New York Law Review

Tag: DUI

  • People v. Aviles, 27 N.Y.3d 500 (2016): Language Barrier and Equal Protection in DUI Investigations

    People v. Aviles, 27 N.Y.3d 500 (2016)

    A facially neutral policy that denies physical coordination tests to non-English speakers does not violate equal protection because it is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests, and does not violate due process because the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speaking suspects violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Jose Aviles, who spoke only Spanish, was arrested for drunk driving and not given a coordination test due to his language barrier. The Court held that the policy did not violate equal protection because it was rationally related to the government’s interests in ensuring test reliability and avoiding administrative burdens. The Court further held that the failure to administer the test did not violate due process because the police have no obligation to provide evidence to assist a defendant.

    Facts

    Jose Aviles was arrested for drunk driving after an accident. He spoke only Spanish and was observed with signs of intoxication. He consented to a breathalyzer test, which registered below the legal limit. Due to his inability to speak English, he was not given a physical coordination test. Aviles was charged with driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that denying him the coordination test violated his equal protection and due process rights.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted Aviles’ motion, finding constitutional violations. The Appellate Term reversed, relying on a prior Appellate Division decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speakers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    2. Whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speakers violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because the policy is rationally related to legitimate government interests.
    2. No, because the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Equal Protection, the court found the NYPD policy facially neutral because it applied to anyone unable to understand English, not specifically targeting any suspect class. The Court determined that rational basis review applied because no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated. The court reasoned that the policy was rationally related to ensuring the reliability of coordination tests, which depend on clear instructions, and to avoiding the financial and administrative burden of providing translation services or multilingual officers. The Court noted that the value of coordination tests diminishes with time, making translation impractical. The court also rejected Aviles’ argument that the policy discriminated based on national origin because the policy was based on language ability, not ethnicity.

    On the Due Process issue, the Court found that the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence or performing a certain investigative step. The Court distinguished between the right to an interpreter in judicial proceedings and the discretionary, investigative nature of coordination tests. The Court concluded that, even if there were a due process right, it would be outweighed by the state’s interest in efficient and reliable law enforcement.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that facially neutral policies, even if they have a disparate impact, do not automatically trigger heightened scrutiny. The ruling supports law enforcement’s ability to make practical decisions during investigations, even if those decisions might disadvantage some individuals. Lawyers should anticipate courts applying rational basis review when challenging similar policies. Further, this decision reinforces that the police have no affirmative duty to assist defendants. It also highlights the importance of how the government’s articulated interests are directly linked to the challenged policy. Later cases involving language access may attempt to distinguish this case by arguing intentional discrimination based on national origin if a policy is shown to be a pretext for racial discrimination.

  • People v. Hager, 69 N.Y.2d 141 (1987): Physical Dexterity Tests and Self-Incrimination

    People v. Hager, 69 N.Y.2d 141 (1987)

    Physical dexterity tests, such as walking a straight line, do not constitute testimonial evidence protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because they exhibit a person’s physical coordination, not their subjective knowledge or thought processes.

    Summary

    Hager was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident. Police apprehended him shortly after the incident and, smelling alcohol on his breath, administered physical coordination tests (e.g., balancing, walking a straight line) and a breathalyzer test without providing Miranda warnings. Hager argued the performance test results should be suppressed as a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that physical dexterity tests do not elicit testimonial evidence and therefore do not trigger the requirement for Miranda warnings.

    Facts

    Catherine Kuehhas was struck by a car driven by Hager at approximately 12:40 a.m. on May 9, 1983.
    Eyewitnesses reported that Hager stopped briefly at the scene but then drove away without providing identification.
    Police pursued and apprehended Hager shortly after the incident.
    The investigating officer detected the smell of alcohol on Hager’s breath.
    Hager was taken to Central Testing Headquarters and consented to physical coordination tests and a breathalyzer test.
    Miranda warnings were not given before the physical coordination tests.

