New York Law Review

Tag: Election Law

  • Matter of Hosley v. LeBlanc, 96 N.Y.2d 413 (2001): Establishes Continuous Residency Requirement for State Legislators

    Matter of Hosley v. LeBlanc, 96 N.Y.2d 413 (2001)

    Article III, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution requires a candidate for the State Legislature to have resided in New York for five years immediately preceding the election.

    Summary

    This case concerns the residency requirements for candidates for the New York State Legislature, specifically regarding the interpretation of Article III, Section 7 of the New York Constitution. Petitioners challenged the candidacy of Kenneth LeBlanc, arguing that his continuous residency in California from 1987 to 1999 disqualified him due to not meeting the five-year state residency requirement immediately preceding the election. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling, holding that the five-year residency requirement must be satisfied in the five years immediately before the election to ensure familiarity with current state issues.

    Facts

    Kenneth P. LeBlanc was designated as the Independence and Democratic Party candidate for the New York State Assembly, 99th Assembly District.

    Petitioners challenged LeBlanc’s candidacy, arguing he did not meet the New York State residency requirements because he lived in California from 1987 to 1999.

    Article III, Section 7 of the New York Constitution requires state legislative candidates to have been a resident of New York for five years and of the relevant assembly or senate district for the twelve months immediately preceding the election.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially concluded that only the 12-month district residency needed to immediately precede the election, finding any five years of residency sufficient.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the five-year state residency must immediately precede the election.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Article III, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution requires a candidate for the State Legislature to reside in New York for the five years immediately preceding the election.

    Holding

    Yes, because the constitutional language, when interpreted in light of the record from the 1938 Constitutional Convention, indicates that the five-year residency requirement must be satisfied in the period immediately preceding the election.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the intent behind the constitutional provision, as revealed in the records of the 1938 Constitutional Convention. The Court acknowledged that the constitutional language was open to multiple interpretations. However, reviewing the convention records clarified that the sponsors and opponents of the provision understood that the five-year residency period must immediately precede the election. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the residency requirement was to ensure that legislators possess a current and relevant understanding of the issues facing the state and the communities they represent.

    The court cited the sponsor’s argument during the convention: “if a man lives in the State for 20 years and he moves out to San Francisco and stays there for five years, I still contend that being away for five years, he loses close touch with the local situation, and he should live here another five years, if he wants to be a legislator in the State.” This quote demonstrates the intent to ensure contemporaneous familiarity with local issues.

    The Court reasoned that interpreting the provision to allow for non-consecutive residency would frustrate the objective of ensuring legislators are currently familiar with state issues. This decision highlights the importance of examining the historical context and legislative intent when interpreting constitutional provisions, especially when the text is ambiguous. It provides a clear rule for residency requirements for state legislative candidates in New York, emphasizing the need for recent and continuous connection to the state.

  • Delgado v. Sunderland, 98 N.Y.2d 420 (2002): Exclusive Remedy for Voting Machine Malfunctions in General Elections

    Delgado v. Sunderland, 98 N.Y.2d 420 (2002)

    The exclusive remedy for challenging the results of a general election based on voting machine malfunctions and contesting title to public office is a quo warranto action brought by the Attorney General, not a summary proceeding under the Election Law or a declaratory judgment action.

    Summary

    Following a general election, Delgado contested the results, alleging a voting machine malfunctioned, costing him votes. The Supreme Court converted the Election Law proceeding to a declaratory judgment action and ordered a new election in one district. The Appellate Division modified, ordering a city-wide election. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a quo warranto action, commenced by the Attorney General, is the exclusive remedy for challenging general election results based on alleged voting machine malfunctions. This prevents uncertainty in office holding and ensures an initial investigation by the Attorney General.

    Facts

    In the November 6, 2001, general election for City of White Plains Common Council seats, a voting machine in the 18th Election District jammed. Delgado, a candidate, alleged the malfunction cost him votes, placing the election of Hockley, who finished ahead of Delgado, in doubt. After a recount, Hockley was ahead by 47 votes.

