New York Law Review

Tag: drug possession

  • People v. Swamp, 84 N.Y.2d 725 (1995): Sufficiency of Field Tests for Grand Jury Indictment

    84 N.Y.2d 725 (1995)

    A grand jury indictment for drug possession can be based on a trained officer’s testimony about a positive field test, even without a formal laboratory analysis, provided the testimony offers a reliable basis to infer the presence of a controlled substance.

    Summary

    Steven Swamp was arrested after crossing the U.S.-Canadian border when a Customs inspector found drug paraphernalia and bags of white powder. A field test indicated the presence of cocaine. The trial court dismissed the indictment for legal insufficiency, arguing that a field test was insufficient. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer’s testimony regarding the field test and observations constituted a sufficient basis for the grand jury to infer the presence of cocaine, establishing a prima facie case for indictment.

    Facts

    A U.S. Customs inspector found drug paraphernalia in Steven Swamp’s car engine, along with bags of plastic vials containing white powder on his person and in the car during a border crossing. Based on the officer’s training and experience, he suspected drug possession. A second Customs inspector, Robert Stephenson, conducted a Scott-Reagent field test, which indicated the presence of cocaine in the powder. Formal laboratory analysis was deferred until trial necessity.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted Swamp’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the field test results insufficient. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an indictment charging possession of cocaine is supported by legally sufficient evidence when the Grand Jury hears only the results of a preliminary field test indicating the presence of cocaine.
    2. Whether the People were required to submit the results of a formal laboratory analysis to the Grand Jury.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence before the Grand Jury, if uncontradicted, established that defendant possessed cocaine.
    2. No, because CPL 190.30(2) permits, but does not require, the submission of a certified laboratory report.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Grand Jury’s role is to investigate crimes and determine if sufficient evidence exists to accuse someone. CPL 190.65 authorizes indictment when the evidence is legally sufficient to establish the offense and provides reasonable cause to believe the person committed the offense. Legally sufficient evidence means a prima facie case, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In drug cases, the evidence must provide a “reliable basis” for inferring the presence of a controlled substance, requiring more than conclusory assertions.

    The court found that CPL 190.30(2) allows, but doesn’t require, submission of a certified lab report. Officer Stephenson’s testimony about his observations (the telltale packaging, substance resembling crack-cocaine, and drug paraphernalia) was competent evidence and not hearsay. The court stated that evidence later proven unreliable can legally support an indictment, as sufficiency is examined as of the time of indictment.

    The dissent argued that a NIK field test alone is insufficient for indictment because it merely allows a police officer to presume the existence of a controlled substance and is not generally accepted as reliable under Frye v. United States. The dissent also raised concerns about the implications of convicting someone based solely on a field test.

    The court distinguished the evidence in this case from People v. Dumas, where the officer simply asserted that the defendant possessed marijuana without indicating the basis for that claim. In contrast, Officer Stephenson recounted the observations that led him to conclude the defendant possessed cocaine. The court emphasized that the standard for sufficiency is whether the evidence before the Grand Jury, if uncontradicted, would support a determination of guilt.

    The court also noted that CPL 715.50 requires a formal laboratory analysis within 45 days of receipt of the drugs, ensuring that more definitive results will be available by trial. “Contrary to the concerns of the dissent, if a subsequent laboratory analysis proved the field test incorrect a defendant would not be entitled to dismissal under CPL 210.20 (1) (b), on the ground that the evidence before the Grand Jury was insufficient.”

  • In Re Renaldo J., 669 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1996): Sufficiency of Non-Hearsay Allegations in Juvenile Delinquency Petitions

    In Re Renaldo J., 669 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1996)

    A juvenile delinquency petition must contain non-hearsay allegations that, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the accused’s commission of the offense; a police officer’s deposition, even if attesting to experience with narcotics, and a copy of a lab report not signed by the original analyst are insufficient to establish a prima facie case.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile delinquency petition contained sufficient non-hearsay allegations to establish a prima facie case for criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Family Court had granted a motion to suppress evidence and dismissed the petition, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the petition, supported by a police officer’s deposition and a copy of a laboratory report, lacked the necessary non-hearsay allegations to establish that the substance in question was heroin. The court emphasized the need for a lab report directly attested to by the analyst who tested the substance.

