New York Law Review

Tag: easement law

  • Anzalone v. Radigan, 69 N.Y.2d 640 (1986): Easement by Adverse Possession Cannot Be Relocated to Further Restrict Use

    Anzalone v. Radigan, 69 N.Y.2d 640 (1986)

    An easement obtained by adverse possession at a specific location cannot be relocated to a new location that further restricts the easement holder’s right of way, especially when the easement holder promptly objects to the relocation.

    Summary

    This case involves a dispute between neighbors over an easement for ingress and egress. The defendants, Radigan, had maintained a barrier on Flower Hill Road, arguably establishing rights to the easement by adverse possession at that location. However, they moved the barrier to a new location, further restricting Anzalone’s use of the road. Anzalone sought an injunction to restore the barrier to its original location. The New York Court of Appeals held that even if the defendants had acquired rights by adverse possession to maintain a barrier at the original location, they had no right to move it to a new location that further restricted the plaintiff’s right of way, especially after the plaintiff promptly objected.

    Facts

    Anzalone’s deed granted her a right of ingress and egress over Flower Hill Road, which abutted both properties. Radigan moved a barrier on Flower Hill Road to a new location, which further restricted Anzalone’s access. Anzalone promptly objected to the relocation of the barrier. Radigan argued that removing the relocated barrier would require trespassing on a non-party’s property.

    Procedural History

    Anzalone sued Radigan, seeking an injunction to compel the removal of the barrier from its new location and restore it to its original location. The lower courts ruled in favor of Anzalone, ordering the removal of the barrier. Radigan appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party who may have acquired rights to an easement by adverse possession based on the existence of a barrier at one location can move that barrier to a new location that further restricts the easement holder’s use of the road, over the easement holder’s objection.

    Holding

    No, because even if the defendants acquired rights by adverse possession to maintain a barrier at the original location, they had no right to move it to a new location that further restricted the plaintiff’s right of way, especially after the plaintiff promptly objected.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the defendants might have acquired rights to the easement by adverse possession based on the barrier’s long-standing presence at the original location (citing Brand v Prince, 35 NY2d 634, 636; Belotti v Bickhardt, 228 NY 296, 302), those rights were limited to that specific location. The court emphasized that the defendants could not extend their adverse possession rights to a new location that further burdened the plaintiff’s easement. The court stated, “Whatever rights defendants may have acquired to the easement by adverse possession, based on the long-continued existence of a barrier at one location on Flower Hill Road, defendants obtained no right to move that barrier to a new location on Flower Hill Road so as to further restrict plaintiff’s use of the road, a move which was promptly objected to by plaintiff.” The court further noted that Anzalone’s property interest in ingress and egress permitted removal of the barrier, even if it meant entering the right of way. The court explicitly stated that it was not reaching any other issue.

  • Kravec v. State of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 1060 (1976): Easement Rights and Access to Landlocked Property

    40 N.Y.2d 1060 (1976)

    When a state-created easement effectively deprives a property owner of reasonable access to a portion of their land, the state must compensate the owner for the resulting damages, especially if the easement’s terms give the state broad control over the owner’s use of the affected property.

    Summary

    The State of New York appropriated a permanent easement across Kravec’s property to construct a drainage ditch. The easement separated a portion of Kravec’s land from a public street, potentially landlocking it. The easement’s terms allowed Kravec to use the property as long as it didn’t interfere with the easement, effectively granting the State veto power over any usage. Kravec sued, arguing the easement landlocked the property. The Court of Appeals held that the easement effectively landlocked the property due to the State’s broad control and the lack of a guaranteed right of access, thus requiring the State to compensate Kravec for the loss.

    Facts

    The State of New York acquired a permanent easement across property owned by Stephen Kravec.
    The easement was 21 feet wide and intended for the construction and maintenance of a drainage ditch.
    The easement bisected Kravec’s property, separating 9.217 acres from Bridge Street.
    The terms of the easement reserved to the owner the right to use the property, provided such use did not interfere with the State’s easement rights.
    The property was zoned for commercial development.

    Procedural History

    Kravec’s estate filed a claim against the State for damages resulting from the taking.
    The Court of Claims determined that the easement did not explicitly deny the owner’s right to cross it and awarded damages only for the direct taking and the cost of building a bridge over the ditch.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims’ judgment.
    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the easement effectively landlocked the property, and remitted the case to the Court of Claims to determine damages accordingly.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the reservation clause in the easement agreement implicitly granted the property owner an untrammeled right of access across the easement to the landlocked portion of the property.
    Whether the easement, due to its terms and practical effect, landlocked a portion of the claimant’s property, thus entitling the claimant to compensation for the loss of access and value.

    Holding

    No, because the reservation clause did not guarantee a right of access and gave the State a virtual veto power over any use of the property by the owner.
    Yes, because the easement, in effect, landlocked the inner portion of the property due to the State’s control over its use, thereby requiring the State to compensate the owner accordingly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the easement’s broad terms and the condition of non-interference gave the State substantial control over the property owner’s use.
    The reservation clause, which allowed the owner to use the property only if it didn’t interfere with the State’s easement rights, effectively gave the State the power to determine whether any proposed use was permissible.
    The court distinguished this case from Clark v. State of New York and Jafco Realty Corp. v. State of New York, because those cases involved easements with an explicit reservation of access, which was absent here.
    The court cited Wolfe v. State of New York, emphasizing that absent an express grant of access, any action by the claimants on the easement may be deemed by the State to interfere with its rights; and any claimed implied right of access under these circumstances is too tenuous to merit consideration.
    The dissenting opinion argued that the reservation of rights necessarily carried with it the right to build a bridge over the State’s drainage ditch and that the State was willing to permit construction. The dissent asserted that the majority’s decision awards the claimant for a taking that did not occur.
    The majority countered that the state cannot take more land than it needs, then reduce damages later by offering some rights back after the taking.
    The court emphasized that damages are fixed and measured at the time of the taking. Because the easement effectively landlocked the property, the state had to pay damages.