New York Law Review

Tag: emotional distress

  • Marmelstein v. Tendler, 16 N.Y.3d 16 (2010): Establishing a Fiduciary Duty in Clergy-Congregant Relationships

    Marmelstein v. Tendler, 16 N.Y.3d 16 (2010)

    A fiduciary relationship between a cleric and a congregant requires specific factual allegations demonstrating de facto control and dominance by the cleric over a uniquely vulnerable congregant, beyond the scope of a typical clergy-congregant relationship.

    Summary

    Adina Marmelstein sued Rabbi Mordecai Tendler and his synagogue, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and emotional distress stemming from a 3.5-year sexual relationship. Marmelstein claimed Tendler, acting as her counselor, advised that sexual relations would improve her chances of marriage. The court dismissed the claims, finding the fraud claim barred by the “heart balm” statute and the fiduciary duty claim insufficiently pleaded because Marmelstein did not demonstrate the unique vulnerability required to establish a cleric’s de facto control and dominance. The court emphasized the need to distinguish actionable fiduciary breaches from non-actionable seductive conduct, even if morally reprehensible.

    Facts

    Adina Marmelstein sought advice from Rabbi Mordecai Tendler starting in 1994, initially regarding personal issues. Tendler later recruited her to his synagogue in 1996. Marmelstein alleges Tendler counseled her on personal, legal, and financial matters, including her desire to marry and have children. She claims Tendler initiated a sexual relationship under the guise of “sexual therapy” to improve her attractiveness to men, which lasted from November 2001 to May 2005. Tendler allegedly threatened her with social ostracization if she disclosed the affair. After the affair ended, Marmelstein alleges her reputation was damaged and she left the synagogue.

    Procedural History

    Marmelstein sued Tendler and his synagogue in Supreme Court, which dismissed the fraud claim but allowed the breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims to proceed. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the remaining causes of action. Marmelstein appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Marmelstein sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Tendler, based on their clergy-congregant relationship and his alleged counseling.

    2. Whether Tendler’s conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Holding

    1. No, because Marmelstein’s allegations failed to demonstrate that Tendler exercised de facto control and dominance over her, making her uniquely vulnerable and incapable of self-protection regarding the matter at issue.

    2. No, because Tendler’s conduct was not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while a fiduciary relationship exists when one party has a duty to act for the benefit of another, Marmelstein’s general assertions were insufficient to establish Tendler as a fiduciary beyond an ordinary clergy-congregant relationship. The court emphasized that pleading a breach of fiduciary duty requires articulating specific facts demonstrating “de facto control and dominance” by the cleric, rendering the congregant “uniquely vulnerable and incapable of self-protection.” Marmelstein’s allegations indicated voluntary consent to the sexual relationship based on her belief it would help her find a husband, showing deception but not the surrender of her will. The court distinguished this case from situations involving sexual contact with a minor, where consent is impossible. Regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found Tendler’s conduct not outrageous enough to meet the high standard required for such a claim, quoting Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., stating the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . and [was] utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” The court also noted concerns about First Amendment entanglement, avoiding the need to assess religious doctrine in evaluating Tendler’s conduct.

  • Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y.3d 148 (2004): Medical Malpractice and Emotional Distress Damages in Stillbirth Cases

    2 N.Y.3d 148 (2004)

    Medical malpractice resulting in a miscarriage or stillbirth constitutes a breach of duty of care to the expectant mother, entitling her to damages for emotional distress, even in the absence of an independent physical injury.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals overturned its prior precedent in Tebbutt v. Virostek, holding that a mother can recover damages for emotional distress caused by medical malpractice leading to a miscarriage or stillbirth, even without an independent physical injury. The court reasoned that medical professionals owe a duty of care to the expectant mother, and malpractice resulting in stillbirth or miscarriage is a direct violation of that duty. This decision aligns New York with the majority of jurisdictions and recognizes the emotional harm suffered by mothers in these circumstances, even when they don’t suffer independent physical harm.

    Facts

    Broadnax: Karen Broadnax experienced significant vaginal bleeding during her pregnancy. Despite these symptoms, medical staff delayed appropriate treatment, resulting in a stillborn child due to placental abruption.

    Fahey: Debra Ann Fahey, pregnant with twins, reported severe abdominal pain and nausea. Her doctor, relying on a previous examination, dismissed her symptoms. She later prematurely delivered both twins, who did not survive, due to an undiagnosed incompetent cervix.

    Procedural History

    Broadnax: The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing Tebbutt.

    Fahey: The Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Appellate Division affirmed, relying on Tebbutt.

