New York Law Review

Tag: Duty to Bargain

  • Matter of City of New York v. New York State Nurses Association, 29 N.Y.3d 486 (2017): Information Rights in Collective Bargaining and Grievance Procedures

    29 N.Y.3d 486 (2017)

    A public employer must provide a union with data normally maintained in the regular course of business, reasonably available and necessary for the administration of the parties’ agreements, including the processing of grievances, which encompasses disciplinary actions when the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) defines grievances to include disciplinary actions.

    Summary

    The New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) sought information from the City of New York’s Human Resources Administration (HRA) to represent two nurses in disciplinary proceedings. The City refused, leading NYSNA to file an improper practice petition. The Board of Collective Bargaining (Board) found the City’s refusal improper, citing NYCCBL § 12-306(c)(4). The City challenged this decision, but the Appellate Division affirmed, finding the Board’s decision rational. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that because the CBA defined “grievance” to include disciplinary actions, the City was obligated to provide the requested information, which included data normally maintained in the regular course of business. The dissent argued that the statute, focused on good faith bargaining, did not extend to information requests for disciplinary proceedings and that the information requests were not necessary for the collective bargaining process.

    Facts

    Two nurses, members of NYSNA, employed by the City’s Human Resources Administration (HRA), faced disciplinary charges for falsifying time records. HRA sent notices outlining the disciplinary process, including a Step 1 conference and a Step 2 Grievance Hearing. NYSNA requested information from HRA, including policies, records, and witness statements, to represent the nurses. The City refused. NYSNA filed an improper practice petition with the Board of Collective Bargaining, alleging a violation of NYCCBL § 12-306(a)(1) and (4). The Board ruled in favor of NYSNA, which the City then challenged in court.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Collective Bargaining found that the City’s refusal to provide information was an improper practice. The City initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which granted the City’s petition and annulled the Board’s determination. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court, holding that the Board’s decision was rational and granting the City leave to appeal on a certified question. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYCCBL § 12-306(c)(4) requires the City to provide information to NYSNA for disciplinary proceedings against its members.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the CBA defined grievance to include disciplinary action, and the information requested was data normally maintained in the regular course of business, necessary for grievance processing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court considered the language of NYCCBL § 12-306, which requires employers to provide data reasonably necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation. The court noted that the CBA defined “grievance” to include disciplinary actions, incorporating the information requirements applicable to grievances. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Pfau v. Public Employment Relations Board, which did not have the same contractual framework. The court held that the City’s arguments regarding the expedited timeline of disciplinary proceedings were unpersuasive, especially since other agencies followed the same process.

    Practical Implications

    This ruling clarifies that the duty to provide information in collective bargaining extends to disciplinary proceedings when the CBA defines disciplinary actions as grievances. Legal practitioners representing unions should review CBAs to identify the scope of “grievance” definitions. This decision reinforces the importance of clear contract language in defining the scope of information rights. Public employers must be prepared to provide relevant information during disciplinary proceedings. This case underscores that access to information is a crucial aspect of union representation and contract administration. Subsequent cases involving information requests related to disciplinary actions will likely cite this case as precedent.

  • Matter of State (SUNY) v. Public Employment Relations Board, 56 N.Y.2d 339 (1982): Union’s Waiver of Right to Negotiate

    Matter of State (SUNY) v. Public Employment Relations Board, 56 N.Y.2d 339 (1982)

    A union may waive its right to negotiate a mandatory subject of bargaining if it knowingly fails to request negotiations on that subject during contract negotiations.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) waived its right to challenge the State University of New York’s (SUNY) “directed absence” policy by failing to demand negotiation on the issue during contract negotiations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the Public Employment Relations Board’s (PERB) determination that CSEA had not waived its right to negotiate the 1977 and 1978 SUNY directives was irrational and unsupported by evidence. The court emphasized that CSEA knew of the policy and its continued enforcement but did not raise it during bargaining.

    Facts

    SUNY issued directives in 1977 and 1978 concerning a “directed absence” policy. CSEA was aware of these directives and that SUNY intended to continue enforcing the policy. In 1976, CSEA unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate an end to SUNY’s “directed absence” policy contained in its 1976 directive. Despite this knowledge, CSEA did not request that the “directed absence” policy be placed on the negotiating table in 1977 or 1978.

    Procedural History

    PERB initially determined that CSEA had waived its right to challenge the 1977 and 1978 SUNY directives. The Appellate Division reversed PERB’s determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, agreeing that PERB’s determination was irrational and unsupported by the evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether PERB’s determination that CSEA did not waive its right to challenge the 1977 and 1978 SUNY directives regarding the “directed absence” policy was rational and supported by substantial evidence, given CSEA’s awareness of the policy and failure to request negotiations on the issue.

    Holding

    No, because CSEA knew of the “directed absence” policy and its continued enforcement but failed to request that the issue be put on the bargaining table during the 1977 and 1978 negotiations. Thus PERB’s determination was irrational and unsupported by the evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CSEA was well aware of the “directed absence” policy outlined in the 1977 and 1978 SUNY directives and knew that SUNY intended to continue enforcing it. Despite this knowledge, CSEA did not attempt to negotiate the policy during the 1977 and 1978 contract negotiations. The court found PERB’s determination that CSEA had not waived its right to negotiate the issue to be irrational in light of these facts. The court emphasized that unions have a responsibility to bring up mandatory subjects of bargaining during negotiations if they wish to preserve their right to negotiate those issues. By failing to do so, they may be deemed to have waived that right. Dissenting, Judge Jasen argued that the scope of the court’s review of PERB’s interpretation is limited. He stated that unless the Board’s determination was affected by an error of law, arbitrary and capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence, the court should not interfere. Quoting Matter of West Ironde quoit Teachers Assn. v Helsby, 35 NY2d 46, 50, the dissent emphasized, “As the agency charged with implementing the fundamental policies of the Taylor Law, [PERB] is presumed to have developed an expertise and judgment that requires us to accept its construction if not unreasonable”.