New York Law Review

Tag: due process

  • Caprio v. New York State Dept. of Taxation & Finance, 24 N.Y.3d 746 (2015): Retroactive Application of Tax Amendments and Due Process

    24 N.Y.3d 746 (2015)

    Retroactive tax legislation does not violate the Due Process Clause if it is supported by a rational legislative purpose, considering the taxpayer’s forewarning, the length of the retroactive period, and the public purpose of the application.

    Summary

    In Caprio v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the retroactive application of 2010 amendments to New York Tax Law § 632(a)(2) violated the Due Process Clause. The amendments clarified that gains from installment obligations received in deemed asset sales of S corporations were considered New York source income for non-resident shareholders. The court applied a balancing-of-equities test, considering taxpayer forewarning, the length of retroactivity, and public purpose. The court held that the retroactive application was constitutional, finding the taxpayer’s reliance on the prior law’s interpretation was unreasonable, the retroactive period was not excessive, and a rational public purpose supported the amendment. This case underscores the limitations on challenging retroactive tax laws and the importance of demonstrating reasonable reliance on prior tax interpretations.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, non-resident shareholders of a New Jersey S corporation (TMC Services, Inc.), sold their shares in 2007 in a deemed asset sale, structured with installment payments. The shareholders elected to use the installment method for federal tax purposes. They reported the sale for federal tax purposes but initially reported no income to New York. The plaintiffs argued that, under prior New York tax law, gains from the sale of stock by non-residents were not taxable. The state, however, issued a deficiency notice based on the 2010 amendments to Tax Law § 632(a)(2), which made it clear that such gains were taxable. The amendments were made retroactive to January 1, 2007.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the retroactive application of the tax amendments. The trial court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the retroactivity. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the retroactivity excessive. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and upheld the trial court’s initial decision, reinstating the tax deficiency.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the retroactive application of the 2010 amendments to Tax Law § 632(a)(2) violated the Due Process Clauses of the United States and New York State Constitutions.

    Holding

    1. No, because the retroactive application of the amendments was not arbitrary or irrational, as demonstrated by the balancing of equities test.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied a balancing-of-equities test based on precedent, evaluating: (1) taxpayer’s forewarning and reasonableness of reliance on prior law; (2) the length of the retroactive period; and (3) the public purpose for the retroactivity. Regarding the first factor, the Court found the taxpayers’ reliance on their interpretation of the pre-amendment tax law was unreasonable, citing that the interpretation was unsupported by actual practice and conflicted with the general S corporation tax treatment. The Court deferred to the legislature’s findings regarding the purpose of the amendments to correct past errors. For the second factor, the Court found the 3.5-year retroactive period was reasonable, given that it applied only to open tax years and was designed to be curative. The third factor, the Court found the legislative purpose to prevent revenue loss and correct an administrative error to be compelling and rational.

    The court referenced the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Carlton, stating, “Tax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code.”

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes that taxpayers have a high bar to overcome when challenging the retroactive application of tax laws. It underscores that courts will give deference to legislative findings on the intent of tax laws and that, if the retroactive application is for a curative purpose, it will be more likely upheld. Furthermore, the case highlights the significance of reasonable reliance, and that this must be based on clear legal precedent or established administrative practice. Businesses should be aware that interpretations of tax law that are untested or based on an unusual reading of the law are unlikely to be protected when tax laws are clarified or amended. Lawyers should advise clients to seek professional advice before relying on tax interpretations and be aware that even a correct interpretation of a statute does not guarantee that they can claim they reasonably relied on that interpretation.

  • People v. Lashway, 24 N.Y.3d 479 (2014): Adjournment of a SORA Reclassification Hearing and Due Process

    24 N.Y.3d 479 (2014)

    The denial of an adjournment in a Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) reclassification hearing is within the hearing court’s discretion, and an adjournment is not required where the defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice from the absence of requested documents.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the County Court abused its discretion by denying a sex offender’s request for an adjournment of his SORA reclassification hearing, pending receipt of documents the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders reviewed in formulating its recommendation. The Court held that the denial was not an abuse of discretion, especially given the defendant’s delay in requesting the documents, the substantial evidence supporting the denial of reclassification, and the availability of future opportunities to seek reclassification and obtain the documents. The Court clarified that while due process applied, the procedural due process rights of the defendant in a reclassification context were not identical to the rights in an initial risk assessment. The Court emphasized that the hearing court’s discretion regarding adjournments, especially when the defendant’s rights are not violated, should be respected.

