New York Law Review

Tag: employment discrimination

  • Ibhawa v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 2024 NY Slip Op 05872: Ministerial Exception is an Affirmative Defense, Not a Jurisdictional Bar

    Matter of Ibhawa v New York State Div. of Human Rights

    The ministerial exception to employment discrimination laws, stemming from the First Amendment, is an affirmative defense and does not strip a government agency of jurisdiction over a complaint.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) dismissed a complaint filed by Victor Ibhawa, a priest, alleging a hostile work environment against the Diocese of Buffalo, finding the ministerial exception deprived it of jurisdiction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent, the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. The Court determined that the DHR’s decision was based on an error of law and remanded the case back to the DHR to review the other defenses presented by the Diocese.

    Facts

    Victor Ibhawa, a Black, Nigerian Catholic priest, was hired by the Diocese of Buffalo to serve as a Parish Administrator. After incidents of racial and xenophobic discrimination, culminating in termination of employment, Ibhawa filed a complaint with DHR alleging a hostile work environment and unlawful termination. The Diocese raised several defenses, including the ministerial exception, which argued that DHR lacked jurisdiction because Ibhawa was a minister. DHR dismissed the complaint on the basis of the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional matter, without considering other defenses.

    Procedural History

    Ibhawa filed a complaint with DHR. DHR dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked jurisdiction due to the ministerial exception. The New York Supreme Court reversed DHR’s dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, finding that the ministerial exception did not definitively bar review. The Appellate Division reinstated DHR’s dismissal, giving deference to the agency’s expertise. The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the ministerial exception to employment discrimination law acts as a jurisdictional bar or as an affirmative defense.

    Holding

    1. No, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, (565 U.S. 171 (2012)) and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (591 U.S. 732 (2020)). The Court emphasized that Hosanna-Tabor specifically held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional limitation. The Court noted that “the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar” (Hosanna-Tabor, 565 US at 195 4). The court explained that the DHR erred by treating the exception as a jurisdictional matter. The issue was not whether the agency had the power to hear the case, but whether any of the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant, including any statutory defenses, would prevent the case from proceeding. DHR’s determination was therefore affected by an error of law, requiring reversal.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the legal nature of the ministerial exception in New York. It forces the DHR to reconsider its decision. The most important implications are that the ministerial exception does not, on its own, prevent a state agency from hearing a case. This decision confirms that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, which means that the employer bears the burden of proving that the ministerial exception applies. The court also emphasizes that the DHR must fully adjudicate a case, considering all defenses raised by the employer, not just the ministerial exception. Moreover, this ruling underscores that state agencies must correctly apply federal constitutional law when evaluating employment discrimination claims in religious contexts, and this is not a matter for agency deference.

  • Kimmel v. State of New York, No. 36 (2017): Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) and Sex Discrimination Claims

    Kimmel v. State of New York, No. 36 (2017)

    The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) allows for the award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in an action against the State of New York under the Human Rights Law for sex discrimination in employment by a state agency.

    Summary

    Betty Kimmel, a former New York State Trooper, sued the State for sex discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, ultimately prevailing at trial and receiving a substantial jury award. Kimmel and her attorneys sought fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The trial court denied the motion, holding the EAJA inapplicable to actions seeking compensatory damages for tortious acts of the State. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the EAJA, which provides for attorney’s fees in certain civil actions against the state, applied to Kimmel’s case. The Court relied on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, which supported a broad interpretation of the term “any civil action,” rejecting the State’s argument that the term was limited to review of administrative actions.

    Facts

    Betty Kimmel, a New York State Trooper from 1980-1994, experienced sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. Kimmel filed a complaint in 1995 against the State of New York and the New York State Division of State Police, alleging a hostile work environment and seeking damages, including attorney’s fees. The State defendants denied any wrongdoing and engaged in obstructionist tactics, leading the Appellate Division to strike their answers. After over a decade, Kimmel prevailed at trial and received a jury award exceeding $700,000. Kimmel and her attorneys then sought attorney’s fees under the EAJA.