    The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the Appellate Division orders in both.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, absent a showing of independent physical injury, a mother may recover damages for emotional harm when medical malpractice causes a miscarriage or stillbirth?

    Holding

    Yes, because medical malpractice resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth should be construed as a violation of the duty of care to the expectant mother, entitling her to damages for emotional distress, even without an independent physical injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals overruled Tebbutt because it created a logical inconsistency in the law. Infants injured in utero who survive can sue for their injuries, and pregnant mothers can sue for independent injuries. However, Tebbutt immunized medical caregivers from liability when their malpractice caused a miscarriage or stillbirth. The Court reasoned that a doctor owes a duty of care to the expectant mother as the patient. The Court stated, “[e]ven in the absence of an independent injury, medical malpractice resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth should be construed as a violation of a duty of care to the expectant mother, entitling her to damages for emotional distress.”

    The court also addressed concerns about expanding liability, stating that while line-drawing is necessary, clinging to an indefensible line is not justified. The dissent argued that Tebbutt established a workable rule, but the majority found it outdated and creating a gap in the law where an aggrieved class of plaintiffs was denied recovery. The majority noted, “[i]f the fetus cannot bring suit, ‘it must follow in the eyes of the law that any injury here was done to the mother.’”

    The court also noted that most jurisdictions permit some form of recovery for negligently caused stillbirths or miscarriages. New York’s ruling limits a mother’s recovery to damages for emotional distress attending a stillbirth or miscarriage caused by medical malpractice, and does not allow a wrongful death claim for the fetus.

  • Ferrara v. Bernstein, 81 N.Y.2d 531 (1993): Negligent Abortion and Emotional Distress

    Ferrara v. Bernstein, 81 N.Y.2d 531 (1993)

    A medical facility can be held liable for emotional distress damages resulting from negligent abortion services, specifically the failure to inform a patient of an incomplete abortion, which leads to a traumatic miscarriage.

    Summary

    Ferrara underwent an abortion at Bernstein’s facility. A pathology report suggested the abortion was incomplete, but Ferrara was not informed. She later experienced a traumatic miscarriage, leading to emotional distress. The court held that the facility was liable for the emotional distress damages because the distress arose not merely from viewing the fetus but from the negligent failure to inform her of the incomplete abortion, compelling her to undergo an unplanned and traumatic miscarriage. This failure was a direct breach of duty owed to her, making the emotional distress compensable. The court distinguished this case from situations where pain arises solely from pregnancy or childbirth.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, Ferrara, underwent an abortion at a facility leased to defendant-doctor Bernstein after paying a fee.
    The surgeon advised her about cramps and Tylenol but provided no further instructions.
    The facility received a pathology report indicating a possibility that Ferrara was still pregnant but failed to notify her.
    Ferrara canceled and rescheduled a follow-up appointment due to weather predictions.
    Before the rescheduled appointment, Ferrara experienced worsening cramps and was taken to a hospital where she delivered a 4 ½-inch fetus.
    During the delivery, a doctor emphasized that the expelled matter was a fetus, intensifying Ferrara’s emotional distress.
    Ferrara claimed psychiatric care was needed because of posttraumatic depression, nightmares, sleeplessness, withdrawal, and reluctance to resume intimate relations.

    Procedural History

    Ferrara sued, arguing negligence in failing to advise her of the pathology report and failure to secure her prompt return to the facility.
    The jury awarded Ferrara $125,000 in damages ($20,000 for pain and suffering and $105,000 for emotional distress).
    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a medical facility is liable for emotional distress damages when a patient experiences a traumatic miscarriage due to the facility’s negligence in failing to inform her of an incomplete abortion.

    Holding

    Yes, because the emotional distress resulted from the facility’s breach of its duty to properly advise the plaintiff of her condition, which caused both physical and emotional injuries, and not merely from witnessing the fetus. The court found a causal relationship between the negligence and the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a causal relationship existed between the negligence (failure to inform) and the injury (emotional distress from the miscarriage). The jury could infer Ferrara would have sought a second abortion had she been informed.
    The court distinguished this case from situations where pain arises solely from pregnancy, emphasizing that Ferrara’s pain stemmed from the negligent abortion services, particularly the failure to notify her of the incomplete procedure and secure her prompt return.
    The Appellate Division noted that the physical pains were not naturally associated with the agreed-upon abortion procedure. As the Appellate Division noted, the physical pains she suffered “most emphatically were not naturally associated with the abortion procedure for which she had contracted.” (179 AD2d 79, 84.)
    The court emphasized that the emotional distress resulted from the failure to properly advise Ferrara of her condition, leading to the miscarriage, rather than simply from viewing the fetus. The Appellate Division stated, “Accordingly, this is a malpractice action based on the failure to properly advise plaintiff of her condition which caused both her physical and emotional injuries.” (179 AD2d, at 85.)
    The court cited Martinez v Long Is. Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., affirming that a breach of duty directly owed to the plaintiff, leading to emotional distress, is compensable. This case supports the proposition that emotional damages are recoverable when resulting from a breach of duty directly to the patient.

  • Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500 (1983): Limits on Recovery for Emotional Distress in Negligence

    Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500 (1983)

    In negligence cases, recovery for emotional distress is limited to situations where the emotional injury is a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach of duty owed to the plaintiff.

    Summary

    A dentist sued a medical supply company for negligence after they incorrectly labeled an anesthetic machine, leading him to administer nitrous oxide instead of oxygen to a patient, causing her death. The dentist claimed this incident caused him emotional distress, forcing him to withdraw from his practice. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the dentist could recover pecuniary losses, he could not recover for emotional injuries. The court reasoned that emotional distress was a consequential, not direct, result of the defendant’s negligence, and allowing such recovery would create an unworkable expansion of liability.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a dentist, purchased an anesthetic machine from the defendants. The defendants overhauled the machine, but negligently reversed the color-coded decals for oxygen and nitrous oxide. The defendants also failed to install, or inform the plaintiff that they could install, connectors of different sizes for the oxygen and nitrous oxide, which would have prevented improper connection of the machine. Consequently, when the dentist attempted to administer oxygen to a patient after extracting teeth, he inadvertently administered nitrous oxide, resulting in the patient’s death. A wrongful death action was filed against the dentist, and he was subject to a criminal investigation. As a result, the dentist suffered mental ill health, damage to his reputation, and was forced to withdraw from his practice.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court held that the dentist was entitled to recover for both emotional harm and pecuniary loss. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint and holding that no cause of action was stated when emotional harm results indirectly through the reaction of the plaintiff to injury negligently caused to another. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the claim for pecuniary losses but denying recovery for emotional injuries.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress when that distress results from the plaintiff’s reaction to the injury negligently caused to a third party, where the plaintiff was the instrument of that injury due to the defendant’s negligence.

    Holding

    No, because recovery for emotional injury is compensable only when a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach of duty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reviewed prior cases involving recovery for emotional harm, categorizing them into three groups: (1) cases where breach of a duty directly results in emotional harm, (2) cases like Tobin v. Grossman where a bystander seeks recovery for emotional distress caused by injury to another, and (3) cases where violation of a duty results in physical injury to a third person and financial or emotional harm to the plaintiff. The court stated, “[T]here is no duty to protect from emotional injury a bystander to whom there is otherwise owed no duty, and, even as to a participant to whom a duty is owed, such injury is compensable only when a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach.” The court found that the dentist’s emotional distress was a consequential result of the defendant’s negligence, similar to the parents’ distress in Howard v. Lecher. Allowing recovery here would create an unmanageable expansion of liability. The court emphasized that the distinction between direct and consequential injuries, while potentially fine, is necessary to create a “rational practical boundary for liability.” Quoting Tobin v Grossman, the court reasoned that drawing any line necessarily differentiates between close cases, and permitting recovery for emotional injury in this case, while denying it to the patient’s family, would be anomalous. The court also noted the speculativeness of damages. The dissent argued the dentist was the instrument of the patient’s death because of the defendant’s negligence, making the injury direct, but the majority rejected this argument.

  • Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809 (1980): Recovery for Emotional Distress Resulting from Injury to Another

    Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809 (1980)

    A plaintiff cannot recover for emotional distress caused by observing injury to a third person, even a close relative, where the plaintiff was not in the zone of danger and did not suffer direct physical injury as a result of the defendant’s negligence.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a mother could recover for emotional and physical injuries allegedly resulting from the administration of a drug, Delalutin, during pregnancy, which caused her child to be born with severe deformities. The court held that neither the mother nor the father could recover for emotional distress, as they were not within the zone of danger and the mother’s physical injuries were derivative of her emotional distress over her child’s condition. The court emphasized the importance of limiting liability in cases of emotional distress to prevent potentially limitless claims.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, a mother and father, brought suit against E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., the manufacturer of the drug Delalutin, and the administering physician. The mother had been administered Delalutin during her pregnancy. The child was born with severe limb deformities and other defects. The parents claimed the deformities were caused by the drug. The mother sought recovery for both emotional distress and physical injuries, while the father sought recovery solely for emotional distress.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, dismissing the father’s claim but allowing the mother’s claim to proceed. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the claims of both the mother and the father.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mother can recover for emotional and physical injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the negligent administration of a drug during pregnancy that caused deformities in her child, where the mother was not within the zone of danger and her physical injuries are primarily derived from her emotional distress over the child’s condition.

