New York Law Review

Tag: Education Law

  • Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 20 N.Y.3d 482 (2013): SDHR Jurisdiction Over Public School Discrimination Complaints

    Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 20 N.Y.3d 482 (2013)

    Executive Law § 296(4), which prohibits discrimination by “education corporations or associations,” does not apply to public school districts, and therefore the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) lacks jurisdiction to investigate complaints against public school districts under that provision.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) has jurisdiction to investigate discrimination complaints against public school districts under Executive Law § 296(4). Students filed complaints with the SDHR, alleging that their school districts permitted harassment based on race and/or disability. The school districts argued that they are not “education corporations or associations” under the statute. The Court of Appeals held that public school districts are not “education corporations or associations” as contemplated by Executive Law § 296(4), reversing the Appellate Division’s order in North Syracuse and reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment, and reversing the Appellate Division’s order in Ithaca City School Dist. and reinstating the Supreme Court’s order. Therefore, the SDHR lacks jurisdiction over these complaints.

    Facts

    Students in the North Syracuse Central School District and Ithaca City School District filed complaints with the SDHR, alleging that their respective school districts engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices by allowing harassment based on race and/or disability.

    Procedural History

    Both school districts initiated CPLR article 78 proceedings seeking to prohibit the SDHR from investigating the complaints, arguing that public school districts are not “education corporations or associations” under Executive Law § 296(4). In North Syracuse, the Supreme Court initially granted the petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, stating the school district should have first exhausted administrative remedies. In Ithaca City School Dist., the Supreme Court initially annulled the SDHR’s determination of discrimination and award of damages, but the Appellate Division modified the award and confirmed the determination, concluding that public school districts are “educational institutions” over which the SDHR has jurisdiction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public school district is an “education corporation or association” as contemplated by Executive Law § 296(4), thereby granting the SDHR jurisdiction to investigate complaints against them.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative history of Executive Law § 296(4) indicates that the term “education corporation or association” refers to private, non-sectarian entities that are exempt from taxation under RPTL article 4, and public school districts do not fall into this category.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals examined the legislative history of Executive Law § 296(4), tracing the term “education corporation or association” back to the Tax Law. The Court highlighted that Tax Law § 4 differentiated between the tax-exempt status of municipal corporations, like school districts, and that of private corporations or associations organized for various purposes, including education. The Court noted that the language of Executive Law § 296(4) was taken almost verbatim from Tax Law § 4(6), indicating the Legislature’s intention for the term to have the same meaning in both laws. The Court emphasized that the phrase “non-sectarian” in Executive Law § 296(4) was intended to carve out an exception for parochial schools, reserving jurisdiction for the SDHR to investigate complaints against private, non-sectarian education corporations or associations. The court rejected the SDHR’s argument to liberally construe the statute to include public school districts, finding no underlying directive to support such a construction. The Court concluded that public school districts, as part of a public system, are distinct from private, non-sectarian institutions and do not need to “hold themselves out to the public to be non-sectarian” to receive tax-exempt status.

  • Rosenblum v. New York City Conflicts of Interest Board, 18 N.Y.3d 422 (2012): Conflicts of Interest Law Enforcement Against Tenured Teachers

    18 N.Y.3d 422 (2012)

    The Conflicts of Interest Board of the City of New York (COIB) is authorized to enforce the Conflicts of Interest Law against a public servant, including tenured teachers, who are also subject to discipline under state education law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the New York City Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB) has the authority to enforce the City’s Conflicts of Interest Law against public servants, specifically tenured teachers, who are also subject to disciplinary proceedings under the state’s Education Law. The Court of Appeals held that COIB’s authority is not superseded by the Education Law, allowing COIB to pursue ethics violations even if the Department of Education (DOE) declines to pursue disciplinary action. This decision upholds COIB’s independence in enforcing ethics rules for city employees, promoting governmental integrity.

    Facts

    Stephen Rosenblum, a tenured assistant principal in New York City, was accused of using his position to seek preferential treatment for his son, a teacher at another school who was facing misconduct allegations. COIB received a complaint alleging that Rosenblum approached the other school’s principal to intervene on his son’s behalf. COIB initiated proceedings against Rosenblum for violating the Conflicts of Interest Law.

