New York Law Review

Tag: DWI

  • People v. Demperio, 86 N.Y.2d 550 (1995): Clarity Required for License Revocation Statutes

    People v. Demperio, 86 N.Y.2d 550 (1995)

    A statute revoking a driver’s license is not unconstitutionally vague if it clearly indicates that a new license application is required after the revocation period expires.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision, holding that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2)(b)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague. The defendant was charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle after his license was revoked due to a prior DWI conviction. He argued the statute was vague because it didn’t explicitly state a new application was needed for reinstatement. The Court of Appeals found the term “revoke” implies permanence, and another part of the statute clarifies that reissuance is at the commissioner’s discretion, implying a new application is necessary. The presumption of constitutionality further supported their decision.

    Facts

    Defendant was stopped for driving in Geddes, NY, on September 19, 1992.
    He was charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree.
    His license had been revoked due to a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) on September 18, 1990.
    He also had a prior conviction for driving while ability impaired the previous year.
    His license was revoked on April 17, 1991, for a minimum of one year under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2)(b)(3).
    He had not applied to have his license reinstated at the time of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Defendant argued that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2)(b)(3) was unconstitutionally vague in Town Court.
    The Town Court agreed with the defendant.
    The County Court affirmed the Town Court’s decision.
    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2)(b)(3) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not explicitly state that a driver must make a new application to have a revoked license reinstated.

    Holding

    No, because the term “revoke” implies permanence, and the statute, read as a whole, makes it clear that reissuance of a license after revocation is not automatic and requires a new application.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court began by noting the presumption of constitutionality afforded to legislative enactments. The Court stated that the word “revoke” means “to annul, void or cancel” and has a “core element of permanence.” The court reasoned that any ambiguity was resolved by the statute’s following paragraph, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(c)(1) which states:

    “(c) Reissuance of licenses; restrictions. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, where a license is revoked pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subdivision, no new license shall be issued after the expiration of the minimum period specified in such paragraph, except in the discretion of the commissioner.”

    The court concluded that this language gave the defendant reason to know that a new application would be required. Additionally, the court noted that the Department of Motor Vehicles sends written notices to individuals whose licenses have been suspended or revoked due to alcohol-related offenses, explicitly stating that “If your license was revoked, you must apply to the Department of Motor Vehicles for a new license.”

    Therefore, considering the plain meaning of “revoke,” the statutory context, and the DMV’s notification practices, the court determined that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.

  • People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259 (1995): Limits on Probationary Conditions Requiring Public Disclosure of Conviction

    86 N.Y.2d 259 (1995)

    A court’s authority to impose conditions of probation is limited to those reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation; conditions primarily intended to punish or deter, or that invade the legislative domain, are impermissible.

    Summary

    Roy Letterlough, a repeat offender with six alcohol-related driving offenses, was sentenced to probation for felony DWI. As a condition, the court ordered him to affix fluorescent signs stating “CONVICTED DWI” to any vehicle he drives if his license is reinstated. Letterlough appealed, arguing the condition was beyond the court’s authority. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the condition was primarily punitive, not rehabilitative, and infringed on the Legislature’s authority to define punishments and regulate highway safety. The court emphasized that probation conditions must focus on individual rehabilitation, not public warning or deterrence, and that novel penalties require legislative authorization.

    Facts

    Roy Letterlough pleaded guilty to felony DWI, his sixth alcohol-related driving offense since 1971. As part of his sentence, he received probation, a fine, license revocation, and was required to undergo alcohol treatment. The sentencing court added a special condition: if Letterlough’s license was reinstated during probation, he had to affix fluorescent signs stating “CONVICTED DWI” to the license plates of any vehicle he drove. The signs had to be durable, waterproof, and inspected by the Probation Department.

    Procedural History

    The Nassau County Court sentenced Letterlough. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted Letterlough leave to appeal and stayed the special condition pending the appeal’s outcome.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court, as a condition of probation for DWI, may order the defendant to affix to the license plate of any vehicle they drive a fluorescent sign stating “CONVICTED DWI”.

