New York Law Review

Tag: due process

  • People ex rel. Michael D. v. Toulon, 2024 NY Slip Op 05178: Due Process Rights of Sex Offenders Under SIST Revocation

    2024 NY Slip Op 05178

    The New York Court of Appeals held that Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4), which allows for the temporary confinement of sex offenders under strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) based on a prompt judicial finding of probable cause to believe they are a “dangerous sex offender requiring confinement,” does not violate procedural due process rights.

    Summary

    This case addressed the constitutionality of New York’s Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4), which outlines the procedures for revoking the SIST of sex offenders. The court examined whether the law’s provision for pre-hearing confinement, based on a probable cause finding that the offender poses a danger, violates the offender’s due process rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that the statute strikes an appropriate balance between individual liberty and public safety, finding that the absence of an adversarial probable cause hearing does not render the statute unconstitutional. The decision emphasizes the importance of a speedy determination of probable cause to protect public safety while upholding the offender’s rights.

    Facts

    Ralph S., a sex offender under SIST due to a “mental abnormality,” was accused of violating his conditions by tampering with an alcohol monitoring bracelet. A parole officer took him into custody. Within five days, the state filed a petition to revoke his SIST and sought to place him in confinement. A psychologist issued a report concluding he was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. The Supreme Court reviewed the petition and, based on the allegations, found probable cause to believe Ralph S. was a “dangerous sex offender requiring confinement” and ordered him detained pending a revocation hearing. Ralph S. challenged the constitutionality of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4), arguing it violated due process by not providing an opportunity to be heard at the probable cause stage. The Appellate Division upheld the statute’s constitutionality.

    Procedural History

    Ralph S. was initially detained based on suspicion of violating his SIST conditions. The Attorney General then petitioned for SIST revocation. Supreme Court found probable cause for confinement and ordered a SIST revocation hearing, where Ralph S. challenged the law via habeas corpus. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division converted the action to a declaratory judgment and affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the statute was constitutional. The Court of Appeals heard the appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4), which allows temporary confinement based on a probable cause finding without a prior adversarial hearing, violates the procedural due process rights of sex offenders under SIST.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute appropriately balances the individual’s liberty interest with the state’s interest in public safety and provides sufficient procedural safeguards.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge. First, it considered the individual’s liberty interest in remaining on SIST, finding this interest to be diminished and temporary. Second, the court found the risk of erroneous deprivation to be minimal because of the judicial probable cause determination, the role of psychiatric reports, and the full revocation hearing that follows. The court reasoned that the additional protection of an adversarial probable cause hearing would be slight and could delay the process. Finally, the court found the state’s interest in protecting the public from sex offenders to be paramount and requiring a prompt determination. The court also noted that the prior jury determination of a “mental abnormality” lessened the need for additional procedural safeguards at the probable cause stage.

    Practical Implications

    This decision affirms that in New York, the temporary confinement of sex offenders under SIST, based on a prompt probable cause finding without a pre-confinement adversarial hearing, is constitutionally permissible. It affects how similar cases involving SIST revocations will be analyzed, emphasizing the balance between individual rights and public safety. The decision clarifies that while offenders have due process rights, the state’s need for a swift response to potential public threats can sometimes outweigh the need for an immediate adversarial hearing. Attorneys representing offenders in similar situations should understand that while they may not have an immediate opportunity to present evidence before confinement, they will have a full hearing within 30 days and must build their case to challenge the findings there.

  • People ex rel. Michael D. v. Toulon, 2024 NY Slip Op 05178: Due Process and Temporary Confinement of Sex Offenders Under Supervision

    2024 NY Slip Op 05178

    The Court held that the provisions of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4) which allow for the temporary confinement of sex offenders under strict supervision, based on a prompt judicial finding of probable cause without the respondent’s participation, satisfy procedural due process requirements.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4) concerning the temporary confinement of sex offenders released to strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST). The case involved an individual, Ralph S., who was confined pending a SIST revocation hearing based on a parole officer’s report and a psychiatric evaluation. The Court considered whether the statute’s procedure, which allowed for a probable cause determination by a court without the respondent’s immediate participation, violated due process. The Court held that the statute was facially constitutional, balancing the individual’s liberty interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the state’s interest in public safety, and the existing procedures provided sufficient due process.

