84 N.Y.2d 795 (1995)

Expert medical testimony is admissible to establish whether a plaintiff has sustained a “permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member” or a “significant limitation of use of a body function or system” as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d), even if the testimony addresses ultimate issues for the jury.

Summary

In a personal injury action arising from a car accident, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether it was improper for the plaintiff’s doctors to testify, using the exact language of Insurance Law § 5102(d), that the plaintiff sustained a “permanent consequential limitation” and a “significant limitation” of use of a body function. The Court held that such testimony was admissible, reasoning that whether an injury meets these statutory definitions often requires medical expertise beyond the ken of a lay jury. The Court emphasized that the expert opinions were supported by objective medical evidence and the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine and present their own expert testimony.

Facts

Plaintiff sustained injuries to her ankle and knee in a car accident. She sued the other driver and the vehicle’s owner for damages. To establish a “serious injury” under New York’s No-Fault Law (Insurance Law § 5102(d)), plaintiff’s physicians testified that she suffered a “permanent consequential limitation” and a “significant limitation” of the use of a body member, function, organ, or system.

Procedural History

The trial court allowed the plaintiff’s doctors to testify as to whether the plaintiff suffered a permanent consequential limitation or a significant limitation. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, determining that she sustained a permanent consequential limitation and a significant limitation and that she was medically prevented from performing normal activities for 90 out of 180 days following the accident. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine if the doctor’s testimony was improper.

Issue(s)

1. Whether it is an error to allow medical experts to testify, using the statutory language of Insurance Law § 5102(d), as to whether a plaintiff sustained a “permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member” or a “significant limitation of use of a body function or system”.

Holding

1. No, because whether an injury constitutes a “permanent consequential limitation” or a “significant limitation” often requires medical expertise, and the expert’s opinion was supported by objective evidence and subject to cross-examination and rebuttal.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the admission of expert opinion is within the trial court’s discretion when it involves knowledge or skill beyond the range of ordinary training and intelligence. The Court found that determining whether an injury is permanent, “significant,” or “consequential” involves medical judgments about the seriousness and qualitative nature of an injury, compared to the normal function of the body, and thus falls within the scope of medical expertise. The court quoted Selkowitz v County of Nassau, 45 NY2d 97, 102, stating that an “expert” should be permitted to offer an opinion on an issue which involves ” ‘professional or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence’ ”. The Court also emphasized the No-Fault Law’s intent to weed out frivolous claims. Permitting medical testimony on the seriousness of the injury assists the jury and is consistent with that intent. The Court acknowledged that there could be instances where asking experts questions in the statutory form would be unduly prejudicial. However, in this case, because the expert’s opinions were supported by objective evidence, the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine and present its own expert who testified that the plaintiff sustained a 20% permanent loss of use of her ankle, the court found no error. Thus, the jury could exercise independent judgment without relying solely on the plaintiff’s experts’ statutory conclusions. The court cited Licari v Elliot, 57 NY2d 230, 234-235, stating that “the legislative intent underlying the No-Fault Law was to weed out frivolous claims and limit recovery to significant injuries”.