New York Law Review

Tag: Effective Assistance of Counsel

  • People v. Mclaughlin, 60 N.Y.2d 465 (1983): The Standard for Insanity Defense and Effective Counsel

    People v. Mclaughlin, 60 N.Y.2d 465 (1983)

    A defendant is not entitled to a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity if they had substantial capacity to know or appreciate the nature and consequences of their conduct and that the conduct was wrong, and strategic choices by counsel, even if unsuccessful, do not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Summary

    Mclaughlin was convicted of kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment after holding three people hostage while demanding transportation to Puerto Rico. He appealed, arguing he was insane and that his counsel was ineffective. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury could reasonably conclude Mclaughlin understood his actions and that his counsel’s strategic focus on the insanity defense, even if unsuccessful, didn’t constitute ineffective assistance. The court also noted that alleged errors in the jury charge were found to be stenographer errors, not actual errors in the judge’s instructions.

    Facts

    Mclaughlin held three people hostage in an apartment building lobby, threatening them with a large knife.

    He demanded that the police secure him transportation to Puerto Rico, where his mother lived.

    At trial, Mclaughlin raised an insanity defense.

    A psychiatrist, Dr. Herman, testified regarding Mclaughlin’s mental state.

    Procedural History

    Mclaughlin was convicted of kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment.

    He appealed, arguing insanity and ineffective assistance of counsel.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the jury could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence presented, that Mclaughlin had the substantial capacity to know or appreciate the nature and consequences of his conduct and that the conduct was wrong, thus precluding a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.

    2. Whether Mclaughlin received ineffective assistance of counsel due to alleged errors in the court’s charge and his lawyer’s reliance on an insanity defense.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because based on Dr. Herman’s testimony, the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mclaughlin had substantial capacity to know or appreciate the nature and consequences of his conduct and that the conduct was wrong.

    2. No, because the alleged errors in the court’s charge were found to be stenographer’s errors, and the lawyer’s reliance on an insanity defense was a strategic choice, even if ultimately unsuccessful.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the jury could reasonably conclude that Mclaughlin understood the nature and consequences of his actions, despite their bizarre nature. The court cited People v. Wofford, 46 N.Y.2d 962, for the standard regarding the insanity defense.

    Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court noted that Mclaughlin failed to raise the claim in a post-trial motion. Furthermore, the court deferred to the trial court’s finding that the alleged errors in the jury charge were due to stenographer errors, not actual errors by the judge. The court also stated that the defense attorney’s decision to focus on the insanity defense was a strategic one, and that “merely an attempt to second-guess what may have been a sound strategy, even if unsuccessful, in light of the clear proof with respect to all the elements of kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment.” The court cited People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, in support of the principle that unsuccessful strategies do not automatically equate to ineffective assistance. The court emphasized the importance of counsel’s strategic choices: “Defendant’s further contention that his lawyer should not have relied almost exclusively on an insanity defense is merely an attempt to second-guess what may have been a sound strategy, even if unsuccessful…”

  • People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 156 (1983): Effective Assistance of Counsel and Waiver of Confidentiality

    People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 156 (1983)

    A defendant is not deprived of effective assistance of counsel merely because a defense strategy, reasonably conceived at the time, ultimately proves unsuccessful; furthermore, allowing the public disclosure of confidential information by a defense witness waives any prior agreement to keep that information secret.

    Summary

    Lemuel Smith was convicted of two murders. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and breach of a stipulation of confidentiality. Smith’s attorney had negotiated a stipulation to keep statements Smith made about multiple murders secret. Smith’s attorney then used the transcript of those statements at trial to support an insanity defense. The New York Court of Appeals held that Smith’s attorney provided effective assistance, as the strategy was reasonable at the time. The Court further held that Smith waived confidentiality by allowing his psychiatrist to publicly disclose the content of the statements.

    Facts

    Robert Hedderman and Margaret Byron were murdered in their religious shop in Albany, New York. During the investigation, William Weber identified Smith as being in the store near Byron’s body. Maureen Toomey identified Smith as leaving the store around the time of the murders. A hair found on Smith’s sweater matched Byron’s hair. Smith was also indicted in Schenectady County for kidnapping and attempted robbery. Smith’s attorney met with the District Attorneys of Schenectady, Albany, and Saratoga Counties to negotiate a plea bargain for all charges. An agreement was reached to allow Smith to be questioned under the condition that all statements would be kept secret and all individuals present would be considered agents of the Schenectady County District Attorney’s office.

