New York Law Review

Tag: Elevation-Related Risk

  • Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335 (2011): Establishing Elevation-Related Risk Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335 (2011)

    To establish liability under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the task performed created an elevation-related risk requiring safety devices and that the absence or inadequacy of such devices was a proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    Luis Ortiz, a demolition worker, was injured while rearranging debris in a dumpster. He claimed violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Court of Appeals addressed whether Ortiz’s task created an elevation-related risk under § 240(1). The Court held that while a simple descent from a low height might not trigger § 240(1), Ortiz’s specific task—standing on a narrow ledge atop a six-foot-high dumpster to rearrange debris—presented a factual question as to whether safety devices were necessary. The Court denied both the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff’s cross-motion, finding triable issues of fact.

    Facts

    Luis Ortiz was demolishing an apartment building owned by Varsity Holdings and managed by Mag Realty Corp. Ortiz and his coworkers filled a six-foot-high dumpster with debris. To maximize space, they climbed onto the dumpster and rearranged the debris. While standing on the dumpster’s narrow ledge, Ortiz, holding a wooden beam, lost his balance on the slippery, rain-soaked surface and fell, sustaining injuries.

    Procedural History

    Ortiz sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Ortiz’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, simultaneously granting Ortiz leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certifying the question of whether its order was properly made. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the task of rearranging debris in a dumpster, requiring a worker to stand on a narrow ledge six feet above the ground, constitutes an elevation-related risk covered by Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to warrant summary judgment in his favor?

    Holding

    1. No, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgement because, on the record, the court cannot say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240(1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster.

    2. No, because Ortiz failed to adduce evidence establishing that he was required to stand on or near the ledge to perform his assigned task and because there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether the task Ortiz was expected to perform created an elevation-related risk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from Toefer v. Long Is. R.R., where a simple descent from a flatbed trailer was deemed not to present an elevation-related risk under § 240(1). The Court reasoned that Ortiz’s task of standing on a narrow ledge atop a six-foot dumpster to rearrange debris presented a more precarious situation. The Court emphasized that the defendants failed to prove that safety devices would not have prevented the fall. “On this record, therefore, we cannot say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240 (1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster.”

    However, the Court affirmed the denial of Ortiz’s cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that he had not sufficiently proven that standing on the ledge was necessary to perform his task. The Court noted that while his affidavit asserting this necessity was enough to ward off summary judgment for the defendants, it was insufficient for him to win summary judgment himself. The Court also pointed out that Ortiz needed to establish that a specific safety device could have prevented his fall, and this remained a triable issue of fact.

    The Court emphasized that when considering the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, and a question of fact remained regarding whether Ortiz’s task created an elevation-related risk that § 240(1) aims to protect against.

  • Sotire v. Immigrant Food & Rest. Servs., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 792 (2008): Applying Labor Law § 240(1) to Commercial Window Cleaning