    Facts

    Defendant, convicted of multiple counts of rape and classified as a level three sex offender under SORA, sought a downward modification of his risk level. The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, solicited by the County Court, did not recommend a reduction. Defendant’s counsel requested an adjournment of the reclassification hearing to obtain documents reviewed by the Board, including two emails. County Court denied the adjournment, and after the hearing, also denied the modification. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the adjournment. The Court found that County Court was not bound by the Board’s recommendation. Furthermore, defendant was not prevented from defending himself against any evidence or documentation relied upon by County Court in deciding such application.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s modification request without a hearing, which the Appellate Division reversed, remitting the matter for a hearing. After the hearing, the County Court again denied the modification. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision, rejecting the argument that the denial of an adjournment was error. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the County Court abused its discretion when denying the defendant’s request for an adjournment of the SORA reclassification hearing, pending the receipt of requested documents?

    2. Whether the denial of the adjournment deprived the defendant of due process of law?

    Holding

    1. No, because the denial of the adjournment was within the County Court’s discretion, considering the absence of prejudice to the defendant.

    2. No, because the defendant was not deprived of due process of law, as he had the opportunity to present relevant information and was not prejudiced by the absence of the requested documents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the decision to grant an adjournment is within the discretion of the hearing court, quoting People v. Singleton. The Court noted, “[w]hen the protection of fundamental rights has been involved in requests for adjournments, that discretionary power has been more narrowly construed.” However, the Court found no abuse of discretion because the defendant was a repeat sex offender, had mental abnormalities, and had accrued infractions while incarcerated, thus rendering the denial harmless. The Court noted that the defendant had not committed a new sex offense in over 26 years, but also had multiple disciplinary actions and was unlikely to be released before his maximum incarceration date. The Court reasoned that the denial of the adjournment did not prejudice the defendant’s rights and did not violate due process because the Court ultimately made its decision based on independent grounds, not the information withheld, quoting People v. Rodriguez. The Court also emphasized the defendant’s right to petition for reclassification again in the future, where he could obtain the requested documents.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the hearing court’s discretion in managing SORA proceedings, particularly regarding adjournments. It informs attorneys that a strong showing of prejudice is necessary to successfully challenge the denial of an adjournment, especially where the defendant’s rights are not violated. Furthermore, defense counsel should be mindful of the differences between due process rights in initial risk assessments and reclassification hearings. This decision suggests that courts will scrutinize whether requested documents are actually critical to the court’s decision. Finally, attorneys and those involved in SORA matters should understand that defendants are not precluded from seeking relief and are able to make a new application for reclassification. This ruling provides guidance to lower courts on how to apply the concept of discretion and harmless error in the SORA reclassification context.

  • Kickertz v. New York University, 25 N.Y.3d 943 (2015): Due Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings at Private Universities

    25 N.Y.3d 943 (2015)

    Private universities, when disciplining students, must substantially adhere to their published rules, but are not required to provide the full due process rights afforded in a governmental setting.

    Summary

    This case concerns a student, Katie Kickertz, who was expelled from New York University (NYU) following a finding of academic misconduct. Kickertz sought reinstatement, a degree, and attorneys’ fees through an Article 78 proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Appellate Division erred by failing to remand the case to allow NYU to file an answer, as required by CPLR 7804(f). The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division should have remanded the case because the facts presented did not preclude the existence of triable issues, and NYU should be permitted to answer the petition. The Court emphasized that private educational institutions must substantially observe their published rules when disciplining students, but are not held to the same due process standards as governmental entities.

    Facts

    Katie Kickertz, a student at New York University’s College of Dentistry, was expelled due to academic misconduct. Kickertz initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement, a degree, and attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court dismissed Kickertz’s petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, granted the petition, and ordered NYU to reinstate Kickertz. NYU appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    1. Supreme Court: Dismissed Kickertz’s petition.

    2. Appellate Division: Reversed the Supreme Court decision, reinstated the petition, and granted Kickertz’s requests.

    3. Court of Appeals: Modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case back to the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred by failing to remand the case to Supreme Court to allow NYU to file an answer under CPLR 7804(f).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Appellate Division should have remanded the case as triable issues of fact existed that warranted NYU being able to file an answer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the interpretation and application of CPLR 7804(f), which requires a court to permit a respondent to answer a petition in an Article 78 proceeding if a motion to dismiss is denied. The Court cited precedent indicating an exception if the facts are fully presented, and no dispute of facts or prejudice would result from the failure to require an answer. In this case, the court found that the facts were not so clear, as “triable issues of fact exist with regard to whether NYU substantially complied with its established disciplinary procedures.” The Court reiterated that a private educational institution, such as NYU, is not required to adhere to the full panoply of due process rights afforded in a governmental setting, but must substantially observe its published rules.

