New York Law Review

Tag: Dwelling

  • People v. Joseph, 27 N.Y.3d 249 (2016): Defining Dwelling in Burglary Cases Involving Mixed-Use Buildings

    27 N.Y.3d 249 (2016)

    The definition of “dwelling” in burglary law includes any part of a building containing residential units, unless the area entered by the burglar is remote and inaccessible from the living quarters, thus not creating the dangers inherent in the burglary of a dwelling.

    Summary

    In People v. Joseph, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a basement in a mixed residential and commercial building qualified as a “dwelling” for second-degree burglary. The court held that the basement, which was used for storage and had no access to the residential apartments above, did not qualify as a dwelling. The court reasoned that the dangers associated with burglary of a dwelling were not present because the basement was both inaccessible and remote from the residential units. The court emphasized the importance of proximity to living quarters in determining whether a burglary constitutes a burglary of a dwelling.

    Facts

    Ronel Joseph entered the basement of the Greenleaf Deli in Manhattan. The basement was accessible only through cellar doors on the public sidewalk. The building above the deli contained six floors of residential apartments. There was no access from the basement to the residential units or the deli itself. An employee saw Joseph in the basement and called 911. Joseph was charged with second-degree burglary (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]), third-degree burglary, resisting arrest, and attempted escape. The trial court denied motions to dismiss the burglary charges. A jury convicted Joseph on all charges.

    Procedural History

    Joseph was convicted in trial court and sentenced to seven years in prison. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order by vacating the conviction on the count of second-degree burglary and remitting to Supreme Court for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the basement of the building constituted a “dwelling” under Penal Law § 140.25 (2) for purposes of a second-degree burglary conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the basement was both inaccessible and remote from the residential units, it did not constitute a dwelling.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court considered Penal Law § 140.00 (2), which states that where a building has multiple separately secured units, each unit is considered part of the main building and the rule set by People v. McCray, 23 NY3d 621 (2014). The court applied the rule in Quinn v. People, 71 NY 561 (1878), finding that if the building contains a dwelling, any burglary in the building is a burglary of a dwelling unless the area burglarized is so remote and inaccessible from living quarters. The court found that the basement was both inaccessible to and remote from the apartments. Because Joseph could not have readily come near the residences, the court concluded that the “special dangers inherent in the burglary of a dwelling do not exist.” The court distinguished the facts from Quinn, where the shop burglarized had a yard that could lead to the living quarters. The dissent argued that the basement was not remote and therefore the exception to the general rule did not apply. The dissent found that although the basement was inaccessible, it was not remote because it was located two stories below the nearest apartment.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the definition of “dwelling” in mixed-use buildings for burglary cases. Attorneys must assess whether the area entered is proximate to living quarters. This decision reinforces that the exception to the general rule applies when the burglarized area is both inaccessible and remote from the residences. Prosecutors must prove this in order to secure a conviction for second-degree burglary. This case emphasizes that the physical layout of the building and the potential for “midnight terror” and violence are important in determining whether the burglary is of a dwelling.

  • People v. Powell, 4 N.Y.3d 305 (2005): Duty to Retreat When in Doorway of Apartment

    People v. Powell, 4 N.Y.3d 305 (2005)

    A defendant standing in the doorway between his apartment and a common hallway has a duty to retreat into his apartment before using deadly physical force against an assailant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant standing in the doorway between his apartment and the common hallway of a multi-unit building has a duty to retreat into his home, if he can safely do so, before using deadly physical force. The defendant, involved in a long-standing dispute with a neighbor, fatally struck the neighbor with a metal pipe while standing in his doorway. The Court reasoned that a doorway is a hybrid private-public space, unlike the inviolate refuge of the home’s interior. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction stating he had no duty to retreat.

    Facts

    The defendant and the victim were next-door neighbors with a history of disputes, including a prior incident where the victim stabbed the defendant. Leading up to the fatal encounter, the defendant and victim argued through their shared wall. The victim went to the hallway to await the police. The defendant, standing in his doorway, argued with the victim, who then allegedly reached into his pocket and threatened to kill the defendant. Believing he was about to be stabbed again, the defendant struck the victim with a metal pipe, resulting in his death.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with murder. At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction stating that he had no duty to retreat because he was in his home or the close proximity of his threshold. The trial court denied the request. The jury acquitted the defendant of murder but convicted him of manslaughter in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant standing in the doorway between his apartment and the common hall of a multi-unit building has a duty under Penal Law § 35.15 to retreat into his home when he can safely do so before using deadly force?

    Holding

    Yes, because the doorway is not considered part of the dwelling under Penal Law § 35.15, as it functions as a portal between a private and public space and does not provide the same expectation of seclusion and refuge as the interior of the home.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the “castle doctrine” and its statutory embodiment in Penal Law § 35.15, which generally requires a person to retreat before using deadly force, unless they are in their “dwelling.” The Court emphasized that the castle doctrine reflects the idea that one’s home is a unique haven from the outside world. However, the Court distinguished the doorway from the interior of the apartment, noting that the doorway “functioned as a portal between an interior world and a public one.” The Court reasoned that the defendant had exclusive control only over that part of the apartment from which nonresidents could ordinarily be excluded. The Court stated, “Here, defendant need only have closed the door, or pulled up the drawbridge, to be secure in his castle.” The Court relied on People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002), which states that whether a particular area is part of a dwelling depends on the extent to which the defendant exercises exclusive possession and control over the area. The Court also cited People v. Reynoso, 2 N.Y.3d 820 (2004), which held that a defendant in a doorway, as opposed to inside the apartment, may be arrested without a warrant.

