New York Law Review

Tag: entrapment defense

  • People v. Calvano, 76 N.Y.2d 862 (1990): Entrapment Defense Requires More Than Opportunity to Commit a Crime

    People v. Calvano, 76 N.Y.2d 862 (1990)

    Merely providing a defendant with the opportunity to commit a crime is insufficient to warrant a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment; the defendant must demonstrate active inducement or encouragement creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to do so.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for patronizing a prostitute, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment. The Court reasoned that the evidence presented, even when viewed most favorably to the defendant, did not reasonably support the defense. The interaction between the undercover officer and the defendant merely presented an opportunity to commit the crime, which is insufficient to establish entrapment. The defendant failed to demonstrate active inducement or encouragement by law enforcement.

    Facts

    An undercover police sergeant, dressed as a woman, was standing on a street corner in Syracuse. The defendant drove up to the curb and the officer approached the car. The officer asked if the defendant was looking for a date and the defendant replied affirmatively. After a brief negotiation about price and services, the defendant agreed to pay $25 for oral sodomy. The officer directed the defendant to drive around the corner, where he was arrested by backup units. An undercover lieutenant overheard and corroborated the conversation. The defendant testified that the officer approached him and offered oral sodomy for money, but he did not respond. He denied agreeing to exchange money for sex.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in Syracuse City Court of patronizing a prostitute. The Onondaga County Court affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial judge erred by denying his request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment, where the evidence showed that an undercover officer offered the defendant the opportunity to engage in prostitution.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate active inducement or encouragement by a public official creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. Merely providing an opportunity to commit a crime is insufficient to establish entrapment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a trial court must charge entrapment if the evidence, viewed favorably to the defendant, reasonably supports the defense. The defendant bears the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, showing: (1) active inducement or encouragement by a public official; and (2) a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. The court emphasized that the officers merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to commit the offense, which is insufficient for entrapment. “Merely asking a defendant to commit a crime is not such inducement or encouragement as to constitute entrapment.” The Court cited Penal Law § 40.05 and People v. Thompson, 47 N.Y.2d 940, 941 (1979), to support this conclusion. The court distinguished between providing an opportunity and actively inducing someone to commit a crime they were not predisposed to commit. The court noted that denying the crime doesn’t automatically support or defeat an entrapment defense. Quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 US 58, 62, the court acknowledged this allowance. The critical factor was the lack of evidence suggesting the defendant was actively persuaded or coerced into committing the offense.

  • People v. DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d 768 (1988): Improper Entrapment Charge When Defendant Denies the Crime

    People v. DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d 768 (1988)

    A trial court commits reversible error by instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment when the defendant explicitly denies raising that defense and instead asserts a defense inconsistent with entrapment.

    Summary

    DeGina was convicted of drug sales. At trial, he argued he sold talcum powder, not drugs, to an undercover officer. The prosecution requested an entrapment instruction, which the court gave over DeGina’s objection. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that giving the entrapment instruction was error because DeGina did not raise that defense. Entrapment requires admitting the crime and claiming inducement, which DeGina didn’t do. This error prejudiced DeGina by undermining his chosen defense and imposing an unassumed burden of proof. The court emphasized that a defendant has the right to chart his own defense, and the entrapment charge contradicted DeGina’s claim that he did not sell drugs.

    Facts

    John DiDomenico, an undercover agent, met DeGina seeking to buy cocaine. After several unsuccessful attempts, DeGina sold DiDomenico an envelope of talcum powder for $125. DiDomenico insisted on restitution, after which DeGina and a friend, Sanzo, sold him opium and amphetamines. At trial, DeGina’s mother testified about numerous calls from “Frank” (DiDomenico) and a meeting between Frank and Sanzo.

    Procedural History

    DeGina was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the entrapment charge harmless error due to “overwhelming evidence” of intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is reversible error for a trial court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment over the defendant’s objection, when the defendant maintains a defense inconsistent with entrapment.