    The Court’s decision emphasizes the procedural rights available to a private university in defending against a student’s challenge to disciplinary actions. It underscores the balance between protecting student rights and allowing educational institutions to maintain their standards and enforce their rules. The ruling clarifies the scope of judicial review in student discipline cases, emphasizing deference to institutional procedures as long as they are substantially followed.

    The Court also declined to address other issues raised by the parties and decided by the lower courts, due to its disposition of the appeal.

  • In the Matter of State of New York v. Floyd Y., 22 N.Y.3d 97 (2013): Admissibility of Hearsay in Civil Confinement Proceedings

    In the Matter of State of New York v. Floyd Y., 22 N.Y.3d 97 (2013)

    In civil confinement proceedings under New York’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA), hearsay evidence underlying an expert’s opinion is admissible only if it is reliable and its probative value in helping the jury evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

    Summary

    Floyd Y., previously convicted of sexual abuse, was subject to a civil confinement petition under Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law. At trial, the State presented expert testimony relying on hearsay evidence, including victim affidavits and police reports detailing both convicted and uncharged sexual offenses. Floyd Y. argued this violated his due process rights. The New York Court of Appeals held that while Article 10 proceedings are civil, due process requires hearsay evidence to meet minimum standards of reliability and probative value before being admitted to protect the respondent’s liberty interests, reversing the lower court’s decision and ordering a new trial.

    Facts

    Floyd Y. was convicted of sexual abuse in 2001. Prior to his release, he was transferred to a psychiatric center. Subsequently, the State filed an Article 10 petition seeking his civil confinement under SOMTA, arguing he suffered from a mental abnormality that made him a danger to others. The State’s experts, Drs. Mortiere and Kunz, testified about Floyd Y.’s past sexual abuse, including uncharged incidents, relying on victim affidavits, police reports, and clinical records. Dr. Mortiere testified to instances of abuse against nine individuals, despite lacking personal knowledge of the events.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court admitted the expert testimony and underlying hearsay over Floyd Y.’s objections. The jury found that Floyd Y. suffered from a mental abnormality, and he was assigned to a secure facility. The Appellate Division affirmed in part, finding some hearsay admissible under the “professional reliability exception,” but deemed the admission of some accusations unreliable, but harmless. Floyd Y. appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the procedures violated his due process rights.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in an Article 10 civil management proceeding, the admission of hearsay evidence underlying expert testimony violates a respondent’s due process rights when that evidence is unreliable and more prejudicial than probative.

    Holding

    Yes, because due process requires that any hearsay evidence admitted in Article 10 proceedings must meet minimum standards of reliability and relevance, and its probative value must substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Article 10 proceedings are civil in nature, and thus do not afford the same Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections as criminal trials. However, given the significant liberty interests at stake, the Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine the scope of procedural due process required. The Court found Floyd Y.’s liberty interest to be substantial, the risk of erroneous deprivation high due to the potential misuse of information, and the State’s interest in avoiding additional procedures outweighed by the other two factors.

    The court emphasized that the primary issue is the admissibility of underlying basis information, which may be hearsay. The Court explicitly stated, “Contrary to our concurring colleagues’ contention, basis hearsay does not come into evidence for its truth, but rather to assist the factfinder with its essential article 10 task of evaluating the experts’ opinions.”

    To balance these concerns, the Court established a two-part test for the admissibility of hearsay basis evidence: (1) the proponent must demonstrate the hearsay’s reliability, and (2) the court must find that its probative value in helping the jury evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. The Court reasoned that this test prevents experts from acting as mere conduits for unreliable hearsay while still allowing the jury to understand the basis for the expert’s opinion.

    Applying this test to the facts, the Court found that the admission of hearsay regarding accusations that resulted in acquittal or were uncharged violated Floyd Y.’s due process rights. The Court noted that adjudications of guilt or admissions by Floyd Y. could provide a basis for reliability, but mere accusations, particularly those unsubstantiated or resulting in acquittal, were more prejudicial than probative. As a result, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial.

