New York Law Review

Tag: DWI

  • People v. Batterson, 69 N.Y.2d 420 (1987): Corroboration of Admissions in DWI Cases

    People v. Batterson, 69 N.Y.2d 420 (1987)

    In New York, a conviction cannot be based solely on a defendant’s admission without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed, though the corroborating evidence need not prove the entire case independently.

    Summary

    Batterson was convicted of driving while impaired. His conviction stemmed from an incident where his father’s car was found in a ditch. Batterson admitted to driving and swerving to avoid a deer. The officer noted signs of intoxication. The County Court reversed, finding insufficient corroboration of Batterson’s admission. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s decision, holding that there was sufficient corroborating evidence, namely the car in the ditch, the absence of skid marks, and Batterson’s behavior, to support an inference that a crime had been committed.

    Facts

    At approximately 3:00 a.m., a vehicle owned by Batterson’s father was found in a ditch, facing the wrong direction. Batterson and two companions were standing beside the vehicle. Batterson stated he was driving, swerved to avoid a deer, and ended up in the ditch. The officer smelled alcohol on Batterson’s breath and observed signs of intoxication. A breathalyzer test revealed a blood alcohol level of .08%.

    Procedural History

    Batterson was convicted in the Walworth Town Court. The Wayne County Court reversed the judgment, dismissing the information due to insufficient corroboration. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the County Court’s order, reinstating the Town Court’s judgment and remitting the case to Wayne County Court for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether there was sufficient corroborating evidence to support Batterson’s admission that he was driving while impaired, as required by CPL 60.50.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate Batterson’s admission that he was driving while impaired. This evidence included the location of the vehicle in a ditch, the absence of skid marks, and Batterson’s demeanor at the scene.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 60.50 requires “some proof, of whatever weight,” that the offense charged has been committed. The purpose of the statute is to prevent convictions based solely on confessions when no crime has actually occurred. The court emphasized that the corroborating evidence need not be substantial on its own, noting that “sufficient corroboration exists when the confession is ‘supported’ by independent evidence of the corpus delicti.” The court cited the presence of Batterson at the scene and the circumstances of the accident as supporting an inference of guilt. The court noted the vehicle was in a ditch, facing the wrong way, the pavement was dry, and Batterson exhibited signs of intoxication. The Court stated that, “Defendant’s admission was the ‘key’ that explained those circumstances and established defendant’s connection to the criminal act”.

  • People v. Farrell, 58 N.Y.2d 637 (1982): Admissibility of Breathalyzer Test Results and Destruction of Evidence

    People v. Farrell, 58 N.Y.2d 637 (1982)

    The prosecution is not required to preserve breathalyzer test ampoules if the defendant fails to show the ampoule could be reanalyzed to produce material evidence and the opportunity to examine another ampoule from the same batch is provided.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution was required to preserve the test ampoule used in a breathalyzer test and whether certain certificates showing the results of analyses of a sample ampoule were admissible as business records. The court held that the prosecution was not required to preserve the ampoule, as the defendant failed to show it could be reanalyzed to produce material evidence. Further, the certificates were properly admitted as business records, as they were prepared in the ordinary course of business and detailed the test results.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for driving while having .10 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in his blood and driving while ability impaired by the consumption of alcohol. A breathalyzer test was administered, and the ampoule used in the test was subsequently destroyed in accordance with routine practice by the New York State Police. Two and a half months after his arrest, the defendant moved for inspection of the test ampoule or dismissal of the indictment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for inspection of the test ampoule or dismissal of the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People were required to preserve the test ampoule used in the breathalyzer test for the defendant’s inspection?

    2. Whether the certificates showing the results of analyses of a sample ampoule were admissible as business records?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant submitted no evidence to show that the ampoule could have been reanalyzed to produce material evidence, and the option of examining another ampoule from the same batch, along with authentication procedures, provided adequate protection of the defendant’s due process rights.

    2. Yes, because the certificates recited and uncontroverted testimony showed that the reports were prepared in the ordinary course of the New York State Police Laboratory’s business, and it is the regular course of the laboratory’s business to make such records.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the prosecution’s routine destruction of the breathalyzer ampoule did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. The court emphasized that the defendant had not demonstrated that reanalysis of the ampoule would yield material evidence. Additionally, the availability of another ampoule from the same batch and the procedures for authenticating the test results provided adequate safeguards. As such, the court found no basis to require the People to preserve the test ampoule.

    Regarding the admissibility of the certificates, the court applied the business records exception to the hearsay rule, citing People v. Gower, 42 N.Y.2d 117, 121. The court noted that the certificates were prepared in the ordinary course of the New York State Police Laboratory’s business, detailing the date of analysis, the individuals who conducted the tests, the materials analyzed, and the test results. The court concluded that these certificates met the criteria for admissibility as business records.

    The court stated, “Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the People were not required to preserve the test ampoule and that the option of examining another ampoule from the same batch along with the procedures required to authenticate the test results provided adequate protection of defendant’s due process rights.”

  • People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419 (1979): Constitutionality of DWI Laws Absent a Blood Alcohol Test

    People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419 (1979)

    Statutory prohibitions against driving while impaired or intoxicated are not unconstitutionally vague, even when no blood alcohol test is administered, because the terms have a commonly understood meaning and provide sufficient standards for adjudication.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, specifically subdivisions 1 (driving while impaired) and 3 (driving while intoxicated), in the absence of a scientific test to determine blood alcohol content. The defendant argued the terms “impaired” and “intoxicated” were unconstitutionally vague without such a test. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the terms possess a sufficiently definite meaning to satisfy due process requirements, providing adequate warning and preventing arbitrary enforcement, even without scientific evidence.