    Holding

    No, because the mother was not within the zone of danger and her physical injuries are primarily derived from her emotional distress over the child’s condition. The court held that allowing recovery in this situation would expand the scope of duty too broadly and potentially lead to unlimited liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609 (1969), which limits recovery for emotional distress caused by observing injury to a third person. The court reasoned that allowing recovery in this case would create an exception that would swallow the general rule. The court emphasized that the mother’s physical injuries were primarily a consequence of her emotional distress over her child’s condition, and she was not in the zone of danger. The court stated that to allow recovery, the emotional distress must result directly from a duty owed to the plaintiff and be a direct, rather than consequential, result of the defendant’s negligence. Quoting from Tobin v. Grossman, the court highlighted the policy considerations against expanding liability for emotional distress: “Every injury has far reaching repercussions… The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.” The court recognized the deep emotional impact on the parents but ultimately concluded that policy considerations dictated against extending the scope of liability in this context. Judge Fuchsberg dissented, arguing that the mother was a direct patient of the doctor and consumer of the drug, and that her allegations of physical injuries (nervous system damage, dizziness, vomiting, and nausea) raised questions of fact as to whether she suffered independent personal injuries apart from her emotional distress.

  • Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978): Limiting Liability for Emotional Distress to Parents of Child with Genetic Disease

    Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978)

    A physician’s negligence in failing to diagnose a fetus with a genetic disease does not create a cause of action for the parents’ emotional distress resulting from the child’s birth and subsequent suffering.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, parents of a child born with Tay-Sachs disease, sued the defendant doctor for negligence, alleging he failed to take a proper genealogical history or properly evaluate it, which would have revealed their heightened risk of having a child with the disease. They claimed that had they been informed of the risk and the availability of testing, they would have aborted the pregnancy. The court held that the parents could not recover for their emotional distress, reasoning that extending liability in this case would create artificial and unmanageable boundaries. The court emphasized the need to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree, even in the face of genuine suffering.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, both Eastern European Jews, consulted the defendant doctor. The doctor failed to take a proper genealogical history or to properly evaluate it. The parents subsequently gave birth to a daughter with Tay-Sachs disease, a degenerative genetic disorder. The parents claimed they would have undergone testing and aborted the pregnancy had the doctor properly advised them of the risk and the availability of tests.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued, alleging the doctor’s negligence caused them mental distress. The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether parents can recover from a doctor for the mental distress and emotional disturbances they suffered as a result of their infant daughter having been born with and eventually succumbing to Tay-Sachs disease, where the doctor was allegedly negligent in failing to diagnose the risk of the disease in utero.

    Holding

    No, because extending liability to the parents in this situation would require an unmanageable extension of traditional tort concepts, leading to arbitrary and artificial boundaries in the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the parents’ suffering but emphasized the need to limit the scope of liability. It noted that while the law seeks to provide redress for injuries caused by negligence, it cannot provide relief for every injury suffered. The court distinguished this case from situations where direct physical or emotional injury results from negligence. Here, the parents suffered emotional distress from witnessing their child’s suffering, not from a direct injury to themselves caused by the doctor’s negligence.

    The court cited Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609 (1969), which denied recovery to a mother traumatized by injuries suffered by her child due to another’s negligence. The court reasoned that extending liability to the parents would create artificial boundaries. For example, the dissent would allow the mother to recover while denying recovery to the father. “The law of liability should not turn on hypertechnical and fortuitous considerations of this type.”

    The court recognized the difficulty in drawing a line if recovery were allowed in this case. “Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree” (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619 (1969)).

  • Lando v. State of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 803 (1976): Negligent Handling of Corpse and Emotional Distress

    39 N.Y.2d 803 (1976)

    A hospital can be held liable for the mental anguish caused to a parent when it negligently fails to properly search for a missing patient, resulting in the parent being denied access to and control over the deceased child’s body.

    Summary

    This case concerns a claim against the State of New York for the negligent handling of a deceased patient’s body at a state-run hospital. The Court of Appeals held that while the claimant failed to prove conscious pain and suffering of the deceased or wrongful death, he did prove his claim for mental anguish. The court found the hospital negligent for failing to conduct a diligent search for the missing patient, whose body was found on hospital grounds. This negligence resulted in the claimant being denied access to his daughter’s body, entitling him to damages for the mental anguish suffered.