    Procedural History

    Smith was indicted by an Albany County Grand Jury for the Hedderman-Byron murders after confessing to those murders at the March 5th meeting. Prior to his Albany County murder trial, Smith unsuccessfully sought to suppress the transcript and tapes of the March 5th meeting. Smith was convicted and sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Smith appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Smith was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
    2. Whether the Schenectady County District Attorney breached the terms of the March 5 stipulation.
    3. Whether the Albany County District Attorney was bound by the March 5 stipulation.
    4. Whether the trial court erred in its Sandoval ruling.
    5. Whether unqualified opinion testimony was improperly admitted into evidence.
    6. Whether the statements Smith made at the March 5 meeting were given voluntarily.

    Holding

    1. No, because the attorney provided meaningful representation under the circumstances.
    2. No, because the Schenectady County District Attorney honored the promise.
    3. No, because no agency relationship existed.
    4. No, because the trial court exercised its discretion.
    5. No, because Dr. Davies was testifying about the nature of the attack, not to Smith’s state of mind.
    6. Yes, because the record supports the factual determination that Smith’s statements were given freely and voluntarily.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that defense counsel’s strategy to assert an insanity defense was reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against Smith in both the Schenectady and Albany County cases. By cooperating with police, counsel hoped to revive plea negotiations. The Court emphasized that “the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel will be met where ‘the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation’.” The court held that the Schenectady County District Attorney’s office did not improperly allow Albany County District Attorney Greenberg to obtain a copy of Smith’s March 5 statements. “The transcript was lawfully subpoenaed by District Attorney Greenberg and only after defendant allowed certain of its contents to be publicly disclosed by Dr. Klopott during his testimony at defendant’s prior Schenectady County trial.” The Court also found no evidence of an agency relationship between Diane Kassel and the Albany County District Attorney’s office. Finally, the court found that the trial court exercised sound discretion in its Sandoval ruling and that Dr. Davies testified about the nature of the attack, not Smith’s state of mind.

  • People v. Lloyd, 51 N.Y.2d 107 (1980): Adequacy of Inquiry for Joint Representation Conflicts

    People v. Lloyd, 51 N.Y.2d 107 (1980)

    When multiple defendants are represented by a single attorney, the trial court must inquire to ensure each defendant is aware of the potential risks involved in joint representation and has knowingly chosen it; however, there is no prescribed format for this inquiry.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court adequately advised a defendant of potential conflicts of interest when the defendant and his brother were jointly represented by one attorney. The court held that while the trial court has an independent duty to ensure the defendants are aware of the risks, the inquiry need not be overly detailed and there’s no specific format required. As long as the court alerts the defendant to the possibility of a conflict, informs them of the right to separate counsel, and receives assurance of their wish to continue joint representation, the court has satisfied its obligation. The conviction was affirmed.

    Facts

    John Lloyd and his brother were jointly indicted and tried for attempted murder related to the beating of Sal La Micela. The incident began when John followed a girl who refused a ride. La Micela intervened, leading to a fight where John allegedly beat La Micela with a stick and kicked him. John’s brother allegedly joined the fight. John testified he acted in self-defense and his brother claimed he didn’t participate in the beating. Both brothers were represented by the same attorney.

    Procedural History

    The trial court inquired about potential conflicts of interest arising from the joint representation. Both defendants stated they understood the potential conflict and wished to continue with joint representation. The jury found John Lloyd guilty of assault but acquitted his brother. John Lloyd appealed, arguing that the court’s inquiry was insufficient to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to separate counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Lloyd appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s inquiry regarding potential conflicts of interest in joint representation was sufficiently thorough to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to separate counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court specifically alerted the defendant to the possibility of a conflict of interest arising from the joint representation, informed the defendant of his right to separate counsel, and received assurance from the defendant that he wished to continue with the joint representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that attorneys must inform clients of potential conflicts, and trial judges have an independent obligation to ensure defendants are aware of the risks of joint representation. The court stated, “[T]here is no prescribed format or catechism that the court must follow.” The inquiry need not be as detailed as the attorney’s because the court may not know all the evidence or defense strategy. Requiring disclosure of defense strategies would also infringe on the defendant’s rights. The court found that the trial court fulfilled its obligation by alerting the defendant to the conflict, informing him of his right to separate counsel, and receiving his assurance that he wished to continue with joint representation. The court emphasized that the extent of precautions taken by the trial court involves a measure of discretion. The court cited People v. Ortiz, 49 N.Y.2d 718, where a general advisory about potential conflicts was deemed sufficient. Because the court protected the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

  • People v. Gonzalez, 47 N.Y.2d 606 (1979): Adequacy of Counsel for Indigent Criminal Appeals

    People v. Gonzalez, 47 N.Y.2d 606 (1979)

    An indigent criminal defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when their appointed appellate attorney submits a brief that merely summarizes the trial evidence, states the attorney’s opinion that there are no meritorious issues, lists points the defendant wants raised, but provides no legal argument supporting those points.

