Tag: Engagement Ring

  • Lowe v. Quinn, 27 N.Y.2d 397 (1971): Recovery of Engagement Ring When Marriage Agreement is Void

    Lowe v. Quinn, 27 N.Y.2d 397 (1971)

    An engagement ring cannot be recovered by the donor if the agreement to marry is void as against public policy because one of the parties is already married, even if a divorce is contemplated.

    Summary

    The plaintiff sued to recover an engagement ring he gave to the defendant, promising to marry her once he was divorced from his current wife. The defendant broke off the engagement. The court held that because the agreement to marry was void as against public policy (since the plaintiff was married at the time of the promise), the plaintiff could not recover the ring. The court reasoned that allowing recovery would be furthering an illegal and immoral transaction, and that Section 80-b of the Civil Rights Law doesn’t alter the principle denying recovery when one party is married.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a married man separated from his wife, gave the defendant a diamond engagement ring in October 1968. The gift was made based on her promise to marry him when he became free (i.e., after his divorce). Approximately one month later, the defendant told the plaintiff she had “second thoughts” and decided not to marry him. The plaintiff requested the return of the ring, which was refused.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued to recover the ring or its value. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the plaintiff cross-moved to amend the complaint to include causes of action for fraud, unjust enrichment, and monies had and received. The Special Term court denied the defendant’s motion and granted the plaintiff’s. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the defendant’s motion and directing summary judgment against the plaintiff. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a man can recover an engagement ring he gave to a woman when the agreement to marry is void as against public policy because he was already married at the time of the promise.

    Holding

    No, because an agreement to marry under such circumstances is void as against public policy, and the court will not aid in furthering an illegal and immoral transaction. Section 80-b of the Civil Rights Law does not alter the principle denying recovery when either party is already married.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that an engagement ring is a pledge for a contract of marriage. Ordinarily, if the recipient breaks the engagement, she must return the ring. However, this rule doesn’t apply when one of the parties is married, as such an agreement is void as against public policy. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions (Alaska, Georgia, and Washington) supporting this view. The court stated it should not lend its aid in furthering such a transaction. The court distinguished cases involving the doctrine of “unclean hands,” stating: “it is difficult to see how the delivery of the ring or the action to procure its return may be deemed unrelated to the contract to marry. There can be no possible doubt that the gift of the engagement ring was part and parcel of, directly related to, the agreement to wed.” Regarding Section 80-b of the Civil Rights Law, the court clarified that this section was intended to allow recovery of gifts when there was no impediment to marry, not to alter the established principle against recovery when one party is already married. “That section must, however, be read in connection with section 80-a which effected the abolition of actions for breach of promise to marry… This statute, however, does not alter the settled principle denying a right of recovery where either of the parties to the proposed marriage is already married.”