New York Law Review

Tag: Employee Injury

  • People v. Cruz, 81 N.Y.2d 983 (1993): Restitution to Law Enforcement for Employee Injury Expenses

    People v. Cruz, 81 N.Y.2d 983 (1993)

    A law enforcement agency is considered a “victim” under Penal Law § 60.27 and can receive restitution for salary and medical expenses paid to an officer injured while apprehending a criminal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Nassau County was entitled to restitution under Penal Law § 60.27 for payments made to a police officer injured while apprehending a burglar. The court held that the county, acting as an employer, was a victim and could receive restitution for sick leave and medical expenses. The dissent argued that reimbursing a law enforcement agency for these costs was against legislative intent and public policy, as such expenses are part of the normal operating costs of crime-fighting.

    Facts

    A Nassau County police officer was injured while attempting to apprehend the defendant during a burglary. As a result of the injury, the officer took sick leave and incurred medical expenses. Nassau County paid the officer’s salary during his sick leave and covered his medical bills pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (1). The sentencing court ordered the defendant to pay restitution to Nassau County for these expenses.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution to Nassau County. The Appellate Division affirmed the restitution order, holding that the county suffered a loss in its role as an employer, not as a law enforcement agency. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. A dissenting opinion was filed arguing against the restitution award.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Nassau County qualifies as a “victim” under Penal Law § 60.27 and is entitled to restitution for the salary and medical expenses paid to a police officer injured while apprehending the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the County suffered a direct, out-of-pocket loss as an employer due to the defendant’s criminal actions, and this loss is distinct from the normal operating costs of law enforcement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Nassau County’s loss was incurred in its role as an employer, not solely as a law enforcement agency. The court distinguished this case from situations where law enforcement agencies seek reimbursement for operational expenses like “buy money” in drug investigations. The court emphasized that the county’s expenses stemmed from legal obligations directly and causally related to the crime. The court cited People v. Hall-Wilson, 69 N.Y.2d 154, supporting the idea that restitution is appropriate when a victim suffers a direct financial loss due to a crime. The dissent argued that costs of providing sick leave and medical benefits to law enforcement personnel are an inextricable part of the normal and foreseeable operating costs associated with that governmental function. It cited People v. Rowe, 75 NY2d 948, where the court held that a law enforcement agency could not recover “buy and bust” money expended in the undercover purchase of drugs, because “‘[w]here public monies are expended in the pursuit of solving crimes, the expenditure is part of the investigating agency’s normal operating costs. The governmental entity conducting an investigation is not therefore considered a “victim” to the extent that public monies are so expended.’” The dissent also pointed out that the Legislature, in amending section 60.27 after Rowe, granted law enforcement agencies “victim” status solely for recovering drug buy money, indicating that reimbursement for ordinary law enforcement costs was not intended. The dissent argued allowing restitution in this case could lead to municipalities seeking reimbursement for a wide range of expenses, such as an officer’s salary while waiting to testify or the cost of repairing a police vehicle damaged during a chase. The majority’s opinion focuses on the direct causal link between the defendant’s crime and the county’s financial loss as an employer, distinguishing it from the general costs of law enforcement. The dissent is concerned about opening the door to municipalities seeking restitution for costs inherent in the crime-fighting function.

  • April v. Sovereign Construction Co., 55 N.Y.2d 627 (1981): Enforceability of Indemnification Clauses in Construction Subcontracts

    55 N.Y.2d 627 (1981)

    An indemnification clause in a construction subcontract, which clearly and unambiguously allocates the risk of liability for injuries arising out of the prosecution of the work under the subcontract, is enforceable.

    Summary

    This case concerns the enforceability of an indemnification clause in a construction subcontract. An employee of the subcontractor was injured while performing work under the subcontract, and the general contractor sought indemnification from the subcontractor based on the indemnity clause in their agreement. The New York Court of Appeals held that the indemnification clause was enforceable because it clearly allocated the risk of liability for injuries arising out of the prosecution of the work under the subcontract, and the injury fell within the scope of that clause.

    Facts

    Donald April, an employee of Wachtel, Dukauer and Fein, Inc. (Wachtel), a plumbing subcontractor, was injured while distributing plumbing materials at a construction worksite. Sovereign Construction Co., Ltd. (Sovereign) was the general contractor. The subcontract between Sovereign and Wachtel contained an indemnification clause stating Wachtel would be responsible for injuries to any person, including Wachtel’s employees, for damages “caused by or resulting from or arising out of any act or omission in connection with this Subcontract or the prosecution of work hereunder”. Wachtel was responsible for plumbing installations, providing plumbing materials, and unloading and distributing them at the worksite.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff, Donald April, sued Sovereign Construction Co., Ltd. Sovereign, in turn, initiated a third-party action against Wachtel, Dukauer and Fein, Inc., seeking indemnification based on the subcontract agreement. The lower courts ruled in favor of Sovereign, enforcing the indemnification clause. Wachtel appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indemnification clause in a construction subcontract is enforceable when an employee of the subcontractor is injured while performing work specifically required by the subcontract.

    Holding

    Yes, because the indemnity provision became controlling with respect to the responsibility and liability for the injury since the plaintiff, an employee of the subcontractor, was injured in the prosecution of the work under the subcontract.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding the indemnification clause enforceable. The court reasoned that the clause clearly and unambiguously allocated the risk of liability to Wachtel for injuries arising out of the work performed under the subcontract. Because the plaintiff was injured while distributing plumbing materials—an activity directly related to Wachtel’s responsibilities under the subcontract—the indemnification clause applied. The court emphasized that Wachtel was responsible not only for plumbing installations but also for providing and distributing plumbing materials, and the injury occurred during this process. The memorandum opinion does not provide extensive reasoning but emphasizes the direct connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the work required by the subcontract. By affirming the lower court’s decision, the Court upheld the principle of freedom of contract and the ability of parties to allocate risk through clear and unambiguous indemnification agreements.