    Summary

    Federico Gonzalez was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. His appointed appellate counsel filed a brief that summarized the trial testimony, stated the attorney believed there were no valid appellate issues, and then listed four points Gonzalez wanted raised, without providing any legal argument. Gonzalez, acting pro se, requested new counsel, arguing the appointed attorney’s representation was inadequate. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Gonzalez was denied effective assistance of counsel because the “brief” was wholly deficient and failed to advocate on his behalf.

    Facts

    Gonzalez was convicted of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance and sentenced to 25 years to life on each count. He requested and was granted assigned counsel for his appeal. The appointed attorney received the trial transcript but filed a brief only after being contacted by the Appellate Division clerk. The brief contained a lengthy summary of the trial testimony, noted some objections, and stated that the attorney felt there were no points to be raised on appeal. The brief then listed four points Gonzalez wanted presented, but contained no argument or discussion supporting any of them.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division appointed counsel for Gonzalez’s appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction based on the brief submitted by appointed counsel and the District Attorney’s submission. Gonzalez, acting pro se, sought leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indigent criminal defendant is denied their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when the appointed appellate attorney files a “brief” that summarizes the evidence, states there are no points to be raised, lists the defendant’s desired points, but advances no legal argument.

    Holding

    Yes, because the “assistance given must be that of an advocate rather than as amicus curiae,” and the attorney’s actions did not constitute single-minded counsel in the research of the law and marshalling of arguments on the defendant’s behalf.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that indigent criminal defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal, meaning the assistance of an advocate, not merely a nominal representative. The court noted the attorney’s dilatory conduct, failure to consult with the defendant or trial counsel, and the perfunctory nature of the brief demonstrated a failure to meet the required standard. The court stated that paid appellate counsel would thoroughly study the record, consult with the defendant and trial counsel. The court found the brief’s lengthy, indiscriminate factual narrative and the absence of legal argument failed to aid either the defendant or the court. The Court stated, “Far from demonstrating conscientious examination of the record and the law, the papers before the Appellate Division on the motion for appointment of substitute counsel clearly portrayed the contrary.” The court quoted People v. Emmett: “appellate counsel not infrequently advance contentions which might otherwise escape the attention of judges of busy appellate courts, no matter how conscientiously and carefully those judges read the records before them.” The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the case for a de novo consideration of the appeal. The court suggested the Appellate Divisions develop procedures for attorneys who consider an appeal frivolous and for the court that appointed them.

  • People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 258 (1979): Duty to Inquire About Potential Conflicts in Joint Representation

    People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 258 (1979)

    When two defendants are represented by the same attorney, the trial court has a duty to inquire whether the defendants are aware of the potential risks of joint representation, but the failure to inquire does not automatically require reversal absent a showing of prejudice.

    Summary

    Defendants Macerola and Letko were convicted of burglary and assault. On appeal, they argued that they were denied effective assistance of counsel because their attorney represented both of them, creating a potential conflict of interest. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a trial court has a duty to inquire into potential conflicts when defendants are jointly represented, failure to do so does not automatically warrant reversal. The Court found that reversal is only required if prejudice resulted from the joint representation, which the defendants failed to demonstrate in this case. The convictions were reversed because of an error in the charge on the burglary count, not the conflict of interest claim.

    Facts

    Macerola and Letko assaulted Donald and June Hauffe at the Hauffe’s motel, allegedly in retaliation for a prior altercation involving Macerola’s mother. Macerola initiated the abuse against Donald Hauffe, and Letko inflicted serious injuries on both Donald and June Hauffe. Both defendants were represented by the same attorney, Armand Riccio, throughout the trial. The defendants were charged and tried as acting in concert.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of burglary and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the assault convictions but reversed the burglary conviction of one defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed the assault convictions, finding that the trial court committed reversible error in its charge to the jury on the issue of burglary. The Court addressed the conflict of interest issue as well.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court’s failure to inquire into potential conflicts of interest in joint representation constitutes per se reversible error.

    2. Whether the defendants demonstrated actual prejudice resulting from the joint representation that would warrant reversal of their convictions.

    Holding

    1. No, because a trial court’s failure to inquire into potential conflicts of interest in joint representation does not automatically constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice.

