New York Law Review

Tag: Drug Testing

  • Pasternack v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, 27 N.Y.3d 820 (2016): Duty of Care of Drug Testing Labs and Third-Party Reliance in Fraud Claims

    27 N.Y.3d 820 (2016)

    Drug testing regulations and guidelines do not create a duty of care for laboratories beyond the scientific integrity of the testing process, and a fraud claim under New York law requires reliance by the plaintiff, not a third party.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two certified questions concerning the liability of drug testing laboratories and program administrators. First, the court considered whether federal drug testing regulations created a duty of care under New York negligence law. The court held that a duty of care exists only when the scientific integrity of the testing process is compromised, not for violations of ministerial regulations. Second, the court addressed whether a plaintiff could establish the reliance element of a fraud claim through a third party’s reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations, ultimately deciding that New York law requires reliance by the plaintiff, not a third party, to establish a fraud claim.

    Facts

    Fred Pasternack, an airline pilot, was required to undergo random drug testing. During a test at a LabCorp site, he was unable to provide a sufficient initial urine sample. According to DOT regulations, he should have been urged to drink fluids. Montalvo, a LabCorp employee, did not explain the shy bladder procedure and allowed him to leave, though she knew he would return. Later, when Montalvo reviewed the chain-of-custody form, she indicated that Pasternack had left and returned, with approval from his airline. The Medical Review Officer (MRO) at ChoicePoint determined this constituted a refusal to test and reported it to the FAA. The FAA revoked Pasternack’s airman certificates and AME designation. After administrative appeals, the FAA reinstated his certificates but Pasternack sued LabCorp and ChoicePoint for negligence and fraud. The district court dismissed the claims, and the Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Pasternack sued LabCorp and ChoicePoint in the District Court, alleging negligence and fraud. The District Court granted ChoicePoint’s motion to dismiss and subsequently granted LabCorp’s motion to dismiss, holding that LabCorp had no duty of care regarding federal drug testing regulations and that a fraud claim required the plaintiff’s reliance on misrepresentations. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals, which accepted the certification.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether drug testing regulations promulgated by the FAA and the DOT create a duty of care for drug testing laboratories and program administrators under New York negligence law.

    2. Whether a plaintiff may establish the reliance element of a fraud claim under New York law by showing that a third party relied on a defendant’s false statements resulting in injury to the plaintiff.

    Holding

    1. No, because the regulations and guidelines that are ministerial in nature and do not implicate the scientific integrity of the testing process do not create a duty of care for drug testing laboratories and program administrators under New York negligence law.

    2. No, because under New York law, the reliance element of a fraud claim cannot be established through a third party’s reliance on the defendant’s false statements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the duty of care under New York negligence law, referencing the precedent set in Landon v. Kroll Lab. Specialists, Inc., where a duty of care existed for laboratories regarding the scientific integrity of their testing. The court declined to extend this duty to encompass violations of regulations not directly related to the scientific accuracy of the testing. To extend liability would create an unacceptable “proliferation of claims.” The court emphasized that the DOT regulations were designed to protect the public, not the individuals being tested. As for fraud, the court cited established New York law requiring reliance by the plaintiff on the misrepresentation. The court distinguished this from cases of indirect communication where the misrepresentation was intended to be relayed to the plaintiff.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the scope of duty of care for drug testing labs, limiting it to the scientific integrity of the testing process. It suggests that laboratories are not liable for mere violations of the regulations regarding procedures. Attorneys should focus on whether a lab’s actions breached professional testing standards, rather than the procedural aspects. The ruling also confirms that, to establish fraud, the plaintiff must have directly relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation. This necessitates demonstrating that the defendant intended for the plaintiff to receive and act on the false information. The decision reduces the risk of liability for labs and could alter how fraud cases involving third-party reliance are evaluated.

  • Gelman v. Kroll Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08075 (2016): Duty of Care for Negligent Drug Testing

    Gelman v. Kroll Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08075 (2016)

    A laboratory that performs drug testing owes a duty of reasonable care to the individual being tested, where a positive test result could foreseeably lead to adverse consequences for that individual.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a drug testing laboratory owes a duty of care to an individual whose sample it tests, potentially leading to adverse consequences based on the results. Gelman, a probationer, sued Kroll after a positive drug test led to probation violation proceedings, which were later dismissed. The Court of Appeals held that Kroll owed Gelman a duty of reasonable care in conducting the drug test because it was foreseeable that a false positive could harm him. This decision clarifies the scope of duty for third-party testing labs and balances the need for accurate testing with potential liabilities.

    Facts

    Gelman was a probationer subject to mandatory drug testing. The Orange County Probation Department contracted with Kroll Laboratory Specialists to analyze Gelman’s oral fluid sample for illicit substances. Kroll reported that Gelman’s sample contained cannabinoids exceeding the cutoff level, leading the Probation Department to file a violation of probation (VOP) petition against him. Later tests (blood and urine) came back negative, and eventually, the VOP was dismissed.