    Facts

    Ralph S., a sex offender, was released to SIST after a jury found he had a “mental abnormality.” As part of his SIST, he was subject to conditions including alcohol monitoring. His parole officer reported that he had violated these conditions by tampering with his alcohol monitoring bracelet. Following an evaluation, the State filed a petition to revoke his SIST, seeking confinement. A court, reviewing the petition and evaluation, found probable cause for confinement and ordered Ralph S. detained pending a revocation hearing. Ralph S. challenged the constitutionality of the temporary confinement procedure.

    Procedural History

    Ralph S. filed a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the temporary confinement procedure. The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division converted the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action and affirmed, holding the statute constitutional. Ralph S. appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4), which allows for temporary confinement based on a probable cause determination without immediate respondent participation, violates procedural due process on its face.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Court found the statutory scheme appropriately balances individual and state interests and provides sufficient process to mitigate the risk of erroneous confinement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, weighing the individual’s interest in liberty, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government’s interest. It found that while there is a liberty interest at stake, the fact that the individual was already subject to restrictions via SIST and the procedure included a judicial probable cause finding, along with a prompt revocation hearing, mitigated the risk of erroneous deprivation. The Court emphasized the state’s significant interest in public safety. The Court also noted the limited benefit of an adversarial proceeding at the probable cause stage, where the individual’s liberty is temporarily at risk. The Court found that requiring such a hearing could undermine the statute’s requirement of an expeditious probable cause determination. The Court also rejected the as-applied challenge.

    Practical Implications

    The decision provides clarity on the due process requirements for the temporary confinement of sex offenders subject to SIST in New York. It confirms that the state can temporarily confine individuals pending a revocation hearing without immediately providing an adversarial hearing at the probable cause stage. Legal practitioners in this area should note the importance of the procedural safeguards built into the existing system, including a prompt revocation hearing where respondents can fully participate. This case reinforces that the balancing of individual rights and public safety is central to the court’s analysis, and practitioners should carefully address these competing interests.

  • People v. Young, 28 N.Y.3d 415 (2016): Confidentiality of Presentence Reports and the Right to Respond

    28 N.Y.3d 415 (2016)

    A sentencing court violates a defendant’s due process rights and CPL 390.50 by failing to adequately explain on the record the reasons for withholding information from the defendant, reviewed by the court for sentencing purposes, even if the source was promised confidentiality.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two issues concerning sentencing procedure. First, the court held that a sentencing court is not required to state its reasons for denying youthful offender (YO) status. Second, the court found that the sentencing court violated CPL 390.50 and the defendant’s due process rights by failing to sufficiently explain its reasons for withholding a confidential document from the defendant that was considered during sentencing. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the County Court for further proceedings, emphasizing the importance of transparency and the defendant’s right to respond to information used in sentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant, then 18, was indicted for attempted murder and assault after a stabbing incident. He pleaded guilty and requested youthful offender status and disclosure of victim impact statements. At sentencing, the court denied disclosure of victim impact statements and imposed a 20-year prison sentence. The Appellate Division remitted for the sentencing court to make a record of its determination regarding youthful offender (YO) status and to explain the reasons for refusing to disclose certain written statements. On remittal, the court denied YO status and stated that it had reviewed a confidential page of the presentence investigation report (PSI), withholding it from disclosure. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the sentencing court had sufficiently complied with its prior order, prompting the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at the trial court and appealed to the Appellate Division, which remitted the case for specific findings. After a second sentencing, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Division again, which affirmed the sentencing court’s decision. The defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case back to the County Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a sentencing court is required to state, on the record, its reasons for denying youthful offender (YO) treatment.

    2. Whether the sentencing court violated CPL 390.50 and the defendant’s due process rights by failing to adequately explain its reasons for withholding a confidential document from disclosure.

    Holding

    1. No, because the legislature did not explicitly require courts to state the reasons for denying YO status, and the court is not obligated to articulate its reasoning for a sentence that is within statutory parameters.