    Facts

    Officer Ferino observed Renaldo J. in possession of 54 decks of what the officer believed to be heroin. A juvenile delinquency petition was filed against Renaldo J., alleging criminal possession of a controlled substance. Attached to the petition were Officer Ferino’s supporting deposition and a copy of a police laboratory report.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court granted Renaldo J.’s motion to suppress physical evidence, finding the arresting officer’s testimony unreliable, and dismissed the juvenile delinquency petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juvenile delinquency petition is jurisdictionally defective when the supporting deposition of the police officer and the attached laboratory report do not contain non-hearsay allegations establishing that the substance in question was heroin.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officer’s deposition did not attest to expertise in narcotics and the lab report was merely a copy not signed by the original analyst; thus, the petition lacks the non-hearsay allegations necessary to establish every element of the offense charged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on prior precedent, specifically Matter of Jahron S., to emphasize that a petition must contain non-hearsay allegations establishing every element of the offense charged. The court found Officer Ferino’s deposition insufficient because it did not establish the officer’s expertise in identifying narcotics, which would have lent credibility to the claim that the substance was heroin. More critically, the court pointed to the deficiencies in the laboratory report. Quoting Matter of Rodney J., the court noted that the report “purports only to be a copy of the original report, and gives no indication that it was signed by the person who tested the [drugs] and prepared that original report.” The court emphasized that the chemist, S. Girgis, only certified that the report was a true copy but did not attest to any personal knowledge regarding the substance seized. Therefore, the petition was deemed jurisdictionally defective on its face. The court held that both the officer’s supporting deposition and the lab report were deficient, each independently failing to provide the necessary non-hearsay confirmation that the substance was indeed heroin, leading to the dismissal of the petition. The court stated, “the petition must be dismissed as jurisdictionally defective on its face due to the absence of nonhearsay allegations establishing every element of the offenses charged”. This case underscores the importance of ensuring that petitions are supported by reliable and direct evidence, particularly when dealing with potentially technical or scientific matters like the identification of controlled substances.

  • People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497 (1993): Knowledge of Drug Weight Required for Possession Conviction

    People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497 (1993)

    To convict a defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance based on weight, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the specified weight of the substance.

    Summary

    Ryan asked a friend to order hallucinogenic mushrooms on his behalf. Police intercepted the package, verified its contents, and delivered it to the friend, who then handed it to Ryan under police supervision. Ryan was arrested and charged with attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, which requires possession of 625 milligrams of a hallucinogen. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Ryan’s conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to prove Ryan knew the weight of the psilocybin in the mushrooms. The court emphasized that the ‘knowingly’ element applies to the weight of the controlled substance, not just the possession itself, to avoid disproportionate punishment.

    Facts

    David Hopkins, at Ryan’s request, ordered a shipment of hallucinogenic mushrooms from a mutual friend in San Francisco. State Police Investigator Douglas Vredenburgh, aware of the transaction, located the package at a Federal Express warehouse. After obtaining a search warrant, the package was opened, its contents verified, and then resealed. Vredenburgh, posing as a Federal Express employee, delivered the package to Hopkins, who was then arrested. Hopkins implicated Ryan and agreed to participate in a supervised delivery. In a recorded call, Hopkins told Ryan he received a “shit load of mushrooms,” to which Ryan responded, “I know, don’t say nothing.” Hopkins also mentioned the shipment contained two pounds. They arranged a meeting, where Hopkins handed Ryan a substitute package filled with newspaper, and Ryan was arrested.

    Procedural History

    Ryan was indicted for attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree. He requested to represent himself, but the trial court denied this request. The trial court rejected Ryan’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence and refused a charge-down to seventh-degree attempted criminal possession. Ryan was convicted and sentenced as a second felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that “knowingly” applied only to the element of possession, not the weight. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “knowingly” element in Penal Law § 220.18 (5) applies to the weight of the controlled substance, requiring the prosecution to prove the defendant knew the weight of the hallucinogen possessed.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to represent himself.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plain language of the statute, rules of construction, the structure of drug possession laws, and prior cases all indicate that the ‘knowingly’ requirement extends to the weight of the controlled substance.
    2. Yes, because the trial court’s rationale for denying the defendant’s request, based on his lack of legal knowledge, was improper.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “knowingly” in Penal Law § 220.18 (5) applies to the weight element of the controlled substance. The court emphasized that a statute defining a crime should be construed as requiring mental culpability unless a clear legislative intent indicates strict liability, and a single mens rea term in a statute is presumed to apply to all elements of the offense unless a contrary intent is clear. The court found no such clear intent to make the weight of a drug a strict liability element. Furthermore, the court highlighted the graded severity of drug possession laws, where the only difference between degrees often relates to the weight of the controlled substance; thus, drastic differences in punishment should be based on culpability. The court noted that there was insufficient evidence to prove Ryan knew the weight of the psilocybin in the mushrooms, as there was no evidence linking psilocybin weight to mushroom weight or the typical dose of the drug. The court cited People v. Davis, 49 NY2d 114, 120, stating that denying self-representation based on a lack of legal knowledge would eviscerate the constitutional right of self-representation. The court stated, “When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.”