    Holding

    No, because the condition is not reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation and is outside the court’s authority to impose in the absence of more specific legislation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on Penal Law § 65.10, which governs probation conditions. The statute emphasizes rehabilitation, directing that conditions be “reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.” The court distinguished rehabilitation from punishment and deterrence, stating that probation aims to reform the offender, not to make them suffer. The “CONVICTED DWI” sign was primarily intended to “warn the public,” making it punitive rather than rehabilitative. The court stated, “[P]ublic disclosure of a person’s crime, and the attendant humiliation and public disgrace, has historically been regarded strictly as a form of punishment.” The court further reasoned that creating new criminal penalties falls within the Legislature’s domain. By imposing a condition that amounts to a novel form of punishment, the trial court overstepped its authority. Furthermore, the court noted that regulating highway safety and vehicle accessories is also a legislative function, citing Vehicle and Traffic Law provisions regarding license plate standards. The court emphasized the need for uniform, statewide standards, which can only be achieved through legislative deliberation. The court explicitly pointed out that it was aware of a bill proposing this exact measure: “Notably, although it was aware of the possibility of using special license plates (see, 1983 NY Senate Bill S 4861), our Legislature has chosen instead to address the public safety problem of recidivist drunk drivers by authorizing other types of law enforcement tools”, demonstrating legislative intent. Judge Bellacosa dissented, arguing that the condition was reasonably related to rehabilitation by potentially deterring Letterlough from drinking and driving due to heightened scrutiny. The dissent also emphasized that rehabilitation and punishment are not mutually exclusive goals. Ultimately, the majority rejected this argument, emphasizing that it was the intent of the court in imposing the condition that determined its nature.

  • People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136 (1986): Admissibility of ‘Deficient Sample’ Intoxilyzer Results

    People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136 (1986)

    An Intoxilyzer test result, even if labeled a ‘deficient sample,’ is admissible as evidence of intoxication if the prosecution establishes a proper foundation demonstrating the instrument’s accuracy and the test’s proper administration; any deficiency in the sample goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of Intoxilyzer test results in a DWI case where the sample was labeled ‘deficient.’ The court held that a ‘deficient sample’ reading is admissible, provided a proper foundation is laid, including testimony about the instrument’s reliability and the proper administration of the test. The court reasoned that any irregularity in the sample’s quality affects the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury to decide, rather than the admissibility itself. The court reinstated the conviction for driving with more than .10% alcohol in the blood.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested after a high-speed car chase. He exhibited signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol, dazed behavior, and failure to pass sobriety tests. A breath test using an Intoxilyzer 5000 was administered. The first test yielded no reading. The second test produced a reading of .217, accompanied by the message “deficient sample — value printed was highest obtained.” The defendant sought to suppress the Intoxilyzer result.

    Procedural History

    The trial court determined the sample irregularity affected the weight, not admissibility, and the jury convicted the defendant of driving while intoxicated. The Appellate Term modified the judgment, vacating the conviction under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) (driving with more than .10% alcohol) and dismissing that count, while affirming the remaining convictions. Both the People and the defendant appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an Intoxilyzer test result indicating a “deficient sample” is admissible as evidence of a driver’s blood alcohol content in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated.

    2. Whether evidence, apart from the Intoxilyzer results, was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant was driving while intoxicated under the common-law standard.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a ‘deficient sample’ reading is admissible if a proper foundation is established showing the instrument’s accuracy and proper administration of the test; the deficiency affects the weight of the evidence, not admissibility.

    2. Yes, because the other evidence presented was legally sufficient to establish that defendant was driving while intoxicated under the common-law standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the testimony of the officer administering the test and the Technical Supervisor of Central Testing. The court highlighted that the Intoxilyzer measures the rate of change in alcohol content, detecting both ‘mouth alcohol’ and the presence of ‘deep lung air,’ which provides the most accurate reading. A ‘deficient sample’ in Intoxilyzer terminology does not mean an invalid sample, but rather one where the subject didn’t breathe long enough to reach sufficient deep lung air.

    The technicians testified that a full sample invariably yields a reading equal to or higher than a deficient sample. The Intoxilyzer is calibrated to give a result 10% lower than the true reading, benefiting the subject. Based on this uncontradicted testimony, and testimony that the Intoxilyzer was in proper working condition and properly administered, the court found the People established a sufficient foundation for the evidence’s reception. The court stated, “Once it was received, the jury was entitled to credit it to determine that defendant was driving with more than .10% alcohol in his blood in violation of section 1192 (2).”

    Regarding the cross-appeal, the court found sufficient evidence, apart from the Intoxilyzer results, to establish common-law intoxication.

