Board of Education v. Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers’ Association, 35 N.Y.2d 599 (1974)
Parallel procedures challenging a school district’s refusal to appoint a teacher, one an appeal to the Commissioner of Education and the other a contract grievance including arbitration, may proceed concurrently when the collective bargaining agreement does not explicitly prohibit it and the grounds for relief are discrete.
Summary
This case addresses whether a teacher and the teachers’ union can pursue both a statutory appeal to the Commissioner of Education and a contractual grievance procedure, including arbitration, simultaneously. The New York Court of Appeals held that, in the specific circumstances, both procedures could continue concurrently because the collective bargaining agreement did not explicitly preclude it, both remedies were pursued diligently, and the grounds for relief under each were distinct. This case clarifies the circumstances where parallel remedies are permissible in disputes involving collective bargaining agreements and statutory rights in the education context.
Facts
Raylene Shayo, a tenured teacher, applied for a first-grade teaching position after her prior role was eliminated. The school board did not act favorably on her application. The teacher, and the Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers Association (the union), believed this was unjust. On April 5, 1972, the teacher filed an appeal with the State Commissioner of Education under Section 310 of the Education Law. Simultaneously, the union initiated a grievance procedure per their collective bargaining agreement, alleging a violation of the agreement’s promotional policy. The grievance procedure included internal stages and final, binding arbitration.
Procedural History
The teacher filed a section 310 appeal and the union started grievance procedures on the same day. The superintendent’s designee dismissed the grievance due to the pending appeal. The Board of Education answered the section 310 proceeding. The union requested a Stage 3 grievance hearing, but the board declined, citing the pending appeal. The union then demanded arbitration. The Board of Education sought a stay of arbitration, which Special Term granted. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition for a stay and remitting to arbitration. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the pursuit of an appeal to the Commissioner of Education under Section 310 of the Education Law waives or abandons the right to pursue grievance procedures, including arbitration, under a collective bargaining agreement for the same underlying dispute.
2. Whether a contractual time limitation for demanding arbitration is a threshold question for the court or an issue of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator.
Holding
1. No, because both remedies were pursued concurrently and diligently, the collective bargaining agreement did not explicitly exclude the specific type of claim, and the grounds for relief under each procedure were discrete.
2. The issue is one of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator, because the time limitation arises from the agreement itself and is necessary for interpreting and applying the agreement to resolve the grievance.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the collective bargaining agreement did not explicitly exclude the teacher’s claim from the grievance procedure. Section 2.1 of Article XXIV excluded disciplinary proceedings and matters of compensation appealable to the Commissioner, but the teacher’s claim for appointment did not fall within these exclusions. The court emphasized that both the Section 310 appeal and the grievance procedures were initiated and pursued concurrently and diligently. Therefore, neither remedy was waived or abandoned. The court stated, “While the school board indicated a clear preference for the section 310 track, the conduct of the teacher and the union discloses only a calculated intention to pursue both remedies concurrently and vigorously.”
The Court also distinguished the grounds for relief. The Commissioner of Education addressed the claim under Section 2510 of the Education Law, while the arbitration was based on Sections 1.1 and 1.2 of Article XI of the collective bargaining agreement. These were distinct issues.
Regarding the time limitation for demanding arbitration, the court cited Long Is. Lbr. Co. [Martin], 15 N.Y.2d 380, holding that because the 10-day limitation arose from the parties’ agreement, its application was a procedural matter for the arbitrator to decide. The court clarified that since the arbitration clause contemplated arbitration as to the interpretation and application of the agreement, the arbitrator should determine whether the union met the contractual deadline. The court noted, “Since the 10-day limitation of time is found in a provision of the agreement, it would seem that a decision as to its application would be procedurally necessary to a determination of the grievance here.”