    Holding

    Yes, because imposing the burden of proving entrapment on DeGina, who had not raised it, constituted an abuse of the affirmative defense that violated his right to have the State bear the entire burden of proof. Furthermore, the instruction undermined the defense chosen by DeGina.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the entrapment defense was improperly applied. DeGina’s defense was that he did not commit the crime charged (selling drugs), but rather sold talcum powder. He claimed the officer fabricated the drug sales story. The court emphasized that a defendant has the right to chart his own defense. “[A] defendant unquestionably has the right to chart his own defense.” The court highlighted the prejudice to DeGina: the entrapment charge undermined his chosen defense, placed him in the midst of contradictory defenses (admitting and denying the sale of drugs), and imposed an affirmative burden of proof he had not undertaken. The court stated, “[T]he court’s charge imposed upon defendant an affirmative burden that the jury was bound to conclude he had failed to sustain.” The Court rejected the argument that the error was harmless, noting that overwhelming evidence of intent was irrelevant when the defense was that the sales never occurred. “Overwhelming evidence of intent would be relevant to the question whether the defense of entrapment had been made out, but was not proof whether the sales took place at all.”

  • People v. Calvano, 70 N.Y.2d 762 (1987): Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence for Entrapment Defense

    People v. Calvano, 70 N.Y.2d 762 (1987)

    Hearsay evidence is admissible to demonstrate inducement and a defendant’s state of mind when asserting an entrapment defense.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of selling drugs to an undercover officer. At trial, Calvano argued entrapment, attempting to introduce statements made to him by a paid police informant who introduced him to the officer. The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objections and directed the jury to disregard the informant’s statements. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the informant’s statements were admissible to show inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, both critical to the entrapment defense. This case highlights the importance of allowing defendants to present evidence relevant to their state of mind when claiming entrapment.

    Facts

    The defendant, Calvano, was charged with selling drugs to an undercover police officer.
    A paid police informant introduced Calvano to the undercover officer.
    Calvano attempted to testify about statements made to him by the informant to support his entrapment defense.

    Procedural History

    Calvano was indicted for selling drugs.
    At trial, the court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objections, preventing Calvano from presenting the informant’s statements.
    Calvano was convicted.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by a police informant to the defendant are admissible as evidence to support an entrapment defense, specifically to demonstrate inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, even if such statements would otherwise be considered hearsay.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statements were offered to show inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, which are relevant to the entrapment defense as defined in Penal Law § 40.05.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in excluding the informant’s statements as hearsay. The statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted within them, but rather to demonstrate the informant’s inducement and its effect on Calvano’s state of mind. The court referred to Penal Law § 40.05, which defines entrapment as engaging in proscribed conduct because induced or encouraged to do so by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purposes of criminal prosecution. “As defense counsel noted at trial, the statements were admissible to show inducement and defendant’s state of mind, which was relevant to his contention that he ‘engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by * * * a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution’ (Penal Law § 40.05).” Because the statements were critical to establishing the entrapment defense, their exclusion was prejudicial to the defendant, warranting a new trial. The court emphasized that all arguments relevant to the admissibility of the evidence were presented to the court during the trial, preserving the issue for appellate review.

  • People v. Bracetty, 63 N.Y.2d 834 (1984): Admissibility of Co-conspirator Statements

    63 N.Y.2d 834 (1984)

    Once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case of conspiracy, statements of a co-conspirator made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against the defendant to bolster other evidence of the defendant’s membership in the conspiracy.

    Summary

    Defendant Bracetty was convicted of conspiracy in the fifth degree for arranging a meeting between an undercover officer and a dealer in illegal licenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy through the defendant’s own statements. Once this threshold was met, the statements of the co-conspirator (the dealer) were properly admitted to bolster the proof of the defendant’s involvement. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in not charging the jury on entrapment, finding no evidence that the defendant was actively induced or lacked predisposition to commit the crime.

    Facts

    An undercover officer met with the defendant. The defendant arranged a meeting between the officer and a dealer in illegal licenses. The defendant’s statements to the undercover officer indicated his familiarity with the illegal license scheme and an expectation of payment for his referral. The dealer made statements that implicated the defendant in the conspiracy.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of conspiracy in the fifth degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, thereby allowing the admission of co-conspirator statements.