  • People v.્યુ, 81 N.Y.2d 53 (1993): No Police Duty to Assist in Independent DWI Blood Test

    People v.્યુ, 81 N.Y.2d 53 (1993)

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(4)(b) grants a DWI defendant the right to an independent chemical test, but does not impose an affirmative duty on police to assist in obtaining such a test.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated and, after consenting to a breathalyzer test, requested an additional independent blood test. He argued that the police’s failure to assist him in obtaining this independent test violated his rights under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(4)(b), warranting suppression of the breathalyzer results. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute only grants the right to an independent test, but does not obligate the police to actively assist in securing it, as long as they do not impede the defendant’s efforts. The burden is on the defendant to arrange for the independent test.

    Facts

    An Ontario County Deputy Sheriff observed the defendant’s vehicle partially off the road with its headlights off. The officer found the defendant walking toward the vehicle, who admitted to driving and drinking. The officer smelled alcohol on the defendant’s breath and observed bloodshot eyes. The defendant failed field sobriety tests. After arrest and Miranda warnings, the defendant consented to a breathalyzer test, which registered .15% BAC. The officer informed the defendant of his right to an independent blood test at his own expense, which the defendant requested. The defendant was immediately arraigned and unable to post bail until the next afternoon. Prior to trial, the defendant claimed the police failed to assist him in obtaining the independent test.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the breathalyzer results and he was convicted of driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated. The County Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the police had no affirmative duty to assist the defendant in obtaining an independent chemical test. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(4)(b), which grants a DWI defendant the right to an independent chemical test, also imposes an affirmative duty on the police to assist the defendant in obtaining that test.

    Holding

    No, because the statute grants the right to the independent test, but is silent as to any affirmative duties on law enforcement to assist in obtaining it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that statutory construction should effectuate the Legislature’s intent, giving the plain meaning to the words used. The statute explicitly grants the right to an additional test, but omits any requirement for police assistance. The court stated, “The statutory right is the defendant’s and so is the responsibility to take advantage of it.” While police should not impede a defendant from obtaining an independent test and should provide reasonable assistance like phone access, they have no affirmative duty to gather evidence for the accused. The two-hour time limit for the official breathalyzer test does not apply to the independent test. The court noted that the admissibility of chemical test results under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 depends only on compliance with § 1194, which was met by the official test in this case. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the police were required to ensure the independent test was administered within two hours of arrest, noting that the time limit applied only to the official test. The court concluded: “law enforcement personnel are not required to arrange for an independent test or to transport defendant to a place or person where the test may be performed.” The court further clarified that while the police should not impede the defendant’s efforts to obtain the independent test and should offer reasonable assistance (e.g., phone access), they have no duty to actively gather evidence for the defendant.

  • People v. Campbell, 69 N.Y.2d 482 (1987): Foundation Required for Blood Alcohol Test Results from DuPont ACA

    People v. Campbell, 69 N.Y.2d 482 (1987)

    Blood alcohol test results obtained from a DuPont Automatic Clinical Analyzer (ACA) are not admissible per se; the prosecution must lay a proper foundation establishing the accuracy and reliability of the machine for blood alcohol content testing, specifically demonstrating its accuracy within the standard of 0.01 grams per 100 milliliters.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the evidentiary foundation required for admitting blood alcohol test results obtained from a DuPont Automatic Clinical Analyzer (ACA) in DWI cases. The Court of Appeals held that such results are not admissible per se simply because they were generated in a hospital laboratory. The prosecution must establish the ACA’s accuracy and reliability for determining blood alcohol content within the legally required precision. The court emphasized that a State Health Department permit for the hospital does not automatically guarantee the machine’s accuracy for forensic blood alcohol testing.

    Facts

    Defendants were charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI) under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2). Blood samples were taken from the defendants and analyzed at Jamestown General Hospital, a state-permitted facility, using a DuPont Automatic Clinical Analyzer (ACA). The tests were performed by certified hospital technologists. The ACA is a spectrophotometer using reagent packs to determine blood alcohol content. The technologists were trained to operate the machine but lacked advanced degrees in chemistry.

    Procedural History

    Defendants were convicted in various Justice Courts of Chautauqua County. County Court reversed these convictions and dismissed the informations, holding that the blood alcohol test results were inadmissible without a proper foundation. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether blood alcohol test results from a DuPont Automatic Clinical Analyzer are admissible in evidence per se, or whether the People must lay a foundation establishing the accuracy and reliability of the machine under the standards articulated in People v. Mertz and People v. Freeland.

