New York Law Review

Tag: employee rights

  • Matter of Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Rochester v. Nyquist, 24 N.Y.3d 505 (2014): Employee’s Right to Elect Disciplinary Procedures

    Matter of Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Rochester v. Nyquist, 24 N.Y.3d 505 (2014)

    When a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is renegotiated or becomes effective on or after September 1, 1994, Education Law § 3020(l) requires that tenured employees must be given the option to elect the disciplinary procedures outlined in Education Law § 3020-a, regardless of any alternative disciplinary procedures detailed in the CBA.

    Summary

    A tenured school social worker was suspended without pay and denied a hearing under Education Law § 3020-a, with the School District insisting she could only challenge the discipline through the CBA’s grievance procedure. The CBA, while containing an alternative disciplinary procedure, was renegotiated after September 1, 1994. The Court of Appeals held that Education Law § 3020(l) mandates that any CBA effective after that date must allow tenured employees to choose between the CBA’s procedure and the statutory § 3020-a process, thus affirming the employee’s right to elect the statutory procedure.

    Facts

    The petitioner, a tenured school social worker, was suspended for 30 days without pay by the respondent School District for alleged misconduct. The School District informed the petitioner that she was required to challenge her suspension using the grievance procedures outlined in the CBA. The petitioner was denied a hearing under Education Law § 3020-a despite her request. The CBA, originally negotiated before September 1, 1994, had been renegotiated in 2006 and stated that disciplinary actions “may” be processed as a grievance. The CBA also stipulated that tenured teachers could not be discharged without Education Law §3020 and §3020-a process.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the disciplinary action, arguing she was entitled to the protections of Education Law § 3020-a. Supreme Court initially ruled against the petitioner. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, granting the petition and holding that the petitioner had the right to choose the statutory review process. The School District appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Education Law § 3020(l) requires that all CBAs becoming effective on or after September 1, 1994, afford tenured employees facing discipline the right to elect the review process provided by Education Law § 3020-a, even if the CBA contains an unaltered alternative grievance procedure agreed upon before September 1, 1994, but the CBA itself was altered after that date.

    Holding

    Yes, because Education Law § 3020(l) mandates that CBAs altered by renegotiation or becoming effective on or after September 1, 1994, must provide tenured employees with the option to choose the disciplinary procedures outlined in Education Law § 3020-a, irrespective of any alternative procedures in the CBA. The purpose of the 1994 amendment was to “secure the right of tenured employees to avail themselves of the process set forth in Education Law § 3020-a.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative intent behind the 1994 amendment to Education Law § 3020(l) was to ensure that tenured educators facing disciplinary charges could choose the procedural protections of Education Law § 3020-a. While the statute grandfathers pre-September 1, 1994, CBA discipline review procedures in unaltered CBAs, its dominant purpose was to secure the right of tenured employees to use § 3020-a. The court stated, “the statute unambiguously provides that when a CBA is altered by renegotiation or takes effect on or after September 1, 1994, it must permit tenured employees to elect section 3020-a’s discipline review procedures.” The Court rejected the School District’s argument that only renegotiation of the *discipline procedures* themselves triggers the employee’s option, finding this interpretation grammatically incorrect and at odds with the statute’s purpose. The Court noted the legislature’s recognized the importance of tenure in the educational context and its intention to preserve the process by which tenured educators are disciplined. The Court also noted that the CBA stated that a disciplinary action “may,” not that it “must,” be processed in accordance with the agreement’s grievance and arbitration provisions, making it statutorily inoffensive.

  • ELRAC, Inc. v. Exum, 16 N.Y.3d 320 (2011): Employee’s Right to Uninsured Motorist Benefits From Self-Insured Employer

    ELRAC, Inc. v. Exum, 16 N.Y.3d 320 (2011)

    An employee of a self-insured employer is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits from that employer, despite receiving workers’ compensation benefits, because the right to uninsured motorist coverage stems from a quasi-contractual obligation.

    Summary

    Birtis Exum, an employee of ELRAC, Inc. (Enterprise Rent-A-Car), was injured in a car accident while driving an ELRAC vehicle in the course of his employment. The other driver was uninsured. ELRAC, as a self-insured entity, sought to avoid arbitration for uninsured motorist benefits, arguing that workers’ compensation was Exum’s exclusive remedy. The Court of Appeals held that Exum could pursue uninsured motorist benefits from ELRAC, notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, reasoning that the obligation to provide uninsured motorist coverage is essentially contractual, and thus not barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. The court likened the situation to the employer writing an insurance policy to itself.