  • People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168 (2013): Duty to Advise on Deportation Consequences

    People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168 (2013)

    Due process requires a trial court to inform a defendant, prior to accepting a guilty plea to a felony, that if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen, they may be deported as a consequence of the plea.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court must inform a defendant that a guilty plea to a felony could result in deportation if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen. The court held that due process compels such advisement because deportation is a plea consequence of tremendous importance. However, the court also ruled that a defendant seeking to withdraw a plea based on the lack of such advice must show a reasonable probability that they would have rejected the plea and gone to trial had they been properly warned. The court overruled part of People v. Ford, holding that failure to advise a defendant of potential deportation can affect the validity of a plea, but reaffirmed the distinction between direct and collateral consequences.

    Facts

    Peque, a Guatemalan national, was arrested for rape. At arraignment, it was noted he lacked a Social Security number. He pleaded guilty to first-degree rape, but the court did not advise him that this conviction could lead to deportation. At sentencing, defense counsel mentioned Peque was subject to deportation and wished the sentence to stand. Diaz, a legal permanent resident from the Dominican Republic, was arrested for drug possession. The court warned him that felony pleas could adversely affect immigration status, but did not specifically mention deportation. Thomas, a legal permanent resident from Jamaica, pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in 1992. The court knew he wasn’t a citizen, but didn’t warn about deportation. He absconded, faked his death, and later returned to the US, seeking admission as a returning resident.

    Procedural History

    Peque: The Appellate Division affirmed Peque’s conviction, citing Ford that failure to advise on deportation doesn’t invalidate a plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Diaz: The Appellate Division affirmed Diaz’s conviction, finding his challenge unpreserved and citing Ford. The Court of Appeals conditionally modified and remitted. Thomas: The Appellate Division affirmed Thomas’s conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether due process requires a trial court to advise a defendant that a guilty plea may result in deportation if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen?

    2. Whether, if such advisement is required and not given, the defendant is entitled to automatic withdrawal or vacatur of the plea?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because deportation is a plea consequence of such tremendous importance, grave impact and frequent occurrence that a defendant is entitled to notice that it may ensue from a plea.

    2. No, because the defendant must establish a reasonable probability that they would have rejected the plea and opted for trial had the court warned of the possibility of deportation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that due process requires a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. While courts need not advise on every possible repercussion, they must advise on direct consequences. Ford classified deportation as a collateral consequence. However, changes in immigration law since Ford have made deportation a near-automatic result for many noncitizen offenders. Quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court noted that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.” The Court overruled the portion of Ford stating that a court’s failure to warn about potential deportation never affects a plea’s validity. However, the Court also held that to withdraw a plea, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that they would not have pleaded guilty had they been informed of potential deportation. Factors to consider include the plea’s favorability, potential consequences after trial, strength of the prosecution’s case, defendant’s ties to the U.S., and counsel’s advice. The Court emphasized that trial courts aren’t required to engage in any particular litany during an allocution in order to obtain a valid guilty plea. The defendant in Diaz was entitled to a remittal to Supreme Court to allow him to move to vacate his plea and develop a record relevant to the issue of prejudice. Thomas was not entitled to relief because deportation was less certain at the time of his plea.

  • Coleman v. Daines, 17 N.Y.3d 1087 (2011): Mootness Exception for Recurring Issues Evading Review

    Coleman v. Daines, 17 N.Y.3d 1087 (2011)

    An appeal is not moot if the issue is likely to recur, is substantial and novel, and will typically evade review in the courts; furthermore, a demand for nominal damages in connection with alleged constitutional due process violations also survives a mootness challenge.

    Summary

    Barbara Coleman brought an action against the Commissioners of the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) and the New York State Department of Health, alleging a failure to timely process her Medicaid application and a failure to inform her of the availability of temporary medical assistance. Although Coleman eventually received the requested benefits, she pursued the case, seeking nominal damages for the alleged due process violation. The New York Court of Appeals held that the case was not moot because the issue of delayed Medicaid processing and failure to inform applicants of temporary assistance was likely to recur, was substantial, and would typically evade review. The court also found that the claim for nominal damages survived the mootness challenge, and that Coleman was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because doing so would have been futile.

    Facts

    In November 2007 and January 2008, Barbara Coleman applied for Medicaid-funded personal care attendant services. After receiving no response, she applied for “temporary medical assistance” in May 2008 pending the determination of her Medicaid application. Later in May 2008, HRA informed Coleman that she was eligible for Medicaid but did not specify the number of hours of personal care. By the end of June 2008, HRA granted Coleman 24-hour personal care attendant services beginning June 30, 2008.