  • People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993): Reasonable Suspicion Justifies Police Pursuit Based on Totality of Circumstances

    People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993)

    Police may pursue a fleeing defendant if they have reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime; this determination is made based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the level of factual basis needed to justify police pursuit and detention of a fleeing individual. Police officers in a high-crime area saw the defendant remove a Hide-a-Key box from a store grate, a method known for stashing drugs. Upon approach by the officers (one of whom was known to the defendant), the defendant fled into a store. The officers pursued, observed the defendant’s actions with the box, and ultimately recovered crack cocaine from it. The court held that the police had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, and the drugs were admissible as evidence.

    Facts

    On April 7, 1989, at 10:50 p.m., Officer Radzinsky patrolled a high-crime area in Mount Vernon, NY. He observed the defendant removing a metal Hide-a-Key box from a store window grate. The officer knew the area was known for drug activity and that Hide-a-Key boxes were sometimes used to stash drugs. As the officers approached, the defendant fled into a nearby grocery store. The officers pursued and witnessed the defendant passing the box to another individual, who then discarded it. The box contained 17 vials of crack cocaine.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with unlawful possession of drugs. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the police lacked justification to pursue him and that he abandoned the box due to illegal police conduct. The lower courts denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had a justifiable basis to pursue the defendant into the grocery store, and whether the crack cocaine recovered from the Hide-a-Key box should have been suppressed.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances to justify their pursuit of the defendant. Therefore, the abandonment of the Hide-a-Key box was not precipitated by illegal police conduct, and the evidence was admissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court clarified that police may pursue a fleeing defendant if they have reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime, citing People v. Leung, 68 NY2d 734, 736. This standard falls between the need for probable cause to arrest and the minimal justification needed for a simple request for information. Reasonable suspicion is defined as “that quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand” (People v. Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113).

    The court emphasized that flight alone is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion. However, flight can be considered in conjunction with other factors. Here, the court considered the following:

    1. The time of day (night).
    2. The location (a high-crime area known for drug activity).
    3. The defendant’s actions (removing a device known to be used for concealing drugs).

    The court found that these factors, combined with the defendant’s flight, established the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify the pursuit. Because the pursuit was justified, the defendant’s abandonment of the Hide-a-Key box was not a result of illegal police conduct. Once the box was abandoned, the defendant lost his right to object to its opening, and the discovery of the drugs provided probable cause for arrest. The court quoted People v. Leung, stating that the removal of the Hide-a-Key box “in this narcotics-prone neighborhood establishes the necessary reasonable suspicion * * * such that pursuit by the officers was justified”.

  • People v. Colon, 77 N.Y.2d 95 (1990): Admissibility of Evidence of Large-Scale Drug Sales in a Possession Case

    People v. Colon, 77 N.Y.2d 95 (1990)

    Evidence of a defendant’s involvement in large-scale drug sales is inadmissible in a trial for simple drug possession if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.

    Summary

    Defendant Colon was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. At trial, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence linking Colon to a large-scale drug selling enterprise. The defense argued this evidence was unduly prejudicial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence was confirmatory of testimony already introduced by the defense. However, the dissenting judge argued the prosecution’s evidence went far beyond the defense’s and improperly portrayed Colon as an active participant in drug trafficking, thus warranting a new trial. This case highlights the importance of balancing probative value against prejudicial effect when admitting evidence of uncharged crimes.

    Facts

    Colon was charged with a single count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. At trial, the prosecution presented significant testimony linking Colon to a large-scale drug operation. The defense objected to the introduction of this evidence, arguing that it was more prejudicial than probative. Specific details of the possessed substance or the nature of the larger drug operation were not detailed in the dissent.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the evidence was confirmatory of testimony already introduced by the defense. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting extensive testimony linking the defendant to a large-scale drug selling enterprise in a trial for simple drug possession, where the defense argues such evidence is unduly prejudicial and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented by the prosecution was confirmatory of testimony already introduced by the defense, and thus its admission was not unduly prejudicial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority of the Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division’s finding that the evidence presented by the prosecution was “confirmatory” of testimony already introduced by defense counsel. The dissent argued that the prosecution’s evidence went far beyond that brought out by the defense and improperly created the impression that the defendant was an active participant in an ongoing drug trafficking operation. The dissent cited People v. Alvino, 71 NY2d 233; People v. Crandall, 67 NY2d 111; and People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264, as precedent for the principle that the introduction of highly prejudicial evidence can deprive a defendant of a fair trial. The key point of disagreement was whether the prosecution’s evidence merely confirmed the defense’s evidence or whether it introduced new, prejudicial information about Colon’s involvement in a large-scale drug enterprise. This case turns on the application of the rule that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