    Procedural History

    Delgado initiated an Election Law article 16 proceeding seeking impoundment and recount. After the recount favored Hockley, Delgado moved to be declared the winner or for a new election. Hockley moved to dismiss, arguing for a quo warranto action. The Supreme Court denied the motion, converted the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, and ordered a new election in the 18th District only. The Appellate Division modified, ordering a city-wide election between Hockley and Delgado. The Court of Appeals then reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a summary proceeding under Election Law article 16 or a declaratory judgment action is a proper vehicle for challenging the results of a general election based on voting machine malfunctions and contesting title to the public office, or whether a quo warranto action is the exclusive remedy.

    Holding

    No, because the proper vehicle for challenging the results and contesting title to the public office of the purported winner where a voting machine malfunctioned is a quo warranto action, now codified in Executive Law § 63-b.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that any action taken by the Supreme Court regarding a general election challenge must be expressly authorized by the Election Law. The Court stated, “[Supreme Court’s] only powers are (1) to determine the validity of protested, blank or void paper ballots and protested or rejected absentee ballots and to direct a recanvass or correction of any error in the canvass of such ballots * * * and (2) to review the canvass and direct a recanvass or correction of an error or performance of any required duty by the board of canvassers.” Because the voting machine malfunction created a disputed issue of fact not resolvable by recanvassing, a quo warranto action, initiated by the Attorney General, is the exclusive remedy. The Court reasoned that this process allows for an investigative and screening function by the Attorney General. The Court also highlighted policy concerns of leaving a contested office vacant during protracted litigation. The Court distinguished lower court decisions and clarified that a declaratory judgment is not an available alternative remedy in this context. The court cited Matter of Mullen v Heffernan, affirming that “The remedy for a failure of a voting machine to record votes cast * * * is vested solely in this court in a plenary action brought by the People of the State… [The candidate] has a remedy in quo warranto and it is [the] only remedy”.

  • La Brake v. Dukes, 96 N.Y.2d 913 (2001): Subscribing Witness Residency Requirement in Election Law Violates First Amendment

    La Brake v. Dukes, 96 N.Y.2d 913 (2001)

    A state law requiring subscribing witnesses on candidate designating petitions to reside in the specific political subdivision violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to New York Election Law § 6-132(2), which requires subscribing witnesses on designating petitions for candidates to reside in the political subdivision where the office is being voted for. Appellants argued that designating petitions for respondents Dukes and Franke were invalid because some subscribing witnesses resided outside the relevant council districts. The respondents claimed that the residency requirement violated the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the residency requirement imposed a severe burden on core political speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

    Facts

    Ronald J. Dukes and Theresa Franke were designated as Democratic Party candidates for Troy City Council. Appellants challenged their designating petitions, arguing that several signatures were witnessed by individuals residing outside the Second and Sixth Council Districts, respectively. Election Law § 6-132(2) requires subscribing witnesses to reside in the political subdivision where the office is being voted for. The candidates argued this residency requirement violated the First Amendment.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition, agreeing that the residency requirement was unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the residency requirement in Election Law § 6-132(2), mandating that subscribing witnesses on designating petitions reside in the political subdivision where the office is being voted for, violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the residency requirement constitutes a severe burden on core political speech and is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that circulating designating petitions constitutes “core political speech,” citing Lerman v. Board of Elections. The court determined that the residency requirement in Election Law § 6-132(2) imposed a significant burden on this protected speech, thus triggering strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the law must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. The court acknowledged that protecting the integrity of the nominating process is a compelling state interest. However, it found that the residency requirement was not narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. The court reasoned that the dual requirements of witness address disclosure and state residency were sufficient to ensure the witness’s availability for subpoena, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the process. The court rejected the argument that the law prevented the intrusion of “outsiders” in the local political process, finding no evidence that insularity was a basis for the residency requirement. Furthermore, the court noted that the statute allows nonresident notaries public and commissioners of deeds to act as subscribing witnesses, undermining the claim that the residency requirement was essential to preventing outside interference. The court concluded that the residency requirement was an unconstitutional restriction on political speech. As the court stated, “The requirement that the subscribing witness be ‘a resident of the political subdivision in which the office or position is to be voted for’ (Election Law § 6-132 [2]) is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling State interest.”