    10 N.Y.3d 792 (2008)

    Commercial window cleaning, comparable to the activity at issue, falls under Labor Law § 240(1) if it involves elevation-related risks that the statute aims to address and the worker is not provided with adequate safety devices.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, a commercial cleaner, was injured while cleaning high interior windows in a dormitory, having been instructed to climb on furniture instead of being provided a ladder. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1). The court reasoned that the activity created an elevation-related risk contemplated by the statute, as the plaintiff was required to climb on furniture to reach the high windows and was not provided with proper safety equipment such as a ladder or scaffold.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s employer, under a commercial cleaning contract, instructed her to clean 10-foot-high interior windows in a dormitory. She was given only a rag and window washing solution. When she requested a ladder, she was told to use furniture instead. While standing on a bed to clean a window, the plaintiff fell and sustained multiple fractures and other injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a Labor Law § 240(1) action against the defendants. The lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that the plaintiff’s activity constituted routine maintenance not covered by the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order, granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as to liability, and denied the defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s activity of cleaning high windows by climbing on furniture, without proper safety devices, constitutes an elevation-related risk covered under Labor Law § 240(1), thus entitling her to summary judgment on the issue of liability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff was injured while cleaning 10-foot-high windows, and was required to climb upon furniture in order to complete her work—creating an elevation-related risk— and she was not provided a ladder, scaffold or other safety device of the kind contemplated under the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in Broggy v. Rockefeller Group, Inc., which held that commercial window cleaning is covered by Labor Law § 240(1) if it involves an elevation-related risk. The court reasoned that in this case, the plaintiff established that she was injured while cleaning high windows in a college dormitory with a rag, and was required to climb upon furniture to complete her work. This created precisely the type of elevation-related risk that the statute was intended to address. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff was not provided with a ladder, scaffold, or other safety device as required by the statute. The court concluded that the lower courts erred in characterizing the plaintiff’s activity as routine maintenance, as the circumstances clearly indicated a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The absence of appropriate safety equipment to mitigate the elevation-related risk was the decisive factor in the court’s determination.

  • Broggy v. Rockefeller Group, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 675 (2007): Establishing Elevation-Related Risks for Labor Law § 240(1) Claims

    Broggy v. Rockefeller Group, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 675 (2007)

    To prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) claim involving cleaning, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the cleaning task created an elevation-related risk requiring protective devices and that the absence of such devices was the proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    Laurence Broggy, a window washer, was injured while cleaning windows in an office building. He stood on a desk to reach the upper portion of the windows and fell, allegedly due to the lack of safety devices. The Court of Appeals held that Broggy failed to prove that the window washing task required him to work at an elevation, thus negating the need for safety devices under Labor Law § 240(1). The Court emphasized that simply using an elevated platform does not automatically trigger liability; the task itself must inherently require work at an elevation.

    Facts

    Laurence Broggy, an employee of ISS, was assigned to wash interior windows on the eighth floor of 75 Rockefeller Plaza. In room 810, Broggy encountered a large desk positioned against the window he needed to clean. He and his coworkers deemed the desk too heavy to move. Broggy climbed onto the desk to reach the upper portions of the windows. While cleaning, a window sash slammed down, causing him to lose his balance and fall off the desk, resulting in injury. Broggy had previously cleaned eight similar windows in the building without incident and without using a ladder or other safety device.

    Procedural History

    Broggy sued the building owners, alleging violations of several sections of the Labor Law, including § 240(1). The Supreme Court initially granted Broggy partial summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, denying Broggy’s motion and granting summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the § 240(1) claim. The Court of Appeals granted Broggy leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff established that the window washing task created an elevation-related risk requiring safety devices under Labor Law § 240(1), and that the absence of such devices proximately caused his injury.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the window washing task inherently required him to work at an elevation, thus failing to establish the need for safety devices under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, focusing on the lack of evidence demonstrating that the window cleaning task required Broggy to work at an elevation. The Court acknowledged that Labor Law § 240(1) explicitly includes “cleaning” as a protected activity. However, the Court distinguished between routine household window washing and tasks that inherently involve elevation-related risks. The Court stated that “[t]he crucial consideration under section 240 (1) is not whether the cleaning is taking place as part of a construction, demolition or repair project, or is incidental to another activity protected under section 240 (1); or whether a window’s exterior or interior is being cleaned. Rather, liability turns on whether a particular window washing task creates an elevation-related risk of the kind that the safety devices listed in section 240 (1) protect against.”

    The Court noted that Broggy did not provide evidence showing how high he could reach from the floor with his tools. While he claimed he had to stand on the desk, he did not demonstrate that this was due to the necessity of working at an elevation. The Court reasoned that the desk may have simply been an obstruction or a matter of convenience. Furthermore, the Court highlighted the fact that Broggy had successfully cleaned eight similar windows without any safety devices. This undermined his claim that the task inherently required elevation-related protection. The Court concluded that summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate because the evidence demonstrated that Broggy did not need protection from the effects of gravity in this instance.

  • Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001): Defines ‘Elevation-Related Risk’ Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide safety devices to protect workers from elevation-related risks, and this protection extends to situations where a worker falls a significant distance, even if they do not ultimately hit the ground.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a roofer, slipped on frost while working on a sloped roof and slid 15-20 feet to the eaves, where his pants were snagged, preventing a fall to the ground. He sued the property owner under Labor Law § 240(1) for failing to provide safety devices. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s injury was covered under the statute because he was exposed to an elevation-related risk and the lack of safety devices was the proximate cause of his injuries. The Court clarified that coverage under § 240(1) does not require the worker to actually hit the ground; it is sufficient that the injury stems from a fall from a height.

    Facts

    The plaintiff was employed by Sahlem’s Roofing & Siding, Inc. and was instructed to lay felt and shingles on a newly constructed house roof. While walking along the roof’s ridge with a roll of felt, the plaintiff’s foot slipped on frost, causing him to twist and slide 15-20 feet down the roof to the eaves. Protruding nails snagged his pants, preventing him from falling to the ground. The plaintiff was not provided with any safety devices, such as toe boards or scaffolding, which were available at other work sites.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Hillcrest Heights Development Corporation, the property owner. The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, finding liability under Labor Law § 240(1). The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s accident, involving a slide down a roof that was stopped before hitting the ground, constituted an elevation-related risk covered under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff was subject to an elevation-related risk due to the lack of safety devices, and the failure to provide these devices was the proximate cause of his injuries. Coverage under Labor Law § 240(1) does not require a worker to actually hit the ground after a fall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide safety devices that protect workers from elevation-related hazards. The statute is interpreted liberally to achieve its purpose. The Court distinguished this case from Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co. and Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., noting that in those cases, the injuries were not directly related to the risk of falling from a height. In this case, the plaintiff fell a significant distance (15-20 feet) due to the lack of safety devices. The Court emphasized that the critical factor is the elevation-related risk and that the statute’s protection should not hinge on whether the worker ultimately hits the ground. The Court stated that “[i]n short, plaintiff was subject to an elevation-related risk while working on this particular roof, and he was not provided with any safety devices. In addition, the failure to provide any safety devices was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. He was within the protective ambit of Labor Law § 240 (1).”

  • Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001): Scope of ‘Falling Object’ Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001)

    Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for injuries caused by falling objects only when the objects are being hoisted or secured and fall due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute; it does not apply to general workplace hazards or pre-existing structural elements.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address the scope of liability under Labor Law § 240(1) in the context of falling objects. In Narducci, a window frame fell on a worker. In Capparelli, a light fixture fell on an electrician during installation. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) only applies when the falling object is related to a significant risk inherent in the elevation at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured, and when the object falls because of inadequate safety devices. The court found that neither case involved such risks, limiting the statute’s application to situations involving the hoisting or securing of materials.

    Facts

    In Narducci, Alex Narducci, an employee of Atlantic Windows, was removing steel window frames from a fire-damaged warehouse. While standing on a ladder, a piece of glass from an adjacent window fell and injured him. The glass was part of the pre-existing building structure. In Capparelli, Louis Capparelli, Jr., an electrician, was installing light fixtures into a dropped ceiling. While on a ladder, a light fixture he was installing began to fall, and he injured his hand trying to stop it. Plaintiff did not fall from the ladder in either case.

    Procedural History

    In Narducci, the Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. In Capparelli, the Supreme Court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified, granting summary judgment to the third-party defendant, holding that the injury was caused by the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site, not the extraordinary elevation risks covered by Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to injuries caused by falling objects that are not being hoisted or secured at the time of the accident.

    2. Whether the fact that a worker is at an elevation when injured by a falling object brings the scenario within the ambit of Labor Law § 240(1) if the object was not being hoisted or secured.

