in other ECL provisions implied a lack of such power for fish and wildlife acquisitions, noting that such an interpretation would frustrate the Legislature’s purpose in granting the general eminent domain power in ECL 3-0305 (1). The Court concluded that the specific provisions were historical artifacts and did not limit the general power.

  • In the Matter of Wayne P., 65 N.Y.2d 1061 (1985): Juvenile Delinquency & Overlap Between Penal Law and Environmental Conservation Law

    In the Matter of Wayne P., 65 N.Y.2d 1061 (1985)

    When a juvenile violates the conditions of a hunting license under the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL), they are not immune from prosecution under the Penal Law for conduct that would otherwise constitute a crime.

    Summary

    Wayne P., a 14-year-old, was found by Family Court to have violated Penal Law § 265.05 after allegedly firing a shotgun at motorcyclists, leading to a juvenile delinquency adjudication. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the ECL exclusively governed his conduct. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that violating the hunting license terms does not shield a juvenile from Penal Law consequences for otherwise criminal actions. The Court emphasized that the ECL does not automatically supersede the Penal Law and that specific language is required to indicate such an intention.

    Facts

    Wayne P., age 14, allegedly fired a shotgun at three motorcyclists in a field near his home.
    He possessed a hunting license but was unaccompanied by a licensed adult at the time of the incident, although his mother could observe him from the house.
    Family Court found that this violated Penal Law § 265.05, which prohibits individuals under 16 from possessing certain weapons, even if otherwise lawful, and adjudged him a juvenile delinquent.

    Procedural History

    Family Court adjudicated Wayne P. a juvenile delinquent.
    The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) exclusively governed the respondent’s conduct.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstated the Family Court’s adjudication of juvenile delinquency, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the sanctions contained in the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) for violation of a hunting license supersede the provisions of the Penal Law proscribing what would otherwise be criminal conduct when committed by a juvenile.

    Holding

    No, because absent evidence of legislative intention to make the ECL the exclusive means of punishing such conduct, a juvenile who exceeds the scope of their hunting license is not immune from prosecution under the Penal Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Family Court had jurisdiction to determine whether the respondent violated section 265.05 of the Penal Law. The Court emphasized that section 265.05 reflects a specific legislative intent to proscribe certain conduct when engaged in by juveniles and thus defines such conduct as juvenile delinquency. It further reasoned that the respondent’s possession of the shotgun, while unaccompanied, was not in compliance with the conditions of his hunting license. The court found no evidence of legislative intent to make the ECL the exclusive means of punishing conduct that would otherwise be criminal. The court cited ECL 71-0905(1), which states that no provision of the Fish and Wildlife Law shall be construed as amending, repealing, superseding, or limiting any provision of the Penal Law unless expressly stated. The court acknowledged that ECL 11-0701(1) is expressly applicable notwithstanding the Penal Law, meaning that a licensed juvenile adhering to the hunting license limitations cannot be prosecuted under the Penal Law. However, a juvenile who exceeds the scope of their license is not immune from prosecution under the Penal Law. As stated by the court, “[s]o long as a person between the ages of 14 and 16 observes the limitations of his hunting license…he cannot be prosecuted for what otherwise would subject him to liability under the Penal Law. A juvenile who exceeds the scope of his license, however, is not immune from prosecution under the Penal Law.” There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.