New York Law Review

Tag: Double-Parking

  • Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285 (1982): Duty of Care, Emergency Doctrine, and Proximate Cause

    Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285 (1982)

    When a driver is faced with a sudden and unexpected emergency, the standard of care remains that of a reasonable person under the circumstances, but the emergency is a factor in determining what is reasonable; furthermore, illegally double-parking can establish proximate cause if it obstructs visibility and maneuverability, contributing to an accident.

    Summary

    Malikah Ferrer, a four-year-old, was struck by a car driven by Ben Harris and owned by Ben and Anna Harris, as she crossed a street to an ice cream truck double-parked by Hassan Javidan. The court addressed whether the evidence supported findings of negligence against both the Harrises and Javidan, and whether the Harrises were entitled to a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine. The court found sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury against all defendants but held the Harrises were entitled to an emergency charge. The Court also considered the admissibility of the mother’s instructions to her daughter regarding street crossing safety.

    Facts

    Malikah Ferrer, accompanied by her older sister, crossed Walton Avenue in the Bronx to reach a “Mister Softee” ice cream truck double-parked by Hassan Javidan. As Malikah crossed from between parked cars, she was hit by a vehicle driven by Ben Harris. Harris knew the area and was aware children were likely to be present. He testified he was driving 15-20 mph and stopped within four feet, claiming the child ran into his car door. Plaintiffs argued Harris failed to sound his horn and that the impact point on the car and the child’s injuries contradicted Harris’s account. Javidan’s truck was illegally double-parked, obstructing visibility and forcing Harris closer to parked cars.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict against the Harrises (75% liability) and Javidan (25% liability). The Appellate Division affirmed. The Harrises appealed based on the denial of their motion to dismiss and the refusal to give an emergency doctrine jury instruction. Javidan appealed by leave of the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether sufficient evidence existed to establish a prima facie case of negligence against Ben and Anna Harris.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the emergency doctrine concerning Ben Harris’s conduct.

    3. Whether sufficient evidence existed to establish a prima facie case of negligence and proximate cause against Hassan Javidan.

    4. Whether the admission of testimony regarding the mother’s safety instructions to her daughters was prejudicial error.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for a jury to determine whether Ben Harris was negligent under the circumstances.

    2. Yes, because the jury could have reasonably concluded that Harris was faced with a sudden emergency, and the trial court should have provided guidance on the applicable law regarding the emergency doctrine.

    3. Yes, because Javidan’s illegal double-parking violated traffic regulations and proximately caused the accident by obstructing visibility and maneuverability.

    4. Yes, because there was no foundation laid to establish that these instructions were a persistent habit and further, parental supervision is not imputable to the child.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that the determination of negligence is fact-specific and best suited for a jury’s consideration. Regarding the Harrises, the court found that while the evidence presented a question of fact as to whether Ben Harris was negligent, the jury should have been instructed on the emergency doctrine. The Court emphasized that “when one is confronted with a sudden and unexpected event or combination of events which leave little or no time for reflection or deliberate judgment, this itself may be a significant circumstance which, realistically as well as conceptually, should enter into the determination of the reasonableness of the choice of action pursued.” The failure to provide this instruction was reversible error. Regarding Javidan, the Court found that his violation of the traffic regulation against double-parking was evidence of negligence, citing Somersall v. New York Tel. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 157, 166. The Court also found that Javidan’s double-parking was a proximate cause of the accident because “but for the van’s unlawful double-parking, the Harris car would not have had to travel as close to the automobiles parked on the east side of the street, thus affording its operator an opportunity for a more wide-angled, more distant and earlier view of the child.” Finally, the Court addressed the evidentiary issue, finding the testimony about the mother’s safety instructions inadmissible because no foundation was laid to demonstrate a persistent habit, citing Halloran v. Virginia Chems., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 392-393, and such supervision is not imputable to the child.

  • Sommer v. New York Telephone Co., 45 N.Y.2d 451 (1978): Double Parking Liability and Proximate Cause in New York City

    Sommer v. New York Telephone Co., 45 N.Y.2d 451 (1978)

    In New York City, where the Vehicle and Traffic Law’s exception for hazard vehicles does not apply, a public service corporation’s vehicle double-parked for non-essential work is unlawfully parked, and whether that violation proximately caused injuries is a jury question.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, injured while watching a card game on a sidewalk, sued after being struck by a car driven by Defendant Quilter. Quilter, attempting to maneuver his car from a parking space, mounted the sidewalk and hit the plaintiffs. A New York Telephone Company truck was illegally double-parked nearby, potentially obstructing Quilter’s path. The trial court instructed the jury on the permissible double-parking for utility repairs, and the jury found both Quilter (70% liable) and the Telephone Company (30% liable) responsible. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment against the Telephone Company, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the Telephone Company’s illegal double-parking could be a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, a question for the jury to decide.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs were on the sidewalk of 118th Street in New York City. Defendant Quilter sought to move his car, parked on the north side of the one-way street. A New York Telephone Company truck was double-parked about one and a quarter car lengths ahead of Quilter’s car. The truck was parked approximately six inches from the second car ahead of Quilter’s vehicle. The Telephone Company employees were working in a building accessed through an alleyway. Quilter, with a learner’s permit, backed up, cleared the car in front, and turned right, ultimately mounting the sidewalk and striking the plaintiffs. The street was 29 feet wide, and the truck was 7 feet 2 inches wide. Plaintiffs were struck opposite the double-parked truck.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Court submitted the case to the jury, which found for the plaintiffs against both defendants. The Telephone Company’s motion for dismissal was denied. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, dismissing the complaint against the Telephone Company. The Appellate Division reasoned that the Vehicle and Traffic Law’s exception for hazard vehicles applied and Quilter’s testimony was incredible. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the jury verdict.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 1103(b) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, concerning exceptions for hazard vehicles, applies in New York City.

    2. Whether the Telephone Company’s illegally double-parked truck was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.

    Holding

    1. No, because New York City regulations supersede the Vehicle and Traffic Law regarding parking.

    2. Yes, because under the circumstances of this case, it was a question of fact for the jury to decide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Section 1103(b) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law does not apply in New York City because Section 1642 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law authorizes New York City to supersede the Vehicle and Traffic Law with its own regulations. Section 190 of the City Traffic Regulations explicitly states that enumerated sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, including section 1202, “shall not be effective in the City of New York.” The applicable regulation for double-parking in New York City is Section 81(c)(2), which only allows double-parking for commercial vehicles expeditiously loading or unloading, provided there is no unoccupied space or loading zone within 100 feet. Since the Telephone Company’s truck had been double-parked for four and a half hours, it was illegally parked.

    The court rejected the Appellate Division’s conclusion that Quilter’s testimony was incredible as a matter of law and that the photographs conclusively showed the Continental proceeded in a straight line, stating that interpretation of the photographs involved evaluations of angle and perspective that are the essence of the jury’s function. The court emphasized that proximate cause was a jury question. Quoting Daly v. Casey, 38 NY2d 808, “However incredible the evidence may have been, as a practical matter it cannot be said that it was incredible as a matter of law, and therefore the complaint should not have been dismissed.” Considering Quilter’s testimony and the distances involved, the Court found a reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that the double-parking was a concurrent cause. The court emphasized that the officer’s opinion about Quilter losing control was not binding, and that August’s testimony contradicting Quilter created an issue for the jury but did not make Quitter’s testimony incredible as a matter of law.