    Holding

    1. No, because Labor Law § 240(1) applies only where the falling of an object is related to a significant risk inherent in the relative elevation at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured, and the object falls due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute.

    2. No, because working at an elevation does not increase the risk of being hit by an improperly hoisted load; the hazard posed by working at an elevation is that the worker might be injured in a fall. The different risks arise from different construction practices, and the hazard from one type of activity cannot be transferred to create liability for a different type of accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) is intended to protect workers from elevation-related risks stemming from the failure to use adequate safety devices such as scaffolds, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, and ropes. The Court emphasized that the statute’s protections extend to falling objects only when the falling object is related to “a significant risk inherent in * * * the relative elevation * * * at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured.” In Narducci, the falling glass was part of the pre-existing building structure and was not being hoisted or secured. The absence of a hoisting or securing device did not cause the glass to fall; thus, it was a general workplace hazard. In Capparelli, there was no height differential between the plaintiff and the falling object, meaning the injury wasn’t due to an elevation-related risk within the statute’s scope. The Court stated, “Even ‘a violation of [Labor Law § 240 (1)] cannot “establish liability if the statute is intended to protect against a particular hazard, and a hazard of a different kind is the occasion of the injury.”’” The Court distinguished between risks inherent in working at an elevation (falling from a height) and risks associated with falling objects (improper hoisting or securing). It clarified that the statute does not cover every gravity-related accident; courts must discern the Legislature’s intended application. The Court found that the scissor jack was designed to protect the worker from falling, an entirely different risk. Here, the plaintiff was adequately secured, and the only risk was the glass. Since the glass was not an object being hoisted or secured, Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply.

  • Toefer v. Long Island Railroad, 4 N.Y.3d 882 (2005): Defining Elevation-Related Risks Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    Toefer v. Long Island Railroad, 4 N.Y.3d 882 (2005)

    Labor Law § 240(1) applies only to elevation-related risks where a worker is exposed to the risk of falling from a height or being struck by a falling object; the mere fact that an injury occurred during a fall does not automatically trigger the statute’s protections.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a demolition worker, was injured when he slipped and fell while exiting a demolition vehicle. He stepped onto the vehicle’s track, which was greasy, causing him to fall three feet to the ground. The Court of Appeals held that the risk of alighting from the vehicle was not an elevation-related risk covered by Labor Law § 240(1), which requires protective devices for elevation-related hazards. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claim, as there was no evidence that the defendant created or had notice of the greasy condition. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order dismissing the claims.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was employed as a demolition worker. After completing his workday, he began to exit his demolition vehicle. The vehicle had tracks on each side but lacked a step for entry or exit. The plaintiff stepped from the cab onto the vehicle’s track, intending to use it as a step. He claimed his foot slipped due to grease on the track, causing him to fall approximately three feet to the ground, resulting in injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought claims under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 200, and under certain provisions of the Industrial Code. The lower court’s decision is not specified in the Court of Appeals opinion. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling (implicitly a ruling in favor of the plaintiff or denying summary judgment to the defendant). The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the risk of alighting from the construction vehicle constituted an elevation-related risk within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the defendant created or had notice of the greasy condition of the track, thereby supporting a claim under Labor Law § 200?

    Holding

    1. No, because the risk of alighting from the construction vehicle was not an elevation-related risk requiring the protective devices listed in Labor Law § 240(1).

    2. No, because plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant created or had prior notice of the greasy condition of the track.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) applies to specific elevation-related risks, referencing Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 514-515. The Court emphasized that the accident must involve a risk stemming from a difference in elevation. Here, the risk of slipping while exiting a vehicle, even one three feet off the ground, did not necessitate the protective devices enumerated in the statute. The Court clarified that a fall alone is insufficient to invoke § 240(1); the fall must be connected to an elevation-related hazard. Regarding the Labor Law § 200 claim, the Court applied the standard established in Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 294-295, requiring evidence that the defendant either created the dangerous condition or had prior notice of it. Since the plaintiff presented no such evidence, the § 200 claim failed. The Court also dismissed the plaintiff’s arguments based on the Industrial Code regulations, deeming them either unpreserved or without merit. The decision underscores the importance of linking an injury to a specific elevation-related hazard to trigger the protections of Labor Law § 240(1). The case is a reminder that not every fall on a construction site is covered by the statute, even if it involves some difference in elevation.