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not charging the jury on entrapment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant’s own statements to the undercover officer established a prima facie case that the defendant arranged a meeting with a dealer in illegal licenses, showing an illicit agreement, the defendant’s familiarity with the workings of it, and the defendant’s intent to be paid.

    2. No, because the defendant was not actively induced to engage in criminal activity, nor was any evidence presented suggesting that the defendant had no predisposition to commit this crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the introduction of the defendant’s statements to the undercover officer provided a sufficient basis for a prima facie case of conspiracy. The court cited precedent holding that once a prima facie case is established, the statements of a co-conspirator are admissible to bolster other proof of the defendant’s membership in the conspiracy. The court referenced People v. Ardito, People v. Sanders, People v. Berkowitz, and People v. Salko to support this rule. The court emphasized that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was sufficient to submit the conspiracy charge to the jury. The court found no evidence supporting an entrapment defense, stating that “[t]he defendant was neither actively induced to engage in criminal activity… nor was any evidence presented suggesting that the defendant had no predisposition to commit this crime.” The absence of inducement or lack of predisposition negated the need for an entrapment charge. This case underscores the evidentiary principle that co-conspirator statements are admissible once an independent basis for the conspiracy has been shown, and it clarifies the circumstances under which an entrapment charge is warranted.

  • People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516 (1984): Sanctions for Failure to Preserve Evidence

    People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516 (1984)

    When the prosecution fails to preserve discoverable evidence, the court must fashion an appropriate sanction to eliminate prejudice to the defendant while protecting society’s interests; dismissal of charges is a drastic remedy that should only be invoked when less severe measures cannot rectify the harm.

    Summary

    Nathaniel Kelly and Angel Marrero were charged with criminal possession of stolen property and petit larceny after allegedly stealing from an undercover officer. The police recovered a wallet and $22, but then returned the evidence to the decoy officer, resulting in its irretrievable loss. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the lost evidence hindered their ability to assert an entrapment defense. The trial court granted the motion, and the appellate term affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that dismissal was an abuse of discretion because less drastic sanctions could have cured any prejudice to the defendants. The court emphasized that the primary concern is to eliminate prejudice to the defendant while protecting society’s interests.

    Facts

    Defendants Kelly and Marrero allegedly stole a wallet containing $22 from an undercover police officer.

    The recovered wallet and cash, consisting of one $20 bill and two $1 bills, were vouchered but then immediately returned to the decoy officer according to police practice.

    The evidence was irretrievably lost.

    Defendants claimed the $20 bill was doctored from a $1 bill to resemble a $20, suggesting police inducement and entrapment.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the charges due to the lost evidence.

    The Appellate Term affirmed the Criminal Court’s decision without opinion.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order, reinstated the informations, and remitted the case to the Criminal Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether dismissal of two informations was an appropriate response to the prosecution’s wrongful failure to preserve discoverable evidence, where less drastic sanctions could have cured any prejudice to the defendants.

    Holding

    No, because the drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where less severe measures can rectify the harm done by the loss of evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the People had a duty to preserve discoverable evidence. The court noted that the intentional relinquishment of the wallet and currency was inexcusable, even if the police practice of returning property in decoy cases demonstrated the absence of any intent to harm the defendants. The court stated, “A necessary corollary of the duty to disclose is the obligation to preserve evidence until a request for disclosure is made.”

    The court emphasized that CPL 240.70(1) requires an “appropriate” response to the prosecution’s wrongful failure to preserve evidence. While prosecutorial fault may be considered, “the overriding concern must be to eliminate any prejudice to the defendant while protecting the interests of society.” The Court cited various sanctions imposed in other cases, including reducing charges, precluding witnesses from testifying, ordering reconstruction hearings, and issuing unfavorable inference charges.

    The court reasoned that dismissal was not necessary in this case because less severe measures could rectify any prejudice to the defendants. The court reasoned that defendants’ argument that the money was intentionally placed in a highly visible position was not something the People would likely dispute at trial. The court also stated that any potential issues of impeaching the credibility of police officers could be addressed through jury instructions as to the bogus nature of the bill used. The Court indicated that the lower court could have instructed the jury to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution on account of the missing evidence.