    Procedural History

    Kimmel filed suit in 1995. The State defendants’ answers were struck due to their obstructionist tactics. Supreme Court held that the EAJA did not apply. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal from the Appellate Division order, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the EAJA permits the award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff in an action against the State under the Human Rights Law for sex discrimination in employment by a state agency.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plain language of the EAJA defines “any civil action” broadly and there are no explicit limitations that would exclude Kimmel’s case, which was brought under the Human Rights Law and was not brought in the Court of Claims.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first looked at the plain language of the statute and found the EAJA applicable to “any civil action” against the state. The Court acknowledged that two limitations exist: that another statute does not specifically provide for counsel fees, and that an action was not brought in the Court of Claims. Since Kimmel’s case was brought in Supreme Court under the Human Rights Law, neither of these exceptions applied. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the term “judicial review” in the EAJA limited its scope to Article 78 proceedings or actions seeking review of a state agency’s administrative actions. The court determined that to accept the State’s interpretation would render the exclusion of actions in the Court of Claims meaningless. The Court also cited that the EAJA was intended to be comparable to the federal Equal Access to Justice Act, and is a remedial statute and therefore, should be construed broadly.

    The Court emphasized that “the word ‘any’ means ‘all’ or ‘every’ and imports no limitation” and further noted that the State’s interpretation would require adding an exception to the statute that was not clearly expressed.

    The concurring opinion agreed that the statutory language was ambiguous but concurred in the result. The concurrence emphasized a concession made by the State during oral arguments, where the State admitted that the EAJA could apply to a Human Rights Law action seeking injunctive relief against a State agency.

    The dissenting opinion maintained that the EAJA’s language, when read in context and with consideration to legislative history, limits its application to judicial review of agency actions and does not encompass actions seeking compensatory damages.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that under the EAJA, attorney’s fees can be awarded in sex discrimination cases brought under the Human Rights Law, which can be brought in Supreme Court, against state agencies. The Court’s emphasis on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history highlights the importance of examining the specific statutory language. Attorneys should consider the possibility of obtaining attorney’s fees under the EAJA for clients who prevail in actions against the State, particularly in the absence of other fee-shifting provisions. Furthermore, the Court’s decision emphasizes the broad construction of remedial statutes. Lawyers and lower courts should be aware of the practical and fiscal consequences of this ruling and its impact on the state’s willingness to engage in litigation.

    Subsequent cases will likely apply this ruling to similar cases involving state agencies and discrimination, and could extend to other types of civil actions against the state that do not fall under the Court of Claims jurisdiction.

  • Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 174 (2017): Liability under the NYS Human Rights Law for Discrimination Based on Criminal Conviction

    Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 30 N.Y.3d 174 (2017)

    Under the New York State Human Rights Law, liability for employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction is limited to employers, while aiding and abetting liability can extend to non-employers.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed three questions certified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the scope of liability under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The case involved two former employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co., Inc. who were fired after their criminal records revealed past convictions for sexual offenses. The court held that liability under NYSHRL § 296(15), which prohibits discrimination based on criminal convictions, is limited to employers, as defined by common-law principles that emphasize the power to control the employee. However, the Court found that NYSHRL § 296(6), the aiding and abetting provision, could extend liability to non-employers, even out-of-state entities, who aid or abet discriminatory practices.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, former employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co., Inc., had prior convictions for sexual offenses. Astro contracted with Allied Van Lines, Inc., a subsidiary of Sirva, Inc. Under the contract, Astro was required to adhere to Allied’s guidelines, which included criminal background checks and automatic failure for employees with sexual offense convictions. After Sirva investigated the plaintiffs’ criminal records, Astro fired them. Plaintiffs sued Astro, Sirva, and Allied, alleging violations of the NYSHRL, among other claims.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court denied. The court granted summary judgment to Allied and Sirva, holding that § 296(15) applied only to employers and that Allied and Sirva were not the plaintiffs’ employers. The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, which certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the scope of liability under the NYSHRL.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYSHRL § 296(15), prohibiting employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction, limits liability to an aggrieved party’s “employer.”

    2. If § 296(15) is limited to an employer, how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party’s “employer” under § 296(15)?

