New York Law Review

Tag: Driving While Impaired

  • People v. Boscic, 15 N.Y.3d 494 (2010): Admissibility of Breathalyzer Results and Calibration Standards

    People v. Boscic, 15 N.Y.3d 494 (2010)

    Breathalyzer test results are admissible if the prosecution demonstrates that the device was in proper working order at the time of the test, without a strict requirement for calibration every six months.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of breathalyzer test results in drunk driving cases. The defendant, Boscic, was convicted of driving while impaired. The County Court reversed, holding that the breathalyzer results were inadmissible because the machine had not been calibrated within six months of the arrest, interpreting People v. Todd as establishing such a requirement. The Court of Appeals reversed, clarifying that People v. Todd does not impose a rigid six-month calibration rule. The admissibility hinges on demonstrating the device’s proper working order at the time of the test. The case was remitted to County Court to determine if the evidence, including the breathalyzer results, was sufficient to support the conviction.

    Facts

    On November 3, 2007, a police officer observed Boscic’s minivan parked illegally. The officer observed Boscic exhibiting signs of intoxication (alcohol on breath, glassy eyes, slurred speech). Boscic admitted to drinking three beers. Field sobriety tests were poorly performed, leading to Boscic’s arrest. A breathalyzer test (BAG DataMaster) at the sheriff’s office registered a blood alcohol level of .07%. The DataMaster had been calibrated approximately six months and three weeks before the test.

    Procedural History

    Boscic was convicted in Bethel Justice Court. Sullivan County Court reversed the conviction, ruling the breathalyzer results inadmissible due to non-compliance with a purported six-month calibration rule derived from People v. Todd, and that the remaining evidence was insufficient. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether People v. Todd established a per se rule requiring breath-alcohol detection devices to be calibrated at least every six months for test results to be admissible at trial?

    Holding

    No, because People v. Todd does not establish a rigid six-month calibration rule. The key requirement is demonstrating that the breathalyzer device was in proper working order when the test was administered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified its prior holding in People v. Todd. The Court emphasized that the Todd decision was based on the totality of the circumstances presented in that case, specifically that “[t]he People failed to establish that the breathalyzer apparatus had been timely calibrated” and that “[i]t was incumbent upon the District Attorney to show that the machine was in proper working order” (38 N.Y.2d at 756). The Court noted that post-Todd decisions have consistently focused on whether the instrument was in “proper working order” at the time of the test (People v. Gower, 42 NY2d 117, 120 [1977]). The Court recognized advancements in breath-alcohol detection technology since Todd was decided. Modern devices utilize scientific methods substantially different from earlier generations. New York State Department of Health (DOH) regulations require calibration “at a frequency as recommended by the device manufacturer” but not less than once a year (10 NYCRR 59.4 [c]). The certificate attesting to calibration slightly more than six months before the arrest was a sufficient predicate to admit the DataMaster results. The admissibility of breath-alcohol analysis results depends on demonstrating that the device was in “proper working order” (People v Freeland, 68 NY2d at 700). The Court remitted the case to the County Court to determine the legal sufficiency of the evidence.

  • People v. Gonzalez, 96 N.Y.2d 195 (2001): Retrial on Lesser Included Offense After Mistrial

    People v. Gonzalez, 96 N.Y.2d 195 (2001)

    When a jury acquits a defendant of a greater offense but fails to reach a verdict on a lesser-included offense, the defendant can be retried on the lesser-included offense using the original accusatory instrument, provided the retrial is limited to the lesser charge and the jury (if any) is not informed of the original, greater charge.

    Summary

    Gonzalez was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). At trial, the jury acquitted him of DWI but couldn’t agree on the lesser charge of driving while impaired (DWAI), resulting in a mistrial on that charge. The prosecution sought to retry him for DWAI using the original accusatory instrument. Gonzalez argued double jeopardy and that the original instrument was invalid. The court rejected these arguments, convicted him of DWAI, and the Appellate Term reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that retrial on the original accusatory instrument was permissible because the Vehicle and Traffic Law and Criminal Procedure Law authorized it, and there was no double jeopardy concern since the retrial was limited to the DWAI charge.

    Facts

    Gonzalez was arrested and charged with DWI. At his first trial, the jury was also charged on the lesser-included offense of DWAI. The jury acquitted Gonzalez of DWI but could not reach a verdict on the DWAI charge, leading to a mistrial on that count.

    Procedural History

    The People sought to retry Gonzalez on the DWAI charge using the original information. The trial court denied Gonzalez’s double jeopardy claim and ruled the retrial would proceed on the original accusatory instrument. After a bench trial on the DWAI charge only, Gonzalez was convicted. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that a new accusatory instrument was required. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a new accusatory instrument is necessary to commence a retrial on a lesser-included charge (DWAI) after the jury in the first trial acquitted the defendant of the greater offense (DWI) but failed to reach a verdict on the lesser-included offense.

    Holding

    No, because both the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Criminal Procedure Law provide statutory authority for the retrial on the original accusatory instrument, and there was no double jeopardy concern since the retrial was limited to the DWAI charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(9) permits a conviction for DWAI even if the accusatory instrument charges only DWI. Also, Criminal Procedure Law § 310.70(2) authorizes a retrial on any count submitted to the jury at the first trial for which the jury failed to reach a verdict. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245, where the defendant was retried on the original indictment that included the greater offense of which he was effectively acquitted. In this case, Gonzalez was only retried on the lesser charge. The court emphasized that “the People here did not seek to retry defendant on the count (driving while intoxicated) of which he was acquitted at the first trial. Rather, the only count at issue in the retrial was the lesser driving while impaired charge for which the jury had failed to reach a verdict. At no point during the retrial was defendant in jeopardy of conviction of the greater offense.” The court also noted the distinction between felony and misdemeanor charges, highlighting that felony charges require a Grand Jury indictment, a concern not present in misdemeanor cases. Finally, the court cautioned that in retrials on lesser-included offenses using the original instrument, the jury should not be informed of the original, greater charge to avoid prejudice.

  • People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987): Appellate Review Standard for Sufficiency of Evidence

    People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490 (1987)

    When reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, an appellate court must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

    Summary

    The People appealed after the Appellate Term reversed the defendant’s conviction for driving while impaired (DWI), stating the evidence was insufficient. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Term applied the wrong standard of review. The proper standard is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Because the evidence was legally sufficient under this standard, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Term for further review.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted in Town Court of operating a motor vehicle while his ability was impaired by alcohol. The Town Court found the defendant’s testimony not credible and credited the police testimony.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction, stating that the defendant’s guilt was not established beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed the charges. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Term applied the correct standard when reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for driving while impaired.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Term should have determined whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Appellate Term’s role was to assess whether inferences of guilt could be rationally drawn from the proven facts, not to substitute its own fact-finding for that of the trial court. The Court cited People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, reiterating that the standard for appellate review of legal sufficiency is whether “ ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” (emphasis in original). The court stated that the Appellate Term “manifestly applied the wrong standard of review.” Applying the correct standard, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. This case clarifies the division of labor between trial courts (as fact-finders) and appellate courts (as reviewers of legal sufficiency). The appellate court’s job is not to re-weigh the evidence and determine guilt or innocence anew, but to assess whether the factfinder’s conclusion was rationally possible based on the evidence presented. The court also cited People v. Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 371-372 and People v. Norman, 85 N.Y.2d 609, 620-621.