New York Law Review

Tag: easements

  • Simone v. Heidelberg, 9 N.Y.3d 177 (2007): Re-creation of Easements After Common Ownership

    9 N.Y.3d 177 (2007)

    An easement extinguished by common ownership of the dominant and servient estates is not re-created upon severance unless the deed conveying the servient estate contains language re-establishing the easement.

    Summary

    This case addresses the conditions under which an easement, extinguished by common ownership, can be re-created. The New York Court of Appeals held that an easement is not re-created when the properties are later separated, even if the deed conveying the dominant estate references the easement and the owner of the servient estate has actual knowledge of it. The easement must be explicitly re-established in the deed conveying the servient estate to bind subsequent purchasers. The court also clarified the high bar for establishing an easement by necessity, requiring absolute necessity at the time of severance, not mere convenience arising later.

    Facts

    In 1933, owners of adjacent properties created a reciprocal driveway easement. In 1978, the properties came under common ownership, extinguishing the easement. In 1982, the common owner subdivided the property, conveying the purported servient estate without mentioning the easement. In 1984, the common owner conveyed the purported dominant estate, referencing the driveway easement in the deed. In 1993, the plaintiffs purchased the servient estate with no mention of the easement in their deed. In 2003, the defendants, the dominant estate owners, removed obstructions to use the driveway. Plaintiffs sued to prevent this, arguing the easement was not in effect.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, declaring the easement extinguished and not re-created. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the easement was re-created due to the reference in the dominant estate’s deed and the servient owner’s knowledge. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an easement extinguished by common ownership is re-created when the properties are later separately sold and the easement is noted in the deed conveying the dominant estate, and the owner of the servient estate has actual knowledge of its existence.
    2. Whether the easement can be sustained as an easement by necessity.

    Holding

    1. No, because an encumbrance must be recorded in the servient chain of title to impose notice on subsequent purchasers of the servient land.
    2. No, because the “necessity” for the easement arose after the severance of the estates and is merely a convenience, not an absolute necessity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the easement was extinguished by common ownership, it was not properly re-created. Relying on Witter v. Taggart, the court emphasized that an encumbrance must be recorded in the servient chain of title to provide notice to subsequent purchasers. The deed conveying the servient estate to the plaintiffs’ predecessor did not mention the easement; therefore, the subsequent references in the dominant estate’s deeds were ineffective. The court stated, “[A] grantor may effectively extinguish or terminate [an encumbrance] when…the grantor conveys retained servient land to a bona fide purchaser who takes title without actual or constructive notice of the covenant because the grantor and dominant owner failed to record the covenant in the servient land’s chain of title.”

    The court rejected the argument for an easement by necessity, stating that the necessity must exist at the time of severance. Here, the need to access the garage only arose later when the defendants removed a tree, making it a mere convenience, not an absolute necessity. The court emphasized that “the necessity must exist in fact and not as a mere convenience” (Heyman v. Biggs, 223 NY 118, 126 [1918]). The court distinguished the facts from a case where the dominant estate was landlocked at the time of severance.

  • Assessment Ass’n v. Town of Holland, 83 N.Y.2d 844 (1994): Valuation of Land Burdened by Easements for Tax Purposes

    Assessment Ass’n v. Town of Holland, 83 N.Y.2d 844 (1994)

    When assessing the value of property encumbered by easements for tax purposes, the court must consider the actual value of the property given the encumbrances, but in the absence of evidence allowing for an accurate adjustment to the stipulated unencumbered value, the full unencumbered value may be used.

    Summary

    Assessment Association sought a reduction in the real property tax assessment for its recreational park, arguing that its value was nominal due to easements granted to individual campsite owners. The Association claimed double taxation because the individual owners’ assessments had allegedly increased to reflect their easement rights. The Association and the Town of Holland stipulated to two values: $130,500 if unencumbered and $10 per parcel if only of nominal value. Lacking further evidence on how to adjust these values, the trial court adopted the full value assessment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s finding was supported by the record in the absence of evidence allowing for an accurate adjustment.

    Facts

    Assessment Association owned 15 parcels of land in Holland, New York, developed as a recreational park with amenities like lakes and campsites. Each campsite deed included an easement allowing the owner to use common areas and facilities within the park. The Association consisted of all campsite owners.

    Procedural History

    The Association sought a reduction in its 1992 real property tax assessment. The trial court, presented with stipulated values of $130,500 (unencumbered) and $10 per parcel (nominal) but lacking further evidence, upheld the full value assessment. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Association’s property, burdened by easements, should be assessed at its full unencumbered value or at a nominal value for real property tax purposes.