    3. Whether NYSHRL § 296(6), providing for aiding and abetting liability, applies to § 296(15) such that an out-of-state principal corporation that requires its New York State agent to discriminate in employment based on a criminal conviction may be held liable for the employer’s violation of § 296(15).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because NYSHRL § 296(15) incorporates Article 23-A of the Correction Law, which limits liability to employers, both public and private.

    2. Common-law principles, focusing on the employer’s power to control the employee in their work, determine whether an entity is an employer under § 296(15).

    3. Yes, because § 296(6), the aiding and abetting provision, extends liability to out-of-state non-employers who aid or abet discriminatory practices.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that NYSHRL § 296(15) is limited to employers, finding that the statute’s language, legislative history, and incorporation of Article 23-A of the Correction Law all supported this interpretation. Article 23-A specifies that the prohibition applies to applications “at” an employer or to employment held. The Court noted that an employer has to consider exceptions under Correction Law § 752, making it clear that only employers could violate the statute. The court also found that when determining who constitutes an employer, common-law principles would apply, giving “greatest emphasis” to the alleged employer’s power to control the employee in their work. For the aiding and abetting claim, the Court found that § 296(6) applies to any “person,” and is not limited to employers. The purpose of this section, as expressed in legislative history, was to hold liable anyone who aids or abets discriminatory conduct, regardless of their status. The court cited a previous case, *National Organization for Women v. State Division of Human Rights*, where the aiding and abetting provision was applied to a newspaper that was not an employer.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of liability under the NYSHRL for employment discrimination based on criminal convictions. It confirms that non-employers can be held liable for aiding and abetting discrimination under NYSHRL § 296(6), even if they are not the direct employer, especially if they have significant control over an employer’s employment practices. Businesses, especially those with contractual relationships that influence employment decisions of other entities, must be aware of this potential liability. Attorneys should use the common-law test, and *GTE* factors, when determining if an entity is an “employer”. Moreover, the case highlights that the NYSHRL’s extraterritoriality provision can extend liability for discriminatory acts committed outside of New York if they impact New York residents.

  • Margerum v. City of Buffalo, 24 N.Y.3d 724 (2015): Notice of Claim Not Required for Human Rights Law Claims; Summary Judgment Inappropriate in Discrimination Cases

    24 N.Y.3d 724 (2015)

    A notice of claim is not required as a condition precedent to bringing a Human Rights Law claim against a municipality, and summary judgment is generally inappropriate in cases involving employment discrimination.

    Summary

    White firefighters sued the City of Buffalo, alleging reverse discrimination under the New York Human Rights Law after the City allowed promotion eligibility lists to expire, thereby allegedly denying them promotions. The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability, finding the City did not have a strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate impact liability in a related federal case. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment ruling, holding that the trial court had improperly decided liability at the summary judgment stage and also clarified that a notice of claim is not required for Human Rights Law claims against a municipality, differentiating these claims from tort claims requiring pre-suit notice.

    Facts

    The City of Buffalo had been subject to federal court orders regarding discriminatory hiring practices in its fire department. The City allowed promotion eligibility lists to expire before their maximum duration. White firefighters who would have been promoted had the lists been extended sued the City, claiming reverse discrimination under the Human Rights Law. The City moved to dismiss, arguing the firefighters failed to file a notice of claim as required under General Municipal Law. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on liability, which was granted by the trial court.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the City’s motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, finding no notice of claim was needed and, after a subsequent Supreme Court case (Ricci v. DeStefano), reversed the grant of summary judgment, finding the City failed to meet a “strong basis in evidence” standard. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs were required to file a notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-i before commencing an action alleging violations of the New York Human Rights Law.

    2. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the issue of liability, given the factual disputes concerning the City’s actions.

    Holding

    1. No, because Human Rights Law claims are not tort actions under section 50-e and are not personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to personal property claims under section 50-i.