    Procedural History

    COIB determined there was probable cause to believe Rosenblum violated the Conflicts of Interest Law and referred the matter to the DOE. The DOE declined to take disciplinary action. COIB then filed a petition with the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH). Rosenblum sought to prohibit COIB and OATH from proceeding, arguing that the Education Law provides the exclusive means for disciplining tenured teachers. The Supreme Court granted Rosenblum’s petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed. COIB and OATH appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Education Law §§ 3020 and 3020-a provide the exclusive means of disciplining tenured teachers, thereby precluding COIB from enforcing the Conflicts of Interest Law against them.
    2. Whether section 2603(h)(2) of the New York City Charter divests COIB of jurisdiction when a state law or collective bargaining agreement allows the employing agency to conduct disciplinary proceedings.

    Holding

    1. No, because “discipline” within the meaning of sections 3020 and 3020-a encompasses only job-related penalties imposed by the employer (DOE), not sanctions imposed by COIB for ethics violations.
    2. No, because the requirement to refer matters to the employing agency does not preclude COIB from proceeding if the agency declines to act; Section 2603(h)(6) specifically states the Board is not prevented from acting where the employing agency decides to terminate or otherwise discipline a public servant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Education Law establishes the exclusive means for the DOE to discipline tenured teachers regarding job-related penalties. However, the Conflicts of Interest Law serves a different purpose: protecting governmental integrity. COIB’s power to impose fines for ethics violations does not conflict with the Education Law. COIB’s fining power isn’t discipline under the Education Law, which is focused on penalties imposed by the employer affecting employment terms.

    The Court also noted the legislative history of the Conflicts of Interest Law, stating that the intent was to create an independent body with the power to enforce ethics rules. Interpreting the law to mean COIB lacks jurisdiction whenever a state law or CBA provides for disciplinary proceedings would undermine COIB’s independence. The Court quoted section 2603(h)(6) of the City Charter, stating:

    “[N]othing contained in this section [2603] shall prohibit the appointing officer [i.e., the employing agency] of a public servant from terminating or otherwise disciplining such public servant, where such appointing officer is otherwise authorized to do so; provided, however, that such action by the appointing officer shall not preclude the board from exercising its powers and duties under [the Conflicts of Interest Law] with respect to the actions of any such public servant.”

    The Court found that this language indicates that COIB retains its powers and duties even if the employing agency takes its own disciplinary action, and by extension, if the employing agency chooses not to act. The dissent argued that a fine is a form of discipline, and the Education Law grants immunity from COIB proceedings.

  • Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893 (2003): Defining “Sound Basic Education” Under the New York Constitution

    100 N.Y.2d 893 (2003)

    The Education Article of the New York Constitution requires the State to provide all children with the opportunity for a “sound basic education,” defined as a meaningful high school education that prepares them to function productively as civic participants.

    Summary

    Campaign for Fiscal Equity (CFE) sued New York State, alleging that the state’s school funding system failed to provide New York City’s public schoolchildren with the opportunity for a “sound basic education” as required by the State Constitution. After a lengthy trial, the trial court found in favor of CFE. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that New York City schools were not providing a constitutionally adequate education due to inadequate resources and inputs. The Court defined a sound basic education as one providing the skills necessary for civic participation and employment, effectively requiring a meaningful high school education. The Court mandated reforms to the funding system to ensure that New York City schools receive sufficient resources. The court outlined a series of metrics, by which outputs and outcomes could be measured.

    Facts

    CFE brought suit against New York State, arguing the State’s funding system failed to provide NYC schoolchildren the opportunity for a sound basic education as required by the New York Constitution. The New York City public school system is a massive undertaking, serving 1.1 million children across nearly 1200 schools. A significant proportion of NYC students are racial minorities, born outside the US, or classified as Limited English Proficient (LEP). A high percentage also qualify for free or reduced-price lunches, indicating widespread poverty. The state funding mechanism involves a complex formula. At the time of trial, NYC schools received less per-pupil funding than most other districts in the state.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially ruled in favor of CFE, finding that the State had violated the Education Article of the New York Constitution by failing to provide adequate funding for NYC schools. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision on the law and the facts. Plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right, arguing the Appellate Division erred in its determination of a sound basic education. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, affirming the dismissal of the Title VI claim, but otherwise reversing the Appellate Division’s decision, and remitting the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court correctly defined a “sound basic education” as required by the Education Article of the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    Yes, in part. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that a “sound basic education” means more than just being qualified to vote or serve as a juror; it requires having the skills appropriate to participate capably and knowledgeably in civic life and to obtain employment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that a sound basic education should prepare students for meaningful civic participation and employment. This necessitates more than an eighth-grade education. The court found the quality of teaching in NYC schools to be inadequate due to the inability to attract and retain qualified teachers. The court also found deficiencies in school facilities, especially overcrowded classrooms. While physical disrepair wasn’t directly linked to student performance, excessive class sizes were. Instrumentalities of learning, like library books and computers, were also inadequate. As for “outputs,” the Court found completion rates unacceptably low, and discounted favorable standardized test results as insufficient evidence of a constitutionally adequate education. “Children are entitled to minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn. Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks. Children are also entitled to minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas” (Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 317).The Court held that the State could not evade its responsibility by blaming mismanagement by New York City or the Board of Education because those are both agents of the State itself. While various reforms unrelated to financing may be necessary, the Court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of establishing a causal link between the funding system and the failure to provide a sound basic education.

