New York Law Review

Tag: EIT Funds

  • Board of Education v. Watertown Education Association, 74 N.Y.2d 912 (1989): Determining Arbitrability in Collective Bargaining Agreements

    74 N.Y.2d 912 (1989)

    When an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of a dispute, the question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the contract is a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator, not the courts.

    Summary

    The Watertown Education Association sought arbitration, alleging the Board of Education violated their collective bargaining agreement by failing to distribute funds received under Education Law § 3602 (27) to a member. The Board argued the “Excellence in Teaching” (EIT) agreement was separate and not subject to arbitration. The Supreme Court granted the Board’s petition to stay arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement to arbitrate was clear and broad and that determining whether the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration provision was the arbitrator’s responsibility, not the court’s. The court emphasized that CPLR 7501 prohibits a court from considering the merits of the claim when arbitration is sought.

    Facts

    The Watertown Education Association (respondent) claimed that the Board of Education of the Watertown City School District (petitioner) violated their collective bargaining agreement, specifically exhibit B concerning the salary schedule. The Association alleged the Board failed to distribute funds received pursuant to Education Law § 3602 (27) to one of its members. These funds, known as EIT funds, were considered part of the teacher’s salary for the school year. The collective bargaining agreement contained an arbitration clause.

    Procedural History

    The Watertown Education Association sought arbitration. The Board of Education commenced a proceeding under CPLR 7503 to stay arbitration, arguing the EIT agreement was separate from the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court vacated the demand for arbitration and granted the Board’s petition to stay arbitration, concluding the dispute was not arbitrable. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dispute over the distribution of EIT funds, arguably covered by a separate agreement, falls within the scope of a broad arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, thus requiring arbitration.

    Holding

    Yes, because the parties’ agreement to arbitrate is clear and unequivocal, and the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of the dispute. Any dispute as to the coverage of the substantive provisions of the contract is for the arbitrator to resolve.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that if the arbitration clause is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of the dispute, the scope of the substantive provisions is a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. The court cited Board of Educ. v Barni, 49 NY2d 311, 314, stating, “[t]he question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the contract is itself a matter of contract interpretation and application, and hence it must be deemed a matter for resolution by the arbitrator.” The court also noted that CPLR 7501 prohibits courts from considering the merits of the claim when arbitration is sought. The arbitration clause defined a “grievance” as “[A] claim by any party to the contract that there has been a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of: (a) law; (b) the employment contract; (c) by-laws and written policies or any unilateral attempt to change the terms and conditions of employment.” The court found that the Supreme Court improperly focused on the separate terms of the EIT agreement instead of determining whether the dispute fell within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision. The court emphasized that it was not the court’s role to inject itself into determining the underlying merits of this arbitrable contract dispute.

  • City School District of City of Elmira v. PERB, 74 N.Y.2d 395 (1989): Limits on Mandatory Bargaining Over School Funding Applications

    City School District of City of Elmira v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 74 N.Y.2d 395 (1989)

    A school district’s decision whether to apply for Excellence in Teaching (EIT) funds is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a school district is required to bargain with its teachers’ union over the decision to apply for Excellence in Teaching (EIT) funds. The New York Court of Appeals held that a school district’s decision to apply for EIT funds is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The court reasoned that the Education Law grants school boards the discretion to decide whether to apply for such funds, and the legislative intent was to leave this decision to the board’s discretion.

    Facts

    The Elmira City School District’s Board of Education voted not to apply for EIT funds due to concerns about the district’s obligation to cover additional fringe benefit costs associated with the increased teacher salaries that EIT funds would support. The teachers’ association demanded that the district negotiate this decision. The district refused, leading the association to file an improper practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB).

    Procedural History

    An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the district violated the Civil Service Law by refusing to negotiate. PERB affirmed the ALJ’s decision, ordering the district to negotiate the application decision. The district then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division annulled PERB’s determination, leading to an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a school district’s decision to apply for Excellence in Teaching (EIT) funds is a proper subject for mandatory bargaining under the Taylor Law, such that a refusal to bargain constitutes an improper practice?

    Holding

    No, because the Legislature intended the decision of whether to apply for EIT funds to be left to the school board’s discretion and did not mandate collective bargaining on this issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the Legislature did not intend for a school district’s decision to apply for EIT funds to be subject to mandatory bargaining. The court based its reasoning on the language of Education Law § 3602 (27), which states that a school district “upon application shall be eligible” for EIT funds, indicating that application is not mandatory. The court emphasized that the regulations implementing the EIT program specify that the application is to be made by the board of education, which is the legislative body. The court noted that while the statute mandates collective negotiations over the distribution of EIT funds, it is silent regarding negotiations over the application decision. The court applied the principle of statutory interpretation that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. As the court stated, the evident purpose of the provision in paragraph (a) is “not only to mandate collective negotiations over the distribution of EIT funds, but to remove any impediment to such negotiations which might otherwise result where, as here, an ongoing collective bargaining agreement between the district and the union exists.” The court held that PERB’s interpretation of the statute was not entitled to deference because the issue was a matter of pure statutory reading and analysis. The court stated: ” ‘the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent’, [PERB’s] interpretations need not be accorded * * * deference”.