    2. No, because factual issues remained regarding the City’s motivation and justification for its actions that should not have been decided at the summary judgment stage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the notice of claim requirement. It held that the General Municipal Law provisions requiring a notice of claim applied only to tort actions and did not apply to claims brought under the Human Rights Law. The Court cited prior Appellate Division cases, which have consistently held that a notice of claim is not required for claims based on the Human Rights Law, concluding that “Human rights claims are not tort actions under section 50-e and are not personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to personal property claims under section 50-i.”

    Regarding summary judgment, the Court cited the Supreme Court case of Ricci v. DeStefano, which held that before taking race-based action, “the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.” The Court emphasized that the standard of proof for claims under the New York Human Rights Law is in nearly all instances identical to Title VII and other federal law. The court explained that there were questions of fact surrounding the City’s actions that were inappropriate to resolve on summary judgment.

    The Court noted that the City’s motivations in allowing the eligibility lists to expire and the strength of any justifications were central to the issue of liability. The Court recognized that the City’s motivations were unclear. The Court of Appeals concluded, “In this case, the issue of liability turns on the factual circumstances behind the City’s actions, the strength of its justifications and its motivations.” The court determined that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because questions of fact remained regarding the City’s motivations, and thus the case was sent back for further proceedings.

  • Acosta v. New York City Department of Education, 16 N.Y.3d 309 (2011): Employer’s Duty to Consider Rehabilitation Under Correction Law

    Acosta v. New York City Department of Education, 16 N.Y.3d 309 (2011)

    Under New York Correction Law § 753, a public employer must thoroughly consider all statutory factors, including evidence of rehabilitation, when determining whether to deny employment to an applicant with a prior criminal conviction based on the “unreasonable risk” exception.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York City Department of Education (DOE) acted arbitrarily in denying petitioner Acosta’s application for security clearance. Acosta, who had a prior conviction for robbery committed when she was 17, had otherwise demonstrated significant rehabilitation. The Court found that the DOE failed to adequately consider all factors outlined in Correction Law § 753, specifically information related to her rehabilitation and good conduct, when determining if employing her would pose an unreasonable risk. The Court emphasized the importance of considering all submitted documentation and reversed the denial of Acosta’s application.

    Facts

    In 1993, Acosta was convicted of first-degree robbery at the age of 17 and served over three years in prison. After parole in 1996, she earned a Bachelor’s degree, volunteered to assist inmates, and held responsible positions at two law firms. In 2006, she took a part-time clerical position at the Cooke Center for Learning and Development, a non-profit providing preschool special education services under contract with the DOE. Three months after starting, she was asked to be fingerprinted for DOE security clearance, having previously disclosed her conviction to Cooke Center.

    Procedural History

    The DOE denied Acosta’s application based on the “unreasonable risk” exception due to her prior conviction, leading to the termination of her employment at the Cooke Center. Acosta then filed a petition against the DOE and the Cooke Center, among others. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the DOE acted arbitrarily and remanded for a remedy. The Appellate Division then certified a question to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York City Department of Education acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied Acosta’s application for security clearance based on a prior robbery conviction, without adequately considering all factors outlined in Correction Law § 753, including evidence of rehabilitation and good conduct.

    Holding

    Yes, because the DOE failed to demonstrate that it considered all of the factors enumerated in Correction Law § 753 when determining whether the “unreasonable risk” exception applied, particularly the information produced by Acosta regarding her rehabilitation and good conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while courts should not re-weigh the factors under Correction Law § 753, the DOE’s actions demonstrated a failure to consider all relevant factors. The DOE’s affidavit stated that Acosta “did not provide references from any previous employers,” but the DOE’s interview notice didn’t request those references and one of the references Acosta did provide noted that Cooke Center relied on “model references from past employers” when hiring her. This highlighted a larger issue: the DOE’s failure to consider all the documentation Acosta submitted regarding her rehabilitation. The Court noted that the Legislature has determined that it is unlawful for employers to deny employment based on prior convictions, and the exceptions to this rule require consideration of the factors listed in Correction Law § 753. The court pointed to the affidavit from the DOE’s Director stating that the DOE follows a “general policy” of closer review for first-time applicants with criminal histories, and stated that in light of the DOE’s failure to review all of Acosta’s documentation, this “closer review” appeared to be a pro forma denial, which is what the statute prohibits. As such, the DOE’s decision was deemed arbitrary and capricious because it did not comply with the Correction Law’s mandatory directive to consider all factors under § 753. However, the Court granted the Cooke Center’s motion to dismiss the petition against it, because the denial of clearance obligated Cooke Center to terminate her employment.

  • Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295 (2004): Establishing Pretext in Discrimination Cases

    3 N.Y.3d 295 (2004)

    In employment discrimination cases, while an employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer then bears the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions; the employee must then demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual.

    Summary

    Paula Forrest, an African-American music therapist, sued the Jewish Guild for the Blind, alleging racial discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. She claimed that racially offensive comments were made by her supervisors and that she was subjected to disparate treatment. The Guild argued that Forrest was terminated for failing to provide required medical documentation and that their actions were non-discriminatory. The New York Court of Appeals held that while Forrest established a prima facie case of discrimination, she failed to demonstrate that the Guild’s reasons for her termination were pretextual, affirming the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to the Guild.

    Facts

    Paula Forrest, an African-American woman, worked as a music therapist and case manager for the Jewish Guild for the Blind. She took a leave of absence to care for her ailing father in Florida. The Guild requested documentation of her father’s medical condition, specifically a form completed by a physician. Forrest alleges she submitted the required information but not on the specific form requested. She claimed that during her employment, she was subjected to racially motivated statements and conduct by her supervisors, including being referred to as an “uppity nigger” and “our Black American Princess.” She also alleged disparate treatment, such as being required to sign in and out for bathroom breaks while White employees were not, and that she was assigned extra duties without additional compensation.

    Procedural History

    Forrest commenced an action against the Guild in the Supreme Court, New York County, in 1998. The Supreme Court initially denied the Guild’s motion for summary judgment. In 2003, the Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Guild, finding that Forrest had not shown that the Guild’s conduct was racially biased or that the reasons for her termination were pretextual. The New York Court of Appeals granted Forrest leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Forrest presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Jewish Guild for the Blind’s articulated non-discriminatory reasons for her termination were pretextual, thereby precluding summary judgment in favor of the Guild.

    Holding

    No, because Forrest failed to adequately demonstrate that the Guild’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual; therefore, summary judgment for the Guild was appropriate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the three-step framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. First, Forrest established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, showing she was a member of a protected class, qualified for her position, and was terminated under circumstances suggesting discrimination. The burden then shifted to the Guild to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination, which they did by stating Forrest failed to provide necessary medical documentation for her leave of absence. The court emphasized that to defeat summary judgment, Forrest had to present sufficient evidence to show that the Guild’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. The court found that Forrest failed to adequately rebut the Guild’s claims or show that the reason for her termination was a cover-up for racial discrimination. The Court noted several deficiencies in Forrest’s response, including her failure to adequately address a settlement agreement, explain why she didn’t provide the requested medical information, or present sufficient evidence linking her psychological treatment to the alleged racial hostility. The Court concluded that Forrest did not demonstrate that the Guild’s actions were motivated by racial animus rather than the stated non-discriminatory reasons. Justice G.B. Smith concurred, emphasizing that while Forrest initially raised triable issues of fact, she ultimately failed to demonstrate pretext, which is required to defeat summary judgment once the employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason for its actions. He noted that the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “lay bare her proof on this motion for summary judgment.”

  • Aurecchione v. Classic Coach, 96 N.Y.2d 23 (2001): Entitlement to Pre-Determination Interest in Employment Discrimination Cases

    Aurecchione v. Classic Coach, 96 N.Y.2d 23 (2001)

    In employment discrimination cases under the New York Human Rights Law, while pre-determination interest on back pay awards is not mandatory, its denial is an abuse of discretion unless the Commissioner provides a justification for the denial, as pre-determination interest is an element of complete compensation to make the victim whole.