    2. No, because the defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the joint representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that while the trial court has a duty to inquire into potential conflicts of interest when codefendants are represented by the same attorney, the failure to conduct such an inquiry does not automatically mandate reversal. The court reasoned that the focus should be on whether the joint representation resulted in actual prejudice to the defendants. The Court emphasized that joint representation is not per se a violation of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and can sometimes be advantageous. “Joint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength against a common attack.”

    In this case, the Court found that the defendants failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice resulting from the joint representation. Their defense was consistent, and both defendants shared the same interest in discrediting the prosecution’s witnesses. The Court rejected the argument that separate counsel might have pursued different defense strategies, finding that such speculation was insufficient to establish prejudice. The Court held that “[m]ere speculation of what might have been is not enough. Actual, not imagined, conflict of interest must be shown before a defendant may successfully claim that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel.”

    The dissenting opinion argued that there was no conflict of interest, or even a possibility thereof, demonstrated, and that no prejudice was shown. The dissent noted that the Appellate Division had treated the issue with disdainful insignificance.

  • People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394 (1978): Effective Assistance of Counsel and Defendant’s Absence from Trial

    People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394 (1978)

    A defendant’s voluntary absence from trial, while not waiving the right to effective assistance of counsel, significantly impacts the assessment of counsel’s effectiveness, particularly where counsel’s actions are strategic responses to the defendant’s absence.

    Summary

    Aiken was convicted of burglary after voluntarily absenting himself from his trial. On appeal, he argued ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his lawyer’s limited participation in the trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while a defendant’s absence does not automatically waive the right to effective counsel, it must be considered when evaluating counsel’s performance. The court found that the attorney’s actions, including limited cross-examination and foregoing opening and closing statements, appeared to be a strategic decision in response to Aiken’s absence, aimed at securing a mistrial, and did not constitute ineffective assistance under the circumstances.

    Facts

    Police responded to a burglary call and found Aiken at the scene, attempting to hide. A windowpane was broken, and the master bedroom was in disarray. Aiken was charged with burglary in the second degree. He attended the first day of jury selection but failed to appear on subsequent days. The trial court determined his absence was willful and voluntary and proceeded with the trial in absentia.

    Procedural History

    Aiken was convicted of burglary in the second degree. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s limited participation in the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Aiken then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by voluntarily absenting himself from trial, is denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney makes strategic decisions, such as limiting cross-examination and foregoing opening and closing statements, in response to the defendant’s absence.

    Holding

    No, because while a defendant’s absence does not waive his right to effective counsel, the court must consider that absence in assessing counsel’s effectiveness, and strategic decisions made in response to that absence do not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions, but noted that the standard for evaluating effectiveness is not precisely defined. The court shifted away from the older “mockery of justice” standard to a more flexible, fact-specific inquiry, considering whether counsel’s representation was “adequate or effective in any meaningful sense.” The court emphasized that a defendant’s absence from trial significantly impacts counsel’s ability to provide effective representation. The court found that the attorney’s actions were a strategic attempt to obstruct the trial and pressure the court into declaring a mistrial. Waiver of opening and closing statements, failure to cross-examine, and failure to call witnesses were all seen as strategic choices, not necessarily indicative of ineffectiveness, given the defendant’s absence and the strength of the prosecution’s case. The court explicitly stated that “a defendant who absents himself from trial may not succeed on appeal by raising counsel’s purported ineffectiveness where counsel affirmatively, as a matter of trial strategy, sought to obstruct the trial of his client.” Ultimately, the court reasoned that allowing the appeal would permit the defendant to benefit from his own misconduct. The court also rejected the argument that retained counsel should be held to a different standard than appointed counsel, finding this distinction irrelevant to the core issue of effective representation.

  • People v. Brabson, 9 N.Y.2d 281 (1961): Right to Counsel Free from Conflicting Duties

    People v. Brabson, 9 N.Y.2d 281 (1961)

    A defendant is deprived of effective assistance of counsel when their attorney is asked to investigate the merits of the defendant’s alibi and report to the court, creating a conflict of interest.

    Summary

    Brabson pleaded guilty to attempted manslaughter. Before sentencing, he sought to withdraw his plea, claiming innocence and an alibi. The court asked Brabson’s assigned attorney to investigate the alibi. Brabson argued this request denied him effective counsel, entitling him to a new lawyer. The Court of Appeals held that asking the attorney to investigate the alibi created a conflict of interest, depriving Brabson of effective counsel. Once this occurred, the court was obligated to appoint new counsel.

