New York Law Review

Tag: Election

  • People v. Dooley, 171 N.Y. 74 (1902): Local Judicial Officer Selection Must Be Either Election or Appointment

    People v. Dooley, 171 N.Y. 74 (1902)

    The New York State Constitution mandates that the selection of local judicial officers in cities, whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for, must be exclusively either by election by the city’s electors or by appointment by local authorities, precluding a hybrid approach where both methods are used concurrently within the same jurisdiction.

    Summary

    In People v. Dooley, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of selecting judicial officers. The court held that Article VI, Section 17 of the New York Constitution mandates a clear choice between election by city electors and appointment by local authorities for selecting judicial officers in cities. The legislature cannot combine both methods within the same territorial division. The court reasoned that allowing both appointment and election would open the door to political manipulation and undermine the intent of the Constitution. This decision ensures a uniform method of selection for judicial officers within a given jurisdiction, preserving the integrity of the judicial selection process.

    Facts

    The specifics of Dooley’s case are not detailed in Crane, J.’s dissent, but the key factual element is the existence of a law or practice that seemingly allowed for both election and appointment of judicial officers within the same city.

    Procedural History

    The procedural history isn’t detailed within this specific dissenting opinion. However, it is clear the case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision on the matter.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York State Constitution permits the legislature to authorize both the election and appointment of judicial officers of the same grade, performing the same duties, in the same local division of a city.

    Holding

    No, because the New York Constitution mandates that judicial officers in cities be chosen either by election or appointment, but not both concurrently within the same territorial or civil division.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, as explained in Crane J.’s dissent in a later case, interpreted Article VI, Section 17 of the New York Constitution, which states that judicial officers in cities must be either elected by the city’s electors or appointed by local authorities. The court emphasized that this provision presents two distinct alternatives, and the legislature must choose one or the other. The court reasoned that allowing both methods simultaneously would create opportunities for political manipulation and undermine the integrity of the judicial selection process. As the court stated, “If the office is to be filled by appointment, the agency by which that is to be accomplished is broadly, yet clearly designated. If the officer is to be elected, the power of appointment is as plainly excluded.” The dissent in the later case argues that a law allowing temporary appointed justices, when elected justices are disabled, violates the principle established in Dooley.

  • In re Slosson’s Estate, 216 N.Y. 79 (1915): Elective Inheritance Rights Under Power of Appointment

    In re Slosson’s Estate, 216 N.Y. 79 (1915)

    When a will grants a power of appointment and the donee partially exercises that power, beneficiaries who would have taken in default of appointment can elect to take under the original will for the portion they would have received in default, even if the donee validly appointed a portion of the estate to others.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether children can elect to take under the original grantor’s will when their mother (the donee of a power of appointment) partially exercises that power, diverting some of the trust estate to other beneficiaries. The court held that the children could elect to take under the original will for the portion they would have received in default of appointment, despite the mother’s partial exercise of the power. This is consistent with the principle that a valid, partial exercise of a power of appointment does not preclude beneficiaries from taking the remaining portion under the original grant.

    Facts

    Peter Naylor’s will created a trust for Josephine Slosson, granting her the power to dispose of the trust estate via her will. The will stipulated that if Josephine did not exercise this power, the trust estate would pass to those who would have received it had Josephine died intestate and owning the property. Josephine’s will disposed of about two-thirds of the trust estate to her children (who would have taken in default) and about one-third to others. The children elected to take the two-thirds share under Naylor’s will, not their mother’s.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court held that Josephine’s will was a valid disposition of the trust estate due to the diversion of one-third to other beneficiaries and thus the children’s shares were subject to a transfer tax. The Appellate Division affirmed this conclusion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the valid disposition by Josephine of a portion of the trust estate to individuals who could only receive it through such disposition negates the right of her children to elect to take the remaining portion of the trust estate under the original will of Naylor?

    Holding

    No, because the valid exercise of a power of appointment as to a part of a trust estate, coupled with either an ineffectual attempt or a failure to exercise it as to the remaining part, does not prevent those entitled from receiving their shares under the original will, as diminished by the exercise of the power.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle established in Matter of Ripley, 192 N.Y. 536, which held that a valid exercise of a power of appointment regarding a portion of a trust estate, coupled with a failure to exercise it for the balance, does not preclude those entitled from taking their shares under the grantor’s will. The court stated that “It is immaterial whether there is a neglect or failure to exercise the power as to the balance of the trust estate, or an attempt to exercise it ineffectual because of the refusal of the donees to accept the disposition. In either of such cases, there is a failure of disposition under the appointment and the original will effects the transfer of the part of the trust estate undisposed of.” The court also referenced Matter of Lansing, 182 N.Y. 238, clarifying that beneficiaries are not forced to take under the power of appointment if they would have taken in default. Here, the children could elect to take under Naylor’s will for the two-thirds they would have received in default, irrespective of Josephine’s partial appointment to others. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the case was remitted to the Surrogate’s Court to modify its order by deducting the value of the children’s shares from the taxable estate.