    2. Yes, because the sentencing court failed to adequately explain its reasons for withholding the confidential document, thereby depriving the defendant of the ability to respond to information used in sentencing and violating his due process rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court first addressed the YO status issue, referencing the plain language of CPL 720.20, and concluding that the legislature left it to the sentencing court’s discretion to decide whether to explain the denial of YO status. The court emphasized that CPL 720.20 does not mandate a statement of reasons, unlike some other sentencing provisions. The court reasoned that policy considerations support this discretion, as sentencing courts are best positioned to weigh the benefits and detriments of explaining the decision to deny YO status. The court determined that the sentencing court had complied with CPL 720.20 by explicitly denying the defendant’s request for YO treatment.

    The court then examined the withholding of the confidential document. Citing CPL 390.50, the court recognized that defendants have a due process right to contest information used in sentencing. Although the court can except information from disclosure based on a promise of confidentiality, it must still exercise its own discretion. The court found that the sentencing court failed to explain the nature or reasons for the confidentiality of the document. The court held that without this explanation, neither the Court of Appeals nor the Appellate Division could adequately review whether the court had abused its discretion, violating the defendant’s rights and CPL 390.50. The court quoted: “In all cases where a part or parts of the report or memoranda are not disclosed, the court shall state for the record that a part or parts of the report or memoranda have been excepted and the reasons for its action.”

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of transparency in sentencing. It clarifies that while sentencing courts are not obligated to provide reasons for denying youthful offender status, they must clearly justify withholding information from a defendant that will be considered in sentencing. The court recognized the importance of ensuring the accuracy and reliability of information used in sentencing and protecting the defendant’s right to respond. This means that the court must state on the record the nature of any withheld document, as well as the reason for withholding it. If a court intends to keep confidential any portion of a document, it should disclose the nature of that document, or redacted portion, as much as possible without revealing confidential information. The court may also choose not to rely on the document, and state that on the record. This decision impacts how judges handle sentencing, specifically the balancing act between confidentiality and a defendant’s right to a fair process.

  • Henry v. Fischer, 28 N.Y.3d 1136 (2017): Preservation of Claims in Prison Disciplinary Hearings

    28 N.Y.3d 1136 (2017)

    In prison disciplinary proceedings, an inmate adequately preserves a claim regarding the denial of documents or witnesses by requesting them and receiving an adverse ruling, without needing to make repeated specific objections.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions in Henry v. Fischer, clarifying the requirements for preserving claims in prison disciplinary hearings. The case involved an inmate, Henry, who requested documents and witnesses during his disciplinary hearing. When the hearing officer denied some of these requests, Henry was found guilty. The trial court and Appellate Division dismissed Henry’s Article 78 petition, concluding that Henry hadn’t adequately preserved his claims by specifically objecting to the denials. The Court of Appeals found that Henry had preserved his claims by making the requests and receiving unfavorable rulings, without a need for further objections. The Court found this adequate and ordered the case remanded.

    Facts

    Jevon Henry, an inmate, faced disciplinary charges for a gang-related assault. At the hearing, Henry requested specific documents, including incident reports and logbook entries, and the testimony of several correction officers and inmates. The hearing officer denied some of these requests. Henry was found guilty and given a two-year sentence in the special housing unit. Henry appealed administratively, arguing he was denied access to requested documents and the hearing officer did not provide an explanation for one inmate’s refusal to testify. When the administrative appeal was denied, Henry initiated an Article 78 proceeding, which the trial court dismissed on the ground that Henry had failed to preserve the issues he sought to raise by proper objection at the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    The case began with a tier III disciplinary hearing against inmate Jevon Henry, at the Greene Correctional Facility. The hearing officer denied some of Henry’s requests for documents and witnesses. Henry was found guilty, prompting an administrative appeal and, subsequently, an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, a decision upheld by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals then granted leave to appeal and reversed the lower courts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an inmate, who requested specific documents and witnesses during a prison disciplinary hearing, adequately preserves his claims regarding the denial of those requests for judicial review by making those requests and receiving adverse rulings without further, specific objections at the hearing?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the inmate adequately preserved the claims by making the requests and receiving adverse rulings, without needing to make specific objections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court referenced the due process protections afforded to inmates in disciplinary proceedings, as established in Wolff v. McDonnell, and further clarified in Matter of Laureano v Kuhlmann, noting the right to call witnesses and present evidence. The Court of Appeals emphasized that Henry made the requests for documents and witnesses and the hearing officer denied those requests. Thus, the court held that the lower courts erred in concluding that Henry’s failure to make further specific objections at the hearing constituted a failure to preserve those rulings for judicial review. In doing so, the court noted that, “In sum, the record shows that Henry plainly requested access to specific documents and witnesses, and the Hearing Officer denied some of those requests.”