    Summary

    Carol Aurecchione won a human rights employment discrimination claim against her former employer. The State Division of Human Rights (Division) awarded her back pay but denied “pre-determination interest” (interest accruing from the date of discrimination). The New York Court of Appeals held that, under these facts, denying pre-determination interest was an abuse of discretion because the purpose of the Human Rights Law is to make victims whole, and pre-determination interest is part of that compensation. Although not mandatory, denying it without justification is an abuse of discretion.

    Facts

    Carol Aurecchione was hired by Classic Coach in April 1986 as a charter reservationist and was later promoted to office manager and then general manager. Despite increased responsibilities, her salary remained significantly lower than that of male office managers. In October 1987, Classic eliminated her manager position and offered her a lower-paying reservationist role, which she refused, requesting a termination letter.

    Procedural History

    Aurecchione filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights in February 1988, alleging employment discrimination. Public hearings were held between 1995 and 1996. In 1999, an Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended decision, and the Commissioner rendered a decision, awarding Aurecchione back pay and compensatory damages but denying pre-determination interest. Aurecchione challenged the denial of pre-determination interest in a proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether victims of employment discrimination are entitled to pre-determination interest on back pay awards under the New York Human Rights Law.
    2. Whether the Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights has discretion in awarding pre-determination interest.

    Holding

    1. While not automatically entitled, the denial of pre-determination interest in this case was an abuse of discretion; the award should have been granted because it complements the back pay award and contributes to making the victim whole.
    2. Yes, the Commissioner has some discretion in determining appropriate compensation, subject to appellate review for abuse of that discretion; however, that discretion must be justified.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Human Rights Law intends to compensate victims of employment discrimination fully. Although the statute does not explicitly mention pre-determination interest, it should be liberally construed to effectuate its intent, which is to make victims whole. Citing Loeffler v Frank, the Court noted that federal courts have recognized pre-determination interest as an essential component of back pay awards under Title VII. The court emphasized that interest is not a penalty but a means of indemnifying the aggrieved party for the loss of the use of money during the period of discrimination. Quoting Love v. State of New York, the court stated that interest represents “the cost of having the use of another person’s money for a specified period.” Since Classic Coach had the use of the money wrongfully withheld from Aurecchione, denying pre-determination interest would provide them with an “interest-free loan.” The Court clarified that pre-determination interest is not automatically required but the Commissioner must justify its denial. Because no such justification was offered in this case, the denial was an abuse of discretion. The Court ordered the Division to calculate the interest and complete the process within 30 days.

  • Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 81 N.Y.2d 623 (1993): Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Discrimination Claims

    81 N.Y.2d 623 (1993)

    In cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the arbitrability of statutory discrimination claims is determined by reference to Congress’s intent regarding alternative dispute resolution for that class of claims.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an arbitration clause in a U-4 form, signed as part of a securities industry registration, is enforceable for disputes involving claims of unlawful discrimination. The Court of Appeals of New York held that, in light of Supreme Court precedent, specifically Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the FAA mandates enforcement of such arbitration agreements unless Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial forum for the specific statutory right at issue. The court overruled its prior holding in Matter of Wertheim & Co. v. Halpert to the extent it conflicted with this principle.

    Facts

    Alphonse Fletcher, Jr., an African-American equity trader, alleged racial discrimination by Kidder, Peabody & Co. Rita Reid, a registered securities representative, claimed gender discrimination by Goldman, Sachs & Co. Both Fletcher and Reid had signed U-4 forms containing broad arbitration clauses as part of their securities industry registration. These forms committed all disputes “arising out of [his] employment” to arbitration. Both then brought suit in court, alleging violations of New York’s Human Rights Law.

    Procedural History

    In Fletcher, the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, citing public policy concerns. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to compel arbitration. In Reid, both the trial court and the Appellate Division compelled arbitration, relying on Gilmer. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the FAA preempts state law regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses in disputes involving statutory discrimination claims.

    2. Whether Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for claims arising under the New York Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 (1)(a)), which prohibits employment discrimination, and analogous federal laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

    3. Whether the U-4 form signed by Reid was a contract of employment excluded from the FAA’s coverage under Section 1.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because in situations where the FAA is applicable, it preempts state law on the subject of the enforceability of arbitration clauses.