    Holding

    No, the blood alcohol test results are not admissible per se because the People failed to establish that the DuPont ACA machine used was sufficiently accurate and reliable for forensic blood alcohol testing to meet the state’s accuracy standard of 0.01 grams per 100 milliliters.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the general reliability of hospital tests for medical purposes and the specific accuracy required for forensic blood alcohol testing in criminal cases. The court referenced People v. Mertz, which requires establishing the accuracy of a breathalyzer before its results are admissible. The Court stated that the State regulations require blood alcohol readings to be accurate within 0.01 grams per 100 milliliters. The court noted that the People did not present any scientific evidence establishing the reliability of the DuPont ACA for determining blood alcohol content within that standard, and that, in fact, evidence suggested the ACA’s manufacturer-set range exceeded this standard. The Court rejected the argument that the technologists’ certifications or the hospital’s permit were sufficient to establish the machine’s accuracy. The Court emphasized that the technologist could not be considered an expert able to attest to the machine’s specific accuracy: “the technologist… does not qualify as an expert on the internal workings of the machine and his or her testimony does not satisfy the distinct foundational requirement that the machine test blood alcohol content accurately within required specifications”. Citing People v. Freeland, the court emphasized the need to show that the machine is capable of accurately discerning the distinction between legal and illegal blood alcohol content.

  • People v. Rogers, 73 N.Y.2d 878 (1988): Admissibility of Breathalyzer Test Results and Authentication Certificates

    People v. Rogers, 73 N.Y.2d 878 (1988)

    An authentication certificate for breathalyzer test results is admissible as long as it certifies that the underlying tests were recorded at or near the time they were performed, regardless of when the certificate itself was dated.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of breathalyzer test results in a DWI prosecution. The County Court suppressed the breathalyzer evidence because the authentication certificate was dated after the tests were performed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the critical factor for admissibility is whether the certificate attests that the underlying tests were recorded contemporaneously with their performance, not the date of the certificate itself. This case clarifies the requirements for authenticating business records under CPLR 4518(c) in the context of DWI prosecutions.

    Facts

    The defendant, Rogers, was charged with driving while intoxicated. The prosecution sought to introduce breathalyzer test results as evidence of his intoxication. The authentication certificate for the breathalyzer machine’s working order was dated some time after the calibration tests were conducted on the machine and simulator solution.

    Procedural History

    The Chautauqua County Court ruled the breathalyzer evidence inadmissible, finding the authentication certificate improperly dated. The People appealed this decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and remitted the case back to that court for a review of the facts consistent with their memorandum.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an authentication certificate for breathalyzer test results is inadmissible solely because the certificate’s date is later than the date the breathalyzer tests were performed.

    Holding

    No, because the relevant inquiry is whether the authentication certificate attests that the recordation of the underlying tests occurred at or near the time the tests were performed. The date of the certificate itself is not determinative of admissibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPLR 4518(c) and its prior holding in People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136 (1986). The court emphasized that the purpose of the authentication certificate is to replace the need for a live witness to testify about the business records. The key requirement is that the certificate must state that the documents it authenticates were produced in the normal course of business at or near the time of the recorded event. The court reasoned that as long as the authenticating certificates properly stated that the tests performed on the breathalyzer and simulator solution occurred at or near the time these tests were performed, then the fact that the authenticating certificates were dated from 8 to 36 days after the tests were performed is irrelevant. The court noted, “Where a ‘certification or authentication’ replaces the testimony of a live witness, pursuant to CPLR 4518 (c), it must state that the documents that it authenticates were produced in the normal course of business at or near the time that the act, transaction, occurrence or event recorded in those documents occurred. The authenticating certificate itself need not be dated or produced at or near the date of the act, transaction, occurrence or event.” This decision underscores the importance of contemporaneous record-keeping in the context of business records and the use of authentication certificates to streamline the admission of such records in court. The focus is on the reliability of the underlying record, not the timing of the authentication.

  • People v. Thomas, 70 N.Y.2d 823 (1987): Admissibility of Audio/Visual Recordings of Sobriety Tests

    People v. Thomas, 70 N.Y.2d 823 (1987)

    Audio/visual recordings of performance-based sobriety tests, including colloquy not amounting to custodial interrogation, are generally admissible without prior Miranda warnings.