  • People v. Torres, 68 N.Y.2d 677 (1986): Establishing Constructive Possession of Contraband

    People v. Torres, 68 N.Y.2d 677 (1986)

    Circumstantial evidence, such as being a named tenant, having keys, and exercising dominion and control over a premises, can establish constructive possession of contraband found within, even if the defendant is not physically present and others have access to the premises.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance and other charges, holding that sufficient evidence existed to prove constructive possession. The evidence showed that the defendant was a named tenant on the lease of the apartment where drugs and paraphernalia were found, had keys to the apartment, and exercised dominion and control over it, even though he was in Puerto Rico when the contraband was discovered. The Court found that these circumstances provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the defendant had constructive possession, despite his absence and the possible presence of others in the apartment.

    Facts

    The defendant leased a luxury apartment with his girlfriend. Police seized methaqualone tablets, cocaine, narcotics paraphernalia, a gun, and ammunition from the apartment. The defendant had left for Puerto Rico the day before the seizure. The doorman saw the defendant 25-30 times in the month leading up to the seizure. The defendant had keys to the apartment. He left the apartment the morning of the seizure carrying a suitcase, leaving behind his safe, gun, and other effects. Upon arriving at a hotel in Puerto Rico, he provided the apartment address as his home address and called the doorman to inquire whether the marshal (who executed an eviction warrant) had “found anything.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and seventh degrees, criminal use of drug paraphernalia in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that the defendant had constructive possession of the contraband seized from the apartment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s status as a named tenant, possession of keys, frequent presence at the apartment, and control over the premises, was sufficient for the jury to find constructive possession, even though he was absent and others may have had access.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the standard of proof in this circumstantial evidence case. The court emphasized that circumstances such as being a named tenant, having keys, and exercising dominion and control over a premises, even in absence, can establish constructive possession of contraband. The court cited People v. Robertson, 48 N.Y.2d 993 and People v. Diaz, 34 N.Y.2d 689 to support the proposition that constructive possession can be found even if the defendant is absent from the apartment or others have use of it. The court also stated that “possession, even if joint, is still possession” (citing People v. Tirado, 38 N.Y.2d 955). The court dismissed the defendant’s argument that the drugs belonged to others using the apartment, reasoning that the evidence sufficiently linked the defendant to the apartment and the contraband. The court also found no merit in the defendant’s contention that the jury instructions regarding constructive possession were erroneous, noting that he failed to object to any material departure from the standard charge at trial. The court concluded that the evidence linking defendant to the apartment and to the contraband sufficiently supported the verdict.

  • People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27 (1982): Admissibility of Evidence Seized After Illegal Entry but Pursuant to a Valid Independent Warrant

    People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27 (1982)

    Evidence seized pursuant to a valid search warrant, based on information obtained independently of an illegal entry, is admissible despite the prior illegality if there is no causal connection between the illegal entry and the discovery of the evidence.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether evidence seized under a valid search warrant should be suppressed because police officers illegally entered the premises before obtaining the warrant. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible because the warrant was based on information obtained independently of the illegal entry, and the entry did not contribute to the warrant’s issuance or the discovery of the evidence. The court emphasized that the exclusionary rule should not apply when the evidence is obtained lawfully through an independent source, even if the police committed an unrelated wrong.

    Facts

    An undercover officer purchased cocaine from Arnau at his apartment. The officer observed a large quantity of narcotics within the apartment. Based on this information, a decision was made to immediately enter and secure the apartment. Officers entered Arnau’s apartment without a warrant, arrested him, and secured the premises. No search for evidence occurred during this initial entry. Subsequently, officers obtained a search warrant based solely on the undercover officer’s observations. The affidavit supporting the warrant made no mention of the initial entry. After obtaining the warrant, officers searched the apartment and discovered cocaine, marihuana, and drug paraphernalia.