  • Nieves v. Five Boro Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 913 (1999): Limits of Liability Under New York’s Scaffold Law

    Nieves v. Five Boro Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 913 (1999)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), the Scaffold Law, protects workers from elevation-related risks and does not apply to injuries resulting from general construction site hazards unrelated to the protective devices provided.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Reding Nieves was injured at a construction site while installing a sprinkler system. He stepped from a ladder onto a drop cloth, tripping over a concealed portable light underneath. He sued under New York Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted summary judgment to the defendant, Five Boro Air Conditioning. The court held that the injury was not caused by an elevation-related risk that the scaffold law was designed to protect against, but rather by a common construction site hazard.

    Facts

    Reding Nieves was installing a sprinkler system at a construction site in Queens. While descending a ladder, he stepped onto a drop cloth covering the floor. Underneath the cloth was a concealed portable light. Nieves tripped over the light, twisting his ankle and falling. He sustained injuries as a result of the fall.

    Procedural History

    Nieves sued Five Boro Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Corp., alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The trial court’s decision is not noted. The Appellate Division’s decision is not directly stated but is impliedly reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury sustained when a worker trips over a concealed object on the floor after stepping off a ladder, where the ladder itself was not defective or improperly placed.

    Holding

    No, because the injury resulted from a hazard unrelated to the elevation-related risk that Labor Law § 240(1) is designed to protect against. The core objective of the statute is to prevent falls from elevated worksites where protective devices are required, and the ladder in this case served its intended purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) provides extraordinary protections, but only for a narrow class of special hazards related to elevation. The statute does not cover “any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity” (quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer HydroElec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501). The court emphasized that the law’s core objective is to prevent falls by requiring protective devices for workers at heights. The court distinguished the case from situations where the ladder itself was defective or improperly placed. Here, the ladder was effective in preventing a fall during the ceiling sprinkler installation. Nieves’ injury resulted from a separate hazard – the concealed object on the floor – wholly unrelated to the elevation risk. Therefore, the court concluded that Nieves’ injuries resulted from the usual dangers of a construction site, not the type of extraordinary peril that Labor Law § 240(1) was designed to prevent. As the court stated, “Where an injury results from a separate hazard wholly unrelated to the risk which brought about the need for the safety device in the first instance, no section 240 (1) liability exists”.

  • Corning v. Allied Piping Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 261 (1995): Establishing Liability Under New York’s Labor Law § 240(1) for Elevated Risks

    Corning v. Allied Piping Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 261 (1995)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors when a worker’s injuries are proximately caused by the failure to provide adequate safety devices to protect against elevation-related risks at a construction site.

    Summary

    This case concerns a painter who fell from a ladder while attempting to paint an alcove, falling over a wall and through a suspended ceiling. The New York Court of Appeals held that Labor Law § 240(1) was violated because the contractor failed to provide any safety device to protect the painter from the specific risk of falling over the alcove wall. The court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff and held the painting subcontractor liable for common-law indemnification to the general contractor because the subcontractor supervised the work. The ruling emphasizes the non-delegable duty of owners and contractors to provide adequate safety measures against elevation-related hazards.