    The Court concluded that while the choice of “appropriate” action is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, “as a general matter the drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where less severe measures can rectify the harm done by the loss of evidence.”

  • People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, 48 N.Y.2d 477 (1979): Collateral Estoppel in Parole Revocation Hearings After Entrapment Defense

    People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, 48 N.Y.2d 477 (1979)

    A prior acquittal based on the defense of entrapment in a criminal proceeding collaterally estops the Board of Parole from revoking parole on the basis of the transactions proved and admitted in the criminal action.

    Summary

    Dowdy, a parolee, was arrested and charged with drug offenses. He was also served with a parole violation notice based on the same offenses. At his criminal trial, Dowdy successfully argued an entrapment defense and was acquitted. Subsequently, at his parole revocation hearing, Dowdy argued that his acquittal collaterally estopped the Parole Board from revoking his parole. The Parole Board rejected this argument, but the Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the successful entrapment defense in the criminal trial precluded the Parole Board from revoking parole based on the same conduct. This was because the prior acquittal, specifically based on entrapment which Dowdy had the burden of proving, barred relitigation of that issue.

    Facts

    Relator Dowdy was on parole for robbery and weapons possession.
    He was arrested and indicted on charges related to the sale and possession of controlled substances.
    He received a parole violation notice based on the same drug offenses, alleging violation of parole rule 12 (prohibiting illegal drug use/possession).
    At the criminal trial, Dowdy asserted the affirmative defense of entrapment.
    The jury acquitted Dowdy on all counts.

    Procedural History

    Dowdy faced a parole revocation hearing where he argued that the criminal acquittal based on entrapment collaterally estopped the parole revocation.
    The Parole Board rejected Dowdy’s collateral estoppel argument and sustained the parole violations.
    Dowdy petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus; the Supreme Court granted the writ, upholding Dowdy’s collateral estoppel defense.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prior acquittal in a criminal proceeding, based on the affirmative defense of entrapment, collaterally estops the Board of Parole from revoking parole based on the same conduct.
    Whether entrapment is a valid defense to an alleged violation of a parole rule prohibiting the use, possession, or purchase of illegal drugs.

    Holding

    Yes, because the successful assertion of the entrapment defense in the criminal trial precludes the Parole Board from relitigating the issue of whether the parolee’s actions were induced by law enforcement.
    Yes, because fundamental fairness dictates that a parolee’s possession or sale of drugs induced by law enforcement officials cannot be the basis for parole revocation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of collateral estoppel in this case. The court found identity of parties sufficient because “the People as prosecutors in the criminal action stood in sufficient relationship with the Division of Parole in the parole proceeding”.

    Regarding the identity of issues, the court stated, “the criminal acquittal in this case constituted a conclusive finding that relator’s conduct was induced by entrapment.” The court reasoned this was a case of “issue preclusion.” Having had “a full and fair opportunity to contest” the claim that relator’s possession and sale of drugs was induced by law enforcement, the People are bound by the prior adverse factual determination. Any difference in the objectives of the two proceedings does not change the application of collateral estoppel.

    The court distinguished this case from others where criminal acquittals did not bar parole revocation. In those cases, the criminal acquittal merely indicated a failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, while the parole revocation proceeding had a lower burden of proof. In this case, Dowdy had the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of evidence in the criminal trial and he succeeded. In the parole revocation hearing, the state had the burden of proving the violation.

    As to whether entrapment is a defense to a parole violation, the court stated, “If the particular possession or sale of the drugs has been induced by the conduct of law enforcement officials, any standard of elemental fairness would dictate that possession or sale so induced may not be made the basis for revocation of parole.”

  • People v. Adams, 43 N.Y.2d 102 (1977): Prosecution’s Duty to Grant Immunity to Informant Witnesses

    People v. Adams, 43 N.Y.2d 102 (1977)

    The prosecution is not generally obligated to grant immunity to a potential defense witness, even if that witness is an informant who could offer exculpatory testimony, unless the informant was an active participant in the crime as an agent of law enforcement.