    Procedural History

    Arnau was charged with multiple drug offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, granted the motion to suppress, and remitted the case. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence seized pursuant to a valid search warrant, obtained after an illegal entry but based solely on information from an independent source predating the entry, must be suppressed.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence was obtained through a source independent of the illegal entry, and the entry did not contribute to the warrant’s issuance or the discovery of the evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the exclusionary rule, designed to deter illegal police conduct, should not apply when the evidence is obtained through an independent source. The court invoked the “independent source rule,” derived from Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, stating that illegally obtained facts do not become “sacred and inaccessible” if knowledge of them is gained from an independent source. The court emphasized that the defendant bears the burden of showing a causal connection between the illegal police conduct and the seizure of the evidence. Here, the valid search warrant was based entirely on the undercover officer’s observations, which occurred before and independently of the illegal entry. The court rejected the argument that securing the apartment constituted an automatic seizure of everything inside. The court stated, “It is one thing to say that officers shall gain no advantage from violating the individual’s rights; it is quite another to declare that such a violation shall put him beyond the law’s reach even if his guilt can be proved by evidence that has been obtained lawfully.” The court found no indication that the warrant was tainted by the illegal entry or that the police exploited the entry to obtain evidence. Thus, the exclusionary rule was deemed inapplicable. The court also held that the 24-hour search warrant was valid given the circumstances. Finally, the court stated that suppressing lawfully seized evidence simply because of an unrelated police error would be inappropriate, as the exclusionary rule was not intended to cover such scenarios.

  • People v. Santiago, 41 N.Y.2d 381 (1976): Informant Disclosure and Inclusory Concurrent Counts

    41 N.Y.2d 381 (1976)

    When a defendant is convicted of both a greater offense and a lesser included offense arising from the same conduct, the conviction for the lesser offense must be dismissed.

    Summary

    Santiago was convicted of selling and possessing a dangerous drug. He argued that the informant’s identity should have been disclosed and that the possession conviction was an inclusory concurrent count of the sale conviction. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly denied disclosure of the informant’s identity after an in camera hearing. However, the Court agreed that the possession charge was a lesser included offense of the sale charge and therefore, the conviction for criminal possession must be dismissed because a defendant cannot be convicted of both selling and possessing the same drugs.

    Facts

    An undercover officer was introduced to Santiago by a confidential informant. Santiago sold the officer heroin. The officer saw Santiago twice more in the following months and later arrested him. Prior to trial, Santiago moved for the disclosure of the informant’s identity.

    Procedural History

    Santiago was convicted of third-degree criminal sale of a dangerous drug and sixth-degree criminal possession of a dangerous drug. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions without opinion. Santiago appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.
    2. Whether the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a dangerous drug should be dismissed as an inclusory concurrent count of the criminal sale conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the informant’s testimony was not relevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
    2. Yes, because the defendant could not have committed the criminal sale without also possessing the drug, making the possession conviction a lesser included offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the informant’s identity, the Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Goggins, stating that "the truly crucial factor in every case is the relevance of the informer’s testimony to the guilt or innocence of the accused." The court found that the trial court had properly determined, after an in camera examination of the informant, that the informant’s testimony would not have been relevant to Santiago’s defense. The court noted the general rule that defense counsel should have access to the record the judge bases his decision on, but upheld the conviction on the sale charge.

    Regarding the inclusory concurrent count, the Court found the District Attorney conceded that under the facts of the case, Santiago could not have sold the drugs without also possessing them. The Court applied CPL 300.30 (subd 4), defining "inclusory concurrent counts," and CPL 300.40 (subd 3, par [b]), mandating dismissal of the lesser count upon conviction of the greater. The court stated that "[a]s these counts were ‘inclusory concurrent counts’…a verdict of guilty upon the greater is deemed a dismissal of every lesser." Therefore, the conviction for criminal possession was dismissed.

  • People v. McLaurin, 38 N.Y.2d 930 (1976): Sufficiency of Evidence Based on Statistical Sampling in Drug Possession Cases

    People v. McLaurin, 38 N.Y.2d 930 (1976)

    In drug possession cases, expert testimony based on a statistical sampling of the seized substance is admissible, and the weight to be given to that evidence is a matter for the jury to decide.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of fourth-degree possession of a dangerous drug. The conviction was based on expert testimony that a random sampling of the seized glassine envelopes contained heroin and that the total amount exceeded the statutory threshold. The defendant argued that the sampling methodology was insufficient to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the expert’s methodology and the weight of the evidence were properly presented to the jury for their determination.