  • Skinner v. Comm’r of Educ., 94 N.Y.2d 663 (2000): Teacher Recall Rights After BOCES Takeover

    Skinner v. Comm’r of Educ., 94 N.Y.2d 663 (2000)

    A teacher whose position is abolished due to a BOCES takeover has the right to be placed on the school district’s preferred eligibility list for seven years, provided they otherwise qualify under Education Law §§ 2510(3) and 3013(3), and these recall rights are not limited by Education Law § 3014-a.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a teacher whose position was abolished when a BOCES (Board of Cooperative Educational Services) took over a school district program retains certain recall rights within the school district. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, asserting that Education Law § 3014-a, which grants seniority rights in BOCES takeovers, does not preclude additional recall rights under §§ 2510(3) and 3013(3). The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to determine if the petitioner qualifies for these additional benefits.

    Facts

    The Utica City School District abolished petitioner Skinner’s probationary teaching position when the Oneida-Herkimer-Madison BOCES took over its Alternative Educational Program. Skinner argued that he was entitled to be placed on the school district’s preferred eligibility list for future employment opportunities per Education Law §§ 2510(3) and 3013(3), in addition to the seniority rights afforded by Education Law § 3014-a.

    Procedural History

    The case originated within the administrative structure of the New York education system, likely with an appeal to the Commissioner of Education. The Appellate Division affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, which denied Skinner’s claim for additional recall rights. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Education Law § 3014-a, concerning seniority rights following a BOCES takeover, limits a teacher’s rights under Education Law §§ 2510(3) and 3013(3) to be placed on a school district’s preferred eligibility list when their position is abolished due to the takeover.

    Holding

    No, because § 3014-a(4) explicitly states that the section should not be construed to limit rights granted by other provisions of law; thus, the existence of rights under § 3014-a does not preclude additional recall rights under §§ 2510(3) and 3013(3).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Commissioner of Education and the Utica City School District incorrectly argued that § 3014-a provided the exclusive set of rights for teachers in BOCES takeover situations. The court emphasized the explicit language of § 3014-a(4), which states: “[t]his section shall in no way be construed to limit the rights of any of such employees set forth in this section granted by any other provision of law.” The Court cited prior case law, including Koch v Putnam-Northern Westchester Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., to support its interpretation that teachers may have rights under both § 3014-a and §§ 2510(3) and 3013(3). The court clarified that a teacher whose position is abolished during a BOCES takeover has the right to be placed on the school district’s preferred eligibility list for employment for seven years, provided the teacher otherwise qualifies for the statutes’ benefits. Because the lower courts did not determine whether Skinner qualified for benefits under §§ 2510(3) and 3013(3), the case was remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings. The court relied on the plain language of the statute, finding no ambiguity that would require a different interpretation.

  • LaValle v. Board of Regents, 9 N.Y.3d 152 (2007): Constitutionality of Joint Ballot for Regent Elections

    LaValle v. Board of Regents, 9 N.Y.3d 152 (2007)