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies how to preserve claims in prison disciplinary hearings in New York. This means attorneys representing inmates should focus on ensuring their clients’ requests for documents and witnesses are clearly made and that they receive adverse rulings. Specific objections to these rulings during the hearing are unnecessary. The ruling has a significant impact on how similar cases are approached by attorneys. It changes the standard for preserving claims in prison disciplinary hearings, thus preventing procedural dismissal based on lack of specific objections. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of clearly documenting requests and rulings during the hearing process. The holding is also important because it reinforces inmates’ due process rights, which are a matter of public policy.

  • People v. Aviles, 27 N.Y.3d 500 (2016): Language Barrier and Equal Protection in DUI Investigations

    People v. Aviles, 27 N.Y.3d 500 (2016)

    A facially neutral policy that denies physical coordination tests to non-English speakers does not violate equal protection because it is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests, and does not violate due process because the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speaking suspects violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Jose Aviles, who spoke only Spanish, was arrested for drunk driving and not given a coordination test due to his language barrier. The Court held that the policy did not violate equal protection because it was rationally related to the government’s interests in ensuring test reliability and avoiding administrative burdens. The Court further held that the failure to administer the test did not violate due process because the police have no obligation to provide evidence to assist a defendant.

    Facts

    Jose Aviles was arrested for drunk driving after an accident. He spoke only Spanish and was observed with signs of intoxication. He consented to a breathalyzer test, which registered below the legal limit. Due to his inability to speak English, he was not given a physical coordination test. Aviles was charged with driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that denying him the coordination test violated his equal protection and due process rights.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted Aviles’ motion, finding constitutional violations. The Appellate Term reversed, relying on a prior Appellate Division decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speakers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    2. Whether the NYPD’s policy of not administering physical coordination tests to non-English speakers violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because the policy is rationally related to legitimate government interests.
    2. No, because the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Equal Protection, the court found the NYPD policy facially neutral because it applied to anyone unable to understand English, not specifically targeting any suspect class. The Court determined that rational basis review applied because no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated. The court reasoned that the policy was rationally related to ensuring the reliability of coordination tests, which depend on clear instructions, and to avoiding the financial and administrative burden of providing translation services or multilingual officers. The Court noted that the value of coordination tests diminishes with time, making translation impractical. The court also rejected Aviles’ argument that the policy discriminated based on national origin because the policy was based on language ability, not ethnicity.

    On the Due Process issue, the Court found that the police have no duty to assist a defendant in gathering evidence or performing a certain investigative step. The Court distinguished between the right to an interpreter in judicial proceedings and the discretionary, investigative nature of coordination tests. The Court concluded that, even if there were a due process right, it would be outweighed by the state’s interest in efficient and reliable law enforcement.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that facially neutral policies, even if they have a disparate impact, do not automatically trigger heightened scrutiny. The ruling supports law enforcement’s ability to make practical decisions during investigations, even if those decisions might disadvantage some individuals. Lawyers should anticipate courts applying rational basis review when challenging similar policies. Further, this decision reinforces that the police have no affirmative duty to assist defendants. It also highlights the importance of how the government’s articulated interests are directly linked to the challenged policy. Later cases involving language access may attempt to distinguish this case by arguing intentional discrimination based on national origin if a policy is shown to be a pretext for racial discrimination.

  • People v. Smith, 27 N.Y.3d 652 (2016): Retroactivity of Catu and Predicate Felonies

    27 N.Y.3d 652 (2016)

    A conviction obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights cannot be used to enhance a subsequent sentence, but the rule in People v. Catu, requiring specific advisement of post-release supervision during a guilty plea, does not apply retroactively to cases finalized before the Catu decision.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the rule established in People v. Catu, which mandates that defendants be informed of post-release supervision (PRS) during plea allocutions, applies retroactively to prior convictions used as predicate felonies. The court held that Catu does not apply retroactively. In both consolidated cases, the defendants’ prior convictions from before the Catu decision (2005) were obtained without proper advisement of PRS. However, because the convictions were final before Catu, the court determined that the lack of PRS advisement did not render those convictions “unconstitutionally obtained” under the law at the time. Consequently, the court ruled that those prior convictions could be used to enhance sentences for subsequent offenses.

