New York Law Review

Tag: entrapment

  • People v. Fisher, 50 N.Y.2d 923 (1980): Entrapment Defense Requires Active Inducement by Government Agents

    People v. Fisher, 50 N.Y.2d 923 (1980)

    The defense of entrapment requires a showing that the defendant was actively induced by government agents to commit the crime; merely providing the opportunity is insufficient.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment. The defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a factual question as to whether he was actively induced by government agents to commit the crime of possession. Additionally, the Court found no deprivation of the defendant’s right to counsel or confrontation, as defense counsel’s prior representation of a key witness did not limit his efforts on behalf of the defendant, especially considering the defendant’s admission to the underlying conduct.

    Facts

    The defendant, Fisher, was charged with criminal possession. At trial, Fisher requested the court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment. He argued that a government informant had improperly induced him to commit the crime. Further, Fisher argued that his attorney’s prior representation of the informant created a conflict of interest, depriving him of his right to counsel and the right to confront witnesses.

    Procedural History

    The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense and Fisher was convicted of the possession charges. This decision was appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Fisher then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment.

    2. Whether the defendant was deprived of his right to counsel and right of confrontation due to his counsel’s prior representation of a key witness.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to raise a factual question as to whether he was actively induced by government agents to commit the crime.

    2. No, because defense counsel’s prior representation of the witness did not limit his efforts on behalf of the defendant, and the defendant’s admission of the underlying conduct negated any potential prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the entrapment defense requires more than simply providing the opportunity to commit a crime. The defendant must show that government agents actively induced him to commit the criminal act. In this case, the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence of active inducement to warrant an entrapment instruction. The court referenced Penal Law § 40.05, which codifies the entrapment defense in New York.

    Regarding the right to counsel, the Court found no evidence that defense counsel’s prior representation of the informant limited his ability to effectively represent the defendant. The Court emphasized that the defendant admitted to the conduct underlying the possession charges. Therefore, any alleged failure by defense counsel to attack the informant’s character could not have reasonably prejudiced the defendant. The Court found no conflict of interest that impaired the defense.

    The court implicitly distinguished this case from situations where government overreach or coercion is evident, which would support an entrapment defense. The ruling emphasizes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate active inducement, not merely the existence of an opportunity to commit the crime.

  • People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511 (1978): Due Process Limits on Police Conduct in Drug Sales

    People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511 (1978)

    Due process of law prohibits a criminal prosecution where the police conduct in inducing the crime is so egregious and deprivative as to shock the conscience and make a fair trial impossible, even if the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of Isaacson for selling cocaine, finding that the egregious police misconduct violated his due process rights. The police, seeking a conviction, brutally coerced an informant, deceived him about his own charges, and used him to lure Isaacson, a Pennsylvania resident, into New York under false pretenses to make a drug sale. The court held that such reprehensible conduct, including physical abuse and deception, justified barring the prosecution, even if Isaacson was predisposed to commit the crime. This case establishes that due process acts as a check on extreme police misconduct, even when entrapment is not proven.

    Facts

    J.D. Breniman was arrested for drug possession. While in custody, he was physically assaulted by a New York State Police investigator. The police failed to inform Breniman that the substance he possessed was not an illegal drug. Under the false impression that he faced a lengthy prison sentence, Breniman agreed to work as a police informant. Breniman contacted Isaacson, a Pennsylvania resident, and persistently solicited him to sell cocaine. Isaacson initially refused. Breniman lured Isaacson into New York by falsely claiming the drug transaction would occur in Pennsylvania. The police investigator orchestrated the scheme to ensure the sale occurred in New York.

    Procedural History

    Isaacson was convicted in County Court of criminal sale of a controlled substance. He raised a defense of entrapment and argued his due process rights were violated. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with two justices dissenting. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police conduct in manufacturing the crime and luring the defendant into New York to make a drug sale was so egregious that it violated the defendant’s due process rights, requiring dismissal of the indictment, even if the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime?

    Holding

    Yes, because the police conduct, including the brutality against the informant, the deception about the informant’s charges, the persistent solicitation of the defendant, and the fraudulent inducement of the defendant into New York, was so egregious that it violated the defendant’s due process rights, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that due process, under the New York State Constitution, acts as a check on police misconduct, even when a defendant is predisposed to commit a crime. The court considered several factors to determine whether the police conduct violated due process:
    1. Whether the police manufactured a crime that otherwise would not have occurred.
    2. Whether the police engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice.
    3. Whether the defendant’s reluctance to commit the crime was overcome by appeals to humanitarian instincts or persistent solicitation.
    4. Whether the record reveals a desire to obtain a conviction with no regard for preventing further crime.

    The court found that the police manufactured the crime by exploiting a vulnerable informant, deceiving him about his charges, and manipulating the situation to lure Isaacson into New York. The court emphasized the police brutality against Breniman, the deception regarding Breniman’s charges, and the persistent solicitation of Isaacson despite his initial reluctance. The court stated, “[T]here comes a time when enough is more than enough—it is just too much.” The court concluded that the police conduct was a brazen disregard of fundamental rights and sanctioned an investigation in which the informant was maliciously used as a pawn to obtain a conviction of any individual. Quoting Justice Frankfurter from Sherman v. United States, the court affirmed that “[n]o matter what the defendant’s past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society”.