    2. No, because there is no evidence in the legislative history of Title VII or its amendments indicating a congressional intent to override the general rule that anticipatory contracts to arbitrate are enforceable under the FAA.

    3. No, because the Supreme Court in Gilmer specifically stated that the U-4 form is a contract with the securities exchanges, not a contract of employment, and thus not excluded from the FAA’s coverage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied heavily on Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., which established that statutory claims are subject to arbitration if the agreement to arbitrate is governed by the FAA, unless Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory right at issue. The court stated, “Under that methodology, the party seeking to avoid enforcement of an arbitration clause governed by the FAA must demonstrate a congressional intent ‘to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum’ for disputes based on a particular statutory right.”

    The court found no evidence in the legislative history of Title VII indicating that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of discrimination claims. It noted that the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, which authorize the use of alternative dispute resolution methods, do not shed light on Congress’ intentions regarding anticipatory agreements to arbitrate future disputes.

    Regarding the U-4 form, the court cited Gilmer‘s holding that it is a contract with the securities exchanges, not a contract of employment, and therefore not subject to the FAA’s exclusion for employment contracts. The court dismissed arguments about the adequacy of the arbitral forum, stating that Congress has already considered and balanced those concerns in enacting the FAA. Quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, the court stated that agreeing to arbitration “trades th[ose] procedures and [the] opportunity for review * * * for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration”.

  • Matter of Easton v. Con Edison, 68 N.Y.2d 66 (1986): Establishing Discrimination Through Circumstantial Evidence

    Matter of Easton v. Con Edison, 68 N.Y.2d 66 (1986)

    A finding of discrimination by the State Commissioner of Human Rights must be confirmed if supported by substantial evidence, which may include circumstantial evidence demonstrating that similarly situated individuals were treated differently based on race or sex.

    Summary

    Pamela Easton, a Black woman, alleged Con Edison discriminated against her based on race and sex by denying her promotions in favor of less-qualified white men. The Commissioner of Human Rights sustained her complaint. The New York Court of Appeals found substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s determination. Con Edison’s inconsistent application of job qualifications, its failure to seriously consider Easton’s application, and its promotion of less-experienced white males constituted sufficient evidence of discrimination. The Court reinstated the Commissioner’s order, which included offering Easton a comparable managerial position with back pay and damages for mental anguish. The Court emphasized it could not substitute its judgement for that of the Commissioner if his decision was supported by substantial evidence.

    Facts

    Pamela Easton, a Black woman, worked in Con Edison’s calendaring unit since 1975. She consistently met high standards and aided the assistant supervisor. In 1978, Charles Gallagher, a white male, was assigned to the unit, trained by Easton, and quickly promoted. When Easton returned from maternity leave in 1982, she learned Gallagher had been promoted to assistant supervisor and then supervisor, without her being considered. After Gallagher’s promotion to supervisor, Con Edison advertised for an assistant supervisor. Easton, meeting the listed qualifications, applied, but Daniel Mercado, a white Hispanic, was selected after a pro forma interview of Easton.

    Procedural History

    Easton filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights. The Commissioner of Human Rights reversed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, finding discrimination. Con Edison challenged the Commissioner’s order. The Appellate Division initially annulled the determination. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Commissioner’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commissioner’s finding of discrimination is supported by substantial evidence?

    2. Whether the complaint was timely filed?

    3. Whether the relief ordered by the Commissioner is sustainable?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the record indicates that Easton, because of her race and sex, was never given more than perfunctory consideration for management level positions within the calendar unit while white male employees with less experience were considered and promoted.

    2. No, because Easton filed her complaint within one year of learning about Gallagher’s promotion to assistant supervisor.

    3. Yes, because the remedial provisions of the Division order are authorized by statute and supported by credible evidence in the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s determination. It noted Easton’s delayed promotion compared to Gallagher’s rapid advancement, despite her training him. The Court highlighted that Easton was not seriously considered for the supervisory positions, while less-experienced white males were promoted. The Court rejected Con Edison’s argument that the successful candidates were more qualified, pointing out that the stated job qualifications were inconsistently applied. The court emphasized the importance of looking at the totality of the circumstances.