    Facts

    Rose Lando, the claimant’s mentally deficient daughter, was a patient at a state-run hospital. She disappeared from the hospital. The hospital, after learning of her disappearance, failed to conduct a careful and diligent search of the hospital premises. Eleven days after her disappearance, her body was found in a wooded area on the hospital grounds, only 50 feet from the parking lot adjacent to her building.

    Procedural History

    The claimant, Ferdinando Lando, filed a claim against the State of New York, individually and as administrator of his daughter’s estate, in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims ruled in favor of the claimant individually for mental anguish. The Appellate Division reversed the Court of Claims’ judgment. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hospital’s negligent failure to conduct a proper search for the missing patient, resulting in the parent being denied access to the deceased child’s body, constitutes a basis for damages for mental anguish suffered by the parent.

    Holding

    Yes, because the hospital’s negligence directly caused the claimant mental anguish by denying him access to and control over his deceased daughter’s body for an extended period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Court of Claims that the claimant proved his claim for mental anguish due to the hospital’s negligence. The court emphasized that the hospital had a duty to conduct a careful and diligent search for the missing patient. The court found the hospital’s search to be inadequate, evidenced by the fact that the daughter’s body was found a short distance from her building. The court reasoned that the hospital’s negligence directly caused the claimant mental anguish because he was denied access to and control over his daughter’s body for 11 days. The court stated that the claimant was “entitled to damages for the mental anguish he suffered when, solely by reason of the hospital’s negligence, he was denied access to and control over the body of his deceased daughter for a period of 11 days.” The court modified the Appellate Division’s order by reinstating the judgment in favor of the claimant individually for $5,000.

  • Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609 (1969): Establishing Limits on Recovery for Emotional Distress

    Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609 (1969)

    A plaintiff cannot recover for emotional distress and resulting physical injury caused by witnessing or learning of an injury to a third person, even a close relative, due to policy concerns about limitless liability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a mother could recover damages for emotional and physical injuries suffered as a result of witnessing her child’s injury in an accident caused by the defendant’s negligence. The court held that no cause of action exists for unintended harm sustained solely as a result of injuries inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the relationship or whether the plaintiff witnessed the incident. This decision was based on policy considerations, including the potential for unlimited liability and the difficulty in establishing reasonable boundaries for such claims.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s two-year-old child was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant. The mother alleged that she was in the “full view and presence” of the accident and suffered severe emotional and physical injuries as a result. However, pretrial examination revealed that the mother was not an eyewitness to the accident itself but arrived on the scene immediately after hearing the screech of brakes and seeing her injured child.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term initially sustained the mother’s cause of action against a motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the cause of action. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mother can recover for her own emotional and physical injuries caused by shock and fear for her child who suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident, when the accident occurred either in her presence or nearby, but not directly witnessed by her.

    Holding

    No, because extending the duty of care to include those who suffer emotional distress from witnessing harm to others would create virtually limitless liability and pose significant challenges in defining the scope of such liability in a reasonable way.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that New York law allows recovery for negligently induced mental trauma without physical impact (citing Battalla v. State of New York). However, the key issue was whether to extend the concept of duty to third persons who do not sustain any physical impact or fear for their own safety. The court recognized the impact on a mother of a serious injury to her child but emphasized that there were no new technological, economic, or social developments that would justify a radical change in policy. The court extensively discussed the policy factors against extending liability, including foreseeability, proliferation of claims, fraudulent claims, inconsistency of the zone of danger rule, unlimited liability, unduly burdensome liability, and the difficulty of circumscribing the area of liability.

    The court rejected the argument that proliferation of claims or potential for fraudulent claims should bar recovery, citing Battalla. However, it emphasized the problem of unlimited liability, noting that if foreseeability were the sole test, liability could extend to a wide range of relatives, caretakers, and even bystanders. The court also pointed out the difficulty in creating a reasonable limitation on liability, as any rule based solely on eyewitnessing the accident would be arbitrary. “Every parent who loses a child or whose child of any age suffers an injury is likely to sustain grievous psychological trauma, with the added risk of consequential physical harm.”

    The court also cited practical difficulties, emphasizing that the consequences of every injury ripple outward without end. “The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. The risks of indirect harm from the loss or injury of loved ones is pervasive and inevitably realized at one time or another. Only a very small part of that risk is brought about by the culpable acts of others.” The court concluded that it is enough that the law establishes liability in favor of those directly or intentionally harmed.