    Facts

    A police officer observed the defendant driving erratically and running a red light. Upon stopping the defendant, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol. The defendant admitted to having a couple of drinks. The defendant’s eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred, he was unsteady on his feet, and his pupils did not dilate when a flashlight was shined in them. The defendant refused a breathalyzer test. The defendant was charged with a misdemeanor for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court dismissed the charges, finding the statute unconstitutionally vague in the absence of a blood alcohol test. The Appellate Term affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether subdivisions 1 and 3 of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, prohibiting driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated, are unconstitutionally vague when applied in the absence of a scientific test for determining blood alcohol content.

    Holding

    No, because the terms “impaired” and “intoxicated” have a commonly understood meaning, providing a reasonable warning of the prohibited conduct and sufficient standards for adjudication, even without a blood alcohol test.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that due process requires criminal statutes to be reasonably definite, providing fair warning and preventing arbitrary enforcement. However, the Constitution requires only reasonable precision, not impossible standards. The court noted that New York law has prohibited driving while intoxicated since 1910, long before scientific tests were admissible. Scientific evidence is admissible but not essential. The Court stated that “if the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubt might rise”.

    The Court stated that driving while impaired prohibits driving when the driver’s ability to operate the vehicle is impaired to any extent, recognizing that individuals have different tolerances to alcohol. The applicable standard is whether the defendant’s abilities are less than what they should possess, judged by an objective standard expected of the average driver.

    Intoxication is a greater degree of impairment, rendering the driver incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities needed to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver. Intoxication is an intelligible concept to the average person and does not require expert opinion. A statute employing terms with accepted meaning, “long recognized in law and life” cannot be said to be unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded that the statute provides reasonable warning and sufficient standards even when no chemical test has been made of the driver’s blood alcohol content.

  • People v. Formato, 30 N.Y.2d 103 (1972): Admissibility of Refusal to Take Blood Alcohol Test

    People v. Formato, 30 N.Y.2d 103 (1972)

    Evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test is admissible in court, provided the defendant was clearly warned of the consequences of refusal, and such admission does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.

    Summary

    Formato was found slumped over in his car after an accident, with signs of intoxication. He refused a blood alcohol test after being warned that his refusal could be used against him in court. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of his refusal. Formato was convicted of possession of gambling records and driving while impaired. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that the refusal evidence violated his self-incrimination rights. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that because Formato had no constitutional right to refuse the test, evidence of his refusal was admissible, provided he was properly warned of the consequences. The court reasoned that the statute did not compel him to refuse, but rather offered a choice with known consequences.

    Facts

    Police officers found Formato alone in his car, which had crashed into a fence. He was bleeding, and the officers smelled alcohol on his breath. They found two wine bottles in the car, one nearly empty. The officers, experienced in DWI arrests, believed Formato was intoxicated. At the hospital, Formato had difficulty producing his driver’s license and refused to provide his registration. An officer took his wallet and found the registration and betting slips. Officer Haverlin, from the Intoxicated Drivers Testing Unit, informed Formato of his rights and warned him that refusing a blood test could result in license revocation and that his refusal could be used as evidence in court. Formato still refused the test.

    Procedural History

    Formato was charged with gambling offenses and driving while intoxicated. His motion to suppress the betting slips was denied. At trial, evidence of his refusal to take the blood test was admitted over his objection. The jury acquitted him of promoting gambling and driving while intoxicated but convicted him of possession of gambling records and driving while impaired. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction, holding that the refusal evidence violated Formato’s privilege against self-incrimination. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical blood alcohol test violates the defendant’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, when the defendant was warned that such refusal could be used against him in court?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant has no constitutional right to refuse the test, and the statute provides for the admissibility of the refusal as evidence, provided the defendant is properly warned of the consequences of refusing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Schmerber v. California, which held that compelled blood tests do not violate the Fifth Amendment because they are not testimonial or communicative. Since a defendant can be compelled to take a blood test, they have no constitutional right to refuse. The court acknowledged that evidence of refusal is admitted to permit the inference that the defendant refused because he feared the test results. The court reasoned that the constitutional protection only applies to compelled communicative or testimonial evidence. Here, the statute doesn’t compel refusal; it presents a choice. The defendant is free to take the test. The court stated, “Although the evidence of the defendant’s refusal to take the test be classified as communicative or testimonial… it should be admissible so long as the defendant was under no compulsion of any sort to refuse to take the test.” The court distinguished this situation from cases where comment on a defendant’s silence is prohibited because, in those cases, the defendant has a constitutional right to remain silent. Here, Formato had no constitutional right to refuse the blood test. The court also reasoned that admissibility of refusal evidence is a permissible condition attached to the privilege of operating a motor vehicle on state highways. As Chief Justice Traynor observed, “A guilty party may prefer not to find himself in a situation where consciousness of guilt may be inferred from his conduct, but it can scarcely be contended that the police…will tend to coerce parties into refusing to take tests in order to produce this evidence.” The court overruled its prior holdings in People v. Paddock and People v. Stratton, which found error in admitting refusal evidence, because those cases were decided when the Vehicle and Traffic Law conferred an unqualified right to refuse a blood test.