    Facts

    The defendant was found in possession of 148 glassine envelopes divided into 10 batches.

    A police toxicologist testified that he selected one envelope at random from each of the 10 batches.

    Analysis of the selected envelopes revealed that each contained heroin.

    The toxicologist weighed each of the 10 selected envelopes, determined the average weight, and then multiplied that average by the total number of envelopes (148) to estimate the total weight of the heroin.

    Based on this calculation, the toxicologist concluded that the defendant possessed more than one-eighth of an ounce of a substance containing heroin, which is the threshold for fourth-degree possession.

    All 148 envelopes were admitted into evidence and available for the jury’s inspection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree in the trial court.

    The defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the requisite amount of heroin, given that the toxicologist only tested a sample of the envelopes.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a prosecution for possession of a controlled substance, expert testimony based on a random sampling of the seized substance is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the statutory minimum amount of the substance.

    Holding

    Yes, because it was for the jury to decide whether the expert had adequately analyzed and weighed the contents and whether his opinion was entitled to be credited.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the toxicologist clearly explained his methodology to the jury, including the selection process, the analysis conducted, and the calculations performed.

    The court emphasized that the 148 glassine envelopes were admitted into evidence, allowing the jury to physically examine the evidence and assess the expert’s conclusions.

    The court stated, “Under these circumstances we believe that it was for the jury to decide whether the expert had adequately analyzed and weighed the contents and whether his opinion was entitled to be credited.”

    The court concluded that the defendant’s argument was without merit, as the jury was entitled to assess the credibility and weight of the expert testimony. The court implies that challenges to the methodology used by the expert are questions of fact for the jury.

    The decision highlights the importance of clear presentation of evidence and expert testimony to the jury, enabling them to make informed decisions about the facts of the case. It also affirms that statistical sampling, when properly explained, can be a valid method for determining the quantity of a controlled substance in drug possession cases.

  • People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624 (1975): Sufficiency of Corroborating Accomplice Testimony

    People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624 (1975)

    The corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony is satisfied when there is evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, assuring the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.

    Summary

    Ray Daniels, Alvin Cooper, and Harriet Evans were convicted of drug possession based on accomplice testimony. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the presence of the defendants in close proximity to a large quantity of drugs and drug paraphernalia found in plain view in Daniels’ apartment. This evidence, combined with the statutory presumption of possession for those in close proximity to drugs in open view, provided enough of a connection to the crime to satisfy the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony.

    Facts

    Sergeant Robert Race placed Ray Daniels’ apartment under surveillance. John Bryant was seen leaving the apartment. Donald James entered the apartment after conversing with an occupant. Daniels and James then left the apartment and were arrested. Bryant was apprehended getting off the elevator. Alvin Cooper opened the apartment door. Harriet Evans was found in bed inside the apartment. Police found 1331 glassine envelopes containing heroin, plastic bags with white powder and gelatin capsules, a scale, and cellophane tape on the kitchen table.

    Procedural History

    Daniels, Cooper, and Evans were convicted of criminal possession of a dangerous drug and criminally using drug paraphernalia after a jury trial. A codefendant, John Bryant, was acquitted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. This appeal followed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the testimony of an accomplice, Donald James, was sufficiently corroborated to support the convictions of Daniels, Cooper, and Evans for drug possession.

    Holding

    Yes, because the presence of the defendants in close proximity to the drugs and drug paraphernalia in Daniels’ apartment tended to connect them to the commission of the crime, thereby corroborating the accomplice’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the purpose of the accomplice corroboration rule (CPL 60.22) is to ensure the accomplice is telling the truth, given their potential lack of reliability and motive to implicate others for leniency. The court stated that the corroborative evidence must “tend to connect the defendant with the commission of [the] offense.” It doesn’t need to prove guilt beyond a moral certainty, but it must reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is truthful. In this case, the court found ample corroboration in the fact that the contraband was found in Daniels’ apartment, and Cooper and Evans were present inside. Citing Penal Law § 220.25(2), the court noted the statutory presumption that every person “in close proximity” to drugs in open view knowingly possesses them. The court reasoned, “When narcotics are found in open view in a room on private premises, every person ‘in close proximity’ to the drugs at the time of discovery is presumed by statute to have knowingly possessed them.” While rebuttable, this presumption, coupled with the large quantity of drugs, provided a sufficient connection between the defendants and the crime to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony that they were involved in the drug business. The court concluded that the policy behind the corroboration requirement was satisfied by the additional proof, which supported the accomplice’s testimony.