    The Court determined the complaint was timely because it was filed within one year of Easton learning about Gallagher’s promotion. The Court referenced precedents stating that the statute of limitations begins to run when the complainant learns of the discriminatory act.

    Regarding the relief granted, the Court emphasized the broad discretion granted to the Commissioner under the statute. The order requiring Con Edison to notify supervisory employees about nondiscrimination laws, offer Easton a comparable position with back pay, and pay compensatory damages was deemed appropriate. The court stated, “an award of back pay to a proven victim of discrimination ‘would seem to be a rather normal sanction to be imposed’”. The Court also found the $10,000 award for mental anguish was within the range of previously approved awards. The court explicitly stated that “the effects of the discrimination were, as the Commissioner notes, renewed every working day when complainant reported to white males petitioner had promoted over her.”

  • Cottongim v. County of Onondaga Sheriff’s Dept., 71 N.Y.2d 623 (1988): Discrimination Claims for At-Will Employees

    Cottongim v. County of Onondaga Sheriff’s Dept., 71 N.Y.2d 623 (1988)

    An at-will employee can bring a claim for unlawful discrimination even though they can be discharged for any reason that is not statutorily impermissible.

    Summary

    Arlene Cottongim, a white female at-will employee of the Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department, was compelled to resign after a black male co-worker, John Stevens, visited her while she was home sick. Stevens, a civil service employee, was only lightly disciplined. Cottongim filed a complaint alleging race and sex discrimination. The Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights found discrimination and ordered reinstatement and damages. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that even though Cottongim was an at-will employee, she could not be discharged for discriminatory reasons and that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s finding of discrimination.

    Facts

    Arlene Cottongim, a white female, worked as a juvenile transport officer for the Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department, considered an “at will” employee. She performed the same duties as John Stevens, a black male deputy sheriff who was a civil service employee. On April 26, 1979, Stevens, claiming illness, visited Cottongim at her home while she was on sick leave. A Sheriff’s Department Internal Affairs Officer discovered Stevens there. Subsequently, Cottongim was told to resign or be fired. Stevens was later charged with abuse of sick leave and assault of a juvenile, receiving only a two-day suspension.

    Procedural History

    Cottongim filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights, alleging unlawful discrimination based on race and sex. An Administrative Law Judge held a hearing. The Commissioner of the Division of Human Rights found discrimination and ordered reinstatement and damages. The Appellate Division modified the award for mental anguish. The County appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commissioner’s determination of discrimination was supported by substantial evidence.
    2. Whether the Commissioner acted within his discretion in ordering reinstatement of Cottongim to her Deputy Sheriff position.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the record sufficiently supports the conclusion that Cottongim made a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she, as a white woman, was disciplined differently from her black male coemployee, Deputy Stevens.
    2. Yes, because the Commissioner has broad powers to form a remedy for discrimination, with the limitation that the remedy be reasonably related to the injury to be rectified; reinstatement is specifically authorized by the Human Rights Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the deference owed to the Commissioner’s expertise in identifying discrimination, noting that discrimination is often subtle and elusive. The court found substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s conclusion that Cottongim was discriminated against. Cottongim established a prima facie case by showing she was disciplined differently than Stevens, a similarly situated black male employee. The Sheriff’s Department’s justifications for Cottongim’s discharge were found to be pretextual. The initial reason (abuse of sick time) was baseless. Other explanations, such as failing to report Stevens’s rule violation or acting to discredit the department, were not consistently applied and appeared discriminatory. The court stated, “Initially, shifting responses alone, especially where the first proffered explanation proves baseless, may give rise to an inference that the later justifications are pretextual.”

    The court distinguished this case from those involving vicarious liability, emphasizing that the Sheriff himself engaged in discriminatory conduct. Regarding the remedy, the court held that reinstatement was appropriate because it returns the employee to the position they were deprived of due to discrimination, and it does not put the employee in a better position than before the discrimination. The court reasoned that to preclude reinstatement would allow public officials to discriminate with impunity, undermining the purpose of the Human Rights Law.