    Holding

    No, because the Association retained certain rights to the common areas and facilities, giving the property more than nominal value and, in the absence of further evidence allowing for an accurate adjustment to the value, the trial court’s adoption of the full unencumbered value assessment was appropriate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that while the Association argued for nominal value due to the easements, it still retained rights to the common areas. The court was faced with only two stipulated values: the full unencumbered value ($130,500) and a nominal value ($10 per parcel). There was no evidence presented that would allow the court to determine an accurate value between these two extremes that accounted for the burden of the easements. The Association argued that the campsite owners’ assessments had been increased to reflect the value of the owners’ rights in the common areas, thus resulting in double taxation. However, the court noted that there was no evidence of enhanced assessments to the individual campsites because of the easements. As a result, the court was “constrained to adopt the full value of $130,500” since it had no basis for choosing any other number. The Court of Appeals deferred to the lower court’s factual findings, noting that “[c]onfronted with a choice of either $130,500 or $10 per parcel and no evidence from which it could adjust these values, the court was constrained to adopt the full value of $130,500. Its findings were supported by the record and affirmed by the Appellate Division. We are bound by these findings.” This case illustrates the importance of presenting sufficient evidence to support a claim for reduced property valuation due to encumbrances such as easements; without such evidence, courts may be forced to rely on the unencumbered value, even if it does not accurately reflect the property’s actual worth. It also highlights that a mere allegation of double taxation is insufficient without proof of such double taxation.

  • Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d 570 (1987): The Stranger-to-the-Deed Rule

    Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d 570 (1987)

    Under the “stranger-to-the-deed” rule, a deed cannot create an easement or other real property interest in favor of someone who is not a party to the deed.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grantor can reserve an easement in a deed for the benefit of a third party who is not a party to the deed (a “stranger to the deed”). The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed the long-standing rule that such a reservation is invalid. The court reasoned that allowing such reservations would create uncertainty in title and potentially lead to needless litigation, outweighing any potential frustration of the grantor’s intent. The court also held that a personal right-of-way (easement in gross) cannot be transferred if it’s not commercial in nature.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Thomson and Defendant Wade owned adjacent parcels of land. Thomson’s property (the annex parcel) fronted a river and had a motel, while Wade’s property was inland and bordered a public road. Both parcels were previously owned by Edward John Noble. Noble used Wade’s parcel to access the public road from the annex parcel. When Noble conveyed the annex parcel, he did not grant an express easement over Wade’s parcel. Later, when Noble conveyed Wade’s parcel, he included a clause that “excepted and reserved” a right-of-way for himself and Thomson’s predecessor. Thomson acquired a quitclaim deed to the right-of-way from the Noble Foundation (Noble’s successor-in-interest).

    Procedural History

    Thomson brought a declaratory judgment action, claiming an easement over Wade’s property. The Appellate Division concluded that no express easement was created. The Court of Appeals affirmed, upholding the “stranger-to-the-deed” rule.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a grantor can reserve an easement in a deed for the benefit of a third party who is not a party to the deed (a “stranger to the deed”).

    2. Whether a personal right-of-way (easement in gross) can be transferred to another party.

    Holding

    1. No, because New York adheres to the “stranger-to-the-deed” rule, which prohibits the creation of an interest in favor of a third party through a reservation or exception in a deed. This rule promotes certainty in title and avoids potential litigation.

    2. No, because the right-of-way reserved to Noble personally was not commercial in nature, and therefore could not be transferred to Thomson via the quitclaim deed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Noble could not create an easement benefitting land he no longer owned. Citing Tuscarora Club v. Brown, 215 NY 543, the court reaffirmed the “stranger-to-the-deed” rule, stating that a reservation in favor of a third party does not create a valid interest. While acknowledging that some jurisdictions have adopted a minority view that would recognize such an interest if the grantor’s intent is clear (citing Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 7 Cal 3d 473), the court declined to abandon the settled New York rule.

    The court emphasized the importance of certainty in real property titles, stating that “public policy favor[s] certainty in title to real property, both to protect bona fide purchasers and to avoid conflicts of ownership, which may engender needless litigation.” (Matter of Violi, 65 NY2d 392, 396). The court noted that any frustration of the grantor’s intent can be easily avoided by a direct conveyance of an easement to the third party.