    Summary

    The defendant was arrested for felony driving while intoxicated and taken to police headquarters for sobriety tests. An audio/video recording was made of the tests, including questions about pedigree, refusal to take a chemical test, and medical conditions. The defendant moved to suppress the audio portion of the tape, arguing that Miranda warnings were required before questioning. The court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division upheld the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that performance tests need not be preceded by Miranda warnings and that the defendant failed to specifically identify which questions he found objectionable.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated and charged with a felony. At police headquarters, he underwent performance-based sobriety tests. During the tests, he was questioned about his identity, his refusal to take a chemical analysis test, and whether he was under medication or diabetic. An audio/video recording was made of the entire process. Police form 38, containing similar questions and answers, was admitted at trial without objection.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the audio portion of the tape, arguing that Miranda warnings should have been administered. The Judicial Hearing Officer denied the motion, finding no custodial interrogation. The trial court confirmed this determination. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether audio portions of a video tape recording sobriety tests are inadmissible because no Miranda warnings were given before the defendant was questioned?

    Holding

    No, because performance tests need not be preceded by Miranda warnings, and the defendant failed to preserve the issue by not specifically identifying the objectionable questions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that audio/visual tapes of performance tests, including colloquy not constituting custodial interrogation, are generally admissible without Miranda warnings. The Court cited People v. Hager, 69 N.Y.2d 141 in support of this holding. Here, the Court emphasized that the defendant made a general motion to suppress the audio portions of the tape but failed to specify which questions and answers he found objectionable. Because of this lack of specificity, the defendant’s claims of inadmissibility were unpreserved and beyond the court’s review, citing People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011. The Court also addressed the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor acted vindictively in indicting him for a felony, finding no merit to it. Citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, the court found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.

  • People v. Moser, 70 N.Y.2d 476 (1987): Defining “Personal Supervision” for Blood Alcohol Tests

    People v. Moser, 70 N.Y.2d 476 (1987)

    The “personal supervision” requirement of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) for blood alcohol tests does not require the supervising physician to be physically present and observing the procedure when a laboratory technician draws the blood sample.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the meaning of “personal supervision” under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) regarding blood alcohol tests. The Court of Appeals held that a physician need not be physically present and observing when a lab technician draws blood. It is sufficient if the physician directs and supervises activities in the emergency room, authorizes the test, and is available for inquiries and emergencies. This interpretation balances the need for medical oversight with the statute’s purpose of easing the process of obtaining blood alcohol tests.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and a blood sample was taken by a lab technician to determine its alcohol content. A physician in charge of the emergency room authorized the taking of the sample, directing and supervising all activities. The physician was not physically present, observing the technician draw the blood.

    Procedural History

    The City Court found that the physician personally supervised the procedure within the meaning of the statute and admitted the blood alcohol test results. County Court reversed, concluding the statute required the physician’s physical presence. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) requires a physician to be physically present, observing the procedure, when a laboratory technician draws a blood sample for the purposes of conducting a test to determine its alcoholic or drug content.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s purpose is to make blood alcohol and drug content tests easier to obtain, and requiring the physician’s physical presence would undermine that purpose. The physician’s authorization and availability to respond to inquiries and emergencies sufficiently addresses the supervision requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the County Court’s interpretation conflicted with the statute’s intent. The 1969 amendment aimed to enlarge the class of authorized persons to draw blood, easing the process of obtaining tests. Requiring the physician to stand by the technician during the procedure would negate the benefit of allowing technicians to draw blood in the first place. The court emphasized that the physician’s authorization of the test, implying a medical judgment that it poses no undue risk to the patient, and their availability for inquiries and potential emergencies, sufficiently addresses the concerns underlying the supervision requirement.

    The Court stated that “the personal supervision of a physician is an important safeguard for the health of the suspects to be tested, it would be anomalous in light of the purposes of the amendment to require the physician to put his other duties aside to watch the technician perform the procedure. If that were the requirement, there would be no reason to allow the technician to take the sample in the first place.”

  • People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375 (1987): State Constitution and Preservation of Breath Samples

    People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375 (1987)

    The Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution does not require police to collect and preserve a second breath sample during a DWI arrest for later independent testing by the defendant.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the New York State Constitution requires police to preserve a second breath sample for defendants in drunk driving cases, allowing for independent testing. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Trombetta. The court reasoned that the reliability of breathalyzer tests is established, and defendants have sufficient alternative means to challenge test results, such as examining the machine, reviewing records, and questioning the administering officer. The court emphasized that a defendant can obtain an additional chemical test by their own physician.

