New York Law Review

Tag: Emergency Doctrine

  • Lifson v. Klink, 9 N.Y.3d 456 (2007): Emergency Doctrine and Foreseeable Circumstances

    Lifson v. Klink, 9 N.Y.3d 456 (2007)

    The emergency doctrine does not apply when the alleged emergency situation (e.g., sun glare) was a foreseeable circumstance given the conditions and surroundings.

    Summary

    Irene Lifson was struck and killed by a car driven by Derek Klink. Klink claimed he was temporarily blinded by sun glare while making a left turn. The trial court instructed the jury on the emergency doctrine, and the jury found Klink not negligent. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the emergency doctrine was improperly applied because the sun glare was a foreseeable condition, given the time of day and Klink’s direction of travel. The court emphasized that the emergency doctrine is reserved for sudden and unexpected circumstances, not those that are reasonably anticipated.

    Facts

    Klink, driving northbound on Harrison Place, attempted a left turn onto Harrison Street, a one-way street. Klink testified his view was partially obstructed, and he inched forward to see traffic. He noticed pedestrians to his left, looked, and proceeded to turn. Mid-turn, he was allegedly blinded by sun glare. He looked down, then up, seeing Lifson just before impact. Lifson was wearing a red coat. The accident occurred around 4:05 p.m. on a sunny day. Lifson was crossing Harrison Street where the MONY Towers’ exit lines up with the entrance to the garage, despite the absence of a marked crosswalk at that location.

    Procedural History

    Lifson’s estate sued Klink and the City of Syracuse. At trial, the court instructed the jury on the emergency doctrine. The jury found the City and Lifson negligent, apportioning fault at 15% and 85%, respectively, and found Klink not negligent. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding Klink, reinstated the complaint against him, and remitted the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the emergency doctrine based on Klink’s claim that he was blinded by sun glare.

    Holding

    Yes, because the sun glare, under the circumstances, was not a sudden and unexpected occurrence that would warrant the application of the emergency doctrine.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The emergency doctrine applies when an actor faces a sudden and unexpected circumstance leaving little time for thought, provided the actor did not create the emergency. The court distinguished this case from situations involving truly unexpected emergencies. The court reasoned that Klink was familiar with the area, was turning west at a time of day when the sun was setting, and that it is common knowledge that the sun can interfere with vision under such conditions. Therefore, the sun glare was not a “sudden and unexpected circumstance.” The court cited Caristo v. Sanzone, where icy conditions were not considered a sudden emergency because the driver was aware of deteriorating weather for hours. The court contrasted this with Ferrer v. Harris, where a child darting into the street was considered a qualifying emergency. The Court stated, “While Klink did not drive this particular route often, he was familiar with the general area since he worked in the MONY Towers. Klink was about to turn to the west at a time of day that the sun would be setting. It is well known, and therefore cannot be considered a sudden and unexpected circumstance, that the sun can interfere with one’s vision as it nears the horizon at sunset, particularly when one is heading west.” Because the improper charge affected the outcome, it was not harmless error. The court emphasized that the jury instruction on the emergency doctrine created an extremely favorable standard for Klink to be judged by.

  • Caristo v. Sanzone, 96 N.Y.2d 172 (2001): The Emergency Doctrine and Foreseeable Road Conditions

    96 N.Y.2d 172 (2001)

    The emergency doctrine does not apply when the allegedly emergent situation, such as icy road conditions, was foreseeable given the weather conditions and defendant’s awareness of them.

    Summary

    In this motor vehicle accident case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the emergency doctrine. Defendant Sanzone’s car slid on ice and collided with plaintiff’s vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that it was reversible error to give the emergency instruction because the icy conditions were not sudden or unexpected, given the known weather conditions (freezing rain, hail) in the hours leading up to the accident. The defendant was aware of the inclement weather. The Court emphasized that the emergency doctrine applies only when a party faces a sudden and unexpected circumstance not of their own making.