    Summary

    Adams was convicted of drug charges. At trial, he argued entrapment and sought to call Fodderell, a confidential informant, as a witness. Fodderell, already serving a federal sentence, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court urged the prosecution to grant Fodderell immunity, but they refused. Adams argued this refusal violated his rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution wasn’t obligated to grant immunity because Fodderell was merely a facilitator and observer, not an active participant in the crime. The Court distinguished situations where the informant acts as an agent of law enforcement.

    Facts

    Earl Fodderell, a narcotics distributor, became a confidential informant after pleading guilty to federal charges.

    Fodderell provided information leading to the investigation of Adams and participated in planning controlled drug purchases from Adams.

    Fodderell introduced an undercover officer to Gardner, who acted as an intermediary in the drug sales, and helped arrange meetings.

    Fodderell was present at one sale where money was exchanged and details of a later transfer from Adams were arranged and may have been an eyewitness to the sale of heroin by Adams to the undercover officer.

    Procedural History

    Adams was convicted after a jury trial.

    He appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s failure to grant immunity to Fodderell was prejudicial error.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s failure to grant immunity to a potential defense witness who invokes their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination constitutes a denial of due process or the right to a fair trial when that witness is a confidential informant who could offer exculpatory testimony.

    Holding

    No, because in the circumstances of this case, the confidential informant was not an active participant in the criminal transaction, and the prosecution, therefore, had no obligation to grant immunity to make his testimony available to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is not absolute and does not compel testimony over a valid claim of privilege, such as the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court noted that the key consideration is whether the prosecution suppressed evidence favorable to the accused, violating due process under Brady v. Maryland. However, there was no suppression here because the defendant knew the informant’s identity and had the opportunity to interview him.

    The Court distinguished this case from situations where the informant is an active participant in the criminal transaction as an agent of law enforcement. In such cases, the prosecution might be required to grant immunity or face dismissal of the prosecution to ensure a fair trial. However, because Fodderell was merely a facilitator and observer, not an active participant, the prosecution was not obligated to grant immunity. The Court emphasized Fodderell’s limited involvement: “In the present instance, at most Fodderell was a facilitator and an observer… In short, his was the now familiar role of the informer; he was not an actor in the criminal transactions.”

    The court also rejected the argument that the defendant was prejudiced by not being able to call Fodderell to the stand and force him to invoke his Fifth Amendment right in front of the jury.

  • People v. Freeman, 36 N.Y.2d 768 (1975): Entrapment Defense Requires Examination of Intent at Any Point, Not Just Initial Contact

    36 N.Y.2d 768 (1975)

    The defense of entrapment is available if law enforcement officers actively induce or encourage the defendant to commit a crime, even if the intent to entrap is formed after initial contact with the defendant; it is not necessary that the intent to entrap existed before encountering the defendant.

    Summary

    John Freeman was convicted of bribing police officers following a search of a luncheonette where he was present. He argued entrapment as a defense. The trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that to find entrapment, they had to determine the police went to the premises intending to induce the bribery. Defense counsel argued the intent to entrap could have formed later. The trial judge initially agreed to correct the charge but then reversed himself. The Court of Appeals found the charge erroneous because it required a finding that the police had the intent to entrap before arriving, effectively removing the entrapment defense from consideration. The conviction was reversed, and a new trial was ordered.

    Facts

    Police officers executed a search warrant at a luncheonette where John Freeman was present.

    During the search, Freeman offered money to the officers.

    Freeman was subsequently arrested and charged with bribery.

    Freeman argued that he had been entrapped by the officers.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Freeman of bribery.

    Freeman appealed, arguing the jury instruction on entrapment was erroneous.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Freeman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defense of entrapment required a finding that the police officers went to the premises with the intent to induce the defendant to commit bribery, thus precluding consideration of an intent to entrap formed after arrival.