    Procedural History

    Hager was convicted of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 (2)(a) and (b) (leaving the scene of an accident) and sentenced to probation.
    Hager appealed, arguing that the physical performance test results should have been suppressed.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    Hager appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the results of physical coordination tests administered to a suspect without Miranda warnings are admissible as evidence, or whether they violate the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence, and physical performance tests demonstrate a person’s physical condition rather than revealing subjective knowledge or thought processes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination protects individuals from being compelled to provide “evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature” (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761). The key distinction lies between evidence that reveals a person’s subjective knowledge or thought processes and evidence that simply exhibits a person’s physical characteristics or condition.
    The court stated, “Evidence is ‘testimonial or communicative’ when it reveals a person’s subjective knowledge or thought processes.”
    Physical performance tests, such as balancing tests and walking a straight line, fall into the latter category. They demonstrate a person’s degree of physical coordination, which is observable by police officers, rather than revealing any thoughts or beliefs.
    “The defendant’s responses to those tests in this case indicated he had imbibed alcohol, not because the tests revealed defendant’s thoughts, but because his body’s responses differed from those of a sober person” (citing People v. Boudreau, 115 A.D.2d 652, 654).
    The court concluded that because the performance tests did not elicit testimonial evidence, Miranda warnings were not required prior to their administration. The evidence obtained from the tests was therefore admissible.

  • People v. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97 (1982): Warrantless Blood Draws and Admissibility in Court

    People v. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97 (1982)

    Blood samples taken from a defendant without consent or a court order are inadmissible in prosecutions for driving under the influence or under the Penal Law, except when taken in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194.

    Summary

    This case consolidates three appeals concerning the admissibility of blood samples taken without consent from individuals involved in car accidents. The New York Court of Appeals held that, absent consent or a valid court order, blood samples are inadmissible in DUI and Penal Law prosecutions unless obtained in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194. This decision rests on the preemption of blood sample authorization by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 for DUI cases and CPL 240.40 for other criminal prosecutions. The court emphasized the need for either explicit statutory authorization or a court order before such samples can be taken and used as evidence.

    Facts

    In People v. Moselle, the defendant was involved in an accident, and officers detected a strong odor of alcohol. A blood sample was taken without his consent or arrest. The blood alcohol content (BAC) was .17%. In People v. Daniel, the defendant crashed his van, and officers found alcohol in the vehicle. The defendant was semiconscious, and a blood sample was taken without consent. His BAC was .22%. In People v. Wolter, the defendant collided head-on with another vehicle, resulting in a fatality. He was arrested for driving while intoxicated but refused a blood test. Despite his refusal, a sample was taken, revealing a BAC of .23%.

    Procedural History

    In Moselle, the defendant was convicted of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2), but the Erie County Court reversed the conviction. In Daniel, the Erie County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results, which the Appellate Division affirmed. In Wolter, the Livingston County Court ruled that the blood test could be used in the manslaughter trial but not the DUI charge. The Appellate Division reversed Wolter’s conviction. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal in all three cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether blood samples taken without consent or a court order are admissible in prosecutions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 when the procedural requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 are not observed.
    2. Whether blood samples taken without consent or a court order are admissible in prosecutions under the Penal Law.

    Holding

    1. No, because absent a manifestation of the defendant’s consent thereto, blood samples taken without a court order other than in conformity with the provisions of subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law are inadmissible in prosecutions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol under section 1192 of that law.
    2. No, because blood samples taken without a defendant’s consent are inadmissible in prosecutions under the Penal Law unless taken pursuant to an authorizing court order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its decision on two legislative enactments: Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and CPL 240.40. Section 1194 authorizes chemical blood tests for DUI prosecutions only under specific conditions (arrest or breath test indication of alcohol) and explicitly states that “if the person refuses to submit to such chemical test, the test shall not be given.” CPL 240.40 outlines discovery procedures, including obtaining non-testimonial evidence like blood samples, but requires a court order. The court found that the Legislature, by enacting these provisions, preempted the field of blood sample authorization. The court stated, “No room is then left for the taking of samples of blood otherwise than pursuant to a court order issued under CPL 240.40 or a court order otherwise authorized by law (or in conformity with § 1194). The negative inference is that the taking of blood in any other manner is foreclosed.” Therefore, because the blood samples in these cases were taken without either consent or a valid court order, they were deemed inadmissible. The court emphasized that “exigent circumstances” might excuse the failure to obtain a court order, but do not provide a source of authority to conduct discovery.