New York Law Review

Tag: Elevator Accident

  • Kush v. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 831 (1990): Superseding Cause in Negligence

    Kush v. City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 831 (1990)

    An intervening act will be deemed a superseding cause and relieve a defendant of liability if the act is of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuates the defendant’s negligence from the ultimate injury that responsibility for the injury may not be reasonably attributed to the defendant.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured after jumping from a stalled elevator. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Court held that the plaintiff’s act of jumping out of the stalled elevator was not foreseeable in the normal course of events resulting from the defendants’ alleged negligence, thereby constituting a superseding cause that relieved the defendants of liability. The court emphasized that the plaintiff, an experienced worker, was not in imminent danger and was aware that assistance had been requested.

    Facts

    Shortly after 7:30 a.m., the plaintiff, a carpenter, entered a freight elevator with 25-30 other construction workers. The elevator stalled six feet above the lobby floor. The elevator operator immediately called for assistance. The elevator remained lit, motionless, and quiet. After 10-15 minutes, two workers manually opened the elevator doors and jumped to the lobby floor. Subsequently, the plaintiff jumped, landing on his heels and claiming injury.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a negligence and Labor Law action against the property’s lessee, general contractor, the contractor that hired plaintiff’s company, and the elevator manufacturer. The Supreme Court dismissed Labor Law claims but did not dismiss the negligence claims, finding the plaintiff’s conduct was not a superseding cause. The Appellate Division dismissed the Labor Law § 240(1) claim but affirmed the lower court regarding negligence claims. Two dissenting judges argued the jump was a superseding cause. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s act of jumping from a stalled elevator six feet above the lobby floor constitutes a superseding cause that relieves the defendants of liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff’s act of jumping was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ alleged negligence under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiff’s jump was not foreseeable given the circumstances. The plaintiff was an experienced worker, not in immediate danger, and aware that help had been summoned. The court distinguished this case from Humbach v. Goldstein, where passengers were trapped in a stalled elevator and unable to get assistance, creating an emergency situation. The Court emphasized that the elevator was lit, quiet and had come to a smooth stop. The fact that other workers had previously jumped without injury did not make the plaintiff’s conduct more foreseeable or less risky. “As a matter of law, plaintiff’s act of jumping out of a stalled elevator six feet above the lobby floor after the elevator’s doors had been opened manually was not foreseeable in the normal course of events resulting from defendants’ alleged negligence.” Therefore, the plaintiff’s jump superseded the defendants’ conduct and terminated their liability for his injuries. The court reiterated the principle established in Jackson v Greene, 201 NY 76, 79 and Boltax v Joy Day Camp, 67 NY2d 617 regarding superseding causes.

  • Feblot v. New York Times Co., 32 N.Y.2d 486 (1973): Limits of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Self-Service Elevator Accidents

    Feblot v. New York Times Co., 32 N.Y.2d 486 (1973)

    Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable in cases where the plaintiff had control over the instrumentality (here, a self-service elevator door) causing the injury and the accident could have occurred without the defendant’s negligence.

    Summary

    Eve Marie Feblot sued the New York Times Company for injuries sustained when a self-service elevator door closed on her. The trial court submitted the case to the jury on a res ipsa loquitur theory, and the jury found for Feblot. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable because Feblot had control over the elevator doors and the accident could have happened without negligence on the part of the New York Times Company. The court also found that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by a witness.

    Facts

    Miss Feblot, a 63-year-old masseuse, visited Arthur Hays Sulzberger’s office on the 14th floor of the New York Times Building. While entering a self-service elevator to leave, the elevator door closed on her, striking her right shoulder and arm. She claimed the door closed suddenly and forcefully, causing injury. The elevator was equipped with a rubber safety edge. The receptionist, Griffin, was present in the corridor.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the complaint against Westinghouse (the elevator service company) but denied the New York Times’ motion to dismiss. The case was submitted to the jury against the New York Times solely on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The jury returned a verdict for Feblot. The New York Times’ motions to set aside the verdict, for dismissal, and for a directed verdict were denied. The New York Times appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable under the presented facts.
    2. Whether the Trial Justice erred in excluding from evidence the written accident report of Zaccor and in refusing to allow Zaccor to give the complete account of the accident, as reported to him by the receptionist, Griffin, after the door therefor had been opened on the plaintiff’s cross-examination of Zaccor?

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff had some control over the elevator door, and the incident could have occurred without negligence on the part of the defendant.
    2. Yes, because the plaintiff opened the door to this testimony on cross-examination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that res ipsa loquitur applies only when the instrumentality causing the injury is in the exclusive control of the defendant, and the accident would not ordinarily occur without negligence. The court stated, “[I]f the instrumentality causing the injury to the plaintiff was ‘in the exclusive possession and control of the person charged with negligence * * * and * * * the accident would not ordinarily have occurred without neglect of some duty owed to the plaintiff’.” In this case, Feblot had some control over the elevator doors, as she activated the mechanism controlling their operation and determined when and how to enter the elevator. The court noted she could have caused the doors to reopen by touching the safety edge. The court distinguished this case from falling elevator or defective interlock cases, where the plaintiff has no control over the elevator’s mechanism.

    Furthermore, the court held it was error to exclude the written accident report of Zaccor and his testimony regarding Griffin’s account of the accident. Because plaintiff’s counsel questioned Zaccor on cross-examination about the report and his conversation with Griffin, the defendant should have been allowed to present the full account of the report to the jury. The court reasoned that “the plaintiff’s attorney on his cross-examination of Zaccor so far exceeded the limits of proper cross-examination in bringing out further matters, which were not mentioned on direct examination and which created such a wholly erroneous impression in the minds of the jury as to the content of the oral report of the accident which Zaccor had received from Griffin, that Times clearly should have been afforded an opportunity to present the full account of this report to the jury.”