    Facts

    Defendant Sanzone was driving a vehicle owned by his wife, defendant Cinquemani. The weather that morning consisted of snow, rain, and freezing rain and the temperature was 22 degrees Fahrenheit. As Sanzone drove downhill toward an intersection, his vehicle began to slide on a sheet of ice. Despite pumping the brakes, the car slid through a stop sign and collided with plaintiff Caristo’s vehicle. The Plaintiff and other witnesses confirmed icy conditions. Sanzone was aware of worsening weather conditions for several hours before the accident. Neither driver had trouble controlling their vehicles before this incident.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence. The trial court, over plaintiff’s objection, instructed the jury on the emergency doctrine. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the complaint was dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed. Plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury on the emergency doctrine when the defendant’s vehicle slid on ice, given that the defendant was aware of the inclement weather conditions prior to the accident.

    Holding

    No, because the icy conditions were not a sudden and unexpected emergency, given the defendant’s admitted knowledge of the worsening weather conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the emergency doctrine applies only when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance that leaves little or no time for thought or deliberation. The actor must also not have created the emergency. The Court emphasized that a trial judge must make a threshold determination that there is some reasonable view of the evidence supporting the occurrence of a qualifying emergency. Here, the Court held that even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was no qualifying emergency because, considering Sanzone’s knowledge of the inclement weather, the presence of ice could not be deemed sudden and unexpected. "[T]here was no reasonable view of the evidence that would lead to the conclusion that the ice and slippery road conditions on the Foster Road slope were sudden and unforeseen." The court distinguished this case from Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285 (1982), where the emergency doctrine was applicable because a child darted into traffic, an unanticipated event. The dissent argued that it was a question of fact for the jury whether the sheet of ice was unforeseen, given that the roads were otherwise ice-free. The dissent also cited other jurisdictions that had held that the emergency charge should be given in factually similar circumstances. However, the majority stated, "[G]iven Sanzone’s admitted knowledge of the worsening weather conditions, the presence of ice on the hill cannot be deemed a sudden and unexpected emergency."

  • Rivera v. New York City Transit Authority, 77 N.Y.2d 322 (1991): Application of the Emergency Doctrine

    Rivera v. New York City Transit Authority, 77 N.Y.2d 322 (1991)

    The emergency doctrine applies when a party is faced with a sudden and unexpected occurrence not of their own making, and the reasonableness of their actions in response is a question for the jury.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a bus passenger, sustained injuries when the bus made an abrupt stop to avoid a collision with a car that turned in front of it. The defendant requested a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine, which the trial court denied, citing the driver’s familiarity with the intersection. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the emergency doctrine instruction should have been given because a reasonable view of the evidence suggested the driver was confronted with a sudden and unexpected occurrence, and it was for the jury to determine the reasonableness of the driver’s response.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was a passenger on a bus owned by the defendant and driven by the defendant’s employee. The plaintiff testified that he was thrown across the aisle and injured when the bus stopped abruptly. The bus driver stated that he was leaving a designated bus stop when a car suddenly turned right in front of the bus from the left lane. The driver applied the brakes immediately to avoid a collision but was unable to avoid the sudden stop.

    Procedural History

    The jury found the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the emergency doctrine. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, vacated the judgment, and ordered a new trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the emergency doctrine, given the bus driver’s testimony about the sudden appearance of a car turning in front of the bus.

    Holding

    Yes, because a reasonable view of the evidence supported that the bus driver was faced with a sudden and unexpected occurrence not of his own making, making the reasonableness of his conduct a question for the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the emergency doctrine instruction should have been given. The court relied on the principle that “[w]here some reasonable view of the evidence establishes that an actor was confronted by a sudden and unforeseen occurrence not of the actor’s own making, then the reasonableness of the conduct in the face of the emergency is for the jury.” The court found that the bus driver’s testimony suggested that the car suddenly and unexpectedly cut in front of the bus. The court reasoned that the driver’s general awareness that cars often make right turns in front of buses did not preclude the jury from deciding that the driver did not anticipate being suddenly cut off by this particular car. As the court stated, “That a driver was aware that cars often made right turns in front of buses would not preclude a jury from deciding that, as to the events in issue in this case, the driver did not anticipate being suddenly cut off by this particular car.” Because the emergency doctrine instruction was erroneously refused, a new trial was warranted.