    Facts

    In People v. Smith, the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree in 2002, but the trial court did not advise him of the mandatory PRS term. Later, he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with five years of PRS. In 2010, he was indicted on weapon possession charges. Because of his 2002 conviction, he was adjudicated a second violent felony offender and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Smith moved to set aside the sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to challenge the 2002 conviction due to the Catu error. The Appellate Division agreed that the Catu error meant the 2002 conviction could not be a predicate felony. In People v. Fagan, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in 2000 and was sentenced without being informed of PRS. He was resentenced in 2009, again without the original PRS. In 2010, he was charged with multiple offenses. Because of his 2000 attempted robbery conviction, he was arraigned as a persistent violent felony offender. Fagan, like Smith, argued that his prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained due to the Catu violation. The Appellate Division agreed, also finding the Catu rule applicable.

    Procedural History

    Both cases involved post-conviction motions under CPL 440.20 challenging sentences based on prior convictions where the courts failed to advise defendants of PRS during plea allocutions. Supreme Court granted the motions, agreeing that the convictions were unconstitutionally obtained under Catu and could not be used as predicates. The Appellate Division affirmed in both cases. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address the retroactivity of Catu in this context.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the rule established in People v. Catu applies retroactively to convictions that became final before the Catu decision.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Catu rule does not apply retroactively.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by reviewing the established principles of retroactivity in criminal procedure, as articulated in Teague v. Lane and People v. Catalanotte. Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure generally do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall under specific exceptions. The court determined that the Catu rule, requiring specific advisement of PRS, was a “new rule” that did not fall under the exceptions because the court was departing from existing law. The court emphasized that at the time of the defendants’ original convictions, New York law did not require automatic vacatur for a court’s failure to pronounce PRS. Instead, existing law required a showing of prejudice. The court further reasoned that the Catu rule did not constitute a “watershed rule” because it did not prevent an impermissibly large risk of inaccurate convictions. The court cited that the purpose of Catu did not affect the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Therefore, under Catalanotte and federal retroactivity principles, the court held that the Catu rule should not be applied retroactively in this situation, and the prior convictions could be used as predicate offenses. The Court reversed the Appellate Division rulings and reinstated the original sentences, finding the prior convictions valid for predicate felony purposes.

    Practical Implications

    This decision is crucial for attorneys dealing with cases involving prior convictions as predicates. It clarifies that Catu is not retroactive, which means that convictions that were final before 2005, even if they involved Catu errors, can still be used to enhance sentences in subsequent cases. This impacts how defense attorneys should evaluate prior convictions when negotiating plea deals or preparing for sentencing, and how prosecutors approach cases involving repeat offenders with pre-Catu convictions. It suggests that attorneys cannot simply invalidate older convictions based solely on the failure to advise of PRS at the time of the plea. The court acknowledged the importance of PRS but found that a failure to inform a defendant of that component would not result in an unjust conviction, meaning that the defendant’s original sentence can stand. The decision also supports the validity of sentences imposed under Penal Law § 70.85, which addressed the Catu errors. The court’s emphasis on the finality of convictions underscores the importance of raising direct appeals promptly to preserve challenges to convictions.

  • Matter of Cortorreal v. Annucci, 26 N.Y.3d 56 (2015): Duty of Hearing Officer to Investigate Claims of Witness Coercion in Prison Disciplinary Hearings

    26 N.Y.3d 56 (2015)

    A hearing officer presiding at an inmate’s disciplinary hearing violates the inmate’s right to call witnesses by failing to undertake a meaningful inquiry into a requested witness’s allegation that the witness had been coerced into refusing to testify in a related proceeding.