    Procedural History

    Gelman sued Kroll for negligent testing. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding Kroll owed no duty to Gelman. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kroll did indeed owe Gelman a duty of care. The certified question from the Second Circuit regarding the duty of care was answered in the affirmative.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a drug testing laboratory owes a duty of care to the individual being tested when the laboratory’s testing errors could foreseeably lead to the individual’s loss of liberty.

    Holding

    Yes, because a drug testing laboratory owes a duty of reasonable care to the individual being tested, where a positive test result could foreseeably lead to adverse consequences for that individual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Kroll owed Gelman a duty of care because it was foreseeable that a negligent drug test could lead to the deprivation of Gelman’s liberty. The court applied the principle that a duty of care extends to those who may be foreseeably injured by a defendant’s actions. The court analogized to existing cases where a duty was found to exist between parties not in direct contractual privity, emphasizing that Kroll’s actions directly impacted Gelman’s legal standing. The Court noted that “Kroll was aware that its testing would directly affect plaintiff’s liberty interest as a probationer” and that this awareness created a duty to perform the testing with due care. The court emphasized the potential for harm from a false positive, distinguishing this case from situations where the connection between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s injury is more attenuated. The dissent argued that imposing a duty on the lab would open the floodgates to litigation and that the primary issue was with the Probation Department’s actions, not Kroll’s testing. The dissent highlighted that the contract was between Kroll and the County, and Kroll fulfilled its contractual obligations. The majority countered that its holding was in line with decisions in other jurisdictions and that it was not creating a new cause of action but applying existing negligence principles to a specific set of facts.

  • City of New York v. Detectives’ Endowment Association, 14 N.Y.3d 41 (2009): Police Commissioner’s Authority over Drug Testing Methodology

    14 N.Y.3d 41 (2009)

    A New York City Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority extends to the selection of drug testing methodologies and triggers, exempting these decisions from mandatory collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the NYPD must collectively bargain with police unions over the methodology used for drug testing (hair analysis vs. urine analysis) and the triggers for such testing. The Court of Appeals held that the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority, granted by the New York City Charter and Administrative Code, encompasses the discretion to choose drug testing methods and triggers. Requiring collective bargaining on these issues would unduly limit the Commissioner’s ability to maintain discipline within the force. Therefore, these decisions are not subject to mandatory negotiation under the Taylor Law.

    Facts

    The NYPD informed police unions of its intent to use radioimmunoassay (RIAH), a hair analysis method, for all drug screening of uniformed members. Previously, urine analysis was primarily used for random and promotional drug screenings, while hair analysis was used for reasonable suspicion, end-of-probation, and voluntary testing. The unions protested, arguing that the change in methodology was subject to collective bargaining. The City maintained that the change was within the Police Commissioner’s authority.

    Procedural History

    The Detectives’ Endowment Association (DEA) and other unions filed improper practice petitions with the Board of Collective Bargaining (Board), alleging that the NYPD unilaterally changed its drug testing policy in violation of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law. The Board granted the petitions, finding that expanding the categories of employees subject to hair testing and changing the testing methodology constituted a unilateral change subject to collective bargaining. The City then filed an Article 78 proceeding to annul the Board’s decisions. The Supreme Court granted the City’s petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority under the New York City Charter and Administrative Code includes the discretion to choose the scientific methodology for drug testing of uniformed officers and the triggers for such testing, thereby exempting these decisions from mandatory collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority extends to the selection of drug testing methodologies and triggers, making these decisions management prerogatives not subject to mandatory collective bargaining.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized the strong state policy supporting collective bargaining under the Taylor Law. However, it also acknowledged that some subjects are excluded from collective bargaining as a matter of policy. The Court relied on its previous decision in Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., (6 NY3d 563 [2006]), which held that New York City Charter § 434 (a) and Administrative Code § 14-115 (a) express a policy favoring management authority over police disciplinary matters, overriding the policy favoring collective bargaining.

    The Court reasoned that the detection and deterrence of wrongdoing, including illegal drug use, is a crucial aspect of the Police Commissioner’s responsibility to maintain discipline. Allowing the Commissioner to unilaterally institute drug testing is insufficient if his discretion to select effective investigatory measures is constrained. Requiring collective bargaining over testing methodology and triggers would unduly limit the Commissioner’s ability to enforce discipline effectively. As the Supreme Court stated, “if the Commissioner is not at liberty to use a particular drug test even after determining that [it] would be more effective at exposing drug use among police officers, then his ability to carry out his disciplinary ‘authority’ has been significantly limited.”

    The Court clarified that its holding was limited to the specific issues presented: drug testing methodology and triggers. It did not address whether every step taken to implement drug testing is excluded from bargaining. The Court emphasized the need to balance collective bargaining rights with the Police Commissioner’s authority to maintain discipline within the NYPD.

  • Wilson v. City of White Plains, 93 N.Y.2d 784 (1999): Establishing Reasonable Suspicion for Employee Drug Testing

    Wilson v. City of White Plains, 93 N.Y.2d 784 (1999)

    A public employer may require an employee to submit to a drug test based on reasonable suspicion of drug use, which can be established through a combination of factors, including past substance abuse history, physical manifestations of impairment, and credible reports of on-the-job substance use.

    Summary

    The City of White Plains Fire Department dismissed firefighter Wilson after a drug test revealed cocaine metabolites in his urine. The Appellate Division annulled the dismissal, finding a lack of objective evidence to justify the drug test. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fire department had reasonable suspicion to order the test based on Wilson’s history of substance abuse, an anonymous letter alleging he reported to work under the influence, his record of absenteeism, his reputation for on-the-job substance use, and a deputy commissioner’s observation of his impaired state just before the test. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider other issues not previously addressed.

    Facts

    Wilson, a firefighter for the City of White Plains, voluntarily sought treatment for substance abuse in 1986. Upon his return to work, the Fire Commissioner informed him that he would be monitored for signs of recurring substance abuse and tested if such signs appeared. In August 1996, the Fire Commissioner received an anonymous letter stating Wilson was reporting to work under the influence of alcohol. A review of Wilson’s personnel file revealed a history of chronic absenteeism. He had a reputation for reporting to work under the influence, earning him the nickname “Scotch Wilson.” On the day of the test, a deputy commissioner observed that Wilson had watery eyes and difficulty focusing. Based on this information, Wilson was ordered to submit to urine and blood tests, which tested positive for cocaine metabolites.

    Procedural History

    The City of White Plains Fire Department terminated Wilson’s employment. Wilson challenged his dismissal in an Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division annulled the dismissal, finding a lack of objective evidence to support the drug test order. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of White Plains Fire Department had reasonable suspicion to order Wilson to submit to a drug test.

    Holding

    Yes, because based on Wilson’s past substance abuse, the anonymous letter, his record of absenteeism, his reputation for on-the-job substance use, and the deputy commissioner’s observation of his impaired state, the Fire Department had reasonable suspicion to order the drug test.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a public agency may lawfully order an employee to submit to a drug test on reasonable suspicion of drug use. The Court found that the Appellate Division erred in concluding there was no objective evidence of Wilson’s substance abuse. The Court highlighted the Hearing Officer’s findings, which the Appellate Division overlooked. The Court emphasized that reasonable suspicion was supported by far more than just the anonymous letter. The City presented evidence of Wilson’s physical manifestations of substance abuse on the day he was tested, his long record of excessive absences, his prior substance abuse problems, his reputation for showing up at work under the influence, as well as his understanding that he could be tested if he showed any signs of recurring substance abuse.

    The Court cited Matter of Perez v Ward, 69 NY2d 840, 842 and Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 231, noting that the standard of review in CPLR article 78 proceedings is whether there was substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer’s decision.

    The Court found that based on all of the evidence presented, the Appellate Division erred in concluding otherwise. Because the Appellate Division did not address all of Wilson’s contentions, the Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for further consideration.

  • Staley v. Constantine, 91 N.Y.2d 544 (1998): Due Process and Confrontation in Administrative Hearings

    Staley v. Constantine, 91 N.Y.2d 544 (1998)

    In administrative hearings, due process does not always require the production of laboratory technicians for cross-examination regarding drug test results, especially when the general reliability of the testing procedures is not disputed and a supervisor familiar with the process is available for cross-examination.

    Summary

    A New York City police officer, Staley, was terminated after a random drug test came back positive for cocaine. At the administrative hearing, the Police Department presented the testimony of the Director of Forensic Toxicology, who oversaw the testing process, but did not produce the technicians who performed the tests. Staley argued that he was denied due process because he could not cross-examine the technicians. The New York Court of Appeals held that due process did not require the production of the technicians, as the reliability of the testing procedures was not in dispute, the supervisor was available for cross-examination, and Staley did not allege any specific errors in the testing of his sample.

    Facts

    Petitioner Staley, a police officer, was randomly selected for a drug screening. His urine sample tested positive for cocaine. At the departmental hearing regarding his termination, the Department presented evidence of the test results. The Director of Forensic Toxicology, Dr. Closson, testified about the testing procedures and results. Dr. Closson did not personally perform the tests but supervised the process and reviewed the data and chain of custody documentation. The Department also presented a sergeant who witnessed Staley provide the sample and seal it. Staley denied using cocaine.

    Procedural History

    The hearing officer found Staley guilty and recommended termination. The Police Commissioner terminated Staley. Staley then filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding, arguing he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the laboratory technicians. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether due process requires the New York City Police Department to produce laboratory technicians for cross-examination at an administrative hearing regarding charges of ingesting and possessing cocaine, where the Department produces the laboratory supervisor, the general reliability of the testing procedures is not disputed, and no specific error in the handling or testing of the petitioner’s specimen is alleged.

    Holding

    No, because due process does not require the production of every laboratory employee involved in testing a urine sample at an administrative hearing, particularly when the general reliability of the procedures is undisputed, a knowledgeable supervisor is available for cross-examination, and no specific errors in the handling or testing of the specimen are alleged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged a limited right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in administrative proceedings as a matter of due process. Citing Matter of McBarnette v Sobol, 83 N.Y.2d 333 (1994), the Court explained that determining whether due process requires the production of specific witnesses depends on the nature of the evidence, the utility of confrontation, and the burden of producing the witness. Here, Staley did not dispute the reliability of the EMIT and GC/MS testing procedures, nor did he allege any specific error in the handling or testing of his specimen. The court noted that the utility of cross-examining the technicians would be limited as they likely would not remember Staley’s specific sample. Furthermore, producing all four technicians would impose a significant burden on the Department. The Court emphasized that Staley had the opportunity to cross-examine the laboratory supervisor about every step of the procedure, and this examination revealed no evidence of a problem. The court stated that “Petitioner’s essential claim is that, without confronting each technician, he was foreclosed from uncovering possible human error in this case.” The court highlighted that Staley could have examined the testifying witnesses, and the specimen and supporting documentation were available for independent analysis. Additionally, Staley could have subpoenaed the technicians himself. The Court rejected a blanket rule requiring the production of all laboratory witnesses in every case. The Court also dismissed Staley’s argument that his termination was an unduly harsh penalty, stating that the punishment was not “‘so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness’”.

  • Matter of Belanger v. New York State Racing & Wagering Board, 70 N.Y.2d 687 (1987): Trainer Responsibility Rule in Horse Racing

    70 N.Y.2d 687 (1987)

    The trainer responsibility rule in horse racing places strict liability on trainers for prohibited substances found in their horses unless they present substantial evidence proving they were not responsible for the administration.

    Summary

    This case addresses the trainer responsibility rule in horse racing. Belanger, a horse trainer, faced a suspension after his horse tested positive for a prohibited substance. The New York State Racing & Wagering Board argued that Belanger, as the trainer, was strictly liable. Belanger argued the substance was administered outside the prohibited window. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trainer did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of responsibility. This case underscores the high burden placed on trainers to ensure compliance with anti-doping regulations.

    Facts

    Belanger was the trainer of Ryan’s Choice, a horse that raced at Monticello Raceway. A post-race urinalysis revealed the presence of prednisolone, a prohibited drug. The New York State Racing & Wagering Board suspended Belanger’s license, citing the trainer responsibility rule. Belanger contended the drug was administered outside the 48-hour window prior to the race. The Board’s expert testified the drug was likely administered within 48 hours. Belanger and his witnesses testified it was administered 55 hours before the race.

    Procedural History

    The Racing & Wagering Board upheld the 60-day suspension. Belanger initiated an Article 78 proceeding. The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division reversed the Board’s decision, finding Belanger presented substantial evidence. The Racing & Wagering Board appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trainer presented substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of responsibility under the trainer responsibility rule, given the positive drug test and conflicting testimony regarding the timing of drug administration.

    Holding

    No, because the trainer failed to rebut the presumption that he was responsible for the presence of the prohibited substance, as he didn’t prove the horse was out of his care during the critical period, despite presenting evidence suggesting administration occurred outside the prohibited window.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the strict liability nature of the trainer responsibility rule: “The rule places strict responsibility on a trainer to ensure that a horse in his or her care and custody does not receive any drug or other restricted substance within specified periods before a race.” Once a positive drug test is established, a presumption of the trainer’s responsibility arises. This presumption can only be rebutted by substantial evidence showing the trainer (or their agents) were not responsible. Here, the Board presented expert testimony supporting administration within the prohibited window, triggering the presumption. While Belanger offered evidence the drug was administered 55 hours prior, he failed to prove the horse was not under his care during the critical 48-hour period. This failure to account for the horse’s whereabouts during the critical period was fatal to his defense. The court distinguished this case from situations where trainers demonstrate lack of control or custody during the relevant time frame. The court thus reinforced the strict liability standard and the high burden on trainers to disprove responsibility. The court explicitly stated that the trainer needed to prove the horse was not in his care, control, or custody during the critical period. “Petitioner offered no proof that the horse was not in his care, control or custody during the critical period”.