    Facts

    Corning Incorporated owned a property called Sullivan Park and contracted with Wellco to perform construction work. Wellco subcontracted with Cook to perform painting work. Plaintiff, an employee of Cook, was injured while painting an alcove. He was positioned on a ladder, reaching over an eight-foot alcove wall to paint, when he lost his balance and fell over the wall and through a suspended ceiling to the floor below. No safety devices were provided to prevent a fall over the alcove wall.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Corning and Wellco, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240, 241, and 200. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs against Corning and Wellco on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240(1). Corning was granted contractual indemnity against Wellco, and Wellco was granted common-law indemnity against Cook. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted Cook leave to appeal from the Supreme Court judgment awarding damages.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether summary judgment on liability was properly granted to the plaintiffs under Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the general contractor Wellco is entitled to indemnification from Cook in the absence of a showing of negligence by Cook and in view of the contractual indemnification agreement between the parties?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the contractor failed to provide any safety device to protect the plaintiff from the specific elevation-related risk of falling over the alcove wall and through the suspended ceiling.

    2. Yes, because Cook supervised and controlled the work of the injured plaintiff and is therefore liable for common-law indemnification, which is not superseded by the contractual agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) places responsibility for worker safety on owners and contractors. The court identified two distinct elevation-related risks: the need to elevate the painter via a ladder, and the risk of falling over the alcove wall. While the ladder itself was not alleged to be defective, the critical failure was the lack of any safety device to protect the painter from falling over the alcove wall. The court cited Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, stating that an owner or contractor who fails to provide safety devices is absolutely liable when the absence of such devices is the proximate cause of injury. The court also referenced Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, noting that a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the precise manner of the accident was foreseeable, only that some risk of injury was foreseeable. The court determined that the absence of protection against a fall through the elevated open area above the alcove was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries as a matter of law. Regarding indemnification, the court found that Cook supervised the work and was therefore liable for common-law indemnification, consistent with Hawthorne v. South Bronx Community Corp. The court clarified that a contractual agreement to indemnify does not supersede the common-law duty to provide indemnification when the subcontractor directly controlled the work.

  • Melber v. 6333 Main St., Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 783 (1998): Defining Elevation-Related Risks Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    91 N.Y.2d 783 (1998)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) applies to elevation-related risks where a worker or object falls from a height, not to situations where an object on the same level is propelled horizontally due to the failure of a hoisting or securing device.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, while dismantling a coal conveyor system in an underground vault, was injured when a cable, used to hoist equipment, snapped, causing a 200-pound tension ball to strike him. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the injury did not result from an elevation-related hazard within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1). The court emphasized that the statute protects against risks stemming from elevation differentials, not from the horizontal propulsion of an object on the same level.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was dismantling a coal conveyor system in a subterranean concrete vault. Dismantled machinery was lifted out of the vault by a crane at ground level, its cable lowered through an opening. A 200-pound metal tension ball was attached to the cable, used to drag dismantled machinery across the vault floor for hoisting. Equipment snagged on the uneven vault floor. Unaware, the crane operator continued to exert tension. The cable snapped, propelling the tension ball against the plaintiff, causing injury.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, reversing the dismissal of the § 240(1) claim, concluding the work exposed the plaintiff to risks associated with elevation differentials. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s injury, caused by a horizontally propelled object due to a snapped cable during dismantling work, constitutes an elevation-related hazard covered under New York Labor Law § 240(1)?

    Holding

    No, because the injury did not result from an elevation-related hazard as contemplated by Labor Law § 240(1). The statute applies to risks associated with falling from a height or being struck by a falling object, not to situations where an object on the same level is propelled horizontally.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) is designed to protect workers from elevation-related hazards, specifically risks arising from work performed at heights or involving the falling of persons or objects. The court distinguished the case from situations where a worker falls from a height or is struck by a falling object due to inadequate safety devices. Here, the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the horizontal propulsion of the tension ball, which was not a consequence of an elevation differential. The court cited Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co. (78 NY2d 509) and Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co. (81 NY2d 494) to reinforce the principle that § 240(1) applies to situations where the elevation differential itself poses a risk. The court focused on the mechanism of injury, noting it did not involve a gravity-related event where the worker or the object fell a significant distance. The decision emphasizes a narrow interpretation of § 240(1), limiting its application to scenarios where gravity-induced risks are directly implicated.

  • Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494 (1993): Scope of Liability Under New York Labor Law for Construction Site Injuries

    Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494 (1993)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) applies only to elevation-related risks; § 241(6) requires violation of a specific safety regulation, not a general standard of care; and § 200(1) requires a showing of supervision or control by the defendant over the injury-producing work.

    Summary

    A welder, Ross, injured his back while working on a construction site. He sued the general contractor, Curtis-Palmer, alleging violations of New York Labor Law §§ 200(1), 240(1), and 241(6). Ross argued that the temporary platform provided was inadequate, forcing him to work in a contorted position. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) only applies to elevation-related hazards like falls, which did not cause his injury. The court further held that § 241(6) requires violation of a specific safety regulation, not merely a general standard of care. However, the court found sufficient evidence to suggest that the general contractor exercised supervisory control over the work, thus allowing the § 200(1) claim to proceed.

    Facts

    Ross, a welder employed by Bechtel Corporation, was assigned to weld a seam near the top of a deep shaft at a construction site managed by International Paper Co., the general contractor. He had to sit at the edge of a temporary platform and stretch awkwardly to reach the seam. Ross complained about the uncomfortable position but was instructed to continue due to time constraints. After several hours, Ross experienced severe back pain and was eventually diagnosed with a disabling back injury.

    Procedural History

    Ross sued International Paper, Curtis-Palmer, and Saratoga Development Corp. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing all claims. The Appellate Division reinstated all claims except the § 241(6) claim against International Paper. Both Ross and International Paper were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to injuries sustained from working in a contorted position, even if not directly caused by a fall from an elevation.
    2. Whether a claim under Labor Law § 241(6) can be based on a violation of a general safety standard rather than a specific regulatory requirement.
    3. Whether, for a claim under Labor Law § 200(1), the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to suggest that the defendant exercised supervision and control over the work that led to his injury.

    Holding

    1. No, because Labor Law § 240(1) is aimed only at elevation-related hazards, and the injury sustained was not the result of a fall or being struck by a falling object.
    2. No, because Labor Law § 241(6) requires a violation of a specific safety regulation, not merely a failure to meet a general standard of care.
    3. Yes, because the contract between Curtis-Palmer and International Paper indicated that International Paper undertook to supervise the construction work and comply with safety standards, suggesting potential control over the worksite.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified the scope of Labor Law § 240(1), stating that it targets elevation-related hazards, specifically “accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person.” The court distinguished between accidents caused by the inadequacy of safety devices to prevent falls (covered by § 240(1)) and other types of harm, even if caused by a deficient device.

    Regarding § 241(6), the court emphasized the need for a violation of a specific and concrete regulatory requirement, not merely a general standard of care. The court stated that regulations using general terms like “adequate,” “effective,” or “proper” are insufficient to establish a nondelegable duty under § 241(6). To allow such general allegations would “seriously distort the scheme of liability for unsafe working conditions.” The court reasoned that “for purposes of the nondelegable duty imposed by Labor Law § 241 (6) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, a distinction must be drawn between provisions of the Industrial Code mandating compliance with concrete specifications and those that establish general safety standards by invoking the ‘[g]eneral descriptive terms’ set forth and defined in 12 NYCRR 23-1.4 (a).”

    As for § 200(1), the court reiterated that liability requires a showing that the defendant exercised supervisory control over the work. In this case, the contract between Curtis-Palmer and International Paper, in which International Paper agreed to supervise construction and comply with safety standards, created a basis for believing that further discovery might reveal actual supervision or control by International Paper. Dismissing the § 200(1) claim prematurely would require assuming that International Paper routinely breached its contractual obligations. The court cited CPLR 3212(f), regarding facts unavailable to opposing party, as a basis to allow further discovery.