Tag: Enright v. Eli Lilly

  • Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377 (1991): Limits on DES Manufacturer Liability to Grandchildren

    Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377 (1991)

    A manufacturer’s liability for injuries caused by a drug does not extend to a “third generation” plaintiff (grandchildren) whose injuries allegedly resulted from their mother’s in utero exposure to the drug, due to policy considerations regarding the limits of liability and potential for limitless claims.

    Summary

    Karen Enright, born prematurely with cerebral palsy, sued DES manufacturers, claiming her injuries stemmed from her maternal grandmother’s ingestion of DES during pregnancy with Karen’s mother, Patricia. Patricia allegedly suffered reproductive system abnormalities due to DES exposure, leading to Karen’s premature birth. The New York Court of Appeals held that the manufacturers’ liability did not extend to Karen. The court reasoned that allowing such claims would expand tort liability beyond manageable limits and create the potential for limitless claims across generations, echoing concerns raised in Albala v. City of New York. The court emphasized that while DES litigation has received special consideration, it doesn’t justify abandoning traditional limits on tort liability.

    Facts

    Karen Enright’s maternal grandmother ingested DES during pregnancy in 1960.
    Patricia Enright, Karen’s mother, was born with reproductive system abnormalities allegedly due to her in utero DES exposure.
    Patricia experienced multiple miscarriages, and Karen was born prematurely in 1981, suffering from cerebral palsy and other disabilities.
    Karen and her parents sued several DES manufacturers, claiming Karen’s injuries resulted from her grandmother’s DES ingestion.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed Karen’s claims, relying on Albala v. City of New York, which limited preconception tort liability.
    The Appellate Division modified, reinstating Karen’s strict products liability claim, arguing public policy favored a remedy for DES victims.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in reinstating the strict products liability claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a drug manufacturer’s liability in a strict products liability action extends to a “third generation” plaintiff whose injuries are allegedly caused by their mother’s in utero exposure to the drug ingested by the grandmother.

    Holding

    No, because extending liability to “third generation” plaintiffs would expand traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds, creating the potential for limitless claims and raising concerns about speculative and remote damages, as previously established in Albala v. City of New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied heavily on its decision in Albala v. City of New York, which declined to recognize a cause of action for a child injured due to a preconception tort against the mother. The court found no meaningful distinction between Albala (medical malpractice) and the current case (DES exposure) to justify a different rule.
    While acknowledging legislative and judicial solicitude for DES victims (e.g., CPLR 214-c and Hymowitz v. Lilly & Co.), the court emphasized that these measures addressed unique procedural barriers in DES litigation, not an intent to create a favored class of plaintiffs.
    The court rejected the argument that strict products liability warranted a different outcome than negligence, stating that the concerns about limitless liability and artificial boundaries remained compelling. The court noted: “For all we know, the rippling effects of DES exposure may extend for generations. It is our duty to confine liability within manageable limits”.
    The court also considered the potential for overdeterrence, which could discourage pharmaceutical research and development, and the role of the FDA in regulating drug safety.
    Liability was limited to those who ingested DES or were exposed to it in utero, balancing the need for redress with the need to confine liability within manageable limits. The court quoted Tobin v. Grossman, stating, “It is our duty to confine liability within manageable limits”.