  • Green v. DiNapoli, 97 N.Y.2d 43 (2001): Duty to Ensure Proper Filing of Election Documents

    Green v. DiNapoli, 97 N.Y.2d 43 (2001)

    A candidate should not be penalized for errors or omissions made by the Board of Elections in the filing process when the candidate has taken reasonable steps to comply with election law filing requirements.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a candidate’s nominating petition when the Board of Elections failed to properly endorse the filing with the date and time of receipt, as required by Election Law § 6-144. DiNapoli, a candidate, timely submitted his certificate of acceptance to the Board of Elections, but the Board failed to time-stamp it. The court held that the lack of endorsement, due to the Board’s oversight, did not constitute a fatal defect because the candidate had fulfilled his responsibility by delivering the document on time.

    Facts

    DiNapoli was nominated as a candidate of the Independence Party for Nassau County Executive. He was required to file his certificate of acceptance with the Board of Elections by July 16, 2001. He presented the certificate to an official at the Board of Elections shortly after 9:30 a.m. on July 16, meeting the deadline. The Board of Elections did not endorse the certificate with the day, hour, or minute of receipt at that time, though a separate book entry indicating timely receipt was made. The Board official intended to time-stamp the certificate later but failed to do so.

    Procedural History

    Green brought a proceeding to invalidate DiNapoli’s designating petition. Supreme Court rejected Green’s challenge, finding the filing valid. The Appellate Division reversed, invalidating DiNapoli’s petition, holding that strict compliance with the statute was required and the lack of endorsement was a fatal defect. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure of the Board of Elections to properly endorse a certificate of acceptance with the time of filing, as required by Election Law § 6-144, constitutes a fatal defect that invalidates the candidate’s petition, when the candidate timely submitted the document.

    Holding

    No, because in the circumstances presented, DiNapoli satisfied the filing requirement of Election Law § 6-144 and the lack of an endorsement due to the Board’s oversight does not constitute a fatal defect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the responsibility for endorsing the document with the time of filing rests with the Board of Elections, not the candidate. Penalizing the candidate for the Board’s error would be unfair, especially when the candidate took the necessary steps to ensure timely filing. The court emphasized that DiNapoli delivered the certificate early in the day to the appropriate Board employee. Election Law § 6-144 states that “All such petitions and certificates shall at the time of filing thereof be endorsed by such officer or board with the day, hour and minute of such filing…”. The Court held that the key issue was that the certificate was delivered to the appropriate Board employee within the prescribed timeframe. The court’s decision reflects a practical approach, acknowledging that candidates should not be prejudiced by administrative errors outside their control. The Court focused on the fact that the candidate had acted diligently and within the requirements of the law, and the error was solely attributable to the Board of Elections. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. O’Hara, 96 N.Y.2d 378 (2001): Clarifying “Residence” for Voting Purposes

    96 N.Y.2d 378 (2001)

    For voting purposes, an individual can have multiple residences, but must have legitimate, significant, and continuing attachments to the residence they choose for voting; the chosen residence must not be a sham.

    Summary

    John O’Hara, an attorney, was convicted of crimes related to filing a false voter registration and voting in an election district where he didn’t reside. The central issue was whether O’Hara’s 47th Street address constituted a valid “residence” under Election Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while an individual can have multiple residences, the chosen residence must be genuine and not merely for circumventing residency requirements. The court found the jury instructions adequate in guiding the determination of whether the 47th Street address was O’Hara’s bona fide residence, and the evidence supported the jury’s verdict.