    Summary

    In this case, Cortorreal, an inmate, was charged with a disciplinary violation. During the hearing, several requested inmate witnesses refused to testify. One witness provided an affidavit alleging he was coerced into refusing to testify at a prior hearing. The hearing officer did not adequately investigate this claim of coercion. The New York Court of Appeals held that when a requested witness claims coercion, a hearing officer must conduct a meaningful inquiry into the allegation. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the hearing officer’s failure to investigate violated Cortorreal’s right to call witnesses and ordered the expungement of the disciplinary action from Cortorreal’s record.

    Facts

    Cortorreal, while incarcerated at Sing Sing, was charged with violating prison disciplinary rules after marijuana was found in a waste container near his work area. He requested testimony from ten inmate witnesses, eight of whom refused to testify. One of the refusing witnesses provided an affidavit stating he was coerced by a correction officer into not testifying at a prior hearing regarding the same incident. The hearing officer did not personally interview the witness or the alleged coercing officer. After the disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer found Cortorreal guilty. The lower courts upheld the decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the hearing officer failed to adequately investigate the claim of coercion.

    Procedural History

    Cortorreal was found guilty at the initial Tier III disciplinary hearing, but this was overturned. A rehearing commenced before a different hearing officer at another facility, and Cortorreal was again found guilty. Cortorreal challenged the determination through an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which was dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a requested inmate witness who states only that they “do not wish to testify” provides a sufficient “reason” for refusing to testify under the regulations.

    2. Whether the hearing officer conducted a sufficient inquiry into an allegation of coercion by a witness who refused to testify.

    Holding

    1. No, because the court held that a statement of not wishing to testify is a valid reason under the regulations.

    2. Yes, because the hearing officer failed to make a meaningful inquiry into the witness’s claim of coercion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed two issues. First, it held that a simple statement by an inmate witness that they do not wish to testify constitutes a valid reason under 7 NYCRR 254.5(a). The court reasoned that the focus should be on whether the manner of refusal signifies coercion. Second, the court held that when a hearing officer is presented with an affidavit claiming coercion, the officer has a duty to conduct a “meaningful inquiry.” The court emphasized that the failure to adequately investigate the claim of coercion violated the inmate’s right to call witnesses, as the hearing officer did not attempt to verify the claim of coercion by the officer.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the obligations of hearing officers in prison disciplinary proceedings when faced with allegations of witness coercion. Hearing officers must now take affirmative steps to investigate such claims. Legal practitioners should advise their clients that a simple refusal to testify can be valid, and should also understand that an allegation of coercion, if not adequately investigated, can result in the reversal of a guilty finding. Furthermore, this case emphasizes that transferring an inmate does not eliminate the taint of any coercion that occurred previously.

  • Gordon v. Google, Inc., 26 N.Y.3d 350 (2015): Opt-Out Rights in Class Action Settlements Affecting Out-of-State Plaintiffs

    <strong><em>Gordon v. Google, Inc.</em>, 26 N.Y.3d 350 (2015)</em></strong>

    A class action settlement that releases out-of-state class members’ individual damage claims related to a merger requires an opt-out provision, even if the primary relief sought was equitable, to protect due process rights.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    In this case, On2 Technologies, Inc. shareholders initiated a class action in New York State after Google acquired On2. The plaintiffs sought mainly equitable relief related to the merger. The parties reached a settlement that, without an opt-out provision, would release all merger-related claims. The New York Court of Appeals held that the settlement could not extinguish the rights of out-of-state class members to pursue individual damage claims because due process requires an opt-out option when a settlement involves the release of individual damage claims, regardless of the primary nature of the original complaint. This decision reaffirmed the precedent set in <em>Matter of Colt Indus. Shareholder Litig.</em>, emphasizing the protection of out-of-state class members’ rights.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    Google and On2 Technologies, Inc. merged. A shareholder filed a class action in New York, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and seeking primarily equitable relief. Other similar actions were filed in Delaware. The plaintiffs in the New York and Delaware actions agreed to settle all claims related to the merger, which included dismissing the actions and releasing all claims with prejudice, but without providing an opt-out right for class members. Over 200 shareholders filed objections to the settlement, arguing that the lack of an opt-out right deprived out-of-state shareholders of their ability to pursue claims. The trial court found the settlement to be fair but refused to approve it because it did not afford out-of-state class members the opportunity to opt out.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    A shareholder initiated a class action in New York State Supreme Court. The Supreme Court preliminarily certified the proposed settlement class but refused to approve the settlement due to the lack of an opt-out provision. The Appellate Division affirmed, with one justice dissenting. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division, answering the certified question in the affirmative.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether a class action settlement that releases all merger-related claims, including potential damage claims, without providing an opt-out right, is permissible when the class includes out-of-state members?