  • People v. Barney, 99 N.Y.2d 369 (2003): Defining ‘Dwelling’ for Burglary After Occupant’s Death

    People v. Barney, 99 N.Y.2d 369 (2003)

    A building retains its character as a ‘dwelling’ for purposes of burglary statutes even shortly after the death of its sole occupant, provided it was usually occupied for lodging, is furnished, and retains the indicia of a residence.

    Summary

    Barney was convicted of second-degree burglary for entering the home of a man who had died three days prior, intending to steal marijuana. The central issue was whether the house still qualified as a ‘dwelling’ under New York Penal Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the house, which was furnished, had utilities connected, and was recently occupied, retained its character as a dwelling. The Court reasoned that a short period after the occupant’s death doesn’t automatically strip the house of its dwelling status, especially considering the potential harm to grieving relatives and friends.

    Facts

    The sole occupant of a house died on August 21, 1999. Defendant Barney, aware of the death and that the decedent kept marijuana in the house, entered the unlocked house to search for drugs. Unable to find the drugs, Barney began collecting other items from the house. Police arrived, summoned by a neighbor, and arrested Barney. The utilities were still connected, and the house was furnished. The decedent’s mother owned the house but lived elsewhere and had given a friend of her son a key to care for the property after his death.

    Procedural History

    Barney was indicted for second-degree burglary and attempted petit larceny. The trial court denied Barney’s request to submit lesser included offenses (third-degree burglary, criminal trespass) to the jury and denied his motion to dismiss the second-degree burglary charge. Barney was convicted of both charges. The Appellate Division affirmed. One of the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the house Barney entered was a ‘dwelling’ within the meaning of Penal Law § 140.25 (2) when its sole occupant had died three days prior to the entry?

    2. Whether Barney was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of third-degree burglary?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, a jury could reasonably conclude that the house was ‘usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night’ as required by the statute.

    2. No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding of burglary in the third degree without also finding second-degree burglary; the house was, in fact, a dwelling.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the statutory definition of ‘dwelling’ as a building ‘usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night’ (Penal Law § 140.00 [3]). The Court emphasized the Legislature’s intent to enact a flexible standard. Considering the surrounding facts and circumstances, the Court noted the house was a furnished residence suitable for habitation and had been occupied until three days before the burglary. Quoting People v. Quattlebaum, 91 N.Y.2d 744 (1998), the court noted the importance of looking to the ‘nature of the structure’ to determine if it was normal and ordinary that it was ‘used as a place for overnight lodging’ and had ‘the customary indicia of a residence and its character or attributes’. The Court distinguished this case from situations involving prolonged absence or abandonment, emphasizing that immediate past use is a relevant factor. The Court rejected a rule that a house automatically loses its dwelling character upon the occupant’s death. The Court stated: ‘The death of its sole occupant three days earlier did not, on its own, transform decedent’s house from a dwelling into a building for the purposes of the burglary statute.’

  • People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002): Duty to Retreat in Multi-Dwelling Buildings

    People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002)

    In determining whether a defendant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense within a multi-unit dwelling, the critical inquiry is whether the defendant exercised exclusive possession and control over the area in question.

    Summary

    Hernandez, a building superintendent, was convicted of manslaughter after fatally shooting a visitor in the lobby of his apartment building. At trial, Hernandez argued self-defense, claiming the victim attacked him. He requested a jury instruction stating he had no duty to retreat because the incident occurred in his “dwelling.” The trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that common areas like lobbies and stairwells in multi-unit dwellings are not considered part of a person’s “dwelling” for the purposes of the “no duty to retreat” exception under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i), unless the defendant exercises exclusive control over that area.

    Facts

    Hernandez was the superintendent of a six-story apartment building, residing in a first-floor apartment. He shot and killed James Carter, a guest of a tenant, in the building. Witnesses testified that Hernandez used racial slurs against Carter after Carter complained about needed repairs. An altercation ensued on the stairwell. Hernandez retrieved a sawed-off shotgun from his apartment and shot Carter. Hernandez claimed Carter attacked him in the lobby and that the gun discharged accidentally during the struggle. The building had a history of drug activity, and the front door was often broken.

    Procedural History

    Hernandez was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying Hernandez’s request for a jury instruction that he had no duty to retreat because the lobby and stairwell of his apartment building constituted part of his “dwelling” under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i).

    Holding

    No, because the lobby and stairwell of a multi-unit apartment building, absent evidence of the defendant’s exclusive possession and control over those areas, do not constitute part of the defendant’s “dwelling” for purposes of the “no duty to retreat” exception in Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “dwelling” in Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i) refers to a person’s residence, and its definition must consider various living arrangements. The critical factor is the extent to which the defendant exercises exclusive possession and control over the area. The Court distinguished the definition of “dwelling” under Penal Law article 140 (burglary offenses), which includes common areas in multi-unit buildings, noting that § 35.20 explicitly refers to the definitions in article 140, while § 35.15 does not. Quoting from People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240 (1914), the Court acknowledged the traditional rule that a person assailed in their dwelling has no duty to retreat. However, it emphasized that this exception applies only to areas under the defendant’s exclusive control. The Court found that because the lobby and stairwell were used by all tenants and their guests, Hernandez did not have exclusive possession and control over those areas. The court explicitly rejected the Appellate Division’s reasoning that focused on the security of the building, stating that the duty to retreat should not depend on how well-protected the area is, but rather on the extent of exclusive control. The court stated: “the determination of whether a particular location is part of a defendant’s dwelling depends on the extent to which defendant (and persons actually sharing living quarters with defendant) exercises exclusive possession and control over the area in question.”