    Facts

    O’Hara lived in a Brooklyn apartment on 61st Street since the 1980s. After redistricting, his 61st Street address was no longer within the relevant election districts. He then filed a new voter registration listing 47th Street as his residence and voted in five elections using that address. The prosecution argued O’Hara did not genuinely reside at the 47th Street address. Evidence showed O’Hara maintained phone service at the 61st Street address, and the owner confirmed his tenancy there. Witnesses testified that when they moved into the 47th Street address, it was uninhabitable, and O’Hara later asked them to hold his mail. O’Hara claimed he lived there with his ex-girlfriend, but other evidence suggested otherwise.

    Procedural History

    O’Hara was convicted on all counts in 1997. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction due to an improper missing witness charge, ordering a new trial. The second trial resulted in a hung jury. The third trial also resulted in a conviction, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division. O’Hara appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Election Law definition of “residence” can be applied in a case of dual residency, and whether the jury instructions regarding the definition of “residence” were proper.

    Holding

    No, the jury instruction was proper because it sufficiently guided the jury in determining whether the defendant had a bona fide residence at the 47th Street address for voting purposes. The court held that the charge, when read as a whole, was not confusing, and the jury applied that instruction to the facts it found.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that while an individual can have more than one residence, for Election Law purposes, the chosen residence must be a genuine one with “legitimate, significant and continuing attachments” and not a sham created to circumvent residency requirements. Citing Election Law § 1-104 (22), the court defines residence as “that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, always intends to return.” The Court reasoned that the jury was properly instructed on how to determine whether the 47th Street address could be considered O’Hara’s residence for voting purposes. The court emphasized that “the sole issue here was whether defendant genuinely took up residence at 553 47th Street for voting purposes.” The jury was not asked to decide which of two residences was more appropriate, but whether the 47th street address was in fact a residence that he genuinely maintained and intended to return. The court dismissed the dissenting opinion’s claim that the Election Law definition and case law definitions of residence cannot stand side-by-side, noting that the defendant’s own testimony, even if credited, was contradicted by other evidence presented, which the jury was entitled to believe.

  • Matter of Hogan v. Callahan, 88 N.Y.2d 973 (1996): Necessary Parties in Election Petition Challenges

    Matter of Hogan v. Callahan, 88 N.Y.2d 973 (1996)

    When challenging the sufficiency of a designating petition for a particular candidate, other candidates listed on the same petition are not necessary parties because each candidate’s petition is treated as unique to that candidate.

    Summary

    This case concerns challenges to designating petitions for candidates in a Democratic Party primary. The Appellate Division invalidated the petitions based on permeation of fraud. The appellants argued that the proceedings should be dismissed because other candidates listed on the same petitions were not joined as necessary parties. The Court of Appeals held that because each candidate’s designating petition is treated as unique, the other candidates were not necessary parties. The Court also found that the Appellate Division had a sufficient basis to determine that the petitions were permeated with fraud.

    Facts

    Two appellants, Hogan and another, submitted designating petitions to be candidates in the Democratic Party primary: one for State Senator and the other for State Assembly Member. Their designating petitions also contained the names of other candidates for other State elective offices. Respondents filed separate proceedings seeking to invalidate each appellant’s designating petition, alleging fraud.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially rejected the invalidation efforts. The Appellate Division reversed, invalidating the petitions based on permeation of fraud. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether proceedings to invalidate a designating petition must be dismissed if all other candidates listed on the same petition are not joined as necessary parties.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in reversing the Supreme Court’s finding that the designating petitions were not permeated by fraud, given that the Appellate Division lacked a trial transcript.

