New York Law Review

Tag: Ejectment

  • Chazon, LLC v. Maugenest, 19 N.Y.3d 410 (2012): Loft Law Compliance Required to Maintain Ejectment Action

    Chazon, LLC v. Maugenest, 19 N.Y.3d 410 (2012)

    A landlord of a New York City loft who has not complied with the Loft Law and has not received an extension of time to comply may not maintain an ejectment action based on nonpayment of rent.

    Summary

    Chazon, LLC, the landlord of a loft building, brought an ejectment action against Maugenest, a tenant who had not paid rent since 2003. The landlord had not complied with New York’s Loft Law, which governs the conversion of commercial buildings to residential use, nor had it obtained an extension for compliance. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the landlord was not in compliance with the Loft Law, it could not maintain an action for ejectment based on non-payment of rent, as explicitly barred by Multiple Dwelling Law § 302(1)(b). The court reversed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing the statutory requirement of compliance for landlords to collect rent or pursue eviction for non-payment in interim multiple dwellings.

    Facts

    Chazon, LLC owned a loft building in Brooklyn. Maugenest occupied an apartment in the building and had not paid rent since 2003. The building lacked a residential certificate of occupancy, making its residential use a violation of Multiple Dwelling Law § 301(1). The landlord had not met the deadlines for compliance with the Loft Law (Multiple Dwelling Law art 7-C), designed to legalize residential occupancy in former commercial buildings, nor had it obtained an extension from the Loft Board. The Loft Board had specifically rejected the landlord’s claim that compliance was hindered by circumstances beyond its control in 2006.

    Procedural History

    Chazon, LLC initiated an ejectment action against Maugenest in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the landlord, awarding possession of the apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landlord who has not complied with the Loft Law (Multiple Dwelling Law art 7-C) and has not received an extension of time to comply, can maintain an ejectment action against a tenant for nonpayment of rent.

    Holding

    No, because Multiple Dwelling Law § 302(1)(b) explicitly bars an action for possession of premises for nonpayment of rent when the building is occupied in violation of section 301 (i.e., lacks a residential certificate of occupancy), and Multiple Dwelling Law § 285(1) only provides an exception for landlords who are “in compliance with” the Loft Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the plain language of the Multiple Dwelling Law. Section 302(1)(b) states that “no rent shall be recovered by the owner of such premises…and no action or special proceeding shall be maintained therefor, or for possession of said premises for nonpayment of such rent” if the dwelling is occupied in violation of section 301. Section 285(1), part of the Loft Law, provides a narrow exception, allowing landlords of interim multiple dwellings to recover rent and maintain actions for possession, but only if they are “in compliance with this article.” The Court emphasized that because the landlord was not in compliance with the Loft Law, the general prohibition of Section 302(1)(b) applied. The court acknowledged that prior intermediate appellate court decisions, such as Le Sannom Bldg. Corp. v. Lassen and 99 Commercial St. v. Llewellyn, had reached different conclusions, but found those decisions irreconcilable with the statute’s clear text. The court stated: “Multiple Dwelling Law § 302 (1) (b) bars not only an action to recover rent, but also an ‘action or special proceeding . . . for possession of said premises for nonpayment of such rent.’ This is such an action, and it is barred.” The Court concluded that any alteration to this outcome would require legislative action.

  • Nestor v. Diamond, 79 N.Y.2d 490 (1992): RPAPL 753(4) Cure Applies in Supreme Court Ejectment Actions

    Nestor v. Diamond, 79 N.Y.2d 490 (1992)

    RPAPL 753(4), which allows a tenant to cure a lease violation within ten days to avoid eviction, applies to ejectment actions commenced in the Supreme Court, not just summary proceedings in Civil Court.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a tenant can utilize RPAPL 753(4) to cure a lease breach in an ejectment action brought in Supreme Court, or if that remedy is limited to summary proceedings in Civil Court. The plaintiff, a cooperative apartment owner, sought to eject the defendant tenants for installing a washing machine without permission. The Court of Appeals held that RPAPL 753(4) applies to ejectment actions in Supreme Court, reasoning that the statute is remedial and should be liberally construed to allow tenants to cure breaches and remain in possession. The Court also denied the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees, as she did not prevail on the central issue of possession.

