New York Law Review

Tag: drug use

  • People v. Fiedler, 31 N.Y.2d 176 (1972): Maintaining a Place for Drug Use Requires More Than an Isolated Incident

    People v. Fiedler, 31 N.Y.2d 176, 287 N.E.2d 300, 335 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1972)

    To be convicted of maintaining a place for unlawful drug use under Penal Law § 1533(2), there must be evidence that the premises were used with some degree of regularity for that purpose, not merely that isolated instances of drug use occurred there.

    Summary

    Leslie and Margaret Fiedler were convicted of violating Penal Law § 1533(2) for allegedly permitting their home to be used for unlawful drug use after police found marijuana and hashish and observed their children smoking it. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the statute requires proof that the defendants “opened or maintained” a place for drug use, not merely that they permitted drug use to occur. The Court reasoned that the statute targets locations maintained for regular drug use, such as an opium den, not a family home where isolated instances of drug use occur.

    Facts

    Police officers, acting under a search warrant, entered the Fiedler’s home and found the defendants, their children, and friends. Upstairs, police found marijuana and hashish being smoked by some of the children. Dr. Fiedler stated that it was his house and he raised his children to think on their own and do what they wanted. The Fiedlers were charged with violating Penal Law § 1533(2), which prohibits opening or maintaining a place where narcotic drugs are unlawfully used.

    Procedural History

    The Fiedlers were convicted in the City Court of Buffalo. The Erie County Court affirmed the judgments. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants’ acquiescence in their children’s isolated use of marijuana and hashish in their family home constitutes “opening or maintaining a place where any narcotic drug is unlawfully used” under Penal Law § 1533(2).

    Holding

    No, because Penal Law § 1533(2) punishes the creation and maintenance of facilities for narcotics users who resort there with some degree of regularity, not the mere occurrence of isolated instances of drug use.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the statute’s language, particularly the word “maintains,” suggests the establishment and upkeep of a facility for narcotics use. The court stated, “It was never contemplated that criminal taint would attach to a family home should members of the family on one occasion smoke marijuana or hashish there.” The court traced the history of the statute, noting its origins in laws targeting opium dens. The Court contrasted §1533(2) with §1533(1), which penalizes using a building for “committing or maintaining a public nuisance.” The information charged the defendants with “permitting” drug use, a concept found in subdivision 1 (public nuisance), while the charge was under subdivision 2 (maintaining a place). The Court reasoned the statute was aimed at “inducing vice, rather than the vice itself” and is “independent of any crime which may be committed.” The Court cited People v. Campbell, 45 Misc.2d 201, stating that to “maintain” a nuisance “means something more than having knowledge of its existence. It means, in addition, preserving and continuing its existence.”

  • People v. Smith, 26 N.Y.2d 331 (1970): Constitutionality of Loitering Laws Related to Drug Use

    People v. Smith, 26 N.Y.2d 331 (1970)

    A statute prohibiting loitering for the purpose of unlawfully using or possessing narcotic drugs is constitutional because it is a reasonable restriction on individual freedom for the public good and is not impermissibly vague.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a statute making it a misdemeanor to loiter in common areas of a building for the purpose of unlawfully using or possessing narcotic drugs. The defendant, found with narcotics paraphernalia and a liquid substance, argued the statute was unconstitutionally vague and lacked proper purpose. The court disagreed, finding that the statute clearly prohibited loitering with the intent to commit a crime (drug use/possession) and served a reasonable purpose in protecting the public from the dangers associated with drug use in public areas. The court distinguished this from statutes punishing mere loitering or status.

    Facts

    Patrolman Connelly saw Smith, known to be a narcotics addict, enter a building. The officer followed and found Smith and two others on a stair landing. Smith held a bottle cap containing a liquid, and another man possessed a hypodermic needle and eyedropper. A third man had empty glassine envelopes. Smith dropped the bottle cap, spilling the liquid, which was not recovered. Officer Connelly testified that bottle caps are commonly used as “cookers” for heroin.

    Procedural History

    Smith was arrested and charged with possession of narcotics instruments and violating the loitering statute. The charge of possession of narcotics instruments was dismissed. Smith was convicted under the loitering statute and sentenced to 60 days. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, and Smith appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith was loitering for the purpose of possessing or using a narcotic drug.
    2. Whether the loitering statute is unconstitutionally vague or lacks a proper purpose.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the circumstances of the gathering, the possession of narcotics implements by one of defendant’s companions, and the expert testimony of the police officer support the inference that the defendant and his companions had gathered to take narcotic drugs.
    2. No, because the statute is sufficiently definite and bears a reasonable relation to the public good.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute prohibits loitering for the purpose of committing a crime (unlawful drug use or possession), not mere loitering itself. The court found that the circumstances – Smith’s presence in a building known for drug activity, his possession of a “cooker,” and his companion’s possession of a needle and eyedropper – supported the inference that Smith was loitering for the purpose of using narcotics. The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to prove guilt if the facts are inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable hypothesis but guilt. The Court distinguished this case from *People v. Rizzo*, noting that Smith and his companions were much closer to actually using the drugs than the defendants in *Rizzo* were to completing the robbery. The Court also held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it provides sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited. The statute has a reasonable purpose: to protect the public from the dangers associated with drug use in public areas. The Court quoted *Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 Y 2d 37, 40*, stating that there is a strong presumption that a statute duly enacted by the Legislature is constitutional, and the invalidity of the law must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated, “The statute makes it illegal to loiter about any ‘stairway, staircase, hall, roof, elevator, cellar, courtyard or any passageway of a building for the purpose of unlawfully using or possessing any narcotic drug’.”