94 N.Y.2d 976 (2000)

A declaration against penal interest is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule only if the declarant was aware at the time of making the statement that it was against their penal interest, and portions of the statement that are not against the declarant’s penal interest are inadmissible.

Summary

Defendant Buford appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in discharging a juror and refusing to admit a defense witness’s testimony regarding out-of-court statements. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court properly discharged the juror and correctly concluded that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay because the defendant failed to establish that the declarant knew the statements were against their penal interest when made, and because portions of the statement were not against the declarant’s penal interest.

Facts

The defendant was convicted of a crime, and during the trial, a juror was discharged. The defendant sought to introduce testimony from a defense witness about out-of-court statements made by another person to support a duress defense. The trial court refused to admit this testimony.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in discharging the juror.
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit a defense witness to testify regarding the out-of-court statements of another person.

Holding

1. No, because the trial court did not err in discharging the subject juror using the “for cause” standard. The Court of Appeals deferred to the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s demeanor indicating a state of mind that would preclude an impartial verdict.
2. No, because the trial court correctly concluded that the statements were inadmissible hearsay, and the defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the declarant was aware at the time he made the statements that they were against his penal interest; furthermore, the portions of the statement supporting the duress defense were not against the declarant’s penal interest when made.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s argument regarding the “grossly unqualified” standard for juror discharge was unpreserved because it was first raised in a motion to set aside the verdict. Applying the “for cause” standard of CPL 270.20 (1) (b), the court deferred to the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s demeanor. As to the hearsay statements, the Court cited People v. Fields, 66 NY2d 876, 877-878 and concluded that the defendant failed to show the declarant was aware that the statements were against their penal interest when made. The court further explained that even if some parts of the statement were against the declarant’s penal interest, the portions supporting the defendant’s duress defense were not and, therefore, were inadmissible. The court noted that “careful parsing of the various parts of the declarant’s statements is required, and those portions of the declarant’s statement that arguably support defendant’s duress defense were not against the declarant’s penal interest when made and thus were not admissible.” This principle underscores the importance of assessing each part of a statement separately to determine admissibility under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, citing People v. Brensic, 70 NY2d 9, 16 and People v. Thomas, 68 NY2d 194, 198.