    Facts

    Defendants were arrested for drunk driving. Police administered a single breathalyzer test using a Smith & Wesson Model 900A, which indicated a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit. The administration of the test destroyed the breath sample.

    Procedural History

    Defendants moved to suppress the breathalyzer results, arguing the destruction of the sample violated the New York State Constitution. The hearing court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed, denying the suppression motions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution requires police to take and preserve a second breath sample for later independent testing by a defendant charged with driving while intoxicated, when the initial test necessarily destroys the sample.

    Holding

    No, because the reliability of breathalyzer tests is generally established, and defendants have adequate alternative means to challenge the results and to obtain additional testing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of California v. Trombetta as a matter of state constitutional law. The court acknowledged its independence in interpreting the New York Constitution but found no compelling reason to depart from the Supreme Court’s analysis. While New York provides strong protections for defendants’ access to information, these protections do not require the police to affirmatively gather evidence for the accused. The court emphasized that breathalyzers are scientifically reliable, and a positive test only establishes a prima facie case. Defendants can challenge the test’s accuracy by questioning the machine’s calibration, the chemicals used, or the administrator’s competence. The court also noted that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(8) grants defendants the right to an independent chemical test by a personal physician, further mitigating any due process concerns. The court reaffirmed its long-standing conclusion that “the scientific reliability of breathalyzers in general is no longer open to question” (citing People v. Mertz, 68 NY2d 136, 148). The Court found that the Supreme Court’s conclusions in Trombetta were consonant with New York State law and interests and that the analysis was correct and provides a fair and proper rule under the State Constitution.

  • People v. Филипс, 69 N.Y.2d 411 (1987): Sufficiency of a Standardized DWI Supporting Deposition

    People v. Филипс, 69 N.Y.2d 411 (1987)

    A preprinted supporting deposition form containing check marks indicating observed conditions and behaviors can satisfy the factual allegation requirements of CPL 100.20 and 100.25(2) in a DWI case.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a standardized, preprinted supporting deposition used in a DWI case, which utilized check marks to indicate observations of the defendant’s condition, was sufficient to meet the requirements of CPL 100.20 and 100.25(2). The court reasoned that the check marks adequately communicated factual allegations supporting the charge of driving while intoxicated. The court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, which had dismissed the charge based on the perceived insufficiency of the deposition form. This case clarifies that supporting depositions do not necessarily require narrative descriptions, so long as they provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the charged offense.

    Facts

    On September 20, 1985, the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The People served and filed a supporting deposition using a preprinted form labeled “Supporting Deposition & DWI Bill of Particulars & 710.30 Notice.” This form contained spaces for general information, chemical test results, and a checklist of police observations regarding the defendant’s behavior before and after the stop. The arresting officer marked boxes next to observations he deemed applicable to the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the supporting deposition, deeming it insufficient because it was a checklist and did not contain factual allegations in the officer’s own words. Consequently, the Town Court dismissed the DWI charge under CPL 30.30, finding that the People’s statement of readiness was a nullity because it was based on the insufficient deposition. The County Court affirmed the Town Court’s decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a Judge of that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a preprinted supporting deposition form, using check marks to indicate observations, contains sufficient factual allegations to satisfy the requirements of CPL 100.20 and 100.25(2) for a DWI charge.

    Holding

    Yes, because the check marks on the preprinted form effectively communicate factual allegations of an evidentiary character that support the DWI charge and provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a supporting deposition must be a written instrument containing factual allegations of an evidentiary character that supplement the accusatory instrument and provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense. The court stated, “Here, the factual statements in the deposition are communicated by check marks made in boxes next to the applicable conditions and observations signifying the complainant’s allegations as to the existence of those conditions and the truth of those observations. We hold such signification sufficient to meet the requirements of CPL 100.20.” The court found that the deposition, which alleged erratic driving, speeding, glassy eyes, slurred speech, impaired motor coordination, a smell of alcohol, and the defendant’s admission to drinking and driving between bars, met the statutory requirements. The court emphasized that the form contained sufficient factual allegations to provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant was intoxicated while driving. The court effectively validated a standardized approach to drafting supporting depositions in DWI cases, streamlining the process for law enforcement. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.