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. No, because the settlement would deprive out-of-state class members of a cognizable property interest. The court held that the settlement could not extinguish the rights of out-of-state class members to pursue individual damage claims without an opt-out provision.

    <strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

    The court relied on the precedent set in <em>Matter of Colt Indus. Shareholder Litig.</em> and <em>Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts</em>. The court emphasized that, even if the original complaint sought primarily equitable relief, the proposed settlement’s broad release of all claims, including potential damage claims, triggered the need for an opt-out provision for out-of-state class members. The court reasoned that such a release would extinguish constitutionally protected property rights. The Court of Appeals distinguished <em>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes</em>, which focused on federal class action rules, because this case was brought under New York law which allows the court discretion to permit a class member to opt out of a class.

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong>

    This decision reinforces the importance of opt-out provisions in class action settlements that affect out-of-state class members and release potential damage claims, regardless of the primary nature of the initial claims. This ruling necessitates careful drafting of settlement agreements in cases involving a mix of equitable and monetary relief, specifically ensuring compliance with due process and protecting the rights of non-resident class members to pursue their own actions. This case illustrates how courts will scrutinize the effects of settlements and will prioritize due process to ensure that class members have the option to pursue individual claims. Attorneys should assess settlements for the potential impact on out-of-state class members and make sure that the settlement provides for an opt-out option if any release of individual damage claims is included.

  • People v. Williams, No. 36 (N.Y. 2016): Preservation of Challenges to Plea Voluntariness in Light of Sentencing Errors

    People v. Williams, No. 36, 2016 N.Y. Lexis 650 (2016)

    A defendant must preserve a challenge to the voluntariness of a guilty plea by objecting in the trial court, even if the challenge is based on an alleged due process violation arising from an illegal sentencing promise, unless the defendant lacked a practical ability to object.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant preserved his challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea when the plea was allegedly induced by the promise of an illegal sentence. The court held that the defendant did not preserve his claim because he had multiple opportunities to object to the plea in the trial court, and his failure to do so precluded appellate review. The court reiterated the importance of the preservation doctrine in criminal cases, while clarifying that exceptions to the doctrine, such as those outlined in People v. Lopez and People v. Louree, apply only when a defendant lacks a practical ability to object. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had vacated the guilty plea on the grounds of a due process violation, and remitted the case for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on the appeal to that court.

    Facts

    Christian Williams was arrested and indicted on drug sale charges. He entered into a plea bargain where he would plead guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree in exchange for a recommended sentence of three years in prison and two years of post-release supervision. During the plea colloquy, the court informed Williams of the sentence, potential maximum sentence based on his criminal history, and the conditions of the plea. However, because Williams was a second felony drug offender previously convicted of a violent felony, the court should have informed him that he faced a statutory sentencing range of six to fifteen years in prison, rather than three years. Williams was subsequently arrested for marijuana and trespass offenses, which led to a hearing to determine if he had violated the plea agreement. After the hearing, the court found that Williams violated the terms of his plea agreement. At sentencing, the court imposed a six-year prison term and two years of post-release supervision. Williams appealed, arguing that the plea was induced by an illegal sentencing promise.

    Procedural History

    After being arrested and indicted, Williams entered a guilty plea in exchange for a three-year prison sentence and two years of post-release supervision. The Supreme Court found that Williams had violated the plea agreement and sentenced him to six years. Williams appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment, vacated the guilty plea, and remanded the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings. The People were granted leave to appeal the Appellate Division's decision to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Williams preserved his challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea for appellate review, despite the absence of an objection to the plea in the trial court.