    Procedural History

    Coleman commenced a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and 42 USC § 1983 action. Supreme Court dismissed the petition based on mootness and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the “likely to recur” exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Appellate Division granted respondents leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals on a certified question.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the claims are moot despite Coleman receiving the requested benefits, considering the alleged policy of not informing applicants of temporary assistance, and whether the claim for nominal damages for due process violations survives a mootness challenge. Also, whether Coleman was required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit.

    Holding

    Yes, the claims are not moot because the issue is likely to recur, is substantial and novel, and will typically evade review; furthermore, the demand for nominal damages survives the mootness challenge. No, Coleman was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because pursuing them would have been futile.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the mootness doctrine, stating that “an appeal is moot unless an adjudication of the merits will result in immediate and practical consequences to the parties.” The Court then cited the exception to the mootness doctrine: “where the issue to be decided, though moot, (1) is likely to recur, either between the parties or other members of the public, (2) is substantial and novel, and (3) will typically evade review in the courts.” The Court found that because the respondents allegedly maintained a policy of not informing applicants of temporary Medicaid assistance, the issue was “likely to recur.” Further, the Court reasoned that the potential ramifications of delays in providing critical benefits and the relatively brief nature of the violation made the question substantial and likely to evade judicial review. Citing Dean v Blumenthal, the Court stated that Coleman’s demand for nominal damages in connection with her alleged constitutional due process violations also survives the mootness challenge. Finally, the Court held that Coleman was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because, accepting Coleman’s assertion as true, pursuing the claims through the administrative process would have been futile, citing Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth.

  • Orange County Commissioner of Finance v. Helseth, 17 N.Y.3d 620 (2011): Notice Required Only for Governmental Taking, Not Subsequent Options

    Orange County Commissioner of Finance v. Helseth, 17 N.Y.3d 620 (2011)

    Due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise parties of an opportunity to be heard regarding a governmental taking of property, but does not mandate notice for subsequent, discretionary options offered after a lawful foreclosure.

    Summary

    The Helseths failed to pay property taxes, leading to a foreclosure action by Orange County. The County provided notice of the foreclosure but the Helseths did not respond, and the County obtained title. The County then offered the Helseths an opportunity to repurchase the property, but notice of this option was returned as undeliverable. The Helseths argued they were entitled to better notice of the repurchase option. The New York Court of Appeals held that due process only requires notice of the initial governmental taking (the foreclosure), not of subsequent, discretionary options like the repurchase opportunity, reversing the lower court’s ruling in favor of Orange County.

    Facts

    The Helseths owned a property in Orange County. They moved and attempted to update their address with the County for tax purposes, but the County’s records still reflected their old address. They failed to pay property taxes, leading to the County initiating foreclosure proceedings. The County sent notice of the foreclosure action to the old address via certified mail, which was returned as unclaimed. The Helseths did not respond to the foreclosure action, and the County obtained a default judgment and title to the property. After obtaining title, the County sent another notice to the old address, informing the Helseths of an opportunity to repurchase the property. This notice was also returned as undeliverable. The Helseths learned of the foreclosure and scheduled auction through their real estate broker.

    Procedural History

    The Helseths moved to stay the sale of the property after learning about the foreclosure. The Supreme Court denied a temporary restraining order and ruled that the initial foreclosure notice was adequate but the notice for the repurchase option was not. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the County failed to provide adequate notice of the repurchase opportunity. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County was required to provide the Helseths with constitutionally adequate notice of the opportunity to repurchase their property after the County had already obtained title through a tax foreclosure proceeding, when the initial foreclosure notice was deemed adequate.

    Holding

    No, because constitutional due process only mandates notice of the governmental taking that impairs the rights of interested parties (i.e., the foreclosure action), and does not extend to subsequent, discretionary remedies offered after the property was lawfully foreclosed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that due process requires notice that is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise” parties of the opportunity to be heard regarding a governmental action that affects their rights (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). The court emphasized that all that was constitutionally required of the County was reasonable notice of the foreclosure action. The repurchase option was a discretionary remedy offered after the property was lawfully foreclosed and conveyed to the County. Therefore, it did not establish or extend a property right entitled to due process protection. The Court distinguished Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), noting that in Jones, the tax sale itself was the governmental taking, whereas here, the foreclosure was the taking, and the repurchase option was a separate, optional measure. The court quoted Sheehan v. County of Suffolk, 67 N.Y.2d 52, 59 (1986) stating “Once taxpayers are provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the adjudicative facts concerning the valuation of properties subject to tax, as was done here, they have received all the process that is due”. The court also cited Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1988), stating that “due process only requires notice of the pendency of the action and an opportunity to respond. The City . . . was not required to send additional notices as each step in the foreclosure proceeding was completed or when each of the available remedies was about to lapse”.

