8 N.Y.3d 692 (2007)

Under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3), the term “intoxication” refers specifically to a disordered state of mind caused by alcohol, not by drugs or other substances.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a driver impaired by a substance other than alcohol (in this case, difluoroethane from “Dust-Off”) could be prosecuted under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3) for “driving while intoxicated.” The court held that “intoxication,” as used in this statute, refers specifically to impairment caused by alcohol, based on the language, history, and legislative scheme of the statute. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss the driving while intoxicated charge. The defendant still faced other charges, including manslaughter.

Facts

Vincent Litto, 19, while driving 50 mph in a 30 mph zone, inhaled difluoroethane from a can of “Dust-Off.” Shortly after, he veered into oncoming traffic and collided with another vehicle, resulting in one death and several injuries. Difluoroethane, a hydrocarbon, acts initially as a stimulant, followed by depression of the central nervous system, impairing perception and reaction time. Litto was subsequently indicted on multiple counts, including driving while intoxicated.

Procedural History

The Kings County Supreme Court dismissed the counts of vehicular manslaughter and driving while intoxicated, determining that hydrocarbon inhalation did not fall within the definition of “driving while intoxicated” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3). The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, reasoning that the legislature’s enactment of a separate provision for driving while ability impaired by drugs implied that the “driving while intoxicated” provision only applied to alcohol. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a driver can be prosecuted under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3) for “driving while intoxicated” while under the influence of a drug or other unlisted substance, as opposed to alcohol.

Holding

No, because based on the legislative history and scheme of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, the term “intoxication” in subdivision 3 refers specifically to a disordered state of mind caused by alcohol, not by drugs or other substances.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals analyzed the language, legislative history, and overall scheme of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192. The court noted that the term “intoxication,” when the statute was initially enacted in 1910, was commonly understood to refer to a condition caused by alcohol. Examination of subsequent amendments, particularly the 1941 amendment allowing blood alcohol content tests as evidence of intoxication, revealed a consistent legislative focus on addressing the “drinking driver.” The 1966 enactment of a separate provision for driving while ability impaired by drugs (VTL § 1192(4)) further supported the conclusion that “intoxication” was intended to apply only to alcohol. The court noted that the legislative history of the 1966 amendment indicated that lawmakers were aware that existing law only addressed impairment by alcohol, and that the new law was needed to address impairment by drugs. The court also pointed to the differing levels of proof required for violations under the statute (e.g., impairment vs. per se intoxication) as evidence that the legislature intended to treat alcohol and drug impairment differently. Allowing any drug to be included in the definition of “intoxication” would blur these distinctions and undermine the legislative scheme. The court quoted from People v. Farmer, 36 NY2d 386, 390 (1975), observing that subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of VTL § 1192 “proscribe separable offenses based upon the degree of impairment caused by alcohol ingestion.” Ultimately, the Court concluded that construing “intoxication” to include substances other than alcohol would improperly override legislative policy judgments and disrupt the carefully crafted statutory scheme. The court acknowledged the potentially dangerous nature of the defendant’s conduct, but emphasized the importance of adhering to the legislature’s intent.