    Holding

    1. No, because Williams had a reasonable opportunity to attack the legality of his guilty plea in the trial court, and because he did not take advantage of that opportunity, he failed to preserve his claim for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the importance of the preservation doctrine in criminal cases, citing numerous prior cases that enforced the requirement of a timely objection at the trial level to preserve issues for appeal. The court distinguished the case from People v. Lopez, where the defendant's factual recitation clearly cast doubt on his guilt, and People v. Louree, where the defendant had no practical ability to object. The Court of Appeals found that the exception in Louree did not categorically exempt due process claims from the preservation rule. The court found that, in this case, Williams had multiple opportunities to challenge the plea’s legality before sentencing. The court reasoned that by failing to object at these stages, Williams did not preserve his claim. The court pointed out that the defense could have inquired into the legality of the sentence or demanded the court honor the promise, but failed to do so. Therefore, his claim was not preserved for review.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of the preservation doctrine in New York criminal procedure. Attorneys must be diligent in making timely objections to preserve issues for appeal. The case clarifies that even when a defendant alleges a due process violation based on a sentencing error, a failure to object will generally preclude appellate review unless the defendant lacked a practical opportunity to object. The case provides guidance on the narrowness of the exceptions to the preservation rule. Criminal defense attorneys must actively question potential sentencing errors during plea colloquies and sentencing proceedings. If the court makes any statements about the potential sentence that may be incorrect, such as failing to accurately describe the statutory range or making an illegal sentencing promise, defense counsel should immediately object and seek clarification. Failing to do so will likely result in waiver of any later challenge on appeal.

  • People v. Sanchez, 25 N.Y.3d 9 (2015): Due Process Requires Disclosure of Grand Jury Minutes in Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) Proceedings

    People v. Sanchez, 25 N.Y.3d 9 (2015)

    In Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) proceedings, due process requires that defendants have access to grand jury minutes used against them in their risk level determination.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the failure to disclose grand jury minutes to a defendant during a SORA risk level determination violated due process. The court found that the non-disclosure was indeed a due process violation because it prevented the defendant from meaningfully challenging the evidence used against him. However, the court also found that the error was harmless due to the overwhelming amount of other disclosed evidence supporting the assigned risk factors. The decision reinforces the importance of pre-hearing discovery in SORA proceedings and the balancing act between protecting the integrity of grand jury proceedings and the due process rights of defendants.

    Facts

    The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of sodomy and was subject to a SORA risk level determination. The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders recommended the defendant be adjudicated a level two sexually violent offender and assigned points for a continuing course of sexual misconduct. At the risk level hearing, the court requested the grand jury minutes. The People provided the minutes to the court but did not disclose them to the defense, arguing that they were not required to do so. The court, relying in part on the grand jury minutes, assessed the defendant points for a continuing course of sexual misconduct. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding there was no due process violation. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court assessed the defendant 85 points and adjudicated him a level two sexually violent offender. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the hearing court’s reliance on grand jury minutes, which were not disclosed to the defense, violated the defendant’s due process rights.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant was deprived of the opportunity to meaningfully challenge evidence used against him in the risk level determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court referenced prior cases, including Doe v. Pataki, which established that due process protections in SORA proceedings are not as extensive as in criminal trials but still require pre-hearing discovery of documentary evidence. The court also cited People v. David W., which emphasized the importance of notice and the opportunity to be heard. The court reasoned that without disclosure of the grand jury minutes, the defendant could not meaningfully challenge their use against him. The court recognized the general policy of keeping grand jury proceedings secret, but noted that this consideration was lessened in this post-conviction context. The court emphasized that the use of minutes for SORA purposes presents a strong interest in disclosure. Although the court found a due process violation, it deemed the error harmless because there was overwhelming evidence, including the defendant’s confession, supporting the risk assessment that had been properly disclosed to the defendant.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of providing defendants with broad discovery in SORA proceedings, particularly access to materials that will be used against them in the risk assessment. Prosecutors should be mindful of their disclosure obligations, which extend beyond the materials prepared by the Board. The case suggests that while the court can still limit the release of grand jury minutes, the use of the minutes in the risk level determination strongly favors disclosure. Attorneys defending clients in SORA proceedings should always request access to grand jury minutes and argue for their disclosure if they are to be used by the court. Subsequent courts have cited Sanchez to underscore the importance of disclosure in SORA proceedings. The court’s harmless error analysis emphasizes the need for the prosecution to have sufficient independent evidence to support their recommended risk level.