McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109 (1987)

When a municipality undertakes to provide emergency housing for homeless families with children, a court has the equitable power to issue a preliminary injunction requiring that the housing meet minimum standards of sanitation, safety, and decency.

Summary

This case addresses whether the New York Supreme Court has the authority to issue a preliminary injunction mandating that New York City Departments of Social Services (DSS) and Housing, Preservation, and Development (HPD) provide emergency housing that meets minimum standards of sanitation, safety, and decency when they have already undertaken to provide such housing for homeless families with children. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court does possess such power. The injunction applies only when the city is already providing emergency housing and directs them to ensure that housing meets certain basic standards. This case emphasizes the court’s power to ensure minimally adequate living conditions when the government has already committed to providing shelter.

Facts

Destitute families receiving emergency housing aid from New York City (lodged in hotels and motels) complained of substandard conditions, including rooms lacking furniture, bedding, or appliances; apartments without adequate heat, hot water, plumbing, or electricity; and buildings infested with rodents and plagued by crime.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court, New York County, granted a preliminary injunction compelling the DSS and HPD to provide emergency housing conforming to minimal standards. The Appellate Division modified the order, vacating the preliminary injunction, citing Matter of Bernstein v. Toia. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, limited to the certified question of whether the Appellate Division properly vacated the preliminary injunction.

Issue(s)

Whether the Supreme Court has the power to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the New York City Departments of Social Services (DSS) and Housing, Preservation and Development (HPD) to provide emergency housing that satisfies minimum standards of sanitation, safety, and decency when they have already undertaken to provide such housing for homeless families with children.

Holding

Yes, because when the city undertakes to provide emergency housing, the court has equitable power to ensure it meets minimum standards, irrespective of any explicit statutory or constitutional mandate to provide such housing in the first place. The prior decision in Matter of Bernstein v. Toia does not bar such an injunction.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Supreme Court’s injunction did not direct the city to provide housing where none was being provided; rather, it applied only when emergency housing assistance was already being granted. The injunction merely directed that the housing meet certain minimum standards, such as providing a bed for each family member, sanitary bathrooms with hot water, sufficient heat, and basic furniture. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Bernstein v. Toia, where the court was asked to substitute its judgment for that of the Department of Social Services regarding the adequacy of shelter allowances set by regulation. Here, when the Supreme Court first imposed minimum housing standards, no applicable departmental regulation existed. The court emphasized that “[i]n a civilized society, a ‘shelter’ which does not meet minimal standards of cleanliness, warmth, space and rudimentary conveniences is no shelter at all.” The court stated that with the later adoption of departmental regulations (18 NYCRR 352.3 [g], [h]), there could be no question about the minimum level of habitability which defendants must meet when they undertake to provide emergency housing. The court concluded that the Appellate Division erred in holding that the Supreme Court lacked the power to issue the preliminary injunction. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for further proceedings, including consideration of whether there was an abuse of discretion in granting the injunction or whether the Appellate Division should make a different disposition of the case.