Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220 (1921)

A child cannot maintain a cause of action for prenatal injuries sustained while in its mother’s womb due to the negligence of another.

Summary

This case addresses whether a child born with injuries sustained while in utero due to the defendant’s negligence has a cause of action against the defendant. The plaintiff, born with injuries sustained while in his mother’s womb when his mother fell into an uncovered coal hole on the defendant’s property, sued the defendant for negligence. The court held that the infant plaintiff could not recover for prenatal injuries. The court reasoned that at the time of the injury, the child was not a separate entity from its mother, and thus, the defendant owed no duty of care directly to the unborn child. This decision reflects the traditional common law view that limited recovery for prenatal injuries.

Facts

The defendant negligently allowed a coal hole in the sidewalk in front of his premises to remain uncovered. The plaintiff’s mother fell into the coal hole. The plaintiff, while in his mother’s womb, sustained injuries as a result of the fall. The plaintiff was born eleven days after the accident.

Procedural History

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover damages for the prenatal injuries. The lower court considered the pleadings. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reviewed the order and considered whether to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant.

Issue(s)

Whether a child can maintain a cause of action for injuries sustained while in its mother’s womb due to the negligence of another.

Holding

No, because the injuries were inflicted upon the mother, and the defendant owed no duty of care to the unborn child apart from the duty to avoid injuring the mother.

Court’s Reasoning

The court recognized the existing legal precedent against allowing recovery for prenatal injuries, noting the lack of a separate entity apart from the mother at the time of the injury. The court acknowledged that while the law sometimes considers the unborn child, such as in matters of property rights or criminal law, this does not automatically translate to a duty of care in negligence. The court stated, “When justice or convenience requires, the child in the womb is dealt with as a human being, although physiologically it is a part of the mother, but the law has been fairly well settled during its centuries of growth against the beneficence of an artificial rule of liability for personal injuries sustained by it.” The court emphasized that at the time the injuries were inflicted, they were injuries to the mother, and any duty was owed to her, not the unborn child. The court declined to create a new cause of action, stating, “No liability can arise therefrom except out of a duty disregarded and defendant owed no duty of care to the unborn child in the present case apart from the duty to avoid injuring the mother.” While acknowledging arguments for allowing recovery based on sympathy and natural justice, the court ultimately deferred to the established legal framework and concerns about public policy, concluding that judicial legislation was not warranted. The court highlighted the public policy implications: “Strong reasons of public policy may be urged both for and against allowing the new right of action. The conditions of negligence law at the present time do not suggest that the reasons in favor of recovery so far outweigh those which may be advanced against it as to call for judicial legislation on the question.”