  • Rivera v. New York City Transit Authority, 77 N.Y.2d 322 (1991): Emergency Doctrine and Foreseeability in Negligence Claims

    Rivera v. New York City Transit Authority, 77 N.Y.2d 322 (1991)

    In negligence cases, a party is entitled to a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine if evidence suggests they were faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance, and the court must also instruct the jury on foreseeability when varying inferences may be drawn from the evidence.

    Summary

    Milton Rivera died after falling onto subway tracks and being struck by a train. His widow sued the New York City Transit Authority (TA), alleging negligence. The jury found the TA 85% at fault. The TA appealed, arguing the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the emergency doctrine and foreseeability. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the evidence presented warranted both instructions, as the operator’s response to Rivera’s fall and the foreseeability of the accident were central to determining negligence. A new trial was ordered.

    Facts

    Milton Rivera fell from a subway platform onto the tracks and was struck by an arriving train, resulting in his death. A police report indicated the train operator stated Rivera stumbled and fell after staggering. The operator testified he saw Rivera staggering onto the tracks from 30-60 feet away and immediately activated the emergency brake. Witnesses observed Rivera acting erratically before the incident, and one witness stated Rivera stood steadily at the platform’s edge moments before falling as the train approached. The autopsy found no alcohol or drug use. Experts disputed the train’s speed and whether the accident was avoidable.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff, Rivera’s widow, sued the New York City Transit Authority (TA) for negligence. A jury found in favor of the plaintiff, apportioning fault 15% to Rivera and 85% to the TA. The Appellate Division affirmed. The TA appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right due to the dissenting justices in the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the emergency doctrine.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on foreseeability.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a reasonable view of the evidence could support the conclusion that the operator was faced with a sudden and unexpected occurrence not of his own making when Rivera fell onto the tracks.
    2. Yes, because the question of foreseeability is usually for the jury to resolve, with proper instructions, when varying inferences may be drawn from the facts and evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the emergency doctrine applies when an actor faces a sudden and unexpected circumstance, leaving little time for deliberation. In such situations, the actor’s conduct should be judged in the emergency context, and the jury should be instructed accordingly. The court found that the evidence presented could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the operator was faced with such an emergency when Rivera suddenly fell onto the tracks. The court noted, “[W]hen an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration…the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context.”

    Regarding foreseeability, the court stated that the jury should have been instructed to consider whether Rivera’s injury and death were reasonably foreseeable risks stemming from the TA’s conduct. The court emphasized that “[w]hether defendant legally caused Rivera’s injury and death depends upon whether they were reasonably foreseeable risks stemming from defendant’s conduct.” The conflicting evidence regarding the operator’s observations and response necessitated a jury determination on foreseeability with proper guidance from the court.

    The court also noted that the trial court improperly admitted the TA’s entire internal rule book, containing irrelevant material and imposing a higher standard of proof than required by law. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the plaintiff presented a prima facie case.

  • Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285 (1982): Duty of Care, Emergency Doctrine, and Proximate Cause

    Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285 (1982)

    When a driver is faced with a sudden and unexpected emergency, the standard of care remains that of a reasonable person under the circumstances, but the emergency is a factor in determining what is reasonable; furthermore, illegally double-parking can establish proximate cause if it obstructs visibility and maneuverability, contributing to an accident.

    Summary

    Malikah Ferrer, a four-year-old, was struck by a car driven by Ben Harris and owned by Ben and Anna Harris, as she crossed a street to an ice cream truck double-parked by Hassan Javidan. The court addressed whether the evidence supported findings of negligence against both the Harrises and Javidan, and whether the Harrises were entitled to a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine. The court found sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury against all defendants but held the Harrises were entitled to an emergency charge. The Court also considered the admissibility of the mother’s instructions to her daughter regarding street crossing safety.