    Facts

    The defendant, Helene Diamond, resided in a rent-stabilized apartment since 1965. The plaintiff, Marianne Nestor, purchased the apartment in 1982 subject to the defendant’s tenancy. In 1983, the plaintiff served notices to cure on the defendants for installing a washing machine and associated plumbing without the landlord’s consent. In 1985, the plaintiff initiated an ejectment action in Supreme Court, alleging breach of the lease.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found a technical breach of the lease but granted the defendant time to cure the violation. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that RPAPL 753(4) was available in an ejectment action in Supreme Court. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether RPAPL 753(4), which allows a tenant to cure a lease violation to avoid eviction, applies to ejectment actions commenced in the Supreme Court.

    Holding

    Yes, because RPAPL 753(4) is a remedial statute that should be liberally construed to permit tenants to cure lease violations and remain in possession, regardless of whether the action is brought in Civil Court as a summary proceeding or in Supreme Court as an ejectment action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that RPAPL 753(4) is procedural and remedial and should be liberally construed to spread its beneficial effects as widely as possible. The statute aims to allow tenants to remain in possession by curing violations after adjudication and obviates the need for tenants to seek a Yellowstone injunction. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the reference to “warrant” in the statute limits its applicability to Civil Court summary proceedings, stating that such a construction would frustrate the statute’s purpose. The Court quoted Killington Investors v. Leino, 148 AD2d 334, 336, stating that a residential tenant who forebears from commencing a declaratory judgment, believing that he [or she] can obtain complete relief in the Civil Court, would be deprived of the benefit of the statute if the landlord unexpectedly commences an action for ejectment in Supreme Court instead of a summary holdover proceeding in the Civil Court, if we were to hold that RPAPL 753 (4) [does] not apply. The result would clearly frustrate the very purpose underlying the statute. The Court also noted the Supreme Court’s broad constitutional jurisdiction, which includes “‘all cases of every description in law and equity, from the most important and complicated to the most simple and insignificant’.” The Court concluded that the Legislature’s creation of new remedies tracked to a particular court does not divest the Supreme Court of its general power. Finally, the Court denied the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees, as she did not prevail on the central issue of obtaining a possessory judgment, stating that Ordinarily, only a prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees.

  • Montauk Tribe of Indians v. Long Island Railroad Co., 159 N.Y. 461 (1899): Legal Capacity of Unrecognized Tribes to Sue

    159 N.Y. 461 (1899)

    An unincorporated Indian tribe, lacking statutory authorization, does not have legal capacity to sue in ejectment, nor can an individual member sue on behalf of the tribe, because the tribe itself possesses no recognized cause of action.

    Summary

    A member of the Montauk Tribe of Indians brought an ejectment action on behalf of himself and other tribe members against the Long Island Railroad Company. The defendant demurred, arguing the plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to sue. The New York Court of Appeals held that neither the tribe, as an unincorporated entity, nor an individual member on its behalf, could maintain the action without statutory authorization. The Court emphasized that Indian tribes are wards of the state and possess only such rights to litigate as are conferred by statute, affirming the long-established public policy.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a member of the Montauk Tribe of Indians, initiated an ejectment action against the Long Island Railroad Company. The plaintiff claimed to represent himself and all other members of the tribe who wished to contribute to the action’s expenses. The plaintiff’s claim stemmed from the tribe’s alleged right to possess certain lands occupied by the defendant. The complaint conceded that the tribe lacked a corporate name and the legal capacity to sue in its own right.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term initially sustained the defendant’s demurrer, dismissing the case. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the action was properly brought in accordance with a prior appeal. Justice Willard Bartlett dissented. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and certified three questions regarding the plaintiff’s capacity to sue and the sufficiency of the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff in this action has the legal capacity to sue?
    2. Whether there is a defect of parties plaintiff in this action, in that the members of the alleged Montauk Tribe of Indians are not made parties plaintiff?
    3. Whether the complaint herein states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Montauk Tribe lacks legal capacity to sue as an unincorporated entity without statutory authorization, and an individual member cannot bring suit on behalf of a tribe that has no recognized cause of action.
    2. No, answered in the negative by extension from the answer to question #1.
    3. No, answered in the negative by extension from the answer to question #1.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent, particularly Strong v. Waterman, to conclude that Indian tribes generally lack the legal capacity to sue in ejectment unless specifically authorized by statute. The court emphasized the unique status of Indian tribes as wards of the state, subject to state control and protection. The Court distinguished the case from situations where equity might intervene to protect tribal lands, noting that ejectment requires a legal right to possession that the tribe, in its unincorporated form, did not possess.