    Regarding the personal right-of-way, the court cited Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227 NY 429, 443, holding that because the right-of-way was not commercial, it could not be transferred to Thomson. Thus, neither the reservation of the easement in gross to Noble nor the reservation of a right-of-way to Thomson’s predecessor entitled Thomson to an express easement across Wade’s property.

    The court concluded, “where it can reasonably be assumed that settled rules are necessary and necessarily relied upon, stability and adherence to precedent are generally more important than a better or even a ‘correct’ rule of law” (Matter of Eckart, 39 NY2d 493, 500).

  • Green v. Mann, 63 N.Y.2d 112 (1984): Limiting Easement Use to the Original Dominant Tenement

    Green v. Mann, 63 N.Y.2d 112 (1984)

    An easement appurtenant to a specific parcel of land cannot be extended to benefit other parcels subsequently acquired by the easement holder, especially when the original grant expressly prohibits enlargement of the easement.

    Summary

    Green sought a declaration to extend an easement appurtenant to one parcel of land (16B-13) to two additional, contiguous parcels (16B-2 and 16C-1) they later acquired. The easement, a right of way over Palmer Lane West, was initially granted by a common grantor, Gulesian, to Green’s predecessor for parcel 16B-13. The New York Court of Appeals held that the easement could not be enlarged to benefit the subsequently acquired parcels because they were not part of the original dominant tenement and because the deed conveying a tenancy in common in Palmer Lane West expressly prohibited enlargement of the easement.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs (Green) owned three contiguous parcels of land: 16B-13, 16B-2, and 16C-1. Parcel 16B-13 had an easement over Palmer Lane West, a private road owned in common by Green and Defendants (Mann). This easement was granted by Alice Gulesian, the common grantor, to the predecessor in title of parcel 16B-13. Green acquired parcels 16B-2 and 16C-1 after acquiring 16B-13. Parcels 16B-2 and 16C-1 originally had a right of way to a public highway (Virginia Lane), which Green relinquished upon acquiring those parcels. The deed conveying the joint interest in Palmer Lane West contained a restriction stating that the easement right of each party “is not hereby abrogated, enlarged or restricted”.

    Procedural History

    Green filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish the right to use the easement over Palmer Lane West for all three parcels. The lower court ruled against Green, and Green appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. Green then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an easement appurtenant to one parcel of land can be extended to benefit other parcels subsequently acquired by the easement holder, when those parcels were not part of the original grant.
    2. Whether a tenancy in common in a private road confers the right to unilaterally create a new easement for the benefit of property to which the original easement was not appurtenant.

    Holding

    1. No, because “the owner of the dominant tenement may not subject the servient tenement to servitude or use in connection with other premises to which the easement is not appurtenant”.
    2. No, because an owner may not unilaterally, and without the consent of the other owners, subject property held in common to an easement in favor of other property either owned by him alone or third parties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the easement granted by Gulesian was specifically appurtenant to parcel 16B-13. The express language in the deed conveying the tenancy in common in Palmer Lane West prohibited the enlargement of the easement. Applying the established rule that an easement cannot be expanded to benefit land beyond the original dominant tenement, the court held that Green’s subsequent acquisition of parcels 16B-2 and 16C-1 did not entitle Green to use the easement for those parcels. The court cited McCullough v. Broad Exch. Co., 101 App Div 566, 572, affd 184 NY 592, stating, “the owner of the dominant tenement may not subject the servient tenement to servitude or use in connection with other premises to which the easement is not appurtenant”. Furthermore, the court stated that Green’s tenancy in common of Palmer Lane West did not allow them to unilaterally create a new easement. Citing Wilson v Ford, 209 NY 186, the court emphasized that an owner cannot subject property held in common to an easement without the consent of the other owners. The court distinguished the case from situations involving the creation of interests in real property, holding that the restriction on the enlargement of the easement was binding even without Green’s signature on the deed, as acceptance of the deed and possession of the property bound Green to the covenants therein.

  • Clark v. State of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 990 (1965): Easements Construed Strictly Against Grantee; De Facto Appropriation

    15 N.Y.2d 990 (1965)

    Easements are construed strictly against the grantor (here, the State), and the landowner retains rights to use the property in any way that does not interfere with the easement; interference with those retained rights can constitute a de facto appropriation.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the scope of an easement granted to the State and Power Authority. The court held that the easement must be construed strictly against the State as the grantee, preserving the landowners’ rights to use the property as long as such use did not interfere with the easement. It further clarified that the landowners possessed the right to cross the easement for access and build roads, including utilities, across the easement land. The court cautioned that any subsequent interference by the State or Power Authority with these retained rights could constitute a de facto appropriation, requiring compensation to the landowners.