    Holding

    Yes, because the intent to entrap could have been formed by the police after their arrival at the premises or indeed at some time during the course of their search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the trial court’s charge regarding entrapment to be incorrect and prejudicial to the defendant. The court stated that the trial court’s instruction required the jury to find that the officers went to the premises *intending* to induce defendant to commit bribery. The court clarified that “the intention to entrap defendant could have been formed by the police after their arrival at the premises or indeed at some time during the course of their search.” This misstatement, coupled with the overwhelming evidence of the bribery itself, effectively removed the entrapment defense from the jury’s consideration, warranting a new trial. The court noted, “In effect the trial court charged entrapment out of the case.” The court also emphasized that there was no evidence that the officers expected to find Freeman at the luncheonette when they went to execute the warrant. Therefore, the error in the charge was critical. The court stated, “It is conceded that standing alone the quoted portion of the charge was incorrect.”

  • People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 255 (1972): Admissibility of Prior Crimes Evidence in Entrapment Defense

    People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 255 (1972)

    When a defendant raises the defense of entrapment, the prosecution may introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes and criminal predisposition as part of its direct case if it is clear the entrapment defense will be invoked.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether evidence of prior crimes is admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief when the defendant pleads entrapment. Larry Calvano was convicted of illegally taking deer. He argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction and improperly admitted evidence of prior crimes to rebut his entrapment defense. The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Court had jurisdiction and that evidence of Calvano’s prior crimes was admissible on the People’s direct case because Calvano raised the defense of entrapment before trial and during the People’s case through cross-examination of the People’s witnesses. The court reasoned that excluding such evidence until the defense presents its case would unduly prejudice the prosecution.

    Facts

    Deputy Sheriff Butrico testified that Larry Calvano admitted to taking three white-tailed deer and arranged their delivery. On January 14, 1969, Calvano led Butrico and two conservation officers to an abandoned bungalow where he presented three white-tailed deer. Calvano was then arrested. The hunting season was closed at the time. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Butrico extensively, suggesting Butrico induced Calvano to commit the crime. Butrico admitted discussing with Calvano the possibility of Calvano “getting” deer for him on numerous occasions.

    Procedural History

    Calvano was convicted in Justice Court, Town of Ramapo, for violating the Conservation Law. The People introduced evidence of Calvano’s prior admissions of killing 181 deer and prior convictions for illegally taking wildlife, which the trial court admitted solely on the issue of entrapment. Calvano appealed, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction and improperly admitted the evidence. The appellate division affirmed the conviction, and Calvano appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Justice Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the misdemeanor of which the defendant was convicted, given the provisions of the Conservation Law.

    2. Whether the defense of entrapment may be properly rebutted upon the People’s case in chief through the introduction of evidence of prior crimes and criminal disposition.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Uniform Justice Court Act (UJCA) impliedly repealed conflicting provisions of the Conservation Law, granting town and village courts jurisdiction over all misdemeanors.

    2. Yes, because when it is clear that the defense of entrapment will be invoked, the prosecution may introduce competent proof of criminal disposition and prior convictions as part of its direct case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed the jurisdictional argument first, noting the conflict between the Conservation Law and the UJCA. The court stated, “In determining whether one statute impliedly repeals an earlier one, the primary and fundamental question to be resolved is what did the Legislature intend.” It emphasized that repeals by implication are disfavored, but will be found where the intent to effect such a repeal is clear, as manifested by an inconsistency between the statutes that precludes giving effect to both. Because the statutes conflicted on the jurisdiction of the Justice Court, the court held that the UJCA, as the later and more general statute, impliedly repealed the conflicting provisions of the Conservation Law.

    Turning to the entrapment issue, the court acknowledged the general rule that evidence of other criminal acts is inadmissible but noted exceptions exist. Citing People v. Molineux, the court referenced its recent holding in People v. Calvano that such evidence is admissible to refute the defense of entrapment. The court quoted Sorrells v. United States, stating, “The predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant…if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue.”

    The court rejected the argument that evidence of predisposition may only be introduced in rebuttal, finding this would “emasculate the rule and work grave prejudice” to the prosecution. The court held that “competent proof of criminal disposition and prior convictions” is admissible in the People’s case in chief when “it is clear that the defense of entrapment will be invoked.” The court reasoned that Calvano had raised the defense of entrapment via pretrial pleading, opening statements, and cross-examination, so the evidence was admissible.