  • People v. Cruz, 19 N.Y.3d 942 (2012): Shackling Defendant Without Specific Justification Violates Constitutional Rights

    People v. Cruz, 19 N.Y.3d 942 (2012)

    A defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when they are physically restrained in view of the jury without a court determination that the restraints are justified by an essential state interest specific to that defendant.

    Summary

    Defendant Geraldo Cruz was convicted of burglary. Prior to the trial, the court ordered him to be shackled, concealed from the jury’s direct view by a curtain around the defense table. Cruz argued that the shackling violated his constitutional rights. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the shackling, without a specific finding of necessity related to Cruz’s behavior during trial, violated his constitutional rights under Deck v. Missouri. The court found that the reasons provided for shackling Cruz were not specific to him and could apply to most repeat offenders. Moreover, the court noted that it was not clear that the jury would not infer that the curtain was present to hide restraints.

    Facts

    Naomi Edwards encountered an intruder. A neighbor, Raquel Oliveria, saw a man matching Cruz’s description acting suspiciously outside Edwards’ house. Oliveria identified Cruz in a showup identification based on his clothing and bicycle, not his face. Cruz was arrested and held on a parole violation. While incarcerated, he wrote letters to Edwards asking her to identify him in court, leading to witness tampering charges that were later dismissed.

    Procedural History

    Cruz was convicted of burglary in the second degree in County Court. He appealed, arguing the shackling violated his constitutional rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Cruz leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated Cruz’s constitutional rights by requiring him to wear shackles during the trial without making a specific finding that the shackles were necessary due to a particular security risk posed by Cruz.

    Holding

    Yes, because federal constitutional law prohibits the use of physical restraints visible to the jury during a criminal trial, absent a court determination that they are justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Deck v. Missouri, which prohibits visible shackling absent a specific finding justifying the restraints. The court found that the reasons given by the County Court for shackling Cruz were general and could apply to many repeat offenders, not just Cruz. The court emphasized that trial courts cannot routinely shackle defendants and must have a particular reason for doing so. The court stated, “[f]ederal constitutional law ‘prohibits the use of physical restraints visible to the jury during a criminal trial, absent a court determination that they are justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial’.” The court also highlighted the County Court’s admission that the decision to shackle Cruz was based on a recommendation from security staff rather than an independent determination by the court. Because the People conceded that the evidence was not overwhelming, the Court of Appeals could not conclude that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Gilford, 16 N.Y.3d 864 (2011): Admissibility of Showup Identifications and Exigent Circumstances

    People v. Gilford, 16 N.Y.3d 864 (2011)

    A showup identification is permissible if it is reasonable under the circumstances, justified by exigency or temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, and not unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s manslaughter conviction, finding the showup identification admissible. The showup occurred shortly after a stabbing at a roller skating rink, with the victim in critical condition. A witness identified the defendant, who was apprehended nearby and shown to the witness at the hospital. The Court reasoned that the showup was justified by its temporal and geographic proximity to the crime and the exigent circumstances of the victim’s condition. The Court deferred to the lower court’s finding that the showup was not unduly suggestive, emphasizing the importance of preserving fresh memories.

    Facts

    A fight broke out at a roller skating rink in the Bronx, resulting in the stabbing of James Earl Jones, who later died, and Kyle Williams. A female witness identified Terrell Gilford as Jones’s attacker to a police sergeant at the scene. Gilford fled and was apprehended by other officers a few blocks away. The officers placed Gilford, handcuffed, in their patrol car. The sergeant instructed these officers to transport Gilford to the hospital where Jones was taken for a showup identification, believing Jones was likely to die. At the hospital, the initial witness, along with a male companion, identified Gilford in a showup conducted in the parking lot approximately 45 minutes after the crime. The witness had already identified the defendant to the sergeant.