    Holding

    1. No, because under Election Law § 6-134 (3), each candidate’s petition is a petition for a separate office, making other candidates on the same petition not necessary parties.
    2. No, because the Appellate Division had the Referee’s report with testimony and findings of fact adopted by the Supreme Court, providing a sufficient basis for factual review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Election Law § 6-134 (3), which states that all sheets designating the same candidate for the same office constitute one petition for that candidate. Citing Matter of Pecoraro v Mahoney, 65 NY2d 1026, 1027, the Court reiterated that although petitions of several candidates may be joined, each candidate’s petition is for a separate office. The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Richardson v Luizzo (64 AD2d 944, affd 45 NY2d 789), noting that Richardson involved a petition invalidated as a fraud on voters because it erroneously suggested that candidates intended to run together, and the sufficiency of a designating petition for any other particular candidate was not at issue.

    Regarding the fraud finding, the Court held that the Appellate Division had a sufficient record basis for its factual review, as the Referee’s report contained testimony and findings of fact that the Supreme Court adopted. The Court stated, “Since the inferences drawn by the Appellate Division are supported by the record, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the Appellate Division erred in finding that the challenged designating petitions were permeated with fraud and that they should be invalidated.”

  • Matter of Mandell v. Board of Elections, 88 N.Y.2d 974 (1996): Sufficiency of Objections to a Designating Petition

    Matter of Mandell v. Board of Elections, 88 N.Y.2d 974 (1996)

    Objections to a designating petition, when amplified by timely objections and specifications submitted with the pleadings, are legally sufficient if they allege insufficient valid signatures based on a line-by-line analysis.

    Summary

    This case involves two proceedings related to the validity of a designating petition for a candidate for Surrogate of King’s County. The Court of Appeals addressed the sufficiency of objections to the petition. The court held that allegations of insufficient valid signatures, supported by a line-by-line analysis and amplified by timely objections and specifications, are legally sufficient to warrant a review by the Board of Elections. The court also addressed the necessary parties to the action.

    Facts

    Petitioner Goldstein filed a designating petition to run for Surrogate of King’s County. Petitioners Mandell, Zunno, and Gold filed a proceeding to invalidate Goldstein’s petition, alleging fraud and insufficient valid signatures based on a line-by-line analysis. Goldstein also initiated a proceeding to validate her petition. Mandell and Zunno filed objections and specifications to the Goldstein petition.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding to invalidate the Goldstein petition. The second and third causes of action were dismissed as insufficient or unappealed, respectively. The first cause of action was dismissed for legal insufficiency and failure to join necessary parties. In the proceeding to validate the Goldstein petition, Supreme Court granted the petition. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment granting the validation petition and remitted the case to the Board of Elections. The matter then went to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether allegations of insufficient valid signatures in a designating petition, supported by a line-by-line analysis and amplified by timely objections and specifications, are legally sufficient to warrant review.
    2. Whether other candidates named in the Goldstein petition were necessary parties.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because allegations of insufficient valid signatures based on a line-by-line analysis, when amplified by timely objections and specifications, are legally sufficient.
    2. No, because failure to join other candidates named in the Goldstein petition as necessary parties was an error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division correctly determined that timely objections and specifications were properly before the Supreme Court in the validation proceeding. These objections were raised in the answer to the Goldstein petition to validate her designating petition.

    Regarding the invalidation proceeding, the court held that the first cause of action, alleging insufficient valid signatures based on a line-by-line analysis, was legally sufficient. The court emphasized that these allegations were amplified by timely objections and specifications. Dismissing the first cause of action based on legal insufficiency was therefore an error.

    Citing Matter of Buchanan v Espada, Jr., 88 NY2d 973, the court also held that the dismissal of the first cause of action for failure to join other candidates named in the Goldstein petition as necessary parties was also an error. As the court stated, the allegations were legally sufficient and should not have been dismissed on that ground.

    The court remitted the matter to the Board of Elections to determine the merits of the petitioners’ objections. The court considered the parties’ remaining contentions and found them unpersuasive.

  • Testa v. Ravitz, 84 N.Y.2d 894 (1994): Board of Elections’ Duty to Canvass Ballots

    Testa v. Ravitz, 84 N.Y.2d 894 (1994)

    A vacancy in a nomination is not created under Election Law § 6-148 when the Board of Elections fails to fulfill its statutory duty to canvass primary ballots and file tabulated statements of the voting results.