    The joint ballot provisions of New York Education Law § 202, which provide an alternative method for electing members of the State Board of Regents when the Senate and Assembly fail to elect by concurrent resolution, do not violate Article XI, §§ 1 and 2 of the New York State Constitution.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of using a joint ballot in the New York legislature to elect members of the State Board of Regents when the Senate and Assembly are unable to agree through a concurrent resolution. Plaintiffs argued that the joint ballot process violates the constitutional delegation of legislative authority, as only the Senate and Assembly acting bicamerally constitute the “legislature.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal, holding that the joint ballot method is constitutional, given its historical use and the Legislature’s ability to function unicamerally for non-lawmaking activities. The Court emphasized the strong presumption of constitutionality afforded to legislative enactments and the absence of any explicit constitutional prohibition against the Legislature acting unicamerally in such a context.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, a state senator and a retired teacher, brought suit against the Board of Regents and the State of New York, challenging the constitutionality of Education Law § 202, which allows for the election of state regents via a “joint ballot” when the Senate and Assembly cannot agree on a candidate through concurrent resolution. The individually named regent defendants were elected using this joint ballot method. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the regents from assuming office and a declaration that the joint ballot provisions are unconstitutional. The legislature had originally used the joint ballot to elect delegates to Congress under the Articles of Confederation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the joint ballot provisions of Education Law § 202 (1) and (2), allowing for the election of members of the State Board of Regents by a joint session of the Senate and Assembly when they fail to agree by concurrent resolution, violate Article XI, §§ 1 and 2 of the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the New York State Senate and Assembly, meeting in a joint session as a unicameral body, constitute the Legislature as contemplated by Article XI, §§ 1 and 2 of the New York State Constitution; therefore, the joint ballot provisions of Education Law § 202 (1) and (2) are constitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, which the plaintiffs failed to overcome. Article XI, § 1 of the State Constitution grants the “legislature” the power to maintain the state educational system, and § 2 constitutionalizes the University of the State of New York, giving the “legislature” authority and control over the University and the regents. The Court stated that the Legislature can function unicamerally when performing duties other than lawmaking. Citing Matter of Anderson v. Krupsak, 40 N.Y.2d 397 (1976), the court stated that the quintessential “legislative power,” its lawmaking power, unlike the power to elect regents at issue here, is directly conferred to and “vested in the senate and assembly” (NY Const, art III, § 1). The Constitution itself thus prohibits the enactment of laws “except by the assent of a majority of the members elected to each branch of the legislature” (NY Const, art III, § 14). Furthermore, the Court pointed to the historical use of the joint ballot, including its use in electing delegates to Congress under the Articles of Confederation and its sanction in Public Officers Law § 41 for filling vacancies in the offices of State Comptroller and Attorney General. The Court concluded that the joint ballot is simply an alternative procedure designed to avoid legislative deadlock and efficiently fill vacancies on the Board of Regents. The court emphasized that there is no constitutional proscription against the Legislature acting unicamerally in a nonlawmaking capacity. The court stated, “There is no constitutional proscription against the Legislature acting unicamerally in a nonlawmaking capacity, and we are unwilling to impose one here.”

  • Jaidan Industries, Inc. v. M.A. Angeliades, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 659 (2001): Enforceability of Arbitration Awards and Public Policy

    Jaidan Industries, Inc. v. M.A. Angeliades, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 659 (2001)

    An arbitration award may be vacated on public policy grounds only where it is clear on its face that public policy precludes its enforcement.

    Summary

    Jaidan Industries contracted with M.A. Angeliades to manufacture windows. A dispute arose, and Jaidan sought arbitration, which resulted in an award that included compensation for “design and engineering new aluminum windows.” Angeliades sought to vacate part of the award, arguing that Jaidan was not a licensed engineer or architect, and thus the award violated New York Education Law. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision to vacate a portion of the award, holding that the award did not facially violate public policy, as it was not clear that the services necessarily required a license.

    Facts

    Jaidan Industries, Inc. agreed to manufacture windows for M.A. Angeliades, Inc. After Jaidan partially performed the contract, Angeliades refused to pay and prevented Jaidan from continuing the work. Jaidan initiated arbitration proceedings, seeking $250,000 in damages. Angeliades counterclaimed for $100,000.

    Procedural History

    The arbitrator awarded Jaidan $166,673.09, which included $78,000 for “design and engineering new aluminum windows.” Jaidan then commenced a CPLR Article 75 proceeding to confirm the arbitration award. Angeliades cross-moved to vacate the award, arguing that the $78,000 portion violated New York’s Education Law because Jaidan did not employ a licensed engineer or architect. The Supreme Court confirmed the award and denied Angeliades’ motion. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order by vacating $78,000 of the award, finding that because Jaidan was admittedly unlicensed, the arbitrator’s award violated public policy on its face. Jaidan appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an arbitration award for “design and engineering new aluminum windows” must be vacated on public policy grounds when the company receiving the award is not a licensed engineer or architect.