    Facts

    The State of New York and the Power Authority obtained a permanent easement over certain lands owned by the claimants. The specific terms of the easement grant were at the heart of the dispute. The claimants asserted they retained the right to use the easement area in ways that didn’t impede the State’s use. The State and Power Authority contended their easement rights were broader and potentially restricted the landowners’ activities.

    Procedural History

    The claimants brought actions against the State, seeking clarification of their rights under the easement and compensation for potential takings. The lower courts interpreted the easement agreement. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals, which reviewed the lower court decisions and the terms of the easement to determine the extent of the landowners’ retained rights and the State’s obligations.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the easement granted to the State and Power Authority should be construed strictly against them, thereby preserving the landowners’ rights to use the easement area for purposes of ingress and egress, including building roads and utilities, as long as it does not interfere with the State’s easement.

    Holding

    Yes, because the easement is to be construed strictly against the State and Power Authority. Claimants retain the right to use the property in any way that does not interfere with the easement, including ingress/egress and constructing utilities. Interference with those retained rights can constitute a de facto appropriation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the principle that easements are to be interpreted narrowly against the party that benefits from them (here, the State and Power Authority). The court stated that the claimants possessed “the right and privilege of using such property, provided the exercise of such right and privilege does not interfere with or prevent the user and exercise of the permanent easement” as well as “the absolute right to cross the said lands covered by the easement for purposes of ingress and egress, including the right to build roads across the said lands and to have the right in perpetuity to use said roads.” The court broadened the interpretation of “roads” to include the construction and maintenance of electric, telephone, water, gas, sewer, and other customary wires and conduits or other usual utility structures, above or below ground at suitable locations in conjunction therewith. The court explicitly warned that if the State or Power Authority interfered with these retained rights, it would constitute a de facto appropriation, requiring the State to provide compensation. The court cited Jafco Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 14 Y 2d 556, to support the principle that interference with property rights could constitute a taking even without a formal appropriation.

  • Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905): When a Railroad Improvement Amounts to Taking of Abutting Owner’s Property Rights

    Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905)

    When a state-mandated railroad improvement substantially impairs an abutting owner’s easements of light, air, and access, it can constitute a taking of private property requiring compensation, even if the railroad itself is not directly responsible for the project.

    Summary

    Muhlker, an owner of property abutting Park Avenue in New York City, sued the railroad for damages caused by the construction of an elevated viaduct pursuant to a state-mandated improvement project. The railroad argued that the viaduct, replacing a depressed cut, was a state project and thus they were not liable for any resulting damages. The Supreme Court held that the abutting owner had property rights in easements of light, air, and access, and the construction of the viaduct substantially impaired these rights. Even though the railroad did not initiate the project, the state action impaired the owner’s property rights, which required just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Muhlker, owned a building on Park Avenue in New York City.
    Prior to 1897, the railroad operated in a depressed cut along Park Avenue.
    In 1892, New York passed a law mandating improvements to Park Avenue, including the construction of an elevated viaduct to replace the cut.
    The viaduct was constructed under the supervision of a public board and accepted by the railroad in 1897.
    Muhlker claimed the viaduct impaired his easements of light, air, and access, diminishing his property’s value.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the railroad liable for trespass on Muhlker’s easements after February 16, 1897.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the railroad not liable because the viaduct was a state project.
    The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the construction of an elevated viaduct by the state, which impaired an abutting owner’s easements of light, air, and access, constituted a taking of private property requiring just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the railroad did not initiate the project.

    Holding

    Yes, because the abutting owner had property rights in easements of light, air, and access, and the construction of the viaduct substantially impaired these rights. The state action impaired those property rights requiring just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that abutting property owners have easements of light, air, and access that are considered private property rights.
    The construction of the elevated viaduct substantially impaired these easements, diminishing the value of Muhlker’s property.
    The Court distinguished between consequential damages resulting from a public improvement (which are not compensable) and a direct appropriation of property rights (which are).
    Even though the railroad did not initiate the project, the state’s action in constructing the viaduct constituted a taking of Muhlker’s property rights.
    The Court emphasized that the state cannot take private property for public use without just compensation, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
    The Court cited previous New York cases establishing the existence and importance of these easements, including Story v. New York Elevated R.R. Co., and noted that these rights were part of the property owner’s title.
    The court notes the seeming paradox that the state mandated the project and the railroad followed suit, but yet the property owner suffered a loss. The Court states “[w]e do not, however, have to go beyond the decisions of the courts of New York to sustain the right of the plaintiff to recover. They are clear upon the existence and the extent of such rights, and we need only consider whether they are invaded by the construction and operation of the viaduct under the circumstances disclosed by the record.”
    The dissent argued that the state’s actions were a valid exercise of its police power to improve public infrastructure, and any resulting damages were consequential and non-compensable. The dissent further notes, “If the viaduct was lawfully constructed and existed in the street under the authority of law, it is impossible to conceive how the defendant could be guilty of a trespass in the operation of its trains upon it. It was constructed for that purpose and the defendant was obliged to use it in the exercise of its franchise and the discharge of the duties due to the public.”

  • Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31 (1881): Enforceability of Parol Agreements for Easements

    Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31 (1881)

    An easement, which is an interest in land, requires a written conveyance (deed) or a legally sufficient substitute like prescription; a mere parol agreement or license, even with consideration, is generally revocable and does not create a permanent easement.

    Summary

    Wiseman sued Lucksinger to enforce an easement for a drain running through Lucksinger’s property. Wiseman claimed he purchased the right for $7 and enjoyed it for over 25 years until Lucksinger blocked the drain due to nuisance issues caused by Wiseman’s alterations. The court found no written conveyance existed, only a lost receipt. The Court of Appeals held that the oral agreement, even with consideration, was a mere revocable license, not an enforceable easement. Wiseman’s use was permissive, not adverse, precluding a prescriptive easement claim. Equity will not enforce a parol agreement absent clear terms, acts of part performance unequivocally related to a permanent easement, and circumstances making reliance on the agreement reasonable. Therefore, Lucksinger was within his rights to revoke the license.

    Facts

    • Wiseman and Lucksinger owned adjoining lots in Syracuse.
    • Lucksinger built a drain across his and Stern’s land to the street sewer.
    • Wiseman paid Lucksinger $7 for the right to connect his drain to Lucksinger’s drain.
    • Wiseman connected his drain and used it for 25 years.
    • Wiseman replaced his plank sewer with a larger tile sewer which, combined with changes to his privy vault, caused waste to flow back into Lucksinger’s basement.
    • Lucksinger cut off the connection to stop the nuisance.
    • No deed or written agreement for the easement existed, only a lost receipt for the $7 payment.

    Procedural History

    Wiseman sued Lucksinger in equity court seeking to restore his drainage rights and restrain Lucksinger from interference. The trial court ruled in favor of Wiseman, declaring an easement and enjoining Lucksinger. The General Term affirmed. Lucksinger appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a parol agreement supported by consideration can create an enforceable easement allowing Wiseman to drain his property through Lucksinger’s land in perpetuity.
    2. Whether Wiseman acquired a prescriptive easement based on 25 years of usage.

    Holding

    1. No, because an easement requires a written conveyance or a legally sufficient substitute; the parol agreement created a revocable license, not an easement.
    2. No, because Wiseman’s use was permissive and not adverse; therefore, no prescriptive right was established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the right to drain through Lucksinger’s land constituted an easement, which is an interest in land. The statute of frauds requires such interests to be created by a written conveyance. A parol agreement, even with consideration, constitutes a mere license, which is revocable at will. Citing Hewlins v. Shippam, the Court emphasized that an easement cannot be conferred except by deed.

    The court acknowledged that equity might enforce parol agreements in certain circumstances, but only where the contract is complete and sufficient, its terms are well-defined, and there are acts of part performance unequivocally related to the agreement. Here, the receipt was equivocal, and the circumstances did not suggest a permanent arrangement. The court noted the lack of specificity regarding the duration of the agreement and the heavy burden a perpetual easement would place on Lucksinger’s property.

    The Court distinguished the case from those where significant, permanent improvements were made in reliance on an agreement, creating an equitable estoppel. Wiseman’s temporary plank sewer was not a substantial enough improvement to justify equitable intervention.

    The Court also rejected Wiseman’s claim of a prescriptive easement because his use was permissive, not adverse. The initial agreement purchased permission for use. Quoting St. Vincent Orphan Asylum v. City of Troy, the court stated, “The occupation of a grantee of the fee is perhaps hostile to his grantor, but not so as to a licensee.” Permissive use cannot ripen into a prescriptive right.

    The court concluded that Lucksinger had merely exercised his legal rights and had not acted fraudulently. Therefore, the judgments were reversed, and a new trial was ordered.