New York Law Review

Tag: ejusdem generis

  • H. Uribe, Inc. v. Merchants Bank of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 336 (1998): Defining ‘Valuable Papers’ in Safe Deposit Box Agreements

    H. Uribe, Inc. v. Merchants Bank of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 336 (1998)

    The term “valuable papers” in a safe deposit box rental agreement, when listed alongside specific items like “securities,” “jewelry,” and “precious metals,” does not unambiguously include cash or currency.

    Summary

    H. Uribe, Inc. sued Merchants Bank to recover for the alleged theft of approximately $2,000,000 in cash, gems, and other items from its safe-deposit box. The rental agreement allowed for the storage of “securities, jewelry, valuable papers, and precious metals only.” The issue was whether “valuable papers” could be interpreted to include currency. The Court of Appeals held that “valuable papers” is unambiguous and does not include legal tender, thus the bank was not liable for the missing cash. The court applied principles of contract interpretation, including ejusdem generis and inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, to reach its conclusion. The court reasoned that the term should be given a limited interpretation, further emphasized by the adverbs “solely” and “only.”

    Facts

    • Hernando Uribe leased a safe-deposit box from Merchants Bank in December 1990. The title was later transferred to his corporation, H. Uribe, Inc.
    • In November 1992, Uribe sold emeralds for cash and allegedly placed the proceeds ($555,000, including $170,270 that is the subject of this suit) in the safe-deposit box.
    • In December 1992, Uribe reported the cash, gems, and other property stolen from the box.
    • The safe-deposit box rental agreement stated that the safe was leased “solely for the purpose of keeping securities, jewelry, valuable papers, and precious metals only.”
    • The bank’s rules and regulations stated that the bank was not a bailee and was not liable for any loss unless caused by a “specific, clearly proven and willful act of Bank.”

    Procedural History

    • Uribe sued Merchants Bank to recover the missing cash.
    • The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to the bank, dismissing the claim for the missing currency.
    • The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the agreement unambiguously excluded currency as an authorized item for deposit.
    • The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the term “valuable papers” in the safe-deposit box rental agreement is ambiguous and can be interpreted to include currency or cash.

    Holding

    1. No, because the term “valuable papers” in this context is unambiguous and does not encompass legal tender.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that “valuable papers,” in usual parlance, is limited to legal or business documents. It cited dictionary definitions and other statutes that distinguish between “valuable papers” and “money.” The court applied the principle of ejusdem generis, stating that “valuable papers” should be interpreted narrowly because it is listed among other specific items like “jewelry,” “securities,” and “precious metals.” The court also invoked the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, arguing that the omission of “cash,” “currency,” or “legal tender” indicates an intentional exclusion. The court rejected Uribe’s argument that the custom of gem merchants to hold large sums of cash in safe-deposit boxes should apply, stating that the average merchant would deposit cash in accounts. The court emphasized that contracts should be enforced according to their plain and clear meaning and should not be subverted by straining to find an ambiguity that does not exist. The court noted that banks are authorized to rent safe deposit boxes upon such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. The court concluded that the term “valuable papers” should be given its usual, plain, and common meaning, and that the agreement excludes cash, currency, or legal tender.

  • Matter of Brown v. Wyman, 22 N.Y.2d 433 (1968): Interpreting ‘Like Catastrophe’ in Social Services Law

    Matter of Brown v. Wyman, 22 N.Y.2d 433 (1968)

    When interpreting a statute, the term ‘other like catastrophe’ should be construed in light of the preceding terms, encompassing only events similar in nature, and an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers should be upheld.

    Summary

    A welfare recipient, Brown, sought replacement of stolen clothing and furniture after a burglary, citing Section 131-a(6) of the Social Services Law, which allows for replacement of necessities lost due to “fire, flood or other like catastrophe.” The New York City Social Services Department denied her claim, a decision upheld by the State Commissioner of Social Services. The lower courts reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that ‘other like catastrophe’ does not include burglary. The court reasoned that the legislative intent, as well as the administrative interpretation, limited the phrase to natural or man-made disasters similar to fire or flood, and that a burglary was too dissimilar to be included.

    Facts

    Brown, a welfare recipient and mother, had her apartment burglarized, resulting in the loss of clothing and furniture. She applied to the New York City Social Services Department for replacement of the stolen items, based on Section 131-a(6) of the Social Services Law. The Social Services Department denied her application.

    Procedural History

    The New York City Social Services Department denied Brown’s application. The Commissioner of the State Department of Social Services affirmed this denial after a hearing. Brown then initiated an Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division reversed the Commissioner’s decision, holding that a burglary constituted a “catastrophe” under the statute and remanded the case to determine the appropriate grant amount. The Commissioner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the phrase “other like catastrophe” in Section 131-a(6) of the Social Services Law includes a burglary, thereby entitling the victim to replacement of stolen items.

    Holding

    No, because the phrase “other like catastrophe” should be construed in light of the preceding terms (“fire, flood”) and encompasses only events similar in nature, and a burglary is not sufficiently similar to a fire or flood to be included within that phrase.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the maxims of statutory construction, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, to interpret the phrase “other like catastrophe.” It reasoned that the legislature intended to include only natural occurrences, or man-made ones similar to a fire. The court deferred to the Commissioner’s interpretation, noting that the agency consistently interpreted the statute to exclude burglaries, stating that “statutory construction is the function of the courts ‘but where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court’s function is limited’”. The court emphasized the importance of upholding administrative interpretations unless they are irrational or unreasonable. The court stated that, “The administrative determination is to be accepted by the courts ‘if it has “warrant in the record” and a reasonable basis in law’…‘The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.’” The court acknowledged the unfortunate frequency of burglaries but stated that this did not justify labeling them as “catastrophes” within the meaning of the statute. Changing this interpretation would require legislative amendment, not judicial action.