    Holding

    No, because the arbitration award does not necessarily violate public policy on its face. It is not definitively established that the design and engineering services required a license, therefore vacating the award based on public policy is inappropriate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an arbitration award may be vacated on public policy grounds only when it is clear from the face of the award that its enforcement would violate public policy, citing Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 631. The court found that the award for “design and engineering new aluminum windows” did not necessarily violate public policy. The Court referenced Charlebois v Weller Assocs., 72 NY2d 587, 591, 593-595, noting that a contract with an unlicensed corporation that included the rendition of professional services did not automatically violate the Education Law or the public policy underlying it. The Court distinguished between activities that clearly require a license and those that might fall into a gray area. It emphasized the need for a clear violation of public policy to justify vacating an arbitration award. The court implied that the services provided might not have required a licensed engineer or architect, and absent a clear showing that they did, the award should stand. The Court’s decision underscores the limited grounds for vacating arbitration awards, particularly emphasizing that the violation of public policy must be evident on the face of the award itself. The Court did not elaborate on dissenting or concurring opinions, as there were none recorded.

  • Tucker v. Board of Education, Community School District No. 10, 82 N.Y.2d 274 (1993): Enforcing Teacher Tenure Notice Requirements

    Tucker v. Board of Education, Community School District No. 10, 82 N.Y.2d 274 (1993)

    When a school board fails to provide a probationary teacher with the statutorily required 60-day notice of tenure denial, the teacher is entitled to pay for each day the notice was late, even if the reason for denial arose less than 60 days before the probationary period ended.

    Summary

    Maria Tucker, a probationary special education teacher, was notified of tenure denial and termination eight days before her probationary period ended, following allegations of misconduct 22 days prior to the end of her term. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that Tucker was entitled to 52 days of pay because she did not receive the statutorily required 60-day notice. The Court reasoned that the statute’s plain language mandates the notice regardless of the circumstances leading to the denial, and that exceptions should not be read into the statute that would undermine its protective purpose for probationary teachers.

    Facts

    Maria Tucker was a probationary special education teacher with a probationary period ending on June 15, 1990.
    On May 24, 1990, Tucker allegedly committed acts of corporal punishment and used a racial epithet.
    The school principal recommended Tucker’s tenure denial based on these allegations.
    Tucker received notice of tenure denial on June 6, 1990, eight days before her probationary period ended.

    Procedural History

    Tucker filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking 52 days’ salary for the late notice.
    The Supreme Court granted the petition.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.
    The Court of Appeals granted the Board of Education’s motion for leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a probationary teacher is entitled to pay for each day the school board’s notice of tenure denial was late when the reason for the denial arose less than 60 days before the end of the probationary period, making timely notice impossible.

    Holding

    Yes, because Education Law § 2573 (1) (a) requires 60 days’ notice whenever a probationary teacher is denied tenure, irrespective of the reasons or when those reasons arise. The statute contains no exceptions, and the court will not read one into the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the unambiguous language of Education Law § 2573 (1) (a), which mandates 60 days’ notice before the expiration of the probationary period for teachers not recommended for tenure. The court stated, “When statutory language is unambiguous, a court will ordinarily give effect to the plain meaning of the words and apply the statute according to its express terms”.

    Rejecting the Board’s argument that compliance was impossible due to the timing of Tucker’s alleged misconduct, the Court highlighted the statute’s purpose: to provide probationary teachers with sufficient time to plan for the upcoming school year and seek other employment. The Court found no indication of legislative intent to create an exception for situations where the grounds for denial arise close to the end of the probationary period.

    The Court also dismissed the argument that awarding pay to a teacher terminated for misconduct was an unjust or anomalous result. It noted that probationary teachers lack the hearing protections afforded tenured teachers and are subject to termination at any time for any reason. The 60-day notice requirement provides a minimal safeguard in light of this lack of protection. The court noted that without this protection a teacher could be denied tenure based on a mere allegation of misconduct. The court further reasoned, “To construe the statute as respondents would have us, would mean that a teacher could be denied tenure without the protection of section 2573 (1) (a)’s notice requirement upon the mere allegation of misconduct, even if groundless.”

    The Court also noted the consistency between section 2573 (1) (a) and Education Law § 3019-a, which requires 30 days’ notice for terminations before the end of the probationary period, even for misconduct. Reading the sections together, the court determined the legislature was concerned that “a probationary teacher—although subject to termination without a hearing—should not be deprived of the protection of a notice requirement when the termination is based on allegations of misconduct.”