    Summary

    In a primary election for a Member of Assembly, a dispute arose when the Board of Elections failed to officially canvass the ballots and file the required tabulated statements due to a deadlock. One candidate sought a judicial determination of the winner or, alternatively, a new primary election. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board’s failure to act did not create a vacancy in nomination under Election Law § 6-148, as a valid nomination is a prerequisite for such a vacancy. The court also affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct its own canvass before the Board fulfilled its statutory duty. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court with instructions to remand to the Board of Elections to complete the canvassing process.

    Facts

    Anne-Renee Testa and John Ravitz were candidates in a primary election for the Liberal Party nomination for Member of Assembly. Testa was a write-in candidate, and Ravitz was the designated candidate. After the primary, a dispute arose regarding the vote count. The Board of Elections was unable to agree on the tabulated statements of the voting results, with a 4-4 vote and two members absent, thus failing to certify the election results.

    Procedural History

    Testa initiated a proceeding under Article 16 of the Election Law, seeking a judicial determination of the winner or a new primary election. The Supreme Court was informed that the Board of Elections had failed to file signed, tabulated statements. The Supreme Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct its own canvass. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a vacancy in a nomination is created within the meaning of Election Law § 6-148 when the Board of Elections fails to fulfill its statutory duty under Election Law § 9-200(1) to canvass the primary ballots and file tabulated statements setting forth the voting results.

    Holding

    No, because a valid nomination is a prerequisite to the creation of a vacancy under Election Law § 6-148, and the Board of Elections’ failure to act means no valid nomination has been made.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that under Election Law § 6-148, a valid nomination must exist before a vacancy can be created. Since the Board of Elections failed to canvass the ballots and file the required statements, no valid nomination had been made. Therefore, no vacancy existed within the meaning of Election Law § 6-148. The court cited Matter of Di Lorenzo v. Heffernan, 187 Misc 766, affd 271 App Div 802, affd 296 NY 687, to support the principle that a valid nomination is a prerequisite to a vacancy. The court emphasized that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct its own canvass before the Board of Elections fulfilled its statutory duty under Election Law § 9-200(1), citing Matter of Larsen v. Canary, 107 AD2d 809, affd for the reasons stated below 65 NY2d 634. The Court noted the Board of Election’s statutory duty to canvass the ballots cannot be abdicated. Furthermore, the failure of the Board of Elections to fulfill its statutory duty does not warrant an order directing the holding of a new primary election, since the court cannot determine if fraud or irregularity made it impossible to determine who rightfully was nominated until the Board fulfills it’s duty. The Court directed that the matter be remanded to the Board of Elections to perform its statutory duty, stating, “Pursuant to Election Law § 16-106 (4), Supreme Court should remand the matter to the Board of Elections, and direct it to perform its statutory duty to canvass the ballots and file the requisite tabulated statements.”

  • Settineri v. DiCarlo, 82 N.Y.2d 813 (1993): Authority of Outgoing Party Chair to Nominate Candidate

    82 N.Y.2d 813 (1993)

    When a vacancy occurs too late for the normal petitioning process, the authority to nominate a candidate rests with the newly elected party officials, not the outgoing ones, especially if certification of the new officials is feasible within the statutory timeframe.

    Summary

    This case addresses the authority to nominate a Republican candidate for the New York State Senate when a vacancy arises too late for a primary election. The outgoing Kings County Republican Party Chairman nominated himself, arguing insufficient time to organize the new county committee. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, which had favored the newly elected committee’s right to choose a candidate, based on the dissent in the Appellate Division. The dissent argued the newly elected committee could have been certified in time to select a candidate and that the outgoing chair was functus officio, lacking authority after the primary election.