    Facts

    Birtis Exum was employed by ELRAC, Inc., a subsidiary of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company.
    While driving a car owned by ELRAC in the course of his employment, Exum was involved in an accident with an uninsured driver.
    ELRAC was self-insured under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370 (3) and did not have a separate insurance policy for the vehicle Exum was driving.
    Exum sought uninsured motorist benefits from ELRAC and served a notice of intention to arbitrate.
    Exum was also entitled to workers’ compensation benefits from ELRAC.

    Procedural History

    Exum served a notice of intention to arbitrate on Elrac, seeking uninsured motorist benefits.
    ELRAC petitioned the Supreme Court to stay the arbitration, which was initially granted.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, allowing the arbitration to proceed. (Matter of ELRAC, Inc. v Exum, 73 AD3d 431 [1st Dept 2010]).
    The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a self-insured employer is liable to its employee for uninsured motorist benefits when the employee is injured in a work-related automobile accident, despite the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because an action against a self-insurer to enforce the liability for uninsured motorist coverage is essentially contractual, and is therefore not barred by Workers’ Compensation Law § 11.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior holding in Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Shaw, 52 NY2d 818 (1980), which established that self-insurers have the same liability for uninsured motorist coverage as insurance companies.
    The court found that there was no reason to diminish Exum’s uninsured motorist protection simply because he was driving a self-insured vehicle.
    Addressing the workers’ compensation exclusivity argument, the court acknowledged Workers’ Compensation Law § 11, which states that an employer’s liability for workers’ compensation is exclusive and replaces any other liability.
    However, the Court stated that the seemingly all-inclusive language of the statute cannot be taken literally, citing Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152 (1980).
    The Court reasoned that the right to uninsured motorist benefits is akin to a contractual right, as if the employer had written an insurance policy to itself with the required uninsured motorist provision. The court stated, “The situation is as though the employer had written an insurance policy to itself, including the statutorily-required provision for uninsured motorist coverage.”
    Therefore, the action to enforce this quasi-contractual right is not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law. The Court distinguished this situation from a tort action directly arising from the injury, which would be barred. The court also referenced Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. (Manning), 62 NY2d 748 (1984), which involved similar facts.

  • Matter of Diaz v. Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center, 62 N.Y.2d 693 (1984): Individual Employee Standing in Arbitration Disputes

    Matter of Diaz v. Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center, 62 N.Y.2d 693 (1984)

    An individual employee has standing to challenge an arbitration award if the collective bargaining agreement specifically grants the employee the right to participate in the arbitration process, including demanding arbitration and selecting representation.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an individual employee had standing to challenge an arbitration award. The Court held that the employee did have standing because the collective bargaining agreement granted employees the right to representation and to initiate arbitration. The court distinguished this case from prior holdings, where collective bargaining agreements did not grant such explicit rights to individual employees. Furthermore, the court reiterated the principle that an arbitration award may only be vacated if it violates public policy or is wholly irrational, finding neither to be the case here regarding the arbitrator’s procedural handling of the timeliness issue.

    Facts

    An employee, Diaz, was subject to disciplinary charges at Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center. The collective bargaining agreement between the employees, the union, and the State allowed an employee facing disciplinary charges the right to representation by the union or an attorney of their choice at each step of the disciplinary process. The agreement also entitled the employee to file a grievance, elect to demand arbitration, notify the American Arbitration Association of an unresolved grievance, and request the appointment of an arbitrator and the scheduling of a hearing.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division initially ruled that the petitioner, Diaz, lacked standing to bring a proceeding to vacate the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Diaz did have standing based on the specific terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division’s order because the arbitration award was not violative of public policy or wholly irrational.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an individual employee has standing to bring a proceeding to vacate an arbitration award when the collective bargaining agreement grants the employee specific rights regarding representation and initiation of arbitration.
    2. Whether the arbitration award should be vacated because it violates public policy or is wholly irrational.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the collective bargaining agreement between the parties specifically allows an employee who is the subject of a disciplinary charge the right to representation and the right to demand arbitration.
    2. No, because the award may not be vacated unless violative of public policy or wholly irrational, and the arbitrator’s procedural resolution of the issue concerning compliance with the contractual requirement that the demand for arbitration be made within a specified time and manner was not irrational.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from previous holdings like Chupka v Lorenz-Schneider Co., Matter of Soto (Goldman), and Matter of Cornell v Caren, noting that in those cases, the collective bargaining agreements did not provide the employee with the same options and rights. Here, the agreement explicitly granted Diaz the right to representation and the right to demand arbitration, giving him a direct stake in the outcome of the arbitration process.

    The court also reiterated the limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. As stated in the memorandum opinion, “an award may not be vacated unless violative of public policy or wholly irrational.” The court deferred to the arbitrator’s procedural resolution, finding it was not irrational. The court did not delve into the merits of the underlying dispute, focusing solely on the procedural issue of standing and the rationality of the arbitrator’s decision-making process.