    The court addressed the prior appeal, clarifying that its suggestion of a possible action by an individual member was not a firm endorsement but a tentative thought. The court reasoned that allowing such an action would contradict the policy of treating Indian tribes as wards of the state, possessed of only such rights to litigate as are conferred by statute. The court stated: “A decision holding that this action could be maintained either by the tribe, or an individual member thereof, on behalf of himself and all others who should come in and contribute, would be contrary to the policy and practice which have been long established in our treatment of the Indian tribes. They are regarded as the wards of the state, and generally speaking, possessed of only such rights to appear and litigate in courts of justice as are conferred upon them by statute.”

    The Court suggested that the appropriate remedy for the tribe was to seek an enabling act from the legislature authorizing a suit in the name of the tribe’s leader or designated members. The Court concluded that this approach was preferable to sustaining an action of questionable legal basis and contrary to established public policy.

  • De Puy v. Strong, 37 N.Y. 372 (1867): Joinder of Tenants in Common in Ejectment Actions

    De Puy v. Strong, 37 N.Y. 372 (1867)

    Tenants in common must either bring separate actions for their respective shares of property or join together in a single action to recover the entire property; some, but not all, tenants in common cannot bring a joint action.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether some, but not all, tenants in common can maintain a joint action of ejectment. The court held that while tenants in common may bring separate actions or join in one action for the entire property, a joint action by some, but not all, is impermissible. The court reasoned that statutory provisions dictate either individual suits or a complete joinder to avoid splitting claims and potentially harassing the defendant with multiple actions. This decision clarifies the procedural requirements for ejectment actions involving tenants in common, ensuring comprehensive resolution of property disputes.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, a subset of the tenants in common, brought an ejectment action against the defendant to recover possession of land. During the pendency of the action, some of the plaintiffs died. The defendant argued that the action was defective because the heirs of the deceased plaintiffs were not brought in as parties.

    Procedural History

    The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed, arguing that the action was improperly maintained by only some of the tenants in common and that the failure to include the heirs of the deceased plaintiffs rendered the action defective. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine the propriety of the joint action and the effect of the plaintiffs’ deaths during the lawsuit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a joint action of ejectment can be maintained by a portion of several tenants in common, specifically whether some but not all tenants in common can jointly sue to recover property.

    Holding

    No, because statutory provisions dictate that tenants in common must either bring separate actions for their individual shares or join together in one action for the entire property, thereby precluding a joint action by some but not all tenants in common.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under the Revised Statutes, tenants in common must either bring separate actions for their respective shares or join in one action for the entire premises. The court noted that prior to the Revised Statutes, New York allowed tenants in common to make a joint demise, effectively allowing a joint action of ejectment based on joint possession, despite their separate titles. However, the Revised Statutes aimed to establish a uniform course of procedure for real property actions. The court emphasized that allowing some, but not all, tenants in common to bring a joint action would permit splitting claims and potentially harass the defendant with multiple actions. The court stated, “The real plaintiff, having the right to use all their names, should not be permitted to split up his claim and harass the defendant with several actions in the names of his grantors separately. His right is entire, and the reasonable interpretation of section 111 is, that the term grantor is intended to embrace all the granting parties when they are more than one.” The court concluded that all tenants in common, or their heirs/legal representatives, should be parties to the action, and if any refuse to join as plaintiffs, they may be made defendants.