  • Board of Education v. Fernandez, 76 N.Y.2d 503 (1990): Limits on Central Board’s Power Over Community Superintendent Selection

    Board of Education v. Fernandez, 76 N.Y.2d 503 (1990)

    A New York City public schools chancellor’s superintendent selection process does not impermissibly interfere with the statutory power of local community school boards to employ a community superintendent, provided the central board policy doesn’t eviscerate the community board’s power.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of Special Circular No. 37, issued by New York City Schools Chancellor Fernandez, which established a process for community school boards to select community superintendents. The community boards challenged the circular, arguing it infringed upon their statutory power to employ superintendents. The Court of Appeals held that the circular was valid, finding that community boards’ hiring practices must conform to city board policies, as long as those policies do not effectively eliminate the community boards’ power. The court emphasized the importance of community input in the selection process and deferred judgment on whether the chancellor’s directive power was being used to substitute his judgment for the boards’.

    Facts

    Chancellor Fernandez issued Special Circular No. 37 to improve the superintendent selection process. It required community boards to establish screening committees with parent representatives. The committees would recommend at least four candidates. The board had to submit comprehensive evaluations of finalists to the Chancellor, who could then issue directives. Community School District No. 29 refused to comply, planning to renew its superintendent’s contract without the Chancellor’s input. The Chancellor threatened to remove the board members. The board then sought a declaratory judgment that the circular was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of the community boards, declaring the circular invalid. The Appellate Division reversed, upholding the circular’s validity. The Court of Appeals granted further review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the superintendent selection process established by New York City’s public schools chancellor impermissibly interferes with the statutory power of local community school boards to employ a community superintendent.

    Holding

    No, because the community boards’ hiring practices must conform to the city board’s policies, as long as those policies do not effectively eliminate a community board’s enumerated power to hire a superintendent. The circular itself does not significantly intrude upon the community boards’ power to employ a superintendent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court analyzed the history of the Decentralization Law, emphasizing that while community boards have a significant role, their powers are subject to the policies established by the city board. The court acknowledged the importance of community boards’ autonomy in selecting their own superintendents, stating, “particular vigilance must be paid to assuring sufficient autonomy by community boards in this respect.” However, the court found that the circular’s requirements, such as the inclusion of parent representatives on screening committees, were consistent with the law’s emphasis on community participation. The court noted the circular was analogous to SEQRA where agencies take a ‘hard look’ at alternatives. The Court deferred ruling on whether the chancellor’s directive power was being used to substitute his judgment for the community boards’, limiting its decision to a facial challenge of the circular. The Court stated, “If the Chancellor determines that the actions of the community school boards are flawed or deficient, in any way, he will so advise the community school board and issue appropriate directives.” The court emphasized that a policy eliminating the community board’s power would be invalid.

  • Vestal Central School Dist. v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 629 (1990): Bargaining Rights and Contracting with BOCES

    Vestal Central School Dist. v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 629 (1990)

    A school district’s decision to contract with a Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) for an academic summer school program is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining with teachers’ unions, due to legislative intent expressed in Education Law § 1950 (4)(bb).

    Summary

    Three school districts contracted with BOCES for a summer school program, replacing their own programs. The teachers’ unions claimed this was a mandatory subject of bargaining. PERB agreed, ordering the districts to cease and desist. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the legislature, in Education Law § 1950(4)(bb), intended that school districts’ decisions to contract with BOCES for academic summer programs not be subject to mandatory collective bargaining, evidenced by the statutory scheme for BOCES program implementation and teacher job protections outlined in Education Law § 3014-a.

    Facts

    Prior to 1984, the three school districts each conducted separate summer school programs, employing teachers who were members of the respondent unions. Their collective bargaining agreements covered summer teaching terms. In 1984, the Legislature amended the Education Law to permit BOCES to offer academic summer programs. In 1985, the school districts contracted with Monroe BOCES to provide a combined summer program for their students, replacing their own programs. The BOCES program offered a wider selection of courses and served more students than the districts’ previous programs.

    Procedural History

    The unions filed improper practice charges with PERB, alleging the districts unilaterally contracted out work exclusively performed by bargaining unit teachers. PERB agreed with the Administrative Law Judge that the districts violated Civil Service Law § 209-a (1)(d). PERB ordered the districts to cease and desist. The school districts filed an Article 78 proceeding, which was dismissed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted the school districts’ petition.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a school district’s decision to contract with BOCES for an academic summer school program in place of their own is a mandatory subject of negotiation under the Taylor Law.