    Facts

    The defendant, Brabson, was indicted for second-degree murder.
    He pleaded guilty to attempted manslaughter in the second degree.
    Before sentencing, Brabson moved to withdraw his plea, asserting he was innocent.
    Brabson claimed he was in Coney Island when the crime occurred in Manhattan, making it impossible for him to have committed the crime.

    Procedural History

    The trial court requested Brabson’s assigned attorney to investigate the alibi and report her findings.
    Brabson argued that this request deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, ordering a new hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court deprived Brabson of effective assistance of counsel when it asked his assigned attorney to investigate the merits of his alibi and report her findings to the court.

    Holding

    Yes, because asking the attorney to investigate the alibi created a conflict of interest, requiring the appointment of new counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that by asking the defendant’s lawyer to check on the facts bearing on the alibi, the defendant was “deprived of the effective assistance of counsel” at a “critical stage of the proceeding.” The court emphasized that the attorney was essentially being asked to abandon her role as an advocate for the defendant and become an investigator for the court. This compromised the attorney-client relationship, as the accused could no longer communicate with his lawyer with the absolute confidence essential to that relationship. The court stated, “To the defendant for whom he speaks, a lawyer’s commitment must be wholehearted, complete and free of ambiguity.” The court further noted that even if the relationship had been formally terminated, the court should not have assigned her tasks that might prejudice the interests of her former client or require her to draw on confidential information. The court reasoned that under these circumstances, it became “difficult, if not impossible, for counsel effectively to represent” the defendant, making it necessary to assign another attorney. The court rejected the argument that the attorney could simply remain silent if the alibi proved unsustainable, arguing that such silence would implicitly convey the attorney’s belief that the defendant’s motion lacked merit.

  • People v. Flynn, 10 N.Y.2d 289 (1961): Right to Counsel When Conflicts of Interest Arise

    People v. Flynn, 10 N.Y.2d 289 (1961)

    When a conflict of interest between co-defendants arises during trial, particularly due to surprise testimony, failure to declare a mistrial and provide adequate separate counsel violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

    Summary

    Police officers Flynn and Byrne were convicted of attempted extortion. During the trial, a witness testified that Flynn planned to exclude Byrne from the extorted money, creating a conflict of interest. The original attorney, representing both defendants, withdrew, and new counsel was appointed for Flynn. Both the original attorney and new counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing Flynn could not be adequately represented at that stage. The court denied the motions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the conflict of interest deprived Flynn of his right to effective counsel and that the surprise nature of the evidence prejudiced both defendants, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Defendants Flynn and Byrne, both police officers, were accused of attempting to extort $500 from Ralph Cozzino by threatening him with arrest and prosecution. Cozzino had a prior felony and misdemeanor conviction and a history of mental health issues. During the trial, Officer McPhillips testified that Flynn had stated he intended to split the extorted money with McPhillips, excluding Byrne.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in the Supreme Court, New York County. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial when a conflict of interest arose between the co-defendants, who were initially represented by the same counsel.
    2. Whether the newly appointed counsel for Flynn had sufficient time to prepare for trial, and whether Flynn’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he lacked representation for four days during the trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the conflict of interest arising from McPhillips’ testimony prejudiced Flynn’s defense, requiring separate and adequately prepared counsel.
    2. No, with qualification. The timing of the new counsel’s entry into the trial, after jury selection and several days of testimony, rendered effective representation impossible, violating Flynn’s Sixth Amendment rights. Consequently, a new trial should also be granted to Byrne, as the jury was led to believe the defendants’ interests were the same.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the significance of the conflict of interest arising from McPhillips’ unexpected testimony. The court noted that prior to this testimony, it was reasonable for a single attorney to represent both defendants, but the surprise evidence created divergent defense strategies. The court cited Glasser v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel is too fundamental to depend on calculations of prejudice. The court found that Flynn’s new counsel could not effectively cross-examine McPhillips without having experienced the initial days of the trial and understanding its atmosphere. The court directly quoted from the Legal Aid Society’s explanation for declining representation, stating that it was “too late in the game to have anyone from our Society to represent this man properly.” The court then reasoned that this was a sufficient basis for a mistrial. While the events were less damaging to Byrne, the court reasoned that the jury was initially led to believe that the two defendants should stand or fall together, making a new trial for both defendants appropriate. The court stated that “If his counsel had known of McPhillips’ testimony from the outset, the inference is that different trial tactics would have been adopted…in leading them to believe that the two defendants’ interests were hostile.”