    Facts

    A vacancy for the 23rd Senatorial District arose too late for the normal primary petitioning process. Under Republican Party rules, the county chairpersons of Kings and Richmond Counties (primarily Kings due to larger representation) nominate the candidate. Robert DiCarlo, the outgoing Kings County Republican Party Chairman, nominated himself. A primary election had already been held, and a new county committee was selected. The new committee argued that it had the right to elect a new chairman who then would select the candidate.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of the petitioners (the newly elected committee), finding the outgoing chairperson was functus officio. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, adopting the dissenting opinion from the Appellate Division which favored dismissing the petitions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the outgoing Chairman of the Kings County Republican Party had the authority to nominate himself as the Republican candidate for State Senator, given that a primary election had been held and a new county committee selected, but there was limited time to certify the new committee before the nomination deadline.

    Holding

    No, because the newly elected county committee could have been certified in time to select a candidate, rendering the outgoing chairman without authority (functus officio).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the dissenting judge in the Appellate Division. The dissent emphasized that Election Law § 6-158(6) requires certificates for party nominations (other than those from primary elections) to be filed after the primary election, suggesting that the newly elected committee should influence the selection. The dissent noted that Election Law § 2-106(4) states that county committee members hold office until the next election. The dissent relied on the factual finding by the lower courts that the Board of Elections could have certified the newly elected committee members within approximately three days after the primary election. Based on that factual finding, the dissent concluded that there was sufficient time for the new chair to take office and nominate a candidate, rendering the outgoing chair without authority. The dissent cited Matter of Torchin v Cohen and Matter of McDonald v Heffernan, which support the view that an outgoing committee or chairperson lacks authority to select candidates after the election of their successors. The dissent noted: “Both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division made the factual finding that the Board of Elections “could have certified the newly elected committee members within approximately three days” after the primary election (197 AD2d 724, 726). That factual finding is binding on this Court.”

  • Matter of Carr v. Ulster County Bd. of Elections, 71 N.Y.2d 78 (1987): Opportunity to Ballot Limited to Technical Defects

    Matter of Carr v. Ulster County Bd. of Elections, 71 N.Y.2d 78 (1987)

    The opportunity to ballot remedy, which allows for a write-in campaign, is available only to cure technical, but not fatal, defects in designating petitions.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the scope of the “opportunity to ballot” remedy under New York election law. The Court of Appeals held that this remedy, which allows voters to write in a candidate’s name on the ballot, is appropriate only when a designating petition suffers from technical flaws, not fundamental deficiencies that render it invalid. The court reasoned that allowing the remedy in cases of significant flaws would undermine the petition process and potentially disenfranchise voters. The dissent argued that the majority’s holding narrowed the scope of the opportunity to ballot and frustrated the purpose of protecting the electorate from disenfranchisement.

    Facts

    Two designating petitions were filed for a primary election for the office of Civil Court Judge. Both petitions were invalidated. Combining the number of valid signatures from both invalidated petitions, a sufficient number of valid signatures existed to support a single petition or a petition for a write-in ballot.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts, relying on Matter of Hunting v Power, directed a write-in ballot. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the opportunity to ballot remedy was not appropriate in this case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the opportunity to ballot remedy is available when designating petitions are invalidated due to deficiencies that are not merely technical.

    Holding

    No, because the opportunity to ballot remedy is available only to cure “technical, but fatal defects in designating petitions.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the opportunity to ballot remedy is not a tool to overcome fundamental flaws in the designating petition process. The court stated that the remedy is meant to address minor technical issues, not to circumvent the requirements for validly nominating a candidate. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the established procedures for designating candidates to ensure fairness and order in elections.

    The dissenting judge argued that the decision substantially narrowed the rule in Hunting v. Power, stating that combining the number of valid signatures contained in the two invalidated petitions, a sufficient number of valid signatures exists to support a single petition, or a petition for a write-in ballot under Election Law § 6-164. The dissent stated that the important policy reason underlying the Hunting rule is protecting an interested electorate from disenfranchisement, and that the intent to “nominate some candidate” is manifest.