    Facts

    Malikah Ferrer, accompanied by her older sister, crossed Walton Avenue in the Bronx to reach a “Mister Softee” ice cream truck double-parked by Hassan Javidan. As Malikah crossed from between parked cars, she was hit by a vehicle driven by Ben Harris. Harris knew the area and was aware children were likely to be present. He testified he was driving 15-20 mph and stopped within four feet, claiming the child ran into his car door. Plaintiffs argued Harris failed to sound his horn and that the impact point on the car and the child’s injuries contradicted Harris’s account. Javidan’s truck was illegally double-parked, obstructing visibility and forcing Harris closer to parked cars.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict against the Harrises (75% liability) and Javidan (25% liability). The Appellate Division affirmed. The Harrises appealed based on the denial of their motion to dismiss and the refusal to give an emergency doctrine jury instruction. Javidan appealed by leave of the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether sufficient evidence existed to establish a prima facie case of negligence against Ben and Anna Harris.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the emergency doctrine concerning Ben Harris’s conduct.

    3. Whether sufficient evidence existed to establish a prima facie case of negligence and proximate cause against Hassan Javidan.

    4. Whether the admission of testimony regarding the mother’s safety instructions to her daughters was prejudicial error.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for a jury to determine whether Ben Harris was negligent under the circumstances.

    2. Yes, because the jury could have reasonably concluded that Harris was faced with a sudden emergency, and the trial court should have provided guidance on the applicable law regarding the emergency doctrine.

    3. Yes, because Javidan’s illegal double-parking violated traffic regulations and proximately caused the accident by obstructing visibility and maneuverability.

    4. Yes, because there was no foundation laid to establish that these instructions were a persistent habit and further, parental supervision is not imputable to the child.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that the determination of negligence is fact-specific and best suited for a jury’s consideration. Regarding the Harrises, the court found that while the evidence presented a question of fact as to whether Ben Harris was negligent, the jury should have been instructed on the emergency doctrine. The Court emphasized that “when one is confronted with a sudden and unexpected event or combination of events which leave little or no time for reflection or deliberate judgment, this itself may be a significant circumstance which, realistically as well as conceptually, should enter into the determination of the reasonableness of the choice of action pursued.” The failure to provide this instruction was reversible error. Regarding Javidan, the Court found that his violation of the traffic regulation against double-parking was evidence of negligence, citing Somersall v. New York Tel. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 157, 166. The Court also found that Javidan’s double-parking was a proximate cause of the accident because “but for the van’s unlawful double-parking, the Harris car would not have had to travel as close to the automobiles parked on the east side of the street, thus affording its operator an opportunity for a more wide-angled, more distant and earlier view of the child.” Finally, the Court addressed the evidentiary issue, finding the testimony about the mother’s safety instructions inadmissible because no foundation was laid to demonstrate a persistent habit, citing Halloran v. Virginia Chems., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 392-393, and such supervision is not imputable to the child.

  • Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984): Limits on Emergency Doctrine Instruction and Driver’s License Cross-Examination

    Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984)

    The emergency doctrine is not applicable when a party participated in creating the emergency, and the scope of cross-examination on credibility is within the trial judge’s discretion.

    Summary

    In a negligence action arising from a car accident, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the emergency doctrine because the plaintiff participated in creating the emergency. Additionally, the Court held that cross-examination regarding the plaintiff’s failure to renew his driver’s license was permissible solely for the purpose of assessing credibility, and the extent of such cross-examination falls within the trial judge’s discretion. The Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s decisions.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Barker, was involved in a car accident with the defendant, Kallash. At trial, Barker sought a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine to justify his speeding at the time of the accident. The trial court refused this instruction. The defendant’s counsel cross-examined Barker on his failure to renew his driver’s license. The court allowed this questioning only on the issue of Barker’s credibility.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the emergency doctrine as a justification for the plaintiff’s speeding at the time of the accident.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing cross-examination on the plaintiff’s failure to renew his driver’s license.

    Holding

    1. No, because the emergency doctrine has no application where the plaintiff participated in the creation of the emergency.
    2. No, because the trial court allowed the jury to consider the testimony solely on the issue of credibility, and the extent of cross-examination on credibility is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the emergency doctrine, the Court of Appeals deferred to the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff’s own actions contributed to the emergency situation. The Court cited Johnson v. Hickson, 43 NY2d 906, 908, reinforcing the principle that the emergency doctrine cannot be invoked by a party who helped create the emergency.