    Procedural History

    Gilford was indicted by a grand jury. He moved to suppress the showup identifications, arguing the absence of exigent circumstances and the suggestiveness of the procedure. The trial court denied the motion, citing People v. Duuvon. Gilford waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted of first-degree manslaughter for Jones’s death and first-degree assault for Williams’s injuries. The Appellate Division upheld the manslaughter conviction but reduced the assault conviction to attempted assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no basis for suppression of the showup or in-court identifications.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the showup identification was admissible, considering the circumstances surrounding its execution?

    Holding

    Yes, because the showup was reasonable under the circumstances, justified by temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, and the lower courts found it was not unduly suggestive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, deferring to its finding that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances and not unduly suggestive. The court emphasized that the showup occurred shortly after the crime and in close proximity to the scene, justifying its use to preserve the witnesses’ fresh memories. The court cited People v. Ortiz, stating that the due process inquiry for showups requires determining whether the showup was reasonable under the circumstances (i.e., justified by exigency or temporal and spatial proximity) and, if so, whether the showup as conducted was unduly suggestive. Because the lower courts already determined these to be the case and their decision was supported by evidence, the Court of Appeals held the decision to be beyond further review.

  • People v. Buchanan, 13 N.Y.3d 1 (2009): Stun Belt Use Requires Specific Justification

    13 N.Y.3d 1 (2009)

    A stun belt may not be used to restrain a defendant in a criminal case without a finding of specific facts justifying the use of such a restraint based on the particular defendant’s circumstances.

    Summary

    Ingvue Buchanan was convicted of second-degree murder. Before trial, the judge implemented a policy of using leg shackles or a stun belt on defendants in serious cases, including Buchanan, citing general security concerns regardless of the defendant’s behavior. Buchanan objected, but the judge required him to wear a stun belt throughout the trial. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that stun belts cannot be routinely used without specific findings justifying their use for the individual defendant, based on their history, the nature of the charges, and other factors. The court emphasized that a defendant’s rights are compromised when such restraints are applied without particularized justification.

    Facts

    Ingvue Buchanan was charged with strangling a 14-year-old girl.

    Prior to opening statements, the trial judge declared a policy of requiring defendants in serious cases to wear leg shackles or a stun belt.

    The judge stated this policy applied to all defendants charged with murder, regardless of individual risk factors.

    Buchanan and his counsel objected to the stun belt, arguing he had done nothing to warrant such a measure.

    The judge acknowledged Buchanan’s lack of prior problematic behavior but insisted on the stun belt for security, deferring to the Sheriff’s Department’s preference.

    Buchanan wore the stun belt throughout the trial, and his complaints of discomfort were medically evaluated but not deemed a contraindication for continued use.

    Procedural History

    Buchanan was convicted of second-degree murder in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with two justices dissenting.

    An Appellate Division Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court can require a defendant to wear a stun belt during trial as a routine security measure without making specific findings that the individual defendant poses a security risk.

    Holding

    No, because a stun belt may not be required unless the trial court makes findings on the record showing that the particular defendant before him needs such a restraint. A formal hearing may not be necessary, but the trial court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to satisfy itself of the facts that warrant the restraint.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while stun belts may be necessary in certain cases, their use cannot be a routine practice without specific justification related to the individual defendant. The court explicitly rejected the argument that because the belt was not visible, it did not raise the same due process concerns as visible shackles, as addressed in Deck v. Missouri. Instead, the court established a rule under New York law requiring trial courts to make findings on the record that demonstrate the need for such a restraint based on the defendant’s history, the nature of the charges, and other relevant factors. The court acknowledged that a formal hearing may not be required, but that there must be sufficient inquiry for the court to be satisfied of the facts warranting the restraint.

    The court emphasized that trial courts retain broad discretion in deciding whether a restraint is necessary for courtroom security, but that discretion must be informed by a case-specific analysis. By implementing a blanket policy, the trial court failed to engage in this necessary individualized assessment. The court did not rule out the possibility of using a stun belt but emphasized the necessity of a factual basis supporting such a decision: “We have no doubt that there are cases in which a court may properly find, considering the nature of the charged offense, the defendant’s history and other relevant factors, that a stun belt is necessary, but those factors must be considered before that finding is made.”

    Judge Read dissented, arguing that the defendant failed to show any actual prejudice from wearing the stun belt and that the conviction should be affirmed. The dissent emphasized that the defendant’s complaints were about discomfort and that there was no demonstration that the belt was visible to the jury or impaired his ability to participate in his defense.