New York Law Review

Tag: employment agreement

  • Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Trecker, 421 N.E.2d 497 (N.Y. 1981): Enforceability of Overbroad Restrictive Covenants

    Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Trecker, 421 N.E.2d 497 (N.Y. 1981)

    A restrictive covenant in an employment agreement that is unreasonably broad and not tailored to protect legitimate business interests such as trade secrets or confidential customer lists is unenforceable.

    Summary

    Columbia Ribbon sought to enforce a restrictive covenant against its former salesman, Trecker, to prevent him from working for a competitor. The covenant prohibited Trecker from selling similar goods within his former territory for two years. The court held the covenant unenforceable because it was too broad, lacking limitations related to uniqueness, trade secrets, confidentiality, or unfair competition. Columbia failed to demonstrate that Trecker possessed or used any confidential information, or that his services were unique. The court refused to rewrite the covenant to make it enforceable.

    Facts

    Trecker worked as a salesman for Columbia Ribbon, a company supplying consumables to the word and data processing industry. He signed an employment agreement with a restrictive covenant preventing him from disclosing customer information or competing with Columbia for two years after termination. After being demoted, Trecker left Columbia and joined a competitor, A-l-A Corporation. Columbia then sued to enforce the restrictive covenant, seeking to enjoin Trecker from competing anywhere in the United States and from soliciting former customers.

    Procedural History

    The trial court (Special Term) dismissed Columbia’s complaint on cross-motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. Columbia appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement is enforceable when it is not reasonably limited temporally and geographically and is not necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition stemming from the employee’s use or disclosure of trade secrets or confidential customer lists.

    Holding

    No, because the restrictive covenant was too broad and not tailored to protect legitimate business interests such as trade secrets or confidential customer lists, and the employer failed to demonstrate the employee’s services were unique or that any confidential information was disclosed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that restrictive covenants are disfavored because they can deprive individuals of their livelihood. Such covenants are only enforceable if reasonably limited in time and geography, and necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition arising from the employee’s use of trade secrets or confidential customer lists. The court noted that customer lists readily ascertainable from outside sources do not warrant trade secret protection. Referencing Purchasing Assoc. v Weitz, the court stated that injunctive relief may be available if the employee’s services are truly special, unique or extraordinary, even without trade secrets. Here, the restrictive covenant was deemed overly broad because it was not tied to uniqueness, trade secrets, confidentiality, or competitive unfairness; it simply restrained competition. Columbia did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Trecker disclosed any secret information, performed unique services, or caused any actual damage to the company. The court declined to rewrite the covenant, stating that Columbia’s evidence was insufficient to defeat summary judgment. As such, the court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint. The court noted, “[T]here are ‘powerful considerations of public policy which militate against sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood’”.

  • Stanley J. Capelin Associates, Inc. v. Globe Manufacturing Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 338 (1974): Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Employment Agreements

    Stanley J. Capelin Associates, Inc. v. Globe Manufacturing Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 338 (1974)

    A restrictive covenant in an employment agreement prohibiting the employment of a person who has obtained confidential information is only enforceable if trade secrets are actually involved and the restriction is reasonable under the circumstances.

    Summary

    Stanley J. Capelin Associates, Inc. sought an injunction and damages against Globe Manufacturing Corp. for employing Peter Libman, a former Capelin employee, allegedly in violation of a restrictive covenant in a contract between Capelin and Globe. The contract prohibited either party from employing individuals who had obtained confidential information from the other party. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to Globe, holding that Capelin failed to demonstrate that Libman had acquired or divulged any trade secrets, and that the mere disregard of a three-year employment restriction, standing alone, was insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

    Facts

    Stanley J. Capelin Associates, Inc. (Capelin), an industrial engineering firm, contracted to provide services to Globe Manufacturing Corp. (Globe). Peter Libman, a field engineer for Capelin, was assigned to Globe’s plant. The contract between Capelin and Globe contained a provision that for three years after the agreement, neither party would employ someone who had been employed by the other and had obtained confidential information. Libman terminated his employment with Capelin in October 1968, effective after a 45-day notice period, but stayed longer to finish a project. In January 1969, Libman discussed employment with Globe. Globe’s president informed Capelin’s president about the potential employment. Libman was hired by Globe in February 1969 as an administrative executive involved in purchasing materials. Capelin commenced an action 11 months later, alleging breach of contract due to the employment of Libman and the intention to obtain confidential information.

    Procedural History

    Capelin sued Globe for a temporary and permanent injunction and damages, alleging breach of contract. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s decision and granted summary judgment to Globe. Capelin appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the restrictive covenant in the contract between Capelin and Globe is enforceable to preclude Globe’s employment of Libman, a former Capelin employee, in the absence of evidence that Libman acquired or divulged any trade secrets or confidential information.

    Holding

    No, because Capelin failed to present sufficient evidence that Libman acquired or divulged any trade secrets during his employment with Capelin, and the mere disregard of the three-year employment restriction, without more, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that summary judgment is appropriate when there are no triable issues of fact. The moving party must demonstrate entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The court noted that Capelin’s claim was based on the breach of a provision in the contract that prohibited the employment of individuals who had obtained confidential information. However, Globe demonstrated that no trade secrets were involved and that Libman’s work with Globe was not in industrial engineering. Capelin’s affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment merely stated in a conclusory fashion that trade secrets were acquired by Libman during his employment. The court stated, “‘Bald conclusory assertions, even if believable, are not enough [to defeat summary judgment]’” (citing Ehrlich v. American Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 255, 259). The court also noted that the opposing affidavit should be made by someone with personal knowledge of the facts. Since there was no showing of trade secrets being acquired and divulged, the remaining issue was the three-year prohibition against employment. The court questioned whether the restriction was reasonable and valid under the circumstances. The court stated that “The burden upon a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is not met merely by a repetition or incorporation by reference of the allegations contained in pleadings or bills of particulars, verified or unverified” (citing Indig v. Finkelstein, 23 N.Y.2d 728, 729). The dissenting judges believed that summary judgment was not warranted because there was a reasonable restrictive covenant governing the re-employment of the plaintiff’s employees, apart from trade secrets (citing Restatement, Contracts, § 516, subd. [f]).