    As to the cross-examination about the driver’s license, the Court emphasized that such evidence is inadmissible on the issue of negligence itself. However, the trial court explicitly limited the jury’s consideration of this evidence to the plaintiff’s credibility. The Court of Appeals recognized the broad discretion afforded to trial judges in controlling the scope of cross-examination for impeachment purposes, citing Richardson, Evidence, § 500, at p 485. The Court stated, “The nature and extent of the cross-examination on the question of credibility is within the sound discretion of the Trial Judge. and therefore beyond our review”.

    The Court also stated that it reviewed the plaintiff’s remaining arguments concerning prejudicial errors and found them insufficient to warrant reversal.

  • McLean v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 393 (1975): Emergency Doctrine and Foreseeability of Harm to Firefighters

    McLean v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 393 (1975)

    The emergency doctrine applies when a person faces a sudden, unexpected situation with little time for thought, and the standard of care is whether they acted as a reasonably prudent person would under the same emergency circumstances; furthermore, foreseeability of harm and contributory negligence are questions for the jury to resolve.

    Summary

    A New York City firefighter, McLean, was injured when he fell through an open, unguarded sliding pole hole in a darkened firehouse dormitory while responding to a fire alarm. He sued the city for negligence. The city argued that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding the emergency situation, fire department regulations, and the alleged influence of alcohol. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of McLean, finding no reversible error in the trial court’s rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence and the jury instructions, emphasizing the jury’s role in determining foreseeability and contributory negligence.

    Facts

    McLean, a firefighter, fell through an unguarded pole hole in a darkened firehouse dormitory while responding to a fire alarm. He had consumed a small amount of wine with lunch earlier in the day and later participated in sports. His commanding officer inspected him at roll call and found him fit for duty, noting no odor of alcohol. Shortly before the alarm, the lights on the second floor were turned off. Upon hearing the alarm, McLean proceeded to the pole hole, which was unlit, and fell through. The city attempted to introduce evidence suggesting McLean was under the influence of alcohol, but the court ruled it inadmissible due to a lack of foundation.

    Procedural History

    McLean sued the City of New York for negligence, and the jury returned a verdict in his favor. The Appellate Division affirmed liability but ordered a new trial on damages unless McLean agreed to a reduced award, which he did. The City appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the jury was improperly charged.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that McLean was confronted with an emergency situation.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that fire department regulations require using the sliding pole in emergencies.

    3. Whether the trial court properly excluded evidence related to McLean’s alleged alcohol consumption and instructed the jury that alcohol was not a factor in the case.

    Holding

    1. No, because the situation confronting the plaintiff was sudden and unforeseen, justifying the emergency charge.

    2. No, because, even if technically incorrect, the charge regarding the fire department rule was inconsequential, as the uncontroverted evidence showed that the pole had to be used in emergencies.

    3. No, because the trial court properly excluded the blood sample report due to a lack of adequate foundation and did not err in excluding the fire department doctor’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the emergency doctrine applies when an actor faces a sudden and unexpected situation with little time for thought. The Court stated, “The essence of the doctrine is that in sudden and unexpected circumstances where an actor is left little or no time for thought, or is reasonably so disturbed or excited that he must make a speedy decision and cannot weigh alternative courses of action, he ‘cannot reasonably be held to the same conduct as one who has had full opportunity to reflect’.” The court found that McLean faced such a situation, as he was not aware of the combination of the fire alarm sounding and the lack of illumination. The Court also upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude the blood sample report due to a break in the chain of custody, noting over 36 hours of custody were completely unaccounted for. The Court deferred to the trial judge’s discretionary power to exclude the fire department doctor’s testimony regarding an odor of alcohol due to a lack of probative evidence and countervailing evidence. The court emphasized that the jury correctly decided whether the city should have foreseen the accident and whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent under the circumstances. These were the critical issues for the jury to resolve.