    Holding

    1. No, because Education Law § 1950 (4)(bb) demonstrates a legislative intention that such decisions not be subject to mandatory collective bargaining.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined that the central legal question was a matter of statutory construction. While acknowledging PERB’s expertise in matters under the Civil Service Law, the Court asserted that statutory construction is a function for the courts, and PERB is accorded no special deference in interpreting statutes. The Court found that Education Law § 1950 (4)(bb) clearly manifests a legislative intention that a school district’s decision to contract with BOCES for an academic summer school program not be subject to mandatory collective bargaining. The Court noted that while the statute does not explicitly prohibit collective bargaining, legislative intent can be implied from the words of the enactment. The Court stated that, to overcome the state policy favoring bargaining, any implied intention not to mandate negotiation must be “plain and clear” or “inescapably implicit.”

    The Court pointed to the statute’s requirements for joint action by at least two school districts and approval by the Commissioner of Education, on a tight timetable, which would be difficult to meet if bargaining were required. More significantly, the Court emphasized Education Law § 1950 (4) (bb) (5), which addresses job protections for teachers in the event of a BOCES takeover. This section incorporates Education Law § 3014-a, which governs teachers’ rights when a BOCES takes over a program, including preferential hiring without loss of seniority-based benefits. The Court concluded that the Legislature’s incorporation of section 3014-a manifested an intention to establish a comprehensive package within the Education Law for a school district’s decision to contract for a BOCES program, thereby withdrawing that decision from the mandatory negotiating process. The court stated, “Given this statutory scheme, we are satisfied that the Legislature’s deliberate incorporation of section 3014-a governing teachers’ rights in the event of a BOCES takeover manifested an intention to establish, within the Education Law, a comprehensive package for a school district’s decision to contract for a BOCES program, and thus to withdraw that decision from the mandatory negotiating process.”

  • City School District of City of Elmira v. PERB, 74 N.Y.2d 395 (1989): Limits on Mandatory Bargaining Over School Funding Applications

    City School District of City of Elmira v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 74 N.Y.2d 395 (1989)

    A school district’s decision whether to apply for Excellence in Teaching (EIT) funds is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a school district is required to bargain with its teachers’ union over the decision to apply for Excellence in Teaching (EIT) funds. The New York Court of Appeals held that a school district’s decision to apply for EIT funds is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The court reasoned that the Education Law grants school boards the discretion to decide whether to apply for such funds, and the legislative intent was to leave this decision to the board’s discretion.

    Facts

    The Elmira City School District’s Board of Education voted not to apply for EIT funds due to concerns about the district’s obligation to cover additional fringe benefit costs associated with the increased teacher salaries that EIT funds would support. The teachers’ association demanded that the district negotiate this decision. The district refused, leading the association to file an improper practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB).

    Procedural History

    An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the district violated the Civil Service Law by refusing to negotiate. PERB affirmed the ALJ’s decision, ordering the district to negotiate the application decision. The district then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division annulled PERB’s determination, leading to an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a school district’s decision to apply for Excellence in Teaching (EIT) funds is a proper subject for mandatory bargaining under the Taylor Law, such that a refusal to bargain constitutes an improper practice?

    Holding

    No, because the Legislature intended the decision of whether to apply for EIT funds to be left to the school board’s discretion and did not mandate collective bargaining on this issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the Legislature did not intend for a school district’s decision to apply for EIT funds to be subject to mandatory bargaining. The court based its reasoning on the language of Education Law § 3602 (27), which states that a school district “upon application shall be eligible” for EIT funds, indicating that application is not mandatory. The court emphasized that the regulations implementing the EIT program specify that the application is to be made by the board of education, which is the legislative body. The court noted that while the statute mandates collective negotiations over the distribution of EIT funds, it is silent regarding negotiations over the application decision. The court applied the principle of statutory interpretation that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. As the court stated, the evident purpose of the provision in paragraph (a) is “not only to mandate collective negotiations over the distribution of EIT funds, but to remove any impediment to such negotiations which might otherwise result where, as here, an ongoing collective bargaining agreement between the district and the union exists.” The court held that PERB’s interpretation of the statute was not entitled to deference because the issue was a matter of pure statutory reading and analysis. The court stated: ” ‘the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent’, [PERB’s] interpretations need not be accorded * * * deference”.