New York Law Review

Tag: drug possession

  • People v. Feliciano, 32 N.Y.2d 140 (1973): Sufficiency of Evidence for Accomplice Liability in Drug Possession

    People v. Feliciano, 32 N.Y.2d 140 (1973)

    Evidence presented to a grand jury is legally sufficient to indict a defendant as an accomplice if it establishes a prima facie case supporting the inference that the defendant aided and abetted the principal in committing the charged offense.

    Summary

    Feliciano and Gonzalez were indicted for possession of a dangerous drug after Santana was caught with marijuana, and they were nearby in a car. The prosecution argued they were accomplices who intended to help Santana escape. The trial court dismissed the indictment against Feliciano and Gonzalez, which the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Feliciano and Gonzalez aided and abetted Santana, thus making them liable as principals.

    Facts

    Customs officers received information about an attempt to land marijuana from a ship at Pier 3 in Brooklyn. Santana disembarked from the ship carrying ten pounds of marijuana. Feliciano and Gonzalez were parked nearby in an automobile. As Santana fled from the customs officers, discarding the marijuana, Feliciano and Gonzalez drove their car towards Santana, who then entered the rear seat of the vehicle.

    Procedural History

    A Kings County grand jury indicted Feliciano, Gonzalez, and Santana for possession of a dangerous drug in the third degree. Feliciano and Gonzalez moved for dismissal of the indictment. The trial court denied Santana’s motion but granted the motions of Feliciano and Gonzalez. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish that Feliciano and Gonzalez committed the offense of possession of a dangerous drug in the third degree as accomplices to Santana.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence before the grand jury supported the inference that Feliciano and Gonzalez were parked where they were and acted as they did to aid and abet Santana in possessing the marijuana.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient, within the meaning of CPL 190.65, to establish a prima facie case that Feliciano and Gonzalez committed the offense charged. The court reasoned that the evidence supported the inference that they were present to aid and abet Santana in possessing the marijuana, making them accomplices and therefore principals in the commission of the offense under Penal Law § 20.00. The court stated, “In our view, the evidence before the grand júry was ‘ legally sufficient’, within the sense of the applicable statute (CPL 190.65), ‘ to establish ’ that Feliciano and Gonzalez committed the offense charged against them: prima facie, such évidence supported the inference that they were parked where they w’ere, and acted as they did, to aid and abet Santana—who physically possessed the marijuana—to commit the crime charged of possessing a dangerous drug in the third degree.” The court also noted that even if the evidence was insufficient to establish the full crime, it was at least sufficient to establish the lesser included crime of an attempt to commit the crime charged in the indictment, as the dissenting Appellate Division justices had observed. The court did not address the lawfulness of the arrest or search and seizure, deeming it unnecessary for the determination of the case.

  • People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278 (1971): Admissibility of Evidence When Multiple Sources Lead to Discovery

    People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278 (1971)

    Evidence obtained following an illegal search is admissible if it is also derived from an independent source untainted by the illegality, or if the information inevitably would have been discovered through legal means.

    Summary

    Reisman was convicted of possessing marijuana. The key issue was whether the marijuana seized should have been suppressed because some information leading to the arrest was allegedly obtained through an illegal search by California police. An airline employee had also independently discovered the marijuana. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the New York police’s surveillance and arrest did not solely depend on the possibly illegal California search, as the airline employee’s independent discovery provided untainted cause for the New York police to act. The court also held that Reisman’s possession of the marijuana was sufficient for the jury to infer his knowledge of its nature.

    Facts

    An American Airlines customer service agent in Los Angeles, Richard Dunkel, became suspicious of two cartons consigned to George Carlton in care of Tanker Beisman, destined for New York. Acting under tariff regulations, Dunkel opened a carton and found what appeared to be marijuana. The Los Angeles police were notified and, without a warrant, confirmed Dunkel’s discovery. Sergeant McKnight of the Los Angeles police notified Detective Tobin of the New York City Narcotics Bureau about the marijuana shipment. Detective Tobin received the defendant’s name, the flight number, the arrival time and air bill number.

    Procedural History

    Reisman was convicted in New York State after a trial. He had moved to suppress the marijuana seized, arguing that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal search in California. The suppression court denied the motion, finding the airline employee’s search was an independent, untainted source of information. Reisman appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the marijuana seized in New York should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search conducted by California police.
    2. Whether the prosecution sufficiently established that Reisman knowingly possessed the marijuana.

    Holding

    1. No, because the New York police had an independent, untainted source of information (the airline employee’s discovery) that led to the surveillance and arrest.
    2. Yes, because Reisman’s act of claiming and accepting delivery of the packages containing marijuana provided a sufficient basis for the jury to infer knowledge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that even if the California police search was illegal, the information from the airline employee, Dunkel, provided an independent and untainted basis for the New York police to act. Detective Tobin’s observation of the cartons at the airport, combined with their telltale odor of marijuana, provided probable cause for the arrest. The court cited People v. Gallmon, 19 N.Y.2d 389, 394, and Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, stating that an arrest based on probable cause allows police to seize contraband within their observation.

    The court distinguished this case from Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, which established the exclusionary rule for derivative evidence. Here, the independent information “would have inevitably resulted” in the New York surveillance, arrest, and seizure, citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209.

    Regarding the full faith and credit argument related to the California court’s suppression order, the court stated that neither direct nor collateral estoppel applied because there was no identity of the prosecuting party or issues. The California court addressed the legality of the search, while the New York court addressed the effect of that illegality on subsequent New York police conduct.

    On the issue of knowledgeable possession, the court emphasized that while possession must be knowing, knowledge can be inferred circumstantially. The court stated, “Generally, possession suffices to permit the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses, especially, but not exclusively, if it is in his hands, on his person, in his vehicle, or on his premises.” Furthermore, the court said, “It is an ancient rule of inference or rebuttable presumption of fact that the recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of any crime warrants the inference of guilt, including, when material, knowledgeable possession.” The court found that the probabilities justifying the inference of knowledge were especially strong given Reisman’s acceptance of delivery, possession of a